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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis examines the evolution of the Republic of Korea Air Force 
(ROKAF) in the period 1946 through 1956, during which the growth of the 
ROKAF was constantly restrained. The examination focuses on two causal 
factors, exogenous and indigenous, that affected the growth of the South 
Korean Air Force: United States Korean policy, and South Korean national 
leadership. American policy toward South Korea demanded an infantry 
(manpower)-oriented ROK military establishment. The United States not 
only favoured using 'local' (i. e., Korean) ground forces, but also feared what 
the ROK government might do with an air force capable of surprising the 
North with a crippling air attack. Nonetheless, in the end, the assiduous 
efforts of ROKAF leaders and dedicated endeavours of their American 
advisers ultimately produced the South Korean Air Force as a tactical 
airpower, with a separate service identity. The American government's policy 
limitations on ROKAF growth and its modernisation are analysed, together 
with several issues arising from the process. 
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lt has been over four decades since the cessation of hostilities on the 
Korean Peninsula. From the ashes of war, the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) has emerged as one of the leading newly industrialised countries in 
the world. The economic growth of South Korea has allowed its Air Force 
to afford the largest fighter forces in Asia in terms of the number of such 
high performance aircraft as F-4s and F-16s. The role of the Republic of 
Korea Air Force has increased ever since the war to encompass most of the 
air defence of the whole Korean Peninsula in cooperation with the United 
States Air Force under the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. How did 
this growth come about? 110w did the ROKAF come into being and develop 
to the point where it became one of America's major partners for promoting 
regional security cooperation in the Far East? To understand how this was 
achieved, it is necessary to examine the early history of the South Korean Air 
Force. Its present position belies its struggles to survive not only war, but 
also the restraints imposed upon it by the United States. 
The principal purpose of this study is to describe and analyse the 
history of the ROK Air Force, before, during, and immediately following the 
1950-53 war, and to do so in the overall context of the United States Korean 
policy. Secondary purposes include chronicling the efforts of the ROK Air 
Force pilots and their leaders in their struggle to establish and then to 
preserve their identity as an independent air arm in the ROK's unbalanced' 
military forces, and providing a historical record of the evolution of the 
Republic of Korea Air Force both in battle and during the modernisation 
period that occurred after the Korean War. 
I Unbalanced' refers to the disproportionate size of the ROK Army. as compared to the Air Force. 
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These overlapping purposes have not previously been examined by 
scholars, to whom the ROK Air Force and its evolution remain unchartered 
territory. Quite simply, there presently exist no scholarly investigations of 
the ROKAF, let alone any attempt to merge both Korean and Western 
records in an analysis of South Korea's Air Force evolution. This study is the 
first attempt of such kind and is informed by the author's thirty plus years of 
service with the ROK Air Force and its US Air Force partners. 
Korean and American archival materials, publications, memoirs, and 
interviews are used as sources. By probing American and Korean sources, 
particularly the US Air Force records of the Far East Air Forces and the Fifth 
Air Force, together with subordinate units of the 314th Air Division and the 
6146th Air Force Advisory Group, plus the histories and records of the US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is possible not only to determine the factors that 
restrained the growth of South Korea's airpower, but also to shed light on 
Korean Air Force leaders' efforts to expand their service and the roles played 
by American air advisers. 
Anyone undertaking a task such as this faces challenges regarding 
source materials that cannot be appreciated by most Western scholars unless 
described in detail. At least four major problems present themselves. The 
first is the comparative absence of native Korean source materials pertaining 
to the early years of the ROKAF. The devastation of the war prevented ROK 
government officials from safeguarding most official records. When Seoul 
was overrun by North Korean troops, a majority of the early records were 
captured and disappeared. Such records that did survive in official hands 
can be found in the Goon-Sa Yon-Goo Si! (Office of Military History 
Studies, which is better described by its earlier name, Gong-Goon Jon-Sa 
Pyon-Ch'an Si! or Air Force I listory Compilation Oiiice). This office has a 
staff of six, of whom only three perform archival duties, which consist 
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primarily of document receipt and filing. The collection has not been 
catalogued, but is arranged on shelves by year and functional area (e. g., 
operations, supply, etc. ). The Korean equivalent to the [U. S. ] National 
Archives, Gook-Rip Ja-Ryo Bo-Kwan So (National Records Storage Office), 
contains no ROKAF materials. This is true as well of the Ministry of 
National Defense History Office, whose holdings are almost exclusively 
ROK Anmy-oriented. 2 
The second major problem is the absence of any ROKAF tradition 
prior to its virtually instantaneous creation in October 1949. (Compare the 
RAF's five-year gestation period in the Royal Flying Corps from 1913 to 
1918, and the USAF's forty-year experience as part of the army from August 
1907 to September 1947. ) This situation resulted directly from the Japanese 
hegemony over Korea from the earliest days of military aviation. One result 
was that there were at most, in 1945, a few dozen Koreans with any serious 
experience in military aviation, to include especially aspects of 
administration and records keeping. 
A third problem, one relating to the paucity of critical analysis or 
commentary, official or otherwise, results from the unique aspects of ROK 
civil-military relations. In most Western countries, critical accounts 
eventually emerge, from both participants and observers. In Korea, with (1) 
former military officers (primarily those of the ROK Army) dominating the 
political life of the nation, and with (2) the fragile nature of the situation 
along the border between the ROK and the DPRK (Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea), those who might have otherwise been critical have had 
2 The reader should note that the absence of extensive or well-ordered official records is not unique 
to the ROKAF. Consider, for example, the following comments from the Introduction to Dr. M. S. 
B. Nader's'The Evolution of Egyptian Air Defence Strategy. 1967.1973; Ph. D. thesis, King's 
College London, January 1990: 'As in most Third World (sic) countries, Egyptian defence-related 
matters are not openly discussed or put in the public domain. ' (p. 6) '... (Tjhe archival systems of 
most Egyptian military institutions remain undeveloped. ' (p. 7) 'Official documents which might 
provide more insight into Egyptian military thinking and behaviour are not generally available... ' 
(p. 12) 
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at least two reasons to remain reticent. In addition, the cultural traditions of 
Korea do not, thus far, encourage public - let alone published - contention 
with regard to the government's position on specific issues, particularly those 
relating to national defence. Even late-in-life memoirs are rare among 
military officers, in particular ROKAF leaders. 
A fourth problem relating specifically to the early years of the 
ROKAF is that there was simply no time (and little interest) for the founders 
of the service to set things down in writing. There were missions to be 
flown, challenges of organisation to be surmounted, American advisers to be 
pleased, a war to be fought. These imperatives contributed to a view that 
recording what was happening was far less important than doing the best 
possible operational job, both at the moment and in the future. 
The devastation of the war precluded Korean government officials 
from safeguarding most official records. President Rhee personally 
maintained his records at his residence, the Kyong"Mu Dae (later called the 
Blue Ilousc). 3 When Seoul was overrun by North Korea, most of these 
records disappeared. What survived of Rhee's materials was the result of the 
careful husbanding of memos, correspondence, speeches and statements 
Rhcc had sent to Dr. Robert T. Oliver. Rhee used Oliver as a speech writer 
and diplomatic coordinator after independence. Oliver was employed by 
Rhee as head of the ROK liaison office in Washington. His office was 
3 Proper and personal names are spelled phonetically in English as close to the original pronunciation 
as possible. I lowever, if the names are widely known already, then they are adopted. Ksesong and 
Panmunjom, two examples, could be spelled as Kaesung and as Panmoonjum. Personal names are 
spelled in the Korean way in the text, but in the Western way in the footnotes and bibliography. In 
the Korean way of spelling personal names, the family name comes first, with such an exception as 
the name of President Rhee, who is widely known in the Western way as Syngman Rhee. For 
instance, in the case of Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul. the former ROKAF Chief of Staff (1949- 
52,1954-56), Kim is his family name and Chung-Yul his first name. All first names are hyphenated 
for identification convenience, but those as a part of the titles of publications remain unchanged as 
originally spelled by the authors. 
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staffed by Korean diplomats from the ROK Embassy. Because Oliver's 
materials were housed in Washington, they survived the war. 4 
Finally in these respects, it is no exaggeration to say that the existence 
of pure ROKAF archives is limited. What materials do exist are essentially 
lists of names and events, and lack both analysis and critical comment. 
11'an"Gong Jon-Sa: 11'an"Gook Jon-Jaeng (The History of the Air War: The 
Korean War), published by the ROK Air Force, is the official record of 
ROKAF participation in combats This history exists in Korean only, and is 
a compilation of statistics and documentary records. The other record is 
Gong-Goon Sa (The History of the Air Force), in eight volumes. Half of 
these have been declassified 6 They exist in Korean only and are purely 
documentary, without any discussion of associated issues and problems, 
primarily because the military government worried that critical analysis 
might be exploited by the North Koreans as well as radical antigovernment 
South Koreans. 
There arc some other official and unofficial records and literature of 
the Korean War in Korean, but they are all either ROK Army- or politics- 
oriented with limited coverage of the ROK Air Force. There are also a few 
oral histories of Korean Air Force participants in Korean. They are few in 
number, and confined to their own personal experiences, without 
observation of strategic significance and political implications of air 
operations of the Korean Air Force. Unfortunately no diaries have been 
released yet, except the memoirs of Lt. Generals Kim Chung-Yul and Chang 
Sung-Whan, both Korean War participants and former Chiefs of Staff of the 
ROK Air Force. 
4 Dr. Oliver was associate professor of communications at the University of Pennsylvania when his 
association with Rhee began in 1942. while Dr. Rhea was in exile in America. 
s ROK Air Force. II'w: g-Gong JwýSa: 11'cvr- nook Jon-Jueng (The history of the Air War: The 
Korean War). Seoul, Korea: ROKAF I listory Office, 1989. 
6 Of eight volumes, only the first four covering the period of 1949-1967 have been declassified. 
Even soy none are available to the general public. 
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The author's interviews with several Korean general officers, together 
with the two written accounts, are invaluable in tracing the development of 
the South Korean Air Force in its early history. Besides these men, the 
author's association with Korean War veterans, ranging from mechanics to 
pilots and commanders, also provided him with invaluable information. In 
addition to Korean interviewees, professors of the USAF School of 
Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), as well as archivists of the USAF 
Historical Research Agency, were especially helpful, in particular, Lt. 
Colonel Mark Clodfcltcr (Ph. D. ), Colonel Philip Meilingcr (Ph. D., and Dean 
of SAAS), and Colonel Richard Rauschkolb (Commander, USAF Historical 
Research Agency). In addition, two internationally recognised historians of 
airpowcr answered every call: Dr. Robert Frank Futrell and Dr. David 
Maclsaac. 
Apart from the unpublished classified and unclassified Korean 
documents, there are two other types of publications - Bee-Mae Poom (Not- 
for-Commercial Sale /in-house documents) and occasional publications made 
available to the public through commercial book stores. Government 
documents cannot be purchased commercially. In fact there is no Korean 
equivalent of either Iier Majesty's Stationery Office or the US Government 
Printing Office. In most cases, Korean government publications are for 
internal use only - not for public dissemination. For instance, the ROK Air 
Force printed Gong-Goon Sa (The History of the ROK Air Force) as an 
internal document which cannot be purchased. Culturally, memoirs and 
writings produced by governmental employees are rarely written for profit, 
and are therefore not commercially available to the public.? 
7 It is up to the discretion of the author if he wishes to publish commercially. As examplm former 
ROK Army Chief of Staff General Chung ll-Kwon's memoirs were published commercially, whereas 
former ROKAF Chief of Staff' Lt. General Kim Chung-Yul's memoirs were published privately (Bee- 
Alae Peaal Not-for-Sale) for limited dissemination. Only 500 copies of Kim's Memoirs were 
published for selected dissemination. Interviews, author with Mrs. Kim Chung-Yul [ 19 July 1994 
13 
Especially noteworthy among the available American documents are 
air intelligence reports and periodic historical reports of Far East Air Forces, 
Fifth Air Force, 314th Air Division and 6146th Air Force Advisory Group. 
These US Air Force commands and units were all directly related to military 
assistance and supervision of the ROK Air Force, 8 and literally anxious to 
record not only their own activities but also those of their 'step-son Air Force' 
- the ROKAF. Hence, to a much greater extent than many realise, it is to the 
American documentation of ROKAF activities that Korean historians must 
look to find anything resembling a full account of the ROKAF's early years. 
The American advisers in Korea were required by USAF regulation to 
compile the records of their activities in Korea by producing periodic activity 
reports. These reports became a part of the over-all semi-annual report of the 
5th Air Force to USAF Headquarters. As the 5th Air Force was charged 
with operational control and the logistic support of the ROKAF through its 
advisory personnel, there is one chapter or section devoted to the status of 
the ROKAF within each 5th Air Force semi-annual history. (The 5th Air 
Force histories, in typescript form and never published, were compiled at the 
time by officers or NCOs of the 5th Air Force Iieadquarters. )9 
A particularly valuable, but little known AFIIRA file is the so-called 
'Barcus Report. ' It is customary for the United States to conduct surveys of 
the effectiveness of USAF operations in war (e. g., the United States 
(telephone), S May 19951 and Kim Dong-Yul, Chief of ROKAF Military I listory Studies, 28 April 
and 15 May 1995. 
a See USAF archives on the histories of Far East Air Forces, Fifth Air Force, 314th Air Division 
and 6146th Air Force Advisory Group during the period from 1948 to 1958 in files with numbers 
prefixed by AFI IRA Call # K730.01 at the US Air Force I listorical Research Agency at Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama. 
9 The entire set of documents with regard to the 5th Air Force history is in file numbers K-730.01. 
6146-GP-7NG-111, and 314-AD-11I at the US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFIIRA) at 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The history of the 5th Air Force during the period of 1948 
through 1956 consists of over 175 archive boxes, in unedited typescript form. The AFIIRA also 
stores the whole set of documents pertaining to the US Far East Command (FEC) in 1,233 archive 
boxes, of which 236 boxes are related to the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) during the period of 1945 
through 1956 in file number K-720.01. 
14 
Strategic Bombing Survey of 1944-47 and the Gulf War Air Power Survey of 
1992-93). As a part of this custom, Major General Glenn O. Barcus, then 
vice commander of Tactical Air Command, [later commander of 5th AF 
(1952-53)], led a survey team consisting of various USAF officers and civil 
servant historians. This team investigated FEAF/5th Air Force operational 
activities on the Korean peninsula during 1950-1953. Their ultimate reports 
consist of seven volumes, appendices, and supporting documents, all in 
manuscript form, as an unpublished in-house document. (In particular, 
volume 1, books I and 3, were of great assistance. )' 
The ROKAF's early struggles to achieve an independent (or at least 
separate) identity had greater support from a few important Korean 
politicians than from most ROK Army officials, not unlike the experiences of 
the RAF in 1917-1918 and the USAF in 1946-1947. This study concentrates 
on the early years of the South Korean Air Force from 1946 until the initial 
completion of Korean Air Force modernisation in 1956. This ten-year period 
is especially important, given the evolution of the South Korean Air Force 
from virtually nothing to nearly one hundred jet fighters and over 16,000 
personnel. The political situation after the end of the Second World War, 
and the American military occupation authorities' concern with developing a 
Constabulary force to secure internal order, initially deflected almost 
everyone's attention from creating a separate air force. 
The creation of the ROKAF with some twenty liaison planes, less 
than nine months prior to the Korean War, was almost a miracle, and a feat 
of enormous importance for the subsequent development of South Korea's 
indigenous airpower. But for the united front and tenacious of ort 
vanguarded by the seven founding leaders, the formation of the ROK Air 
10 U. S. Air Force, 'An Evaluation of the Ef'ectiveness of the United States Air Force in the Korean 
Campaign, 25 June - December 1950' Volume I. Books I and 3, ins. The documents are commonly 
known as the Barcus Reports. K168.041.1,25 Jun-Dec 1950, v. 1, pt. 1. US Air Force historical 
records. US Air Force I listorical Research Agency. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 
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Force would not have occurred. Chapter One focuses on two facets of the 
birth of the ROKAF: (1) the background of various aviation groups which 
banded together, calling for the creation of an air force; and (2) how, once 
united as a military organisation, this army air corps unit fought to gain its 
independence as a separate service. Chapter Two analyses the situation on 
the Korean Peninsula prior to the Korean War, focusing on the lack of 
military preparedness on the parts of both the ROK Air Force and the United 
States Air Force (USAF), largely a result of America's security policy in the 
Far East. Chapter Three examines ROKAF's combat activities, including 
how the ROKAF participated in the war by simultaneously implementing 
pilot training and combat missions in close coordination with American air 
advisers. It is essentially an overview of ROKAF activities at all levels 
during the war, and is designed to provide the necessary background for 
Chapters Four and Five. 
Chapter Four assesses how successfully the USAF advisory team 
(6146th Air Force Advisory Group) accomplished its mission in support of 
ROKAF combat operations and pilot training during the Korean War. The 
initial establishment of the Advisory Group, its command relationships with 
both 5th Air Force and ROKAF headquarters, the specific activities of the 
American advisers in the field, and the mentorship and role model aspects of 
the advisory effort all receive detailed treatment. Chapter Five examines the 
policy limitations of ROKAF's restrained growth with emphasis on the ROK- 
US Agreed Minute, and its effects on the South Korean Air Force. It was 
this basic document upon which the post-Korean War modernisation of the 
ROKAF was based. 
The ROK-US Agreed Minute prevented the ROKAF from increasing 
the number of its fighter wings. Instead, the existing wing of propeller- 
driven F-5 Is was converted to F-86F jet fighters. Personnel strength was 
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allowed to increase to accommodate the introduction of C-46 twin-engined 
transport aircraft and the formation of an aircraft control and warning (radar) 
squadron. Chapter Six then discusses the ROKAF modernisation process 
from 1953 to 1956 and the extensive conversion training of air and ground 
crews. In the process of modernisation, a number of issues and problems 
arose. Chapter Seven examines four recurring issues which persist to this 
day: (1) aviation English requirements; (2) tri-lateral air defence cooperation 
between the United States, Korea, and Japan; (3) transfer of America's 
operational control to the ROK government; and (4) the ROKAF air defence 
posture, particularly in light of the operational and doctrinal challenges 
posed by the difficulties of defending the ROK capital from air attack. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE FORMATION OF 
THE SOUTH KOREAN AIR FORCE 
Air Forces are more difficult to organize and put on a sound footing 
than either army or navy, because in this newest arm we have no 
traditions upon which to build except those developed during the war. 
Brigadier General William Mitchell' 
The history of the Republic of Korea Air Force began with a 
collection of diverse groups who shared one interest - the love of aviation. 
The liberation of Korea after the Second " World War brought returning 
Korean airmen from Japan and China back to their homeland, seeking a way 
to develop their interest in aviation into an instrument for their own country. 
The formation of a country s air force must be considered in the context of 
the tradition and culture in which it flourishes. Korean culture emphasises 
the seniority of the members of any group. To understand how the South 
Korean Air Force came into being in an orderly manner in a short period of 
time, it is necessary to examine the origins of the groups who banded 
together out of love for aviation. 
Soon after the establishment of the Gook-Bang Kyong-Bee Dae (the 
Korean National Defense Constabulary: hereafter the Constabulary) the 
American military occupation authorities required re-education of all ethnic 
Koreans who had served the Japanese or Chinese military. They were 
required to attend an American military training institute called Goon-Sa 
Young-O Hak-K)o or the Military English Language School (METS). 
Regardless of their previous rank and background, all Korean military 
personnel were required to learn not only rudimentary English, but basic 
t William Mitchell. Brigadier General, Air Services. Our Air Force: The KeystaK of National 
Defense (New York: Dutton & Co., 1921). p. xx. 
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military training, in accordance with American military manuals and 
regulations. The MELS became the first military training organisation for 
the future ROK military leaders, including air leaders. As the South Korean 
Air Force first started as an aviation detachment of the Constabulary (the 
predecessor of the ROK Army), this chapter commences with a discussion of 
the genesis of the Constabulary and the establishment of the MELS, and then 
examines the roots of the founding members and their pioneering role in the 
formation of the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF). 
I. I. The Genesis of the ROK Armed Forces (Constabulary) 
In early November 1945, two months after American military 
occupation started, US Army Chief of Staff General of the Army George C. 
Marshall instructed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander 
of United States Forces in the Far East, to prepare plans for raising a police- 
type force in Korea as the first step toward reducing the number of US troops 
in southern Korea. On 9 January 1946, the Department of War authorised 
General MacArthur to form a Korean police force of 50,000 - 20,000 regular 
police, 25,000 state reserve police, and a coast guard of 5,000, to be 
equipped with surplus US weapons. The purpose of authorising a 
constabulary-type police reserve force was to supplement the Korean 
National Civil Police (KNP), which was to be trained to the point where they 
could relieve US occupation forces of civil police functions. 2 
The first battalion of this police reserve force, officially designated 
as the First Battalion of the First Regiment, was formally inaugurated on 15 
2 James F. Schnabel, United States Army In the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The Flrst Year 
(hereafter cited as Schnabel, Policy and Direction) (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 
1972), p. 31; Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naklong. 
North to the Yalu, June-November 1950 (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, 1961), p. 
13. See also Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: K AG In Peace and War 
(Washington, DC: US Army Office of Military history, 1962), pp. 12-13. 
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January 1946. It went into action in the Seoul area in late January with a 
Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army Forces in Korea as its commanding 
officer and a handful of American officers assigned to guide it. 3 Seven 
additional regiments were subsequently formed by April 1946, at Pusan, 
Taegu, Kwangju, In, Taejon, Chongju and Chunchon, in a scaled-down 
strength of slightly over two thousand men in total. 4 These units would also 
'provide a nucleus for expansion, if and when circumstances permitted a 
bonafide Korean national defense military force. 's 
By the end of 1947 the ranks of the Constabulary had swollen to 
nearly 20,000 men 6 In February 1948, Lt. General John R. [lodge, 
commander of US occupation forces in Korea, recommended to Washington 
that the Constabulary be increased to 50,000 men, equipped with heavier 
infantry-type weapons - though not artillery - from US stocks in Korea and, 
if needed, American sources in Japan. At that time, the formation of a 
Korean military was still considered premature, because of the lack of 
training facilities and competent Korean military leaders. Consequently, 
Hodge's recommendation was disapproved by the US Far East Command of 
General MacArthur, who instead favoured an increase to 50,000 men to 
supplement the existing 25,000 Korean police force.? 
3 Eight months later, a Korean Brigadier General (Ryu Dong-Yul) took over as its first Korean 
commander. ROK Ministry of National Defense, Ha*-Gook JonJaeng Sa: Joe I Kwon: IIae-B'ang 
Awa Korn-Goon, 1945-1950.6 (7he History of War in Korea Volume 1: The Liberation w id the 
Birth of the Armed Forces. 1945- June 1950) (hereafter cited as 11ae-B'ang Kwa Kort-Goon) 
(Seoul, Korea: Military history Compilation Committee/MND, 1967), pp. 259-260. This book was 
retrieved soon after being published as an in-house document for official use only, and no longer for 
public We. The reason was not known. A copy of this book was found recently by the author in 
one of the master files at the Office of Military i{istory Studies, IIQ ROKAF. 
a Sawyer, Alilitary Advisors, p. 17, Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 32; llae-B'ang Kwa Kon- 
Goon, p. 258. 
s Sawyer. llfllilaryAJvisors p. 32. 
b Young Woo Lee, 'Birth of the Korean Army, 1945-50: Evaluation of the Role of the US 
Occupation Forces, ' Korea A World affairs 4: 4 (Winter 1980), p. 647; Schnabel, Policy and 
Direction, p. 18. 
7 Sawyer, AlilltaryAdvlsorc pp. 28-29. 
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The Constabulary received minimum publicity owing to Soviet 
sensitivities. Aware of Soviet concern, American military occupation 
authorities took a cautious attitude in implementing occupation policies 
concerning Koreans in the south. For instance, the term national defence 
was replaced by internal security. On 15 June 1946 the Department of 
National Defense, therefore, became the Department of Internal Security. 8 
This Constabulary represented Korea's first national defence effort since 
1907, when the Yi Dynasty's Royal Army was forced to disband in 
accordance with the agreement signed on 24 July 1907 between Korea (Yi 
Dynasty) and Japan, which removed from the Korean authorities any vestige 
of power to make decisions or to exercise governmental functions. 
Consequently, the Korean Royal Army was ordered disbanded on i August 
1907.9 
The development of the Constabulary was hampered by a lack of 
equipment and the language barrier. Some sixty thousand rifles taken from 
the surrendered Japanese forces had been set aside by the Americans 
pending the time when the Korean military might use them. From this 
reserve the Americans issued rifles to Constabulary units as they were 
activated. (The Korean soldiers later received a few Japanese light machine 
guns from American troop units that had collected them as souvenirs. )'0 
The second impediment was the language barrier, one of the most 
urgent obstacles to be overcome. To tackle the language problem - few US 
a Ibid. p. 20, 
9 Sung-I lae Kang and Jac-Sung Yoo, MinJok Jon-Ma" Sa I (The History of Korean People's 
Ordtal in War, Volume 1) (Seoul, Korea: War IGstory Compilation Committee(ROK Ministry of 
National Defense, 1984), p. 181; Tae-Jin Lee, 11-Bon Ae Dae-Ilan Jae-Kook K'ahng dom (Japan's 
Coercive Occupation of the Korean Empire) (Seoul, Korea: Kka-Chi Sa, 1995), p. 142; Sung-Soo 
Park, Dok-Rip Woon-Dang Sa Yon-Koo (A Study of the History of Ind epenrknce Movement) 
(Seoul, Korea: Ch'ang-Pak Kwa Bee-Pyong Sa, 1980), p. 129; Jong-Kook Yin, Il-Bain Goon Ae 
Cliosun Ch/m-1(yak Sa I (Utstory of Japanese Invasion of Korea, Volume 1) (Seoul, Korea: p-W01 
So-G'ak, 1988), p. 207. Andrew C. Nahm, Kona: Tradition if Transformation: A History of the 
Korean People (Seoul, Korea: I lollym Corp.. 1988), p. 21 S. 
10 Sawyer, MllilaryAdvisors, p. 16; llae-B'ang Kwa Kon-Coon p. 258. 
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personnel understood Korean and qualified interpreters were difficult to find 
-a language school was established on 5 December 1945. A class of sixty 
officers from three groups was admitted: twenty from among those who had 
served in the Japanese Army, twenty from among the former Japanese police 
officers, and twenty from the KPG-aligned Kwangbok Goon (the Restoration 
Army). " Many of these original sixty officers selected for the first class 
eventually came to dominate the top level of the Republic of Korea Army 
(ROKA) after 1948. Thus this class took on an importance that was not 
anticipated in 1945. 
The majority of members of both the first class of the Military English 
Language School and the first two classes of the Constabulary Officers' 
Training School in 1945-46 were from among those Korean Army officers 
who had served in the Japanese military during the Second World War. 
Nearly 50,000 Koreans had been conscripted, of whom several hundred 
attained officer rank, and almost one hundred were graduates from the elite 
Japanese Military Academy. '2 Many of these officers later became 
prominent figures either in the South Korean military or politics. Distinctive 
among them were: Chae ßyong Duk (ROKA Chief of Staff, April 1947- 
November 1949; April-July 1950), Chung 11 Kwon (Commander in Chief of 
ROK Armed Forces, July 1950-October 1952; former Prime Minister, and 
Speaker of the National Assembly 1972-1976), Park Chung flee (ROK 
President, 1963-1979) and Kim Chae Kyu (Commanding General of the 
ROK 2nd Army, Director of the Korean CIA as well as the assassin of 
tt The Kwangbok Goon stands for the Korean Independence Restoration Army. Metaphorically 
KNwangbok means restoration of glory and Goon the Army. I{ereafer it is cited as the Restoration 
Army. It was established in collaboration with the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in 
Chungking in September 1940. Five thousand strong in 1945, this group was described as the only 
body of Koreans that fought the Japanese during the Pacific War. ! Iae-N'wig Kwa Kaºº-(kx^ p. 
258. Kim Se-jin, The 1'o1irlcs of Alililary Reºýnlution in Korea (Chapel hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1971), p. 38. 12 The author estimated these figures from his personal interviews on 16-28 September 1994 with 
Korean graduates of the school. 
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President Park). The Constabulary in 1945 and 1946 thus produced the 
leading ROK military cadre that its organisers hoped would'ease the transfer 
of elite from the Japanese Army to the ROK Army. '13 Bruce Cumings, 
critical of this view, noted that whereas in Japan high ranking Japanese and 
Korean militarists were tried and executed as war criminals by American 
military occupation authorities, and purges of most former Japanese officers 
were conducted, in Korea such officers were instead rewarded with control 
of the Constabulary. 14 
The American Military Government's policy to allow the 'unfiltered' 
admission of former colonial military and police officers into the officers' 
corps of the newly born Korean national defence force affected all other 
sectors of the country. In the embryonic Korean civil police and military 
establishment, the Korean people soon began to see the former Japanese 
police agents and military officers who had led colonial police and military to 
either persecute or fight against many Korean patriots. Many colonial 
collaborators were also seen in the fledgling Korean civil service field and in 
the political arena. None of the Korean intellectuals who had collaborated 
with Japanese colonial rulers were ever tried for their past traitorous 
activities. For this reason, a majority of former Restoration Army members 
refused to participate in the Constabulary. 's 
What annoyed the Korean public most, then as well as now, was the 
collaboration, clearly recorded in Korean history, of those Korean 
intellectuals who supported Japanese colonial mobilisation efforts during the 
Second World War. These collaborators have consistently been criticised by 
Korean writers in their published literature. Distinctive among such works is 
a book which compiles selections from pro-Japanese works written during 
is Kim, The Politics ofVfiliiwy Revolution In Korea, p. 137. 14 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Vol. 1: Liberation and the Emergence of 
Separate Regimes 1945-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. $07,200n, 201 n. 
15 Hae-B'ang Kwa Kon-Gaon, pp. 258,279. 
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the colonial rule by Korean historians, pedagogues, poets, novelists, writers 
and other activists. 16 Under such circumstances a sound leadership ethos 
and appropriate role models proved difficult to generate for the sake of 
healthy nation-building. At the outset, a seed was sown for the Korean 
public's mistrust of their military leadership. This later bred criticism of the 
credibility and legitimacy of the military establishment and the government 
itself. Mistrust between the Korean public - in particular the intellectual 
community - and the military grew during the period when the latter's coup 
d'etat took place in 1961. From then, authoritarian military rule reigned in an 
internationally controversial form of 'non-democratic' government until 
February 1993, when Kim Young Sam (a, 'pure civilian' without military 
connection) was elected President of South Korea. 
1.2. The Establishment of the ROK Air Force 
When the formation of the South Korean Constabulary forces was 
discussed by the Bureau of National Defense of the United States Army 
Forces in Korea (USAFIK) in November 1945, American military 
occupation authorities confined the issue to only the ground and naval 
components, owing to the US government's official policy that envisaged no 
need for an air force, because Korean military forces would be limited to an 
internal security role only, capable of offering 'token resistence' to invasion, 
but providing no plausible basis for allegations of being a threat to North 
Korea. 17 
16 Jong-Kook Yim, Chin-Jil Moon-flak Ron (On the Pro-Japanese Literature During the Colonial 
Rule), Seoul, Korea: Pan-Moon Kak, 1965. 
17 U. S. Congress. I louse. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Background Information on Korea 
Report... 81st Cong. 2d sess. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1950), p. 34; Schnabel, Policy and 
Direction, pp. 34-35. See also Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950- 
1953 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1983), p. 17. Hereafter cited as Futrell, The USAF in Korea. 
1950-53. 
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The lack of a military aviation role was greatly disappointing, 
particularly for some five hundred South Koreans who had been engaged in 
aviation branches of the Japanese and Chinese Air Forces, because they 
entertained great hopes of organising a Korean air force immediately after 
the liberation of Korea. As they found that the actual formation of a Korean 
air force was impossible at that time, because South Korea was still under 
the military occupation of the United States government, whose policy saw 
no need for a South Korean air force, the Korean airmen moderated their 
ideas and contented themselves with the formation of a fraternal group, 
called the 11'ang-Gong Gon-Sol 11yop-11ae (the Aviation Building 
Association or ABA). The ABA was formed on 10 August 1946 with the 
hope of obtaining assistance from the USAFIK in forming the Korean Air 
Force, if and when it became appropriate to do so. 18 
These founding airmen, who were later to form the nucleus of the 
Republic of Korea Air Force, came from nine different backgrounds: (1) 
Korean graduates from the Japanese Military Academy; (2) Korean pilots 
from the Chinese Air Force; (3) Koreans from the Japanese Aviation Boy 
Cadet Programme (Sho-Naeng Go-Koo tiei); (4) Korean students from 
Japanese colleges; (5) Korean airmen from the Japanese military aviation 
volunteer programme; (6) Korean civilian employees in the Japanese Army 
Air Corps; (7) Korean employees in Japanese civilian airlines; (8) Domestic 
Korean aviation company employees; and (9) Koreans engaged in aviation 
recreation, such as glider pilots. 19 
18 ROK Air Force, Gong-Go of Sa Jae I Jip, 1949- 1933 (The Nlsrory of the Air Force: Volume 1, 
1949-1953) (hereafter cited as Gong-Goon Sa (1), 1949 - 53) (Taejon, Korea: ROK Air Force 
Headquarters, 1991), p. 42; Chung-Yul Kim, Kim Chwrg Yul floe Go Rok (Kim Chung Yul 
Memoir) (Seoul, Korea: Eul-Yoo Moon-Wha Sa, 1993), p. 90. (Kim's memoir was printed as an in- 
house document, not for public sale. ) 
19 Among these nine groups, distinguished in their later services in the ROK Air Force, were three of 
special importance: (1) Korean Graduates from the Japanese Military Academy: There were 
nine graduates who were captains and lieutenants of the Japanese Army Air Corps. One was a 
bombardier, three were mechanics, and five were pilots who flew Japanese fighters during the 
Second World War. Six of these were to play leading roles in the ROKAF and political leadership of 
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Among these nine groups, the most prominent were the first three 
groups. The third group of Sho-Naeng Go-Koo Ile!, mainly consisting of 
former Japanese non-commissioned officer (NCO) pilots, collaborated with 
the first group of former Japanese military officer pilots. Accordingly, there 
existed two most influential groups, i. e., Korean graduates from the Japanese 
Military Academy and Korean pilots from the Chinese Air Force. The 
Japanese group was led by Colonel Kim Chung-Yul (later ROKAF Chief of 
Staff, 1949-52/1954-56), known to be the most competent of the leaders in 
the Korean Army Air Corps/Air Force. The second group's leader was 
Colonel Choi Yong-Duk, a former Chinese flyer, who was known to be loyal 
to the former Chinese Army General Lee Bum-Sok. 20 Despite their diverse 
backgrounds, these groups worked closely together without serious conflicts 
South Korea after ROK's independence in 1948. (1) Park Bom-Jip (Class No. 52) [Brigadier General, 
Deputy Chief of Staff ROKAF (September - November 1950), killed in an aircraft crash in 
November 1950. ]; (2) Kim Chung-Yul (Class No. 54)[Lt. General, ROKAF Chief of Staff (1949-52, 
1954.56); Minister of National Defense (1956-1961); Ambassador to the U. S. (1972-74); Prime 
Minister (1987-88)]-. (3) Kim Chang-Kyu (Class No. 55) [Lt. General, ROKAF Chief of Staff(1958- 
60), Congressman (1975-80)]; (4) Park Won-Suk (Class No. 56)[Lt. General, ROKAF Chief of Staff 
(1964-66)]; (5) Shin Sang-Chul (Class No. 56)[Major General, Superintendent of the Air Force 
Academy (1952.57), Ambassador to Vietnam(1964-68), and Congressman (1975-80)]; (6)Chang 
Chi-Ryang (Class No. 60)[Lt. General, ROKAF Chief of Staff (1968-70). and Congressman (1975- 
80)]. The numerical figure in parentheses is the serial number of each graduating class. For instance, 
No. 52 class is equivalent to the class of 1937. (11) Korean Pilots from the Chinese Air Force: 
Fifteen officer pilots, who flew Chinese military aircraft, belonged to this group, and they 
distinguished themselves in the ROKAF by producing two ROKAF Chiefs of Statt Choi Yong- 
Duk. a graduate of the Chinese Military Academy, had first started flying in 1921, and participated in 
the early formation of the Chinese Air Force. Ile became a lieutenant colonel of the Chinese Air 
Force, and also served as a general officer in the Korean Restoration Army. He later became 
ROKAF Chief of Staff (1952-54). Kim Shin was also a graduate from the Chinese Military 
Academy, and was sent to the United States for pilot training in 1944 as a Chinese Air Force pilot 
officer. lie later became ROKAF Chief of Staff (1960-64) and ambassador to Taiwan (1964-69). 
(111) Korean Pilots from the Japanese Aviation Boy Cadet Programme (Sho-Naeng Go-Koo 
Ifel): One hundred and ten young (14-17 years old when they joined) enlisted aviators belonged to 
this category. Forty were pilots, and another forty were mechanics, and the remaining were radio 
operators. Out of this group, Lee Keun-Suk was an ace, with twenty-three kills in the China and 
Pacific theatres. Kim, Kim Clung Yul Memoir, pp. 82-89. 
20 General Lee was one of the most prestigious Korean leaders of the Independence Movement in 
Manchuria during Japanese colonial rule, and later became the Prime Minister and Minister of 
National Defense from 1947 to 1948. 
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under the strong leadership of Colonel Kim Chung-Yul, who stressed the 
importance of solidarity among Korean airmen. 21 
The Aviation Building Association selected seven former military 
pilots to form a steering committee. (These seven members were the core of 
the cadre in the subsequent ROK Air Force. All later became generals and 
four of them eventually served as ROKAF Chief of Staff )22 From the very 
beginning, they drew up a list of seniority of all five hundred original airmen 
(who consisted of ninety pilots, three hundred mechanics, and some one 
hundred supporting specialists), based on previous individual military 
backgrounds (e. g., length of service, rank, specialities, etc. ) during the 
Second World War in the Japanese and Chinese military. This seniority 
roster was used for subsequent personnel career management, thereby 
minimising possible conflicts arising from the lack of a personnel 
effectiveness evaluation system at that time. This roster also drove most 
decisions affecting subsequent promotions and command assignments 23 
Upon its formation, the ABA tried to seek approval from the US 
Military Government to use those aerodrome facilities and airplanes left by 
21 The discussion of this paragraph is based on three sources: (1) Kim. Kim Chung Yul Afemoir, pp. 
82-89; (2) US Sth Air Force, Appendix 100: Air Intelligence Information Report, Subj: ROKAF - 
Origin and Political Background in The History of the Fifth Air Force, 1 January - 30 June 1952, ' 
ms-, vol. 2, pp. 343-349. US Air Force historical records, K730.01, Jan-Jun 1952, v. 2. US Air 
Force ICstorical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Hereafter cited as '5th AF 
History, Jan-Jun 1952, ' ms., vol. 1. K-730.01, Jan-Jun 1952, v. 2. AFIIRA; and (3) interviews, 
author with former ROKAF Chiefs of Staff, Lt. Generals (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu (1958-60), Chang 
Sung-Whan (1962-64) and Chang Chi-Ryang (1968-70), 28-30 October (telephone) and 24-28 
April 1995. 
22 The seven members were: Choi Yong-Duk, Kim Chung-Yul, Lee Moo-Young, Chang Duk- 
Chang, Park Bom-Jip, Lee Keun-Suk, and Kim Young-When. Gong-Goon Sa (1), 1949 - 53, p. 43. 
See also US Far East Air Forces Air Intelligence Information Report IR-263-49, Subj: South Korean 
Army Air Force, 12 September 1949.720.609B-2 49/09/23. AFI IRA. Out of the seven ABA key 
members, the first three (Choi, Kim, Chang) later became Chiefs of Staff of the ROK Air Force. The 
remaining four were killed during the Korean War except Kim Young-Whan, whose F-51 went 
missing in adverse weather during a training mission near the Kangnung area on 5 March 1954. 
ROK Air Force, 11'ang-Gong K! Sa-Go Tong-R'am: 1930-1972 (Anatomy of Aircraft Accidents, 
1950-1972) (Seoul, Korea: Office of Inspector General/1! Q ROKAF, 1973), p. 38; '5th AF history, 
Jan-Jun 1954, ' ms., vol. 1, p. 427. K-730.01, Jan-Jun 1954, v. 1. AFIIRA. 
23 Kim, Kim Chung Vu! Memoir, pp. 86-89; telephone interviews, author with Lt. Generals (Ret. ) 
and former ROKAF Chiefs of Staff Kim Chang-Kyu (1958-60) and Chang Chi-Ryang (1968-70), 
29-30 October 1995. 
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the surrendered Japanese military, to no avail. There were 'a considerable 
number of serviceable transport type Japanese aircraft surrendered in Korea 
[with] sufficient parts and fuel available to operate these airplanes over a 
considerable period of time, ' in September 1945, when Lt. General [lodge 
had accepted the Japanese surrender. South Koreans, however, were denied 
access to the surrendered Japanese aviation assets, because the American 
military occupation authorities intended to use them for their own 
purposes. 24 
Accordingly, General dodge was granted 'authority to retain 
sufficient Japanese transport type aircraft and parts to operate a small airline 
in Korea under US Military Government using Korean personnel. ' But this 
scheme was soon canceled, and all Japanese aircraft in South Korea were 
condemned and scrapped in accordance with the United States government's 
policy, which required 'destruction of captured enemy aircraft and 
components under US jurisdiction. '25 In retrospect, the loss of captured 
Japanese flying machines proved costly to the new republic when the Korean 
War broke out and the ROKAF pilots had to fight with only twenty-two 
unarmed liaison planes. 26 
In contrast, the Soviet military occupation authorities allowed North 
Koreans to use the Japanese-surrendered airfields and aircraft. A civilian 
voluntary aviation corps was formed at Sinuiju airfield in October 1945, 
consisting of some fifty former Japanese military aviators. A month later 
they were permitted to retain the Japanese Type-95 trainer aircraft, which 
were initially used for training North Korean pilots from November 1945 
24 Section IV, paragraph 19 of SWNCC 58/9, dated 5 September 1945. JCS 1609, 'Use of Japanese 
Aircraft for U. S. Military Government Air Line in Korea, ' 19 January 1946. PD 580.8 Korea 
(Commercial Air) (27 Dec 45) Box 393; Air Force - Plans Project Decimal Files, 1942-54; Records 
of the Department of Defense, RG 341. NA/WDC. 
25 1bkL 
26 8 L-4s, 4 L-5s and 10 T-6s. ROK Air Force, fl'Wig-GongJon Sa: Ilan-GookJonJaeng (The 
History of the Air If'ar: The Korean War) (Seoul. Korea: ROK Air Force I Eistory Office, 1989), p. 
58.1 iereafter cited as 1l'wrg-GongJon-. Sa. See also Gong-Conn Sa (I), 1949-S9, p. 57. 
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until they had to stop flying in June 1946, when three of them were lost in 
accidents. 27 
Early in 1947, the ABA Steering Committee members were able to 
approach Colonel Terrill E. Price, the US Army Advisor to the USAFIK's 
Internal Security Office, in charge of all activities concerning Korean 
aviation, and presented to him a roster of those five hundred ADA members, 
noting their individual specialties. 2 (Ethnic Koreans at first had not been 
permitted by the Japanese colonial government to enter the Japanese military 
service. But in 1935, the Japanese Imperial Command changed its policies, 
and from that time on Korean citizens entered every branch of the Japanese 
Army and Navy Aviation Corps, serving as pilots of bomber, fighter, and 
transport aircraft; members of aircraft maintenance crews; and in all other 
fields necessary to maintain an cflicient and adequate air force. )29 
During March 1948, Colonel Price advised the visiting ABA leaders 
to enter the Korean Constabulary Infantry School (KCIS), stating that 
although he did not know when it would be feasible to organise a Korean air 
force or any unit thereof, he thought it advisable that if and when such an 
organisation should be inaugurated, leaders should be readily available. 
Accordingly, on I April 1948, seven key members of the ABA entered the 
KCIS for a month-long American Army basic training course and then 
received an additional one and a half month officer's training course at the 
27 North Koreans resumed their pilot training in December 1948 when Soviet-supplied PO-2 light 
trainer aircraft entered the North Korean People's Army's aviation unit. Gong-Gix», Su (I), 1949 - 
53, pp. 62-63; ! fang-Gong Jwn-Sa, p. 33; 11ae-1I'curg Kwa Kon-(; cxmn, pp. 698.699. 
28 Colonel Price was first appointed as the director of the USAFIK's internal security in Spring 
1946, and six months later stepped down to the role of advisor, when a Korean Director took over 
the office. Price left Korea in May 1948. Kim. Kim Chung Yul Memoir, p. 90; Sawyer, Jllibrwy 
Advisors, pp. 20-22,31. 
29 Far East Air Forces Air Intelligence Information Report IR-263.49, 'South Korean Army Air 
Forces, ' 12 September 1949. US Air Force historical records. 720.6090.2,49/09/23. US Air Force 
Historical Research Agency (AFI IRA), Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama. I lereafer cited as 'Air 
Intelligence (12-0949)/ 720.60911.2,49/09/23, AFI IRA. ' 
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Korean Constabulary Academy, the predecessor of the Korean Military 
Academy (KMA). 30 
On 15 June 1948 these seven men were commissioned Army second 
lieutenants. Their commissioning was preceded by the formation of the 
Kyong-Bee Dae Nang-Gong Bu-Dae, the Constabulary Aviation 
Detachment (CAD) on 15 May 1948 at Susack airstrip in a suburb north of 
Seoul, under the direct jurisdiction of the Tong-Wee Bu (l leadquarters of the 
Constabulary). On 7 July 1948 these seven lieutenants were transferred to 
the CAD, and they immediately started obtaining information pertaining to 
possible recruits most qualified for the CAD. Aller collecting all possible 
information, there came a period of administering examinations to selected 
applicants, which were designed to determine their capabilities prior to their 
acceptance into the CAD. 3' These examinations also served as a means of 
determining the amount of additional training which would be required 
before maximum efficiency could be expected from the CAD. A total of 
nineteen officers and eighty-five enlisted men comprised the Korean 
Constabulary Aviation Detachment when it was moved to Kimpo airfield on 
27 July 1948.32 
The Korean Constabulary Aviation Detachment was redesignated as 
the Yook-Goon Nang-Gong KI-JI Bu-Dae, the Army Air Hase Detachment 
(AABD) on 5 September 1948. A week later the AABD was re-organised 
to become the Yook-Goon 11'ang-Gong Sa-Ryong Du, the Army Air Corps 
(AAC), manned by 495 officers and airmen, and equipped with ten L-4 
liaison type aircraft, which were donated by the US Army 7th Division's 
30 ROK Military Academy. II'an-Gook Jon lacng Sa (7he War History of Korea) (Seoul, Korea: 
li-shin Sa, 1992), p. 191; Gong-Garver Sa (1), 1949-33, pp. 42-43. 
31 At the time the CAD was commanded by Ist Lieutenant Choi Yong-Duk, who later became the 
ROKAF Chief of Staff (1952-1954). 
32 11'ang-Gortg Jon-Sa, pp. 46-4 8. 
30 
aviation unit. 33 On 13 September the AAC pilots participated in the first air 
parade over the capital city of Seoul with the clear emblem of the Tae-Guk, 
the Korean national logo, painted on their wings and fuselages. It was the 
first Korean fly-by over Seoul since December 1922, when Mr. Ahn Chang- 
Nam, a Korean aviation pioneer, flew a Japanese civilian biplane. 34 In the 
meantime, Korean instructor personnel of five pilots and twenty mechanics 
were trained by the United States Ground Forces liaison pilots and 
mechanics. These Korean pilots and mechanics in turn instructed the other 
Korean pilots and mechanics. By the end of September 1948 the South 
Korean military had thirty pilots and seventy mechanics. 35 
On 14 January 1949, the Yook-Goon 11'ang-Gong Sa-Kwan flak-Kyo 
(the Korean Army Air Corps Academy), the predecessor of the ROK Air 
Force Academy, was established at Kimpo airfield for aviation office's 
training. The following day, the Yo-Ja 11'ang-Gong Dae (the Woman's 
Aviation Detachment or WAD) was formed to train female aviators. The 
formation of the WAD was followed eight months later by the activation of 
the Shin-Byong Kyo-Yook Dae (the Airman's Training Dctachment). 36 In 
November 1948, the Korean National Assembly passed the Republic of 
Korea Armed Forces Organisation Act, and on 15 December the Korean 
Constabulary forces became ROK's national defence organisation, including 
the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the Army (ROKA), and the Navy 
(ROKN). Accordingly, the Korean National Defense Constabulary was 
33 Air Intelligence/ 1949.9.12.720.60913-2. AFI IRA; Go, Goan Sa (7). 1949-53, pp. 4445; 11'wrg- 
GongJon-S4 p. 48. 
34 Young-Dahl Kwak. ed.. II JJ ob Jo Jacng: Chang-rang Ae Bee-11wa: Soon-Kiu Jin 
Young- 11'oong Du! (The Korean War: The Unroll Story in the Air: 11/Jden Heroes) (Seoul, Korea: 
Myong-In I long-Bo, 1993), p. 484. 
35 Air Intelligence (12-09-49)/ 720.60913-2,49/09/23. AFIIRA. South Korean Air Force sources 
state different figures: 90 pilots and some 300 mechanics. Kim, Kim Chung Yu! Alemoir. p. 86; 
Ming-Gong Jon Sa, p. 48. The author assumes that USAF figures were based on the number of 
Korean pilots and mechanics who successfully completed formal training in the L-4 aircraft. 
36 The Woman's Aviation Detachment was deactivated on 27 June 1950. Gong-Garin Sa (1). 1949- 
53, p. 340, 
31 
redesignated Gook-Goon (the Republic of Korea Armed Forces), but without 
allowing its Army Air Corps to become a separate service. » 
The idea of a separate Korean Air Force was strongly opposed by the 
ROK Army generals. ROK Army Chief of Staff Major General Chae Byong- 
Duk argued that for the 'efficient' control of airpower in the conduct of air- 
to-ground operations, the air force should remain under the jurisdiction of 
the Army. 38 American Army advisers also objected to an independent air 
force as not being realistic. Brigadier General William L. Roberts, Chief of 
the US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG), stated 
that initially the US Army Air Force was developed by the Army signal 
unit. 39 As the ROK Anny was nascent, whit was needed would be a small 
aviation unit to support the ROK Army signal operations, and the issue of 
ROK Air Force independence, therefore, might better be discussed after the 
ROK Army was strengthened sufTieiently. 40 
In other words, American advisers' opposition was twofold : (1) Less 
than fourteen liaison planes plus the purchase of ten AT-6 trainer aircraft 
were not only insufficient to warrant a separate air arm, but also the AABD, 
later AAC, had been initially 'intended for an air liaison detachment for the 
Korean Army, and nothing more; and (2) furthermore, South Korea's 
economy was not strong enough to support an air force. 4' These arguments 
ignored the need for advance preparation of an organisation with 
37 Brigadier General Lee llyung-keun became the first ROKA Chief of Staff. Ilae-B'ang Kwa 
Kan-Goon pp. 360-368. 
39 ROKAF, Gong-Gam 25-Nyon Sa (71, e 25-year History of the Air Force) (Seoul, Korea: ROK 
Air Force 1Cstory Office, 1976), p. 16.1lerealler cited as Gong-Croon 25Nyvn Sa. 
39 A Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG) was established by MacArthut's headquarters 
on 15 August 1948. On 1 July 1949 the PMAG was redesignated the KMAG (the United States 
Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea) and came under the jurisdiction of the 
Ambassador to the American Mission in Korea. Appleman. South to the Naktong. North to the 
Yalu, p. 13; Sawyer, MilitaryAdvisor; p. 45; Department of State, A Historical Summary of United 
States - Korean Relations: With a Chronology of Important Dewrk pments, (Washington, DC: 
USGPO, 1962), p. 75; ll'an-GookJonJaengSa, pp. 199-200. 
40 Gong-Goon Sa (1). 1949-53, p. 49; Ilae-B'ang KwuKorn-Goon, p. 599. 
41 Sawyer, Military Advisors, p. 93. 
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autonomous authority to employ airpower professionally. The Second World 
War demonstrated airpowcr to be a highly technical and specialised tool with 
which to wage war. Future airpower projection under the leadership of air 
experts would be essential to the security of South Korea. What should have 
been the focus of development was the potential significance of South 
Korea's own airpowcr for their future national defence. 
Supported by the ROK naval leadership42 and MND stab, who 
recognised the specialised role of airpowcr in modern warfare, all members 
of the airman community united together in launching a campaign. The 
Korean airmen extended their appeal to ranking ROK government officials, 
including members of the National Assembly, the Minister of National 
Defense, and ROK Army and Navy leaders, as well as President Syngman 
Rhee. 43 Leaders of the ROK Army Air Corps increased their independence 
campaign by publishing in April 194811'ang-Gong Ae K , ong-Jong (An Air 
Warning) written by Lieutenant Colonel Kim Chung-Yul, the Superintendent 
of the Army Air Corps Academy and one of the seven ABA founding 
members. Kim's An Air Warning, emphasising the need for South Korean 
airpower modernisation and AAC's independence, was disseminated to 
various political and bureaucratic leaders. 
The purpose of An Air Warning was threefold: (1) to explain to the 
public the rationale for a separate Air Force; (2) to increase public 
understanding of the mandatory roles of the Air Force in future national 
defence; and (3) to promote public support for the growth of an indigenous 
Korean airpower. It discussed such issues as (1) introduction of fighter 
aircraft; (2) training of air commanders; (3) separation of the airpower 
42 The navy, as a minority in the ROK armed forces, aligned itself with the ROK Army Air Corps in 
an unsuccessful attempt to curb the preponderance of the ROK Army. Authors view was endorsed 
by former ROKAF Chiefs of Staff: Telephone interviews. author with Lt. Generals (Ret. ) Kim 
Chang-Kyu, Chang Sung-Whan, and Chang Chi-Ryang. 28-30 October 1995. 13 Gang-Goon Sa (I), 1949-59, p. 49; Gang-Cam 25-Nywr Sa (25 Yews of du ROK Air Fore), 
p. 13. 
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budget; and (4) personnel comparison between ground, air and naval 
strength. Colonel Kim stressed in An Air Warning: 
As an indispensable leg of the national defense force 'tripod' 
(ground, naval and air forces), a separate air force should be a fait 
accompli, and most of the other countries already have their 
independent air forces because airpowcr is an indispensable yet 
specialized necessity. But [1 would] prefer reservation of a 
further discussion of this issue, because of an existing peculiar 
phenomenon. Opposition is so strong that the mere utterance of 
the two words, Air Force, would invite abhorrence from opposing 
parties, the reasons for which we aviators can hardly understand. 
They seem to be possessed of an incorrect perception that [our] 
thought of independence is premature and dogmatic. 44 
In his An Air Warning, Colonel Kim also warned of an imminent 
North Korean invasion, accompanied by air attacks in waves. The first wave 
of air attacks on Day One would be against strategic targets in the Seoul 
area, including Seoul Yo'E Do airbase, POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant) 
storage, and ammunition and supply dumps. The second wave of air strikes 
would attack the flan River main bridge, the Jmjin River railway bridge, and 
piers of Inchon Harbour. The third wave of air attacks would be at night 
against Seoul residential areas. These night bombings would be incendiary, 
designed to demoralise the civilian population. In order to counter these 
initial waves of North Korean air attacks, Colonel Kim urged the importance 
of tactical aircraft 45 Kim emphasised the enemy's air threat ought to be 
countered by a South Korean Air Force with autonomous command and 
control. Kim's vision was ignored by ROK Army generals, who refused to 
recognise the power of air attacks. Kim cited the historical record of world 
44 Kira. Kim Chung Yu! Memoir. Appendix t: 'An Air Waring, ' pp. 339,349.350. Author's 
translation. For Kim's full account of 'An Air Warning, ' ice, pp. 331-353. 43 Ibid, pp. 343-346. 
34 
airpower pioneers such as Generals Douhet and Mitchell, who also angered 
their Army generals, and were ultimately stigmatised as Army traitors 46 
Despite American policy, President Rhee agreed with Colonel Kim's 
analysis and insisted that the ROK would need an air force to cope with 
North Korea's growing airpower. According to a Korean air intelligence 
report early in 1949, an air regiment was created in North Korea in June 
1948, and was believed to be based at Pyongyang, comprising approximately 
800 personnel and 36 Soviet trainers plus some captured Japanese planes. 
Soon after activation of the air regiment, North Korean officers were sent to 
the Soviet Union for flying training and were sent back to North Korea 
when their flying proficiency had reached ä satisfactory level. Intelligence 
further estimated that North Korean Air Force personnel strength would 
continue to increase to 1,800 men by the end of 1949.47 In the summer of 
1949, President Rhee dispatched a formal request for tactical aircraft 
through the American Ambassador to Korea and made similar requests in 
subsequent months. 48 Rhee was particularly desirous of obtaining F-51,13- 
25, AT-6, and C-47 type aircraft from the United States 49 
Faced with the increase of North Korea's air strength, President Rhee 
advocated the addition of the Air Force in the process of reviewing the new 
legislation for the ROK Armed Forces Organization Act (AFOA), so that the 
46 Mid, p. 349. 
47 Gong-Gam Sa (1), 1949-53, p. 64; Air Intelligence Information Report, 'Review of North 
Korean Air Power and Its Potentialities, ' 28 Feb. 1950, Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, in the 
attachment to Memorandum of Conversation, 3 April 1950, Records of the Department of State. 
Record Group (RG) 59, Central File, 1950.54,795.00/4-350, Box 4682. National Archives II, 
College Park, Maryland. hereafter cited as Air Intelligence (28-2-50)/RGS9CF19S0-54/795.00/4- 
350. NA (11). 
48 US 5th Air Force, 'The I listory of the Fifth Air Force, 1 January - 30 June 1952' m. t, vol. 1, p. 
261. US Air Force historical records, K730.01, Jan-Jun 1952, v. 1, US Air Force Historical 
Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Hereafter cited as '5th AF history, Jan-Jun 
1951; ms, vol. 1. K-730.01, Jan-Jun 1932, v. 1. AFI IRA. 
49 Air Intelligence (I2-09-49)/ 720.60913-2,49/09/23. AFI IRA. 
33 
legal basis (AFOA Article 23) was provided. " Supported by President Rhee, 
his Minister of National Defense, Naval Chief of Operations, ROK air 
leaders' assiduous efforts and Colonel Kim's written appeal, independence 
finally materialised on 1 October 1949, when the ROK government approved 
the decree to detach the Army Air Corps from the ROK Army and bring 
AAC's 1,600 personnel and its 20 liaison airplanes under the direct 
command of a separate ROK Air Force. Colonel Kim Chung-Yul took office 
as the first ROK Air Force Chief of Staff on 1 October 1949. At its 
inception the ROK Air Force was divided into such functional sections as 
Headquarters (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics), Flying Group, 
Air Base Support Group, and the Air Force Acadcmy. 5' (Figure 1-1) 
In retrospect, it was a miraculous accomplishment in light of the 
innocuous size and capability of the ROK Air Force's aircraft fleet, 
composed wholly of twenty small liaison aircraft, with zero tactical fighters, 
bombers, or transport aircraft. The accomplishment should be attributed 
to the united efforts of the ROK Air Force leaders, the indirect influence of 
the creation of a separate United States Air Force in 1947, and the strong 
support of President Rhee, as observed by American advisers: 
On 1 October 1949, partially as a result of constant pressure by 
[South Korean] Air Force personnel who had formerly flown with 
Japanese and Chinese air forces, the air-arm was separated from 
the army ... President Syngman 
Rhee, who was extremely air 
minded, exerted considerable influence in effecting the change. 52 
Rhee was never happy with America's infantry-oriented policy 
concerning military aid to Korea. Rhee was convinced that with sufficient 
support, the ROK might be able to operate a small but 'reasonably effective 
50 Gong-Goon Sa (7), 1949-53, p. 49; Ltr, Chief KMAO, to Korean Minister of National Defense, 
Seoul, 7 Oct 49, P&O File 091 Korea, sec. 1, case 18/2 as quoted in Sawyer, Military Advisors. p. 
93. 
51 Gong-Goon Li (1). 1949-53, pp. 48-49)! ae-Bang Kwa Nor-QxAm pp. 598-600. 
52 '5th AF History, Jan-Jun 1952, ' ma., vol. 1, p. 261. K-730.01, Jan-Jun 1952, v. 1. AFHRA. 
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Figure 1-1: ROK Air Force Organisation (1 October 1949) 
Minister 
National Defense (F) 
ARMY(E) AIR FORCE NAVY(A) 
Chief of Staff (A) 
Dcputy 
Chicf of Staff (A) 




Judge Advocate (C) 
Public Information (C) 
A-1 A=2 A-3 A-4 
PERSONNEL(B) INTELLIGENCE(D) OPERATIONS(C) LOGISTICS(ß) 
Flying Group Air Base Support Supply Depot Air Police Squadron 
(A) Group (A) (C) (ß) 
Women's Flying Detachment (C) Air Force )lospital (n) 
Legend: A: Colonel; B: Major; C. Captain; D. I at Lt; E: Mai General; F: Civilian. 
Source: ROK Air Force, Gong, -Germ Sa Jae 1 Jlp. 1949-1933 
(The History of the Air Force. 
Volume 1,1949-1953) (Seoul, Korea: ROKAF history Office, 1991). p. 50. 
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tactical air arm. ' An Amcrican air attachd in Scoul obscrvcd in 1949 that 
presidential pressure for tactical aircraft and an air force of'rcasonable size' 
was constantly exerted: 
[Rhee] was primarily responsible for the passing of the law which 
in October 1949 created the Korean Air Force. This particular 
move and subsequent moves such as discussions in Korea, 
during October 1949, with [Major] General [Claire Lee] 
Chennault and Brigadier General [Russell E. ] Randall (USAF 
Retired) regarding the purchase and operation of military type 
aircraft and the hiring of General Randall as Air Force adviser 
were primarily attempts to pressure the US into providing an 
air force and an air advisory group. " 
President Rhee invited Randall to visit Seoul to discuss becoming 
Rhee's air adviser. 34 But General Randall's 'first loyalty to the United States, ' 
precluded any commitment beyond providing advice to the Korean 
government on the issue of establishing a Korean Air Force. " Randall 
neither supported fully Rhec's request for tactical aircraft, 5' nor stressed 
sufficiently Rhee's reiterated statements to him (Randall) affirming that 'the 
Government of the Republic of Korea would not embark upon offensive 
53 US 5th Air Force, The History of the Fifth Air Force, I January - 30 June 1952, ms., vol. 2, pp. 
345-346, US Air Force historical records, K730.01, Jan-Jun 1952, v. 2, US Air Force Historical 
Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. I tereafier cited as '5th AF I listory, Jan-Jun 
1952, ' me, vol. 2. K-730.01, Jan-Jun 1952, v. 2. AFHHRA. See also Martha Byrd, Clienukrult: 
Giving Wings to the Tiger (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 343. 
54 At first Rhee asked General Chenault to become his air adviser, but Chenault instead presented 
General Randall to Rhee. Byrd, Chennwult, p. 343. 
55 'Memorandum of Conversation. by Mr. John A. Williams of the Division of Northeast Asian 
AfY'airs, December 7,1949' in Foreign Relations of the Untied Stales 1949, Volume 1,71: The 
Far&W and Auslralia, part. 2 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1976), p. 1104. l lereafer cited as FRUS 
1949, v. 7, pt. 2. 
56 Telegram, The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, December 7,1949' in 
FRUS, 1949, v. 7, pt. 2, p. 1106. Martha Byrd states differently: 'Gen. Russell E. Randall was 
someone who could survey Korea's need and make a report. The result had been a request to the 
United States for combat airplanes to (the ROK Air Force) before the end of 1949, but these had not 
been provided. ' Byrd, Chennault, p. 343. 
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action in North Korea without the approval of the United States 
Government. 'S7 
Even earlier, the American reluctance to approve fighter aircraft for 
South Korea had prompted President Rhec to send his special envoy, Dr. 
Chough Pyung Ok, to Washington in April 1949. Dr. Chough pressed for a 
122-airplane air force of 3,000 men with seventy-five fighters, twelve 
bombers, thirty training and reconnaissance planes, and five cargo aircraft, 
all to no avail. 58 President Rhee continued to seek from the US government 
the expansion of his Air Force in a slightly down-sized scale - this time, in 
the summer of 1949, a 99-plane air force including twenty-five F-51 
fighters. 59 The ROK's request was again denied by the American 
government, based on the US Far East Command's negative comments 60 
Following Rhee's lead, ROK Minister of National Defense Shin 
Sung Mo asked for tanks and righter aircraft from the US government. This 
appeal was soon echoed by the American ambassador in Seoul, John J. 
Muccio, who warned in his report of 26 October 1949: The South Korean 
Army is outnumbered in all weapons except individual arms and the 
37 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John A. Williams of the Division of Northeast Asian 
Affairs, December 7,1949' in FRUS, 1949, v. 7, pt. 2, p. 1105. 
ss Seoul Newspaper (ed. ), Ju-!! an M! -Gown 30-Njrm Sa (30 
Year History of US Forces in Korea) 
(Seoul, Korea: clang-Rim, 1979), p. 110; Futrell, 77w USAF In Korea 1950-1953, p. 16; US Air 
Force, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conf Ict, 25 June "1 November 1930 
(hereafter cited as USAF Operations in Karea, June - Nov 1950) (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Air Force, 1952), p. viii. ; Gong-Goon Sa (! ), 1949-53. P. 55. 
39 This plan was devised at Rhee's request by Major General Claire L. Chennault, USAF, Retired. 
who had commanded the US 14th Army Air Force during the Second World War. ROK Ministry of 
National Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staft 11'anl ask Jon-Sa (Tire War !!! story of Korea) (Seoul. 
Korea: Kyo-Irak Sa, 1984) (hereafter cited as !! 'an-Go(A Jon-Sa), p. 605; Gong-Goon Sa (! ), 
1949-53, p. 54; USAF Operations in Kona June-Nov 1950, p. viii; Futrell, The USAF In Korea, 
1950-53, p. 17. 
60 General MacArthur, the commander of the American forces in the Far East, commented in 
January 1950 that the force suggested by Chennault was not essential for internal order in Korea, 
would increase the possibility of war between North and South Korea, and would lend credence to 
communist charges that the United states was fostering an arms race there. ' 11'an-Cook Jon-Sa, p. 
605; Gong-Goon Sa (1), 1949-53, p. 54; USAF Operations In Korso, June-Nov 1950, p. viii; Futrell, 
The USAF In Korea, 1950-53, p. 17. 
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Russians have given North Korea much better armament: 6' Recommending 
F-51 Mustang fighters for the Republic of Korea Air Force, he emphasised 
that it was imperative that Korea be given some means of defence against air 
attack, but that the only aircraft the Republic of Korea had received were 
twenty liaison-type [non-tactical] planes. 62 
Ambassador Muccio's recommendation was refused for two reasons. 
Firstly, the American advisers in the KMAG argued that 'the rough terrain, 
poor roads, and primitive bridges militated against efficient tank operations, ' 
and that the ROK military forces should be conceived as being for internal 
security only, with no need of such heavy weapons. Secondly, Americans 
feared that South Korea might embark upon military adventures of its own 
into North Korea if it was given such tanks and fighters 63 Initially the 
KMAG thought the exclusion of such offensive type weapons was 
appropriate in view of Korea's topographical characteristics (terrain factors) 
and America's monetary constraints'4 However, the KMAG later 
acknowledged the ROK's need for fighters. In its recommendation for the 
fiscal year 1950 MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program) aid to Korea, 
the KMAG warned that Russians had recently supplied more than 120 T-34 
tanks, 65 40 YAK-fighters and 70 IL-attackers to North Korea, and requested 
in December 1949 iifly-two aircraft for the ROK Air Force, including forty 
61 Schnabel, Policy and Direciior , p. 36. During 
1949.50. the Soviet Union supplied about 180 
aircraft: in addition to Yak-3's and IL. 2'i, 10 reconnaissance Plane* and 60 Yak trainers; 122-mm. 
howitzers; 122-mm. guns; 76-mm. self-propelled guns; 45-mm. anti-tank guns; 61-mm.. 82-mm., and 
120-mm. mortars. By June 1950, the North Korean ground forces - the Korean People's Army 
(KPA) and the Border Constabulary - expanded to about 135,000 men. ! Iae-B'ang Kwa Kon-Gom 
pp. 691-699; Appleman, South to the Nakrorrg, North to the Yalu, pp. 10.12. 
t U. S. Congress. Senate. Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations. Military Situation 
in the Far Fast, Part 3: Military Situation in the Far Ferst and 1"bcts Surrounding the Relief of 
General Douglas MacArthur, 1931. Hearings ... 82d 
Congress, Ist Seu. (hereafter cited as 
MacArthur h earings), p. 1993. 
63 Sawyer, Military Advisors, pp. 100.101. This rationale, time and time again, would drive US 
policy, as shall be seen in subsequent chapters. 
64 1bld, p. 100. 
65 Appleman asserts 150 tanks. Appleman, South to the Nahtons North to Yalu, p. 10. 
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F-51 Is, tcn T-6s and two C-47 cargo plants, but without any positivc response 
from the US govcrnmcnt. 66 
When it became apparent that every request for tactical aircraft would 
be refused, no matter the nature of the request, ROK leaders sought a non- 
US avenue to acquire the tactical aircraft . 67 The ROK government appealed 
to the Korean public to cooperate in raising a civil fund to purchase righter 
aircraft 68 The appeal was publicised through the government-run radio 
system and daily newspapers 69 
In quick response to the appcal of the ROK govcmmcnt, Korcan 
intellectuals and politicians joined the mass media in encouraging the 
public's participation in the nation-wide fund raising campaign, reminding 
them that: 'For the sake of our national defence as a sovereign state, no 
Koreans would argue about the spontaneous participation in the historical 
campaign of acquiring the indispensable aircraft out of our own pockets... 
The immediate participation should be everyone's patriotic duty. " Civil 
servants were also encouraged to lead the Korean public in the active fund- 
raising campaign: 'Needless to say, all civil servants should be role models in 
the nation-wide pursuit of expansion of our air defence power by 
demonstrating to the public their leading role in the campaign'7' In 
actuality, civil servant contributions accounted for more than half of the total 
66 Ibid., p. 12. Sawyer, in his Mllirary A4 Mc r. depicts slightly lower figures of the Soviet's 
s supply of tactical aircraft. 30 YAK-9 fighters and 5 IL-2 bombers. Saywer. Military AcMsurs, p. 94. 
Eventually the purchasing source ended up with a Japan-based American trading company. A 
further discussion on this issue follows in the subsequent pages. 
68 Gong-Coon Sa (7), 1949-1933, p. 56. 
69 Clxuun 1/bo, September 23.1949, p. 1 and September 26,1949, p. 2; Do g-Ah Ilbo, September 
25,1949, p, 1 and September 26,1949, p. 2. 
70 Author's translation from an article titled 'Chi-Sung Ae Kyol-Jong In Ae-Gook Ki: Ch'ang Gong 
Ae Choi-Byok U-Ro Bang-Gong Jon-Sun Ac) (The Inauguration of the Patriotic Aircraft, a Result 
of Our I Iearty Patriotism: Surely a Water-tight Air Shield in the Anti-Communist Frontline'), Dong- 
Ah /lho, 13 May 1949, p. 2. Daily newspapers in Seoul joined together in their united efforts to 
advertise the event on consecutive days on and around the inauguration day of the newly purchased 
AT-6 aircraft. See Dong, Ah ! lbo and Clio-Sun No of 12-16 May 1949, p. 2. 71 Chosun 1/bo (Cho sun Daily New. V%Vvr), 26 September 1949, p. 2. Authors translation. 
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funds collected - 180 million Won, out of a total civil fund of 350 million 
Won (worth about $600,000 in 1949 US dollars) - in a few weeks. 72 
This was a considerable amount of money, worth the equivalent of 
either purchasing twenty surplus US C-47 cargo planes, or leasing one 
hundred of the same surplus transport aircraft. ') (Sec Figure 1-2) The 
refusal of the United States to allow South Korea access to this surplus 
equipment demonstrates American policy restraints, rather than availability 
and maintainability of the aircraft. 74 
Figure 1-2: Prices for US Surplus Cargo Planes (1946)7' 
Typc of Aircraft Option 'A' Option 'I3' 
C-54A $75,000 $16,000 
C-54B 90,000 24,000 
C-53 25-40,000 8,000 
C-47 20,000 4,000 
C-46 25-40,000 not available 
Without prior consultation with American advisers, two ROKAF 
officers were to be sent abroad for a preliminary market survey. But the US 
government intervened and forced the ROK to abort the plan once again for 
fear of South Korea's possible self initiated provocation against North 
Korca. 76 As an alternative, the ROK government negotiated a $300,000 
commercial contract for ten Canadian-made AT-6s, 'advanced' trainers, with 
72 Climun 11bo, 14 May 1950, p. 2. 73 Generally speaking, the total programme cost of a weapon system is divided into two parrs: (I) 
the unit cost of the equipment; and (2) its operating cost for one year, including spare parts. The 
unit cost normally occupies around two-thirds of the total programme cost. 
74 Interview, author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Chang Sung-When, 26 April 1995. General Chang had 
flown Japanese bombers during the Second World War. Ile later became ROKAF Chief of Staff 
(1962-1964). 
75 These were the US Surplus Property Administration prices for various types of surplus planes 
offered to Chinese National Aviation Corporation. Option 'A' is the cash purchase price and option 
'13' is the rate per annum on lease for five years. Telegram, The Secretary of State to the Embassy in 
China. I February 1946, Subj: 'Surplus Planes Purchased from the U. S. ' in FRU. S. 1946.71ie Far 
F. as1: China, v. 10, p. 768. 
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the Air Carrier Company, a private American aircraft trading firm in Tokyo. 
They were factory-rebuilt and were to be equipped with machine guns and 
bomb racks, and because of this the US government again refused to grant an 
export license. » The purchase of these ten AT-6s was also resisted by US 
economic aid officials who claimed that 'Korean dollar credits were scarce, ' 
and that the price was'exorbitant. '7 Eventually, difficulties were overcome 
and delivery of the aircraft minus guns and bomb racks was approved. The 
ten AT-6s were delivered in April 1950. In a nation-wide ceremonial rally 
on 14 May 1950 at Seoul Yo'E Do airfield, these ten 'advanced' trainers 
were named Gon-Gook llo (77ue Nation-Building). 79 
Once the contract was signed and the arrival of the aircraft was 
confirmed, the United States Air Force provided a nine-man training team - 
three officer flight instructors, three airplane mechanics, two radio 
mechanics and one aircraft electrician - to assist in transition training in the 
newly purchased AT-6s. But the State Department made it clear in its inter- 
departmental correspondence that the furnishing of these personnel did not 
mean 'a commitment in support of an autonomous Korean Air Force. That 
is, the Department does not consider that it is supporting the creation of an 
autonomous Korean Air Force by suggesting to the Department of Defense 
that air advisers be (separately] assigned to Korea. ' The American training 
team, the Department continued to reason, was provided simply because 'in 
the absence of competent advisers ... the new aircraft and equipment will 
be 
lost to the South Korean government through misuse. 'HO Nevertheless, the 
76 Two officers were: Lt. Colonel Kim Chung-Yul and Major Lee Keun-Suk. Kim, Kim Chang Yu! 
Atems ir, p. 99. This was also verified in Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul's personal talk on 23 
February 1990 with the author. Author's memorandum of records dated 27 February 1990. 77 US government permission was required because the AT-6s that were manufactured in Canada 
were subject to specific contract limitations regarding We to third panics. 
78'5th AF history, Jan - Jun 1952. ' m. s.. vol. 2, pp. 344.345. K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1952, v. 2. AFI IRA. 79 Gong-Goon Sa (/), 1949.1953, p. 56. 
80 'The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Office of 
Foreign Military Affairs. Office of the Secretary of Defense (1 {alaby); January 31,1950 in FRUS, 
1950, v. 7, pt. 2, p. 24. 
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training with these T-6 aircraft received between April and June 1950 was a 
major factor in laying a foundation for training Korean pilots eventually to 
fly F-51 s with a minimum of transition training soon after the invasion of 
South Korea. 8' 
Another contribution to the potential of the South Korean Air Force 
was made by Borne Associates, an American firm which contracted with the 
Korean government for the operation of Kimpo airfield in October 1949, 
after the last of the US occupation forces departed. The contract included 
the training of civilian technicians in airport operations. South Korean Air 
Force personnel were classified civilians for the purpose of receiving 
training. Those who were not then ROKAF personnel became so after the 
start of hostilities. 82 Although the numbers involved were few, and the 
training rather poor and short lived, the contribution to ROKAF potential 
was important. 
No major change in ROK's air defence improvement (i. e., righter 
capability) occurred until the middle of June 1950, when the ROKAF had 
merely twenty-two liaison and trainer airplanes, and 1,897 officers and 
airmen, including fifty-seven pilots, of whom thirty-nine were considered 
fully trained. Also included were ninety cadets who had just started a two 
year regular course in the newly founded ROKAF Acadcmy. 113 The ten T 
6sM and 12 L-4s/L-5s were deployed at Kimpo and Yo'E Do airfields, and 
81 Kim, Kim Chung Yul Memoir, p. 131; 7 Gstory of the Far East Air Forces (hereafter cited as 
FEAF History), 1 July 1953 - 31 December 1953; ms., vol. 1., p. 26. K720.01 Jul-Dec 1953, v. 1. 
AFIIRA. 
82 '5th AF 1 Gstory, Jan - Jun 1950, ' m. s., vol. 2, pp. 344-345. 
K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1950, v. 2. AFI IRA. 
83 Thirty-two of the ROKAF Academy's first class took part in the Korean War, (lying an average 
of some fifty combat missions each in F-51 s. Three were killed in action. 11'ang-Gong AMP. &, pp. 
254-255. 
84 The AT-6s were redesignated T-6s when Americans refused to equip them with bomb racks and 
other attack options. 
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a 
the ROKAF had detachments at five other airfields (Suwon, Tacgu, 
Kwangju, Kunsan, and Cheju Island). 85 
The formation of the South Korean Air Force was unique in the 
annals of airpower. This force came into being owing primarily to the far- 
sightedness, enthusiasm and determination of the founding members, 
together with already experienced personnel who brought to their new 
organisation flying, maintenance and management skills necessary for 
operations of their fledgling air force. Initially they encountered resistance 
from both the Korean Army leaders and the American military advisers, but 
their persistence eventually overcame all obstacles. The development of the 
ROKAF was enhanced by the attention paid to the culture and tradition of 
Korean seniority, which precluded many potential conflicts among airmen, 
particularly during the early, unsettled stages of ROKAF formation. Albeit a 
nominal force structure without a single tactical aircraft, the basic foundation 
(pilots, aircraft, airfields and organisation) was laid with assured status as a 
separate service of the ROK Armed Forccs. 86 
As the newly created ROK Air Force eagerly began to anticipate its 
future, the military situation on the Korean peninsula rapidly deteriorated 
from border clashes and communist-agitated insurrections and guerrilla 
harassment in South Korea. How the South Korean Air Force was swept 
into the embroiling conditions, and how it adapted to its opportunities on the 
eve of hostilities, will be analysed in the following chapter. 
gs Out of the initial 20 L-4sM5s, eight were lost in training and liaison missions. Gong- oon Sa (1). 
1949 - 1953, pp. 57,60; 11'ang-Gcw gJon-Sa, p. 58. 86 For an account of ROK Army historians on the ROKAFs independence. see Yoi-A-Go n Jcw-&: 
6.25 Sa-1Jyon, Jae I Kwon (The 11lsiory of the Army. ' The Korean War, Volume 1) (Taegu, Korea: 
ROK Army Office of Iiistory, 1952), pp. 81.85. The book is out of print. The author was granted 
access to this book. which is presently kept as ROK Air Force historical reference material. Deung- 
Rok Don-I1o (Registration No. ) #8443. Goon-S& Ja-Ryo (Military Reference) #721.18/1977.10.27. 
ROK Air Force Goon-Sa Yon-Goo Sil (Office of Military 1 History Studies), Taejon. Korea. 
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CIIAi'TER TWO 
TILE MILITARY SITUATION 
ON TILE PENINSULA, 1949-JUNE 1950 
When the ROK Air Force became a separate service on I October 
1949, it was three months after the departure of the last unit of the 
withdrawing US occupation forces from Korea, and less than nine months 
before the outbreak of the Korean War. The nascent ROKAF, equipped with 
some twenty light planes, was virtually helpless to fill the vacuum left by the 
departure of American air forces, and the air defence preparedness of South 
Korea against Soviet-supplied North Korea's YAK-fighters was practically 
nil. When the Soviet-trained North Korean People's Army launched a 
preemptive attack with their T-34 tanks and YAK fighters on 25 June 1950, 
the ROKAF had to cope with the communist onslaught with bare-hands; 
until the US fighter forces came to their assistance. Nor were the United 
States Air Forces in the Far East prepared for the required air effort in the 
Korean theatre. 
This chapter examines (1) how the security of South Korea was 
perceived by the United States government prior to the Korean War, and (2) 
how ill-prepared both the Korean and American air forces were on the eve of 
hostilities. Both of these factors affected the early history of the South 
Korean Air Force, which was viewed by the United States as a token 
supplementary force for defensive purposes only. 
2.1. US Government's Perception of South Korea 
Prior to the War 
46 
American interests in the Korean peninsula until the outbreak of the 
Korean War remained peripheral. ' Dr. Syngman Rhee (one of the leading 
political leaders, not yet President) interpreted the Truman Doctrine as 
implying an extended commitment to South Korea as well, although it soon 
became clear that the original intent of the doctrine, as applied to Greece and 
Turkey for the containment of communism, was not present in the case of 
South Korea. 2 In the summer of 1949, a US Department of the Army study 
reflected the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the non-applicability 
of the Truman Doctrine to South Korea, due to'its little strategic value': 
[It] involves a militarily disproportionate expenditure of US 
power, resources and effort at a time when international relations 
in Europe are precariously balanced and militarily unsound. To 
apply the Truman Doctrine to Korea would require prodigious 
effort and vast expenditures far out of proportion to the benefit to 
be expected. ' 
This view was later rcconfirmcd by General Matthew B. Ridgway, the 
former Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command (April 1951-May 
1952): 'Above all, the close ties of blood and culture ... persuaded 
Washington that Europe must come first and Asia second'+ Ridgway further 
stated that prior to the Korean War, in case of a next global war involving 
the United States, Korea would be 'of minor importance and, in any event, 
t John Lewis Gaddis, 'Korea in American Politics. Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945.50,1 in Yonosuke 
Nagai and Akira Iriye (eds), The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1977). p. 282; Callum A. MacDonald, Korea. * 77we War Be"i" I7enkrm (New 
York: Free Press, 1986), pp. 17,23; Matthew D. Ridgway, 71w Korean War (Garden City. NY: 
Doubleday, 1967), p. 147; Glenn D. Paige, 11w Korean lt'cislorr (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 
69; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preprvuleranve of Po er: National Security, the Truman Admnistraiion, 
and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 1992), pp. 385,407.418; Futrell, The 
(ISAF In Korea, 1950-53, p. IS. 2 Ltr, Dr. Syngman Rhee to President Truman, March 13,1947. FHUS. 1947, v. 6, p. 620. 
Truman did not respond to Rhee's interpretation of the Truman Doctrine. Ibiet, p. 620 fn 39. 3 Memo, Dept. of the Army to the Dept, of State, 27 June 1949; Subj: Implications of a Possible 
Full Scale Invasion from North Korea Subsequent to Withdrawal of United States Troops from 
South Korea. FIWS, 1949, v. 7, pt. 2, p. 1056. 
4 Ridgway, 71weKorewt Ifirr, p. 147. 
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indefensible. " From an economical standpoint, the low priority of Korea 
may be traced to the US desire to avoid 'a drain of men and material on the 
peninsula that would weaken American capabilities elsewhere, especially in 
vital Europe. i6 
On 30 December 1949, six months after the US troop withdrawal 
from South Korea, President Truman approved NSC 48/2, a document that 
spelled out the Washington government's policy for Asia. To prevent the 
expansion of communist power into the Pacific, the United States intended 
to rely on its bastions in the Philippines, the Ryukus, and Japan. As for 
South Korea, mentioned almost in passing, the United States should continue 
to provide economic, military, and technical assistance. ' Then, on 12 January 
1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson delivered his famous speech to 
the National Press Club, in which his sketch of the American defensive 
perimeter in the Far East excluded South Korea from the US defence line, 
and declared that should an area lying beyond the perimeter prove incapable 
of turning back an aggressor, it would be up to 'the entire civilized world 
under the Charter of the United Nations' to protect the area's independence. ' 
Acheson's speech alarmed many South Koreans, who thought it 
represented their abandonment by the United Statcs. 9 Greater anguish would 
s Ibld, p. 11. 6 Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 69. 
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the 
National Security Council, December 30,1949, Subj: The Position of the United States with Respect 
to Asia' FRUS, 1949, Y. 7, pr 2, The Far last aid Australia, p. 1218. NSC 48/2 showed 
America's determination to contain communist expansion in Asia. Fora full account of NSC 48/2, 
see Ibid, pp. 1215.1220; Department of State, United States - Vietnam Relatiorsr, 1945-1967, 
Volume 8 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971), pp. 225-275. s 'Crisis in Asia - An Explanation of U. S. Policy, ' remarks by Acheson. January 12,1950, 
Department of State Bulletin, 22: 551 (January 23,1950), P. 116. John Edward Wilz asserts: 
'Acheson's National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950, was, in essence, a summation of NSC 48 
[documents]. But it clearly did not dissuade the Communist dictators from proceeding with plans 
for a military conquest of South Korea' John Edward Wilz, 'Encountering Korea: American 
Perceptions and Policies of 25 June 1950, ' in William J. Williams, ed., A Revolutlorkary War: Korea 
and the Transformation of the J'astwar Work1(Chicago, IL: Imprint Publications, 1993), p. 77 fn 
220. For Wilz's full account, see Old, pp. 13.82. 9 Dong Ah llbo (13 January 1950), p. 1; 1 lo-Jae Lee, Ilan-Cook Oe4 yo Jung-Check At Yl cyrg Kwa 11yon-Si1. " llae-Bang 8-Nyon JNin lok Kal-Dung Ki At Ban-Sung (Ideals and Realities of 
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have been stirred among the Koreans in Seoul, had they known the 
substance of Acheson's testimony presented to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee the day following the National Press Club speech. Ater 
explaining to the senators that South Korea could not turn back a Soviet- 
assisted invasion by North Korea, the secretary testified that he did not know 
if the United States would undertake to resist North Korea's invasion of 
South Korea. He also conceded that the Soviets probably would veto any 
resolution introduced in the Security Council of the United Nations 
mandating a military response by UN members to an invasion of South 
Korea. 1° When the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Tom Connally of Texas, surprised Korean' leaders in Seoul by telling a 
reporter in April 1950 that abandonment of the Republic of Korea by the 
United States was a 'distinctive possibility, South Korean concern was 
intensified. 1' 
The ambiguous hint of UN support in the event of war in Korea did 
not anticipate any specific attempt to exploit the vacuum left in South 
Korea. 12 At that time the American policymakers believed that 'the major 
threat to the South was from internal unrest and subversion, rather than from 
invasion, ' and that any communist hostile provocations would occur in 
South Korean Foreign Policy: Self-F. raminallon of the 8-Year Natkw al Conflict Perrw (Scout, 
Korea: Bop-Moon Sa. 1986), p. 47; Sil Park, //an-Goo. t' Oe-K un Bee-Sa (Tie Unto1J Story of 
Korean Diplomacy) (Seoul, Korea: Ki-Rim Si, 1979), p. 28; Chom-kon Kim, The Korean ff v, 
1950-1953 (Seoul, Korea: Kwangmyong Publishing, 1980), pp. 49-53; f lak joon Kim, ! Ian- xxA 
AloonJae Wa CookJae Jong-Ghee (The Korean Question and International Politics) (Seoul, Korea: 
Park-Young Sa, 1995), p. 194. See also 'Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs (Rusk), to the Under Secretary of State (Webb), ' May 2,1950. FRUT. 1950, v. 7, 
Korea, p. 65. 
1° U. S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Reviews of the World Situation: 1949- 
(950. Hearings ... 81st Cong., Ist and 2nd soss. 
(Washington, DC: USGPO, 1950), p. 191. 
t 'World Policy and Bipartisanship, ' interview with Senator Tom Connally. U. S News and World 
Report 28: 18 (May S. 1950), p. 30; 'The Charge [d'Affaires) in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary 
of State, ' May 5,1950. FRUS, 1950, v. 7, Korea, pp. 66.67. 12 David S. McLellan, Demo Acheson: The State Deportment Years (New York: Dodd, Mead, 
1976), p. 268. 
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Europe. 13 American military planners and policymakers paid little attention 
to the Soviet Union's fundamental strategic and geopolitical concern with 
Korea. 14 Soviet control of the Korean peninsula could provide the USSR 
with strategically advantageous air and naval bases outside its borders, 
thereby giving the. USSR'a further strategic advantage' in threatening Japan, 
and consequently enhancing 'the position of the USSR vis-a-vvts the US in the 
Far East' For instance, Soviet military control of the entire Korean 
peninsula would make it possible for the Russians to neutralise 'the 
usefulness of Japan as an American base, ' in the event of a major war, 
because of Soviet air and naval threats poised from the peninsula. " But such 
views, common among US intelligence analysts, had little effect on high- 
level policymakers, most of whom were sceptical about the USSR's military 
capabilities so soon after the devastating losses incurred during the Second 
World War. 
When the United States ran into the 'shocks of 1949' - the US 
monopoly of the atomic bomb was broken upon the explosion of the first 
Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949, some years ahead of US 
expectation, ' and the 'loss of China' appeared definite in October"- 
President Truman responded to the increased apprehension about the trend 
of the nation's security position, and in January 1950 directed the State 
Department to conduct a study on general security policy. The results were 
13 Rudolf J. Rummel, 'Korea and the Correlation of Forces Toward War, ' Korea and World Affairs 
5: 1 (Spring 1981), p. 25 fn 8. 
14 Pacific Command United States Army (PACUSA) Report. 'Estimate of Soviet Offensive 
Capabilities in Korea and Vicinity, ' 1 April 1946, in 'KO-46127 PACUSA Report, ' 720.609-7. US 
Air Force historical records, US Air Force Ilistorical Research Agency (AFIIRA), Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama. 
is Annex A: Soviet Position in Northern Korea, Memorandum by the Central Intclligence Agency, 
June 19,1950. EXIS 1950, v. 7, p. 111. 16 The NSC assumed that by 1954 the Soviet Union would possess a stockpile of a considerable 
number of nuclear warheads. Maurice A. Mallin, TwnLc Fighters & Ships: U5 Conventional Force 
Pluming since 117V11(Washington, DC: llrassey's, 1990). p. 4S. 17 John Lewis Gaddis, The Strategies of GHitalrunent: A Critical Appraisal of 1163tu r American 
National Security 1'olicy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 90. 
so 
submitted to the President in April 1950. The study report, entitled NSC- 
68,18 treated the Soviet threat 'as primarily military, " and emphasised 'the 
inadequacy of the Western capability to meet limited military challenges due 
to a lack of conventional forces, shortcomings in the Western alliance 
system, and the military and economic weaknesses of Western Europe, ' 
accordingly advocating a drastic increase of American conventional forccs. 20 
NSC-68 can be interpreted as a call to arms that urged significant upgrading 
of Western defence capability. The gist of the document called for increased 
defence expenditure for the improvement of US conventional forces 'without 
war, without long-term budget deficits, and without crushing tax burdcns'2' 
The document's priorities were focused on the defence of Western Europe, 
and the Middle East. 22 Even the formulation by the National Security 
Council of NCS-68, a document arguing that America should stand up to 
Soviet and Soviet-supported expansion across the entire world, brought no 
apparent change in the thinking of the Washington government about 
Korea. 23 No mention was made of Korea, which was 'presumably to be 
written off entirely. 924 
is The result of the study was initially submitted to the President on 7 April 1950, over the 
signatures of Secretaries Dean Acheson (State) and Louis Johnson (Defense). On 12 April, it was 
forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. The President expressed 
neither approval nor disapproval of the report itself. Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 38-39; 
MacDonald, Korea. p. 24. 
19 MacDonald, Korea, p. 22. 20 William W. Kaufmann, ! Tanning Cw, wntiarrl Forcei, 1950-19.90 (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1982), p. 2. 21 1b11 p. 93. 22 lbkL, p. 11 S. 23 The details on the background and formulation of the NSC-68 can be found in NSC-68: 
Enclosure 2. 'A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31,1950. ' 
FRUS 1950, v. 1, National Security Affairs: Foreign &, mnomlc 11ollry, pp. 235-292. President 
Truman returned the report to the NSC with instructions to work out its actual cost in dollars. 
3efore this could be done, the war began in Korea. 4 Schnabel and Watson, JCS/7he History of the Korean Mar, pp. 4748. According to General 
Ridgway, the U. S. emergency plans for the Far East did not provide for the defence of the Korean 
peninsula, Ridgway, hie Korean War, p. 12. 
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2.2. The Military Balance in the Far East (1949 -. tune 1950) 
In June 1950, the ROK Army had a total of eight infantry divisions of 
65,000 men plus an additional 33,000 in headquarters and service troops. 
Each of the divisions was below its nominal strength of 10,000, and 
equipped with light weapons only. 23 In addition, the 17th Regiment of the 
Capital Division was independently deployed on the Ongjin peninsula, 
geographically separated from the mainland of South Korea. 26 The other four 
divisions were scattered throughout the interior and southern parts of the 
country, three of them engaged in anti-guerrilla activity and training in small 
unit tactics. 27 Only thirty of the ROKA's sixty-seven battalions, including the 
three squadrons of the cavalry regiment, had completed company training by 
the end of 1949. Of these, only twenty had begun the battalion phase. 
Eleven battalions had not yet finished their platoon training. Twenty-eight 
battalions had completed qualification firing of the MI rifle, but the 
remaining thirty-nine, recurrently engaged in counter-guerrilla activities, 
were from 20 % to 90 % qualified. The overall training state of the South 
Korean troops was so below standard; ' that the ROK Army 'could have been 
the American Army in 1775.29 
The ROK Navy in June 1950 had a total of 6,956 officers and sailors 
(1,077 marines included), and only one patrol craft (PC701) recently 
25 The divisions engaged in fighting guerrillas in the eastern and southern mountains had a miscellany 
of small arms, including many Japanese Type- 99 rifles. I leaviceweapons the ROK Army had 
before the Korean War were: 27 armoured can; 700 artillery pieces and mortars, including 105-mm. 
howitzers and 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars; about 140 anti-tank guns and about 1.900 2.36-in 
bazookas, which later proved fbtile coping with North Korea's T-34 tanks. Schnabel and Watson, 
JCS17he History of the Korean War, pp. 326-327. 
26 The Ongjin peninsula on the west coast was Isolated from South Korea's landmass by the 38th 
Parallel. After American troop withdrawal. no access by South Koreans was available by land. See 
Figure 3.1 in Ch. 3. 
!! 'an-Cook Jon. pp. 309-311. 28 J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The ! 1lstory and Les s of Korea (Boston. MA: 
I ioughton Mifflin Co.. 1969). p, 43; ! Ian-Cx ok Jon & wng Sa, p. 214. 29 ! l'an- cxýt Jon, laeng Sa, p. 196; Sawyer, Alilikay Athisors p. 69. For an English account of 
the state of ROK Army training from mid-1949 to May 1950, ace Sawyer. Military, 4, A-lcnrs pp. 
67.78. 
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purchased in the United States from surplus vessels; three other similar 
patrol craft at Hawaii were en route to Korea, I LST, 15 former US mine 
sweepers, 10 former Japanese mine layers, and various other small craft, 
totaling 28 tactical craft and 43 auxiliary craft. -' 
The ROK Air Force in June 1950 was of minimal strength, consisting 
of a single flight group of less than 2,000 officers and airmen and 22 light 
(non-tactical) airplanes. " At the time, the United States Far East Air Forces 
had a considerable number of F-51 Mustang propeller-driven fighters in 
Japan and they were being replaced by jets. 31 Although these might be 
obsolescent to the American pilots, they were not to Korean pilots. In March 
1950, KMAG suggested to Washington about fifty of the F-S 1s be turned 
over to the ROKAF, to no avail. " Soon of er the war started, ten of these F- 
51 fighters were hurriedly ferried to Taegu airfield, later becoming the 
mainstay of the ROK Air Force. " At the outbreak of hostilities, the South 
Korean Air Force lost many of its L-4/L-5 liaison planes in combat. They 
were very vulnerable to small fires because of their lack of armour plate and 
bullet-proof fuel tanks. In retrospect, to match the speedy, hard-hitting 
Soviet YAK-fighters, the South Korean pilots had to have its equal, the F-5I 
Afustang fighters. " 
In contrast to the United States, which focused its military assistance 
on the ROK Army, the USSR provided a considerable air strength to North 
30 Hae-li'ang Kwa Kon-Golni, p. 600. 
Gong-Gar»: , kr (1), 1949-1953, pp. 57-60; 
11'wtgd o ig Jo Sa, p. 38; US Air Force source 
shows fewer ROKAF aircraft on the eve of the Korean War: sixteen airplanes (8 L. 4s, S L-Ss, and 3 
T-6s). Futrell, UMF In Korea. 1950-53. P. 17. 
32 A total of 47 F-S Is were available in FEAFI inventory. US Far East Air Forces. H14FRe port vit 
the Korean War: Volume / (s. l., 1954), p. 14. This report was produced in two volumes in the same 
'3ear. Hereafter the Volume I is cited as F EAF Rrlwr! (/) and Volume 11 as F'E: t F Relxirt (2). 
Ltr, Maj Gen C. L. Bolte, G-3 Dept. Army to Brig Gen W. L. Roberts, Chief, KMAG, 8 March 
1950. Ops 091 Korea (Section 1) (Cases 1.20); Decimal File March 1950-193 1, Box 121; Records 
of the Department of the Army, Record Group 319. National Archives, Washington. DC. (NADC) 34 flae-B'ang Kwa Kon-Goon, pp. 789-791. Gong-Goon Sit (1) 1949-33, pp. 119.121; Futrell. Ilk, 
USAI in Korea, 1950-1953, p. 89, 35 Dean E. I less, Battler hymn (New York: McGraw-I fill), p. 76. 
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Korea. In June 1950, with headquarters at Pyongyang, the North Korean Air 
Force (NKAF) consisted of one air division of three regiments: a righter 
regiment, a ground-attack regiment, and a training regiment. NKAF was 
estimated to command a considerable number of various types of aircraft, 
half of which were YAK fighters and IL-attack aircraft. North Korea also 
possessed a line of airfields from coast to coast with four (Sinmak, 
Pyonggang, Kumchon, and Kansong) close to the 38th Parallel, in 
advantageous positions for offensive air action against South Korea. Most of 
North Korea's tactical aircraft were based at airfields near Pyongyang, 
Yonpo and Sinmak. 36 (The number of NKAF's total aircraft on the day North 
Korea invaded the South varies depending upon sources. But the most 
updated number of NKAF tactical aircraft was 152 as appraised by FEAF 
i ntel I igence. )'7(Figure 2-1) 
The number of North Korean Air Force personnel in June 1950 was 
estimated as high as 2,200 men. From October 1946 to the cvc of the Korean 
War, four classes, totaling 1,080 North Korean air force personnel, were 
known to have received flying training at USSR airbascs near Moscow, 
Kiev in Ukraine, and Vladivostok. 38 On the cvc of hostilities the Far East 
36 'Maj. Hugh L. Williamson, Actg. Air Attache, Seoul, rpt. No. 4-50,11 May 1950 and rpt. 
AF200113, OSI Dist. No. 8,10 June 1950' as cited in Futrell, The USAF In Korea. 1950-53, p. 720 
(n64. 
The ROK Air Force source indicates the total number of North Korea's aircraft as 198 (100 
Yak-fighters; 71 IL-10; 4 11-4; 18 PO-2/TU-2; and 3 miscellaneous planes). Gong-Goon Sa (1). 
1949-53, p. 64; I! 'ang-GwWdon p. 36. Dr. Futrell's total NKAF aircraft number Is 162: 62 IL- 
10 attack aircraft, 70 Yak-3/713 fighters, 22 Yak-16 transports (equivalent to USAF C-45), and 8 
PO-2 trainers. Futrell, The USAF In Korea; 1950-53, p. 19. The breakdown of 152 NKAF aircraft 
was brought up to date by the FEAF intelligence upon defection of a North Korean pilot to the ROK 
on 28 April 1950. This information correlated with that obtained from a North Korean pilot. shot 
down near Suwon at the outbreak of hostilities (Major Pak Kyung Ok, 29 June 1950). UXAF 
Opcrorlom in Korea, Jure. Nov 1950, p. ix. 
38 Corrg-Gar n Sa (/), 1949-53, p. 64; 11'ang. Gong Jon, +Sa, p. 36. There were two distinctive 
figures who played key roles in the activation of North Korea's air force. One was Senior Colonel 
Wang Yon, who had served in Manchuria and was graduated from a Soviet military academy as an 
air force lieutenant in the Soviet army. Ile had been in North Korea since 1945. Wang commanded 
the North Korean air unit. His chief of stall' was believed to be Colonel Lee 1 iwal, who had been 
educated in Japan. Ile was thought to be responsible for the organisation of the North Korean Air 
Force. Gang-Corn Sa (1), 1949-53, pp. 63-64; 11'wrg-Gong Jon Sa, pp. 32-36; Peter Lowe, the 
Origins of te Korean Mar (London, UK: Longman, 1986), p. 53. 
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Air Forces intelligence assessed that most North Korean pilots were 
aggressive and eager to fight, although they had limited flying experience. 
Despite the fact that the NKAF was immature and incompletely trained, 
FEAF intelligence further thought North Korea's airpowtiwcr was clearly an 
offensive force, and had the capability to destroy the meager ROKAF and 
then materially to assist the North Korean ground forces as they moved into 
South Korea. 39 
Figure 2-1: North Korean Air Force Air Order of Battie40 
(April-June 1950) 
Location Type Number 
Yon po ....................... Yak-713 .............. ......... 10 Yon po ....................... Yak-11 ............... ......... 
12 
Yonpo ....................... IL-10 ................ ......... 
18 
Sinmak ............... ....... Yak-713 .............. ......... 
10 
Si nmak ............... ....... IL-10 ................. ............ 
2 
Pyongyang ................ IL-10 ............................ 
8 
Pyongyang ................ 
Yak-713 .............. ........ 
20 
Pyongyang .......... ...... Yak-11 ......................... 
2 
Pyongyang .......... ...... IL-10 ........................... 
40 
Various locations ..... Miscellaneous ..... .......... 
30 
Total Aircraft ........................................ ........ 
152 
While North Korea's air power was built up in the northern part of the 
Korean peninsula, South Korea's Air Force was miniscule and unarmed. The 
only available external airpowcr was US air forces in the Far East. I fowever, 
their force deployment was scattered around the region. The Far East Air 
Forces, the air component of the Far East Command (FEC), were divided 
among three numbered air forces: 5th Air Force (AF) (Japan), 13th AF 
39 Air Intelligence Information Report, 'Review of North Korean Air Power and Its Potentialities, ' 
28 Feb. 1950, Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, in the attachment to Memorandum of 
Conversation, 3 April 1950, Records of the Department of State, Record Group (RG) 39, Central 
File, 1930-54,795.00/4.350. l3ox 4682. National Archives 11, College Park, Maryland. 
40 1M1 Operations In Aurru, June- Nov 1950, p. ix. 
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1re: r% of Responsibility of the Numbered Air Forces 
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(Philippines), and 20th AF (Okinawa). Collectively, these USAF numbered 
air forces were commanded by US Air Force Lieutenant General George E. 
Stratemeyer. Covering an extensive area of operations from Japan to the 
Ryukyus, the Marianas and Philippines, the FEAF had, prior to the Korean 
War, thirty squadrons, the equivalent of nine of the forty-eight combat wings 
in the whole of the USAF. " The aircraft complement of FEAF's tactical 
units bespoke its primarily defensive mission. As of 31 May 1950, FEAF 
possessed 1,172 aircraft (including those in storage and a few in salvage or 
recommended for salvage), of which 73 were B-26s, 27 ß-29s, 47 F-S I s, 
504 F-80s, 42 F-82s, 179 transports of all types, 48 reconnaissance planes, 
and 252 miscellaneous aircraft. " 
The Far East Air Forces were tasked with only one minor mission 
related to Korea in war, and that was to provide for the safety of American 
citizens in the country. 43 it was not the responsibility of the Commander of 
FEAF to plan for the air defence of Korea, for the implementation of an 
interdiction program in Korea, or for the possible support of ground units 
engaged in combat in Korea. All FEAF F-80s, the mainstay of a US defence 
force based beyond the boundaries of Korea, were initially configured as 
interceptors and not fitted out to discharge the primary functions of tightcr- 
bombers, even though the role subsequently was forced upon them. " (Fifth 
Air Force combat units were stationed at various bases from Misawa on 
northern Honshu Island, to Itazukc on the southern tip of Kyushu Island. 
The nearest bases in Japan were located nearly 350 miles from the initial 
t M. J. Armitage and R A. Mason. Air 1'a»Yr In te Nuclear Age (2nd Ed. ) (Chicago, IL: 
University of Illinois Press. 1994), p. 22. 12 ll'an-Go k Jon-Sa. p. 787; USAF Operations In Korea June-Nov 1950, p. 3. The figures of 
tactical aircraft conflict with those depicted in other US Air Force archives. For instance, FEAF 
rSported 24 17-51s. 39017-80s and 3217-82s. See FF4FReport (I), p. 14. 
U. S. Air Force Oral History Interview: K239.0512-919: General Earl ß. partridge, 12 April 
1968, p. 13. K239,012-919. AFi IRA. 44 USAF Operations in Korea June-Nov 1950, p. 1. See also U. S. Air Force Oral History 
Interview: K239.0512-919: General Earl E. Partridge, 12 April 1968, pp. 13.14. K239.012-919. 
AFI IRA. 
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battle line, north of Seoul. )" (See Figure 2-2) The over-riding mission of 
FEAF was to provide air defence and air warning for the Japanese Islands, 
the Ryukyu Islands, the Marianas, and for the United States bases and 
installations in the Philippine Islands. On the eve of hostilities, FEAF 
possessed in all of Japan only four airfields with runways 7,000 feet long 
which could meet the operational requirements for jet lighters loaded with 
maximum fuel and armaments. ` 
FEAF, whose authorised personnel strength was 39,975 officers and 
men, had assigned 33,625 -a little under the Air Force peacetime 
requirement of 90 percent manning. Most FEAF units and all 5th Air Force 
units held peacetime T/O & is (Table of Organization and Equipment) 
allotment of aircraft. The appearance, however, of a satisfactory T/O &E 
status was deceptive, for there were shortages of particular categories of 
personnel and deficiencies in training, which, compounded by material 
shortages, would lower operational ef7icicncy in combat. The light 
bombardment group, for example, was short of navigators, bombardicrs, and 
gunners, so that its combat crews could not conduct sustained operations 
cfiiciently. " 
Prior to the Korean War, USAF budget ceilings, moreover, had cut 
into the training programme due to the Truman administration's policy to 
hold military appropriations and expenditures to a minimum: non-tactical 
manoeuvering missions such as cross-country flights in Japan had been 
curtailed prior to the Korean War, and most of the navigational flights 
had been accomplished between well-known bases (geographically 
45 TEAF Weekly Intelligence Roundups, ' No. 18, From 0001/I 31 Doc SO to 2400/16 Jan 51. 
Related Documents to Barcus Report (Sup. Doc. in D. C. ). K-168.04.1, V. 2, pt 10. Sup. Doc. 10. 
6 
25 Jun - 31 Dec 1950. AFI IRA. 
USAF Opera: ioru In A'orcc June-Nov 1950, p. 3; U. S. Air Force Oral Ilistory Interview: 
K239.0512-919: General Earl E. Partridge, 12 April 1968, pp. 13-14. K239.012-919. AFIIRA. 47 USAF Operation t in Korea; June-Nov 1950 p. 3. 
37 
Figure 2-2: Disposition of USAF Tactical Units in Japan " 
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48 USAF. Unlled Slaps Air Force Optrutlow M& Kadi Cortflcl. 111MM "I Nowm&r 1910 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1952), p. 15. 
distinctive air bases, well equipped with navigation aids, e. g., between either 
Yokota-lwakuni-Yokota or Itazukc-Tachikawa-Misawa-Itazuke), by the 
pilots making full use of radio aids and ranges. (See also Figure 2-2), Rocket 
training of FEAF fighter pilots was limited by the USAF policy that stocks of 
5-inch high velocity aerial rockets (LIVAR) were not to be depleted without 
special permission. Since few FI? AF pilots had ever fired a 5-inch JIVAR, 
they had to get their rocket training in combat, for which they were ill 
prepared. 49 Their unit commanders 'estimated their combat efficiency in the 
spring of 1950 to be only 10 to 25 percent of that usual for such units during 
World War 1I iS° 
2.3. The Eve of Hostilities 
In the meantime, despite the lack of tactical aircraft, the South 
Korean pilots worked hard to support the ROK Army with whatever 
equipment was available. During the period of October 1948 to January 
1949, when the communist-connected ROK Army mutinies occurred in the 
Yosu-Sunchon and Cheju Island areas, the AAC pilots were called upon to 
support the mop-up operations against these mutineers. $' The missions they 
flew - liaison, aerial observation, and leaflet dropping - were limited by the 
L-4's short flight range. Soon the US Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) 
supplied ten additional longer-range L-5's, which brought the total number of 
the AAC's strength to twenty aircraft. s= South Korean pilots, who felt 
helpless when they found themselves exposed to the demand for tactical air 
19 Mid, pp. 3-4. 50 Ibld, p. 4. 
31 The Korean Army Air Corps did not become the ROK Air Force until 1 October 1949. English 
accounts of communist-agitated ROK Army mutinies and guerrilla harassments in South Korea prior 
to the Korean War can be found in John Merrill. Korea: The Peninsula Origins of he Korean War 
(London, U. K.: Associated University Press, 1989), pp. 99.129; and Bruce Cumings, The Origins of 
the Korean Mar: i plume 11; The Roaring of thc' Cat rt 1947.1950 (Princeton. NJ. Princeton 
University Press, 1990), pp. 268-290. 
52 N'wrg-&» gJurr Sq p. 49. 
59 
strikes during these counter-insurgency support operations, tried to 
compensate by dropping from their liaison type aircraft 'home-made' bombs, 
hand grenades and mortar shells, to no avail. In one unusual instance, an 
ammunition mechanic of the Korean Army Air Corps produced nine 30- 
pound aerial bombs which were dropped successfully from an L-4 aircraft on 
the communist insurgent forces on Cheju Island. '3 
One of the lessons learned during this period was the deficiencies of 
the L-4/5s. Their limited range, slow speed, and lack of communications 
equipment made clear the Korean pilots' need for higher performance tactical 
aircraft. Another lesson learned was the need to maintain pilots' flying 
proficiency, without which the support missions would not have been 
executed successfully. When ten 'hcav. V and 'fast' metal-framed T-6 
'advanced' trainer aircraft arrived, barely two months before the outbreak of 
hostilities, Korean pilots immediately converted to the new equipment. 
These T-6 trainers were regarded as one of ROK's national treasures. 
Aware that the ten aircraft were paid for with money donated by the Korean 
public, ROKAF pilots were mindful of their significance to the Korean 
people. Only the 'best selected' pilots were allowed to fly. Although these 
planes were not equipped with weapons, their higher speed and 
manocuvcrability, as well as their sturdy metal airframes, enabled the Korean 
pilots to fly tactical manoeuvres in acrobatics and simulated air-to-ground 
attack missions. In addition to maintaining their proficiency in tactical 
manoeuvres, visual navigation flights across country and near border areas 
were constantly flown, so that South Korean pilots could quickly identify 
landmarks from the air. When the war broke out, these pilots were 
53 These bombs were twenty-four inches long and each contained TNT from thirty-six sticks of 
dynamite. The South Korean pilot who dropped these bombs stated that the bombs were effective 
for an approximately twenty-five meter radius. Air Intelligence (12-0949) 720.60913-2,49/09/23. 
AF11RA See also Chang Sung Whan, My L4fv as an Avtalor (in-house publication, not for public 
saleXSeoul, Korea: ROKAF Public Information Office, 1964), pp. 19-21; G -G(xm Sa (1). 1949- 
. 53. pp. 53-34; ! fang- nmgJo -. Sc, p. 53. 
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immediately prepared to support ground forces in aerial reconnaissance and 
liaison missions, and to convert to the F-51 lighters quickly. Korean pilots 
were mentally geared to fight, but still materially def icient. 54 
The poor condition of the Korean Air Force at the beginning of 1950 
was simply a reflection of the entire state of the military-political scene on 
the southern part of the peninsula. The ROK military was in disarray, 
American troops were gone, and the Korean political situation was unstable 
from border clashes, insurrections, and hollow threats to march north. The 
frequent attacks by the KPA forces along the 38th Parallel caused nervous 
misgivings in South Korea that the communists might attempt to invade in 
the near future. " The American intelligence agencies in the Far East also 
became aware of the increasingly aggressive posture of the communist 
regime in North Korea. On 10 March 1948, intelligence branch (G-2) of US 
Army Forces in Korea reported to the Far East Command in Tokyo a rumour 
'from a usually reliable source that the North Korean Army would invade 
South Korea in April, and G-2 believed it 'plausible: - As late as December 
1949, six months before the hostilities, Far East Command's G-2 reported 
almost identical intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington that 
there were indications that an invasion of South Korea by North Korea was 
planned for March or April 1950, but the JCS regarded the report as 
'doubtful' Disagreements among US intelligence analysts could not be 
resolved, as was revealed when FEC/G-2 decided that the rumour it was 
54 This is summarised in English by the author from the oral history of Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim 
Chung-w. 'I Pan-Gook Jon-Jaeng Myon-D'am Rok Jae 1 Kwon (The Oral I Gstory of the Korean 
War. Volume 1'), ms., pp. 90-98,102-104. ROKAF historical records, Dung-Rok Bon-Ilo N 71.708 
(1967), ROK Air Force Office of Military ICstory Studies, Taejon, Korea. Kim's testimony was 
reaffirmed by interviews, author with Lt. Generals (Ret. ) Chang Sung-Whan and Chang Chi-Ryang. 
23-25 April 1995, and 28-30 October (telephone) 1995. 
33 Prior to the Korean War from May 1949, more than 400 armed clashes and skirmishes occurred 
along the 38th Parallel. Sawyer, MiI1iwyAdWscr4 p. 73. 
56 Rpt, 'Korea " Rumored Invasion of South Korea, ' 10 March 1948. P&0 091 Korea TS 
(Section 111) (Class 3.15), Box 21, Decimal File 1946-1948, Records of Department of the Army 
(Plans and Operations Division), Record Group 319. National Archives, Washington, DC. 
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hearing had been fabricated 'by the North Koreans for the purpose of causing 
unrest in South Korea. '57 
The ROK government thought otherwise. It was becoming alarmed by 
the increasing signs of North Korea's aggressiveness. On 10 May 1950, in 
one of many similar public statements, the ROK National Defense Minister 
Shin Sung-Mo announced that North Korea was moving forces toward the 
38th Parallel. "' But the ROK National Defense Ministry and ROK Army did 
not 'take any countermeasures with regard to such ominous reports, ' instead, 
simply presuming that the North Korean military movement was 'part of a 
series of psychological operations designed to threaten the South in 
connection with their deceptive peace ot%nsive. '59 Nonetheless, the Korean 
Embassy in Washington was instructed to advise the United States 
government that the ROK Constabulary forces were without an adequate 
amount of ammunition and would urgently require force improvement. The 
response was negative. It appeared that Washington's attention remained 
focused chiefly on the May 30 election in Korea. The ROK government's 
warning about the intentions of North Korea might have been regarded by 
Washington as the Seoul government's political manocuvcring, because the 
ROK government was in part responsible for the impression that it might 
wish to resort to military action to unify the country. 6° The National Defense 
Minister stated in a bellicose manner at a press meeting on 10 May 1950 
that'our National Armed Forces arc fully prepared to go and recover our lost 
land in the north upon order. 161 Belligerent remarks made by the ROK's 
57 MacArthur Hearings, p. 1992. 58 ! I! an-Cook JwrJacng Sa, pp. 314.318; Kim Chum-kor, The Korean War, 1930-33 (Seoul, 
Korea: Kwang-Myong Publishing, 1980), p. 206. 
59 Kim Chum-kon, The Korean War, p. 206. 
Pyo-Wook Ilan, The Problem of Korea Unification: A Study of the Un/fcailan 1'olicy of the 
Republic of Korea 1948-1960 (Seoul, Korea: Seoul Computer Press, 1987), pp. 66.67. 61 The author's translation. 11'an-rxxAj n Sd. p. 314. In fact, the National Defense Minister was 
preceded one and a half years earlier by ROK's Foreign Ministet. who said that the ROK would not 
hesitate to take military action against the communists in North Korea. 
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ranking officials resulted simply in creating an unnecessary false impression, 
detrimental to the ROK's security. "' 
On the eve of hostilities, the readiness of the ROK armed forces 
remained deficient; all of the details concerning the ROK's weaknesses in the 
face of a potential assault by the North Korean People's Army were brushed 
aside. ROK military readiness deficiency was illustrated by poor 
maintenance of equipment. Over one third of all ROK Army vehicles were 
pulled out of the frontline and sent to rear areas for 'repair. ' The remaining 
two thirds were also about to be sent to the rear for 'general inspection' when 
North Korea launched its invasion. In addition, a considerable number 
(about fifteen to twenty percent) of all firearms except M-1 rifles (machine 
guns, automatic rifles and mortars) were collected in a'periodic maintenance 
programme. '63 The amount of ammunition in stock was barely sufficient to 
support combat infantry troops in battle for less than a week. '4 
On 10 June 1950, a fortnight before the war occurred, at the peak of 
the intelligence (surveillance) build-up and during an emergency look-out for 
a possible North Korean provocation of hostilities, all of the ROKA 
division commanders along the 38th Parallel were suddenly reshuflled. 6S The 
director of operations of the ROKA headquarters was also dismissed. The 
division commanders' reshuffle was soon followed by replacing many units 
along the 38th Parallel. This abrupt change of combat commanders and rc- 
assignment of frontal regiments inevitably disrupted ROK combat 
62 Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study nj U. S. Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 74; Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful 
Unification of Korea. The Politics if FleLJ Uperaiionr, 1947-1930 (1 [ague. Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijholl'. 1959), p. 240. 
63 Kim Chum-kon, The Aorewt War, p. 208. 
64 IhkL The US policy to maintain its logistic support for the ROK Army at less than a week level 
remained unchanged during and after the Korean War. 'Debriefing of General Taylor, ' in 
Memorandum for the Record, by Walter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, June 9, 
1954 in ERU. 1952.54, v. IS, pt. 2, p. 1803. 
115 An emergency alert was issued, effective as of 4.00 pm on 11 June 1950 to Increase military 
vigilance against North Korea's deceptive peace offensive. Kim Chum-kon, The Korean Mr. p. 
207; !! an-Goon Jcn-Sa, p. 31 S. 
'63 
preparedness. " Without explanation, the high state of vigilance was 
suddenly canceled as of midnight on 24 June 1950, the very eve of the North 
Korean attack, and all officers, NCO's (Non-Commissioned Officers) and 
enlisted men were allowed either a few days of weekend leave or a one day 
outing. Moreover, commanding officers of ROK Army military 
establishments in the Seoul area and nearby frontline units were invited to 
the house-warming party of the new KMAG club in downtown Seoul, 
leaving the front line essentially unguarded, while the North Korea People's 
Army units along the 38th Parallel eagerly awaited an imminent attack 
order. 67 
South Korea's weaknesses (the govcmment's indecisiveness and 
military unpreparedness), and the US policy of disengagement from Korea 
made possible the exploitation of the situation by North Korea. South Korea 
became a victim to strategic surprise. This danger could have been 
minimised by enhancing alertness to intelligence assessments of political and 
military indicators of warning and by a continuous and realistic appraisal of 
South Korea's strengths and weaknesses relative to those of North Korea. 
With the Army so deficient, and the Air Force without fighters, the 
ability of the South Koreans to defend themselves did not exist. American 
policy to prevent South Korea from marching north was a success. Its policy 
66 ! 1'an-G ok Jon-Sez. pp. 314-3 IS. 67 Ilse-B'cmA Kwa Kon-Goon, p. 753. Motives for the poor preparedness have never been 
documented. Allegations that the ROK military leadership, including Major General Chae Byong. 
Duk. the new Army Chief of Staff. who took his office on 10 April 1950, may have been involved 
with North Korea-manipulated fifth columnists cannot be supported. Chat was fired on 30 June, 
sent to the front line, and reported 'killed' on 28 July 1950 in a battle near the I ladong-Chinju area, 
the southern tip of the Pusan perimeter. ll'un-Gc * Jorr, S&, p. 3I8. For fiuther discussion, see 
Professor Lee Jong I lak, ROK Defense College. '!! an-Gook Jon-Joeng C/, n-K! Jak-Jon Air Boon- 
Sok' ('An Assessment of the Initial Phase of the Korean Rar), pp. 23.23, presented at the Fifth 
Defense Symposium in Seoul on 21 June 1988, sponsored by The Korea Institute for Defense 
Analyses. General Lee 1iyung-Keun, the first ROK JCS chairman (1954-36), stated: it was a 
misfortune to see him (General Chat) allowed to command the ROK Armed Forces at the critical 
initial stage of the Korean War. Ile was an ordnance officer in the Japanese Army and knew little 
about military operations. ' I lyung-Keun Lee, Goon-Bat 11-Bon Ae Oe-Kil Inneng: Lee IlJvng- 
Keun live-Go Rok (A Life of Military Serial Number One: The Lonely Road of life: lee Ilwng- 
KeunAlem oir) (Seoul, Korea: Joong-Ahng Ilbo-Sa, 1994), pp. 42-46. Authot's translation. 
64 
to provide for a defensive force, however, was a failure. South Korea was 
exposed, entirely vulnerable to any outside attacks, as the summer of 1950 
began. When the South Korean Air Force was called upon to respond to the 
invasion by North Korea, the ROKAF encountered enormous difficulties and 
challenges. flow the ROK Air Force not only survived the war, but also 




COMBAT ACTIVITIES OF THE ROK Alit FORCE 
DURING TIIE KOREAN WAR, 1950.1953 
At the outbreak of the conflict they had a little Air Force ... But by no stretch of the imagination were they a tactical air force. 
They got very little attention from Air Force assistance, guidance 
or anything else. It was an army deal over there almost entirely. 
So ... shortly we realized we should get them 
in the business 
and we organized first a combat squadron, an F-S1 squadron. ' 
The combat element of the Republic of Korea Air Force has 
done extremely well and have made a definite contribution to the 
war effort. 2 
For all practical purposes, the Republic of Korea Air Force did not 
exist in terms of tactical capability when war began. However incapable the 
ROK Air Force was, it had to fight with whatever was available at the time, 
because this was a fight for the survival of the South Korean nation. The 
South Korean Air Force adapted to the lack of weapons, flying proficiency, 
and combat experience. Eventually the Korean Air Force did contribute to 
the successful air campaign of the Korean War, taking second place among 
the UN air forces in terms of the number of combat missions flown, in spite 
of its tenuous tighter strength. 
This chapter addresses the issue of how the Republic of Korea (South 
Korea) Air Force evolved during the battle and survived the war. The 
chapter is confined to the operational viewpoint of the air campaign in 
I Cstorical Document: K239.0312.798: General 0. P. Weyland, p. 43. U. S. Air Force historical 
records. K239.0512-799,23/00/00-39/00/00. US Air Force I listorical Research Agency, Maxwell 
Air Force Base. Alabama. I iereafer cited as'General Weyland's Oral I listory Interview. ' AFI IRA. 
General Weyland was the Commanding General of Far East Air Forces (1931.1953). ) 
'Air Briefing for Unified Command Mission, 11 April 1932, ' in The 1 {istory of the Fifth Air Force, 
I January - 30 June 1932; ms.. vol. 2, p. 338. U. S. Air Force historical records, K-730.01, Jan-Jun 
1952, v. 2, US Air Force I listorical Research Agency. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. I lereafter 
cited as'5th AF I Eistory. Jan-June 1952' ms.. vol. 2. K"730.01, Jan-Jun 1952, v. 2. AFI IRA. 
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general, and focuses on the ROKAF's combat operations in particular. The 
ROKAF's air operations during the Korean War were restricted to close air 
support and air interdiction only, due to its limited resources and roles What 
factors were present in the process which threatened to deny the existence of 
the ROK Air Force as a separate service even during the war? Who played 
the leading role in the ROKAF's struggle for survival? How effectively did 
the US Air Force advisers assist the ROKAF fighter pilots in coping with 
challenges in combat? This chapter is divided into four phases in 
accordance with significant chronological events in the evolution of the 
ROKAF's combat posture in battle. (Figure 3-1) It is, in a way, the story of 
an itinerant air force, one that began with almost nothing and ended with a 
proud combat record. 
3.1. The Initial Resistance: Combat with Ten F-51 Mustang 
Fighters (25 June - 23 September 1950) 
The inability of ROKAF to counter the North Korean attack at the 
outbreak of war should not be overlooked, because militarily the lack of 
opposition by any airpowcr for the first two days was tremendously 
advantageous to North Korea. Enemy action during this period included 
large-scale movements of troops and armour across the 38th Parallel, an 
amphibious operation at Kangnung on the cast coast, and the occupation of 
Chunchon, Pochon and Tong'Duchon by North Korean troops supported by 
seventy tanks. KPA's predominant dependence on its armour without air 
3 An air campaign is usually divided into two aspects - strategic and tactical. Strategic air 
operations are 'directed at a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive 
destruction of such enem? s war-making capacity as key manufacturing systems, sources of raw 
material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, and communication 
facilities' Tactical air operations '(involve] six combat functions: (1) counter-air. [including air 
superiority operations]; (2) close air support; (3) air interdiction; (4) tactical air reconnaissance; (5) 
tactical airlift operations, including air evacuation; and (6) special operations! Bruce W. Watson and 
Susan M. Watson (eds. ), Urlied Stare: Air Fort: A Dictionary (New York: Garland, 1992), pp. 
754,771. 
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Figure 3-1: Deployment of RO KAF Flying Units 
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cover made it extremely vulnerable to air attacks. Only a few flights of 
fighters armed with 5-inch rockets and napalm would have been sufficient to 
neutralise these unopposed KPA tanks. KPA's amphibious operations at 
Kangnung could have been crushed easily by air strikes, because without air 
cover they were simply'sitting ducks. ' However, US Air Force's first strikes 
against ground targets occurred on 28 June, the fourth day of the invasion. 
By that date Seoul had fallen, Kimpo airfield was in enemy hands, and North 
Korean columns on the cast coast had occupied Mukho Naval Base below 
Kangnung. By 29 June, heavy fighting raged along a fluid front in the 
Kimpo sector, Kapyong was lost, and North Korean troops began to mass 
along the north shore of the Ilan River. 
North Korean attacking forces' early advance could not have been so 
rapid had it been subjected to immediate and continuing air strikes of 
UN/US Air Forces. " During the first four days of the war, the primary effort 
of the United States Far East Air Forces was directed towards the evacuation 
of American nationals from Korea and the provision of fighter cover to 
support the evacuation. ' By the time the American Air Force was allowed 
to operate north to the Yalu and a concentrated effort was directed against 
targets in the whole area of North Korea on 29 June, it was too late to 
prevent the fall of Seoul. The momentum for effective use of US airpower 
against the KPA's initial armoured thrust was lost, because of delayed 
permission for American air operations north of the 38th Parallel 6 
4 The North Korean air and surface forces were unopposed. until the first flights of US 5th Air 
Force's F-80 and F-82 fighters came to the Korean peninsula on 27th June 1950 to conduct an air 
cover for evacuating American citizens. USAF Operations in Korea. Jun-Nov 1950, p. 6; McPeak, 
Merrill A. 'No Clear Mission Statement Until Now, ' Air Force Times, (August 3.1992), p. 4. 
s U. S. Air Force, 'An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the United States Air Force in the Korean 
Campaign, 25 June - December 1950, ' Volume I. Book I, mx, p. 46. K168.041.1,25 Jun-Dec 1950, 
v. 1, pt. 1. US Air Force historical records. US Air Force I Gstorical Research Agency. Maxwell Air 
Force Base. Alabama. Hereafter cited as Barcus Report ßk. 1. 
6 The JCS authorised the FEAF to extend their air operations into North Korea late in the afternoon 
of 29 June 1950. USA Operations in Korea, Jun - Nov 1950, p. 7. 
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Immediately after North Korea started its initial reconnaissance air 
raids over Seoul-Yo'E Do and Kimpo airfields at 10 a. m. on 25 June 1950, 
all members of the ROKAF were ordered to report to their nearest airfields 
or accessible ROKAF units. Upon report, the recalled officers and airmen 
were regrouped into six units: flying operations, aircraft maintenance, anti- 
aircraft, operational liaison, combat support transport, and medical support. 
Every one of these groups, regardless of its original specialty, was tasked 
with the ground defence of the airfields. Their only weapons were Japanese 
Type-99 rifles. ' 
North Korea's air raids started at noon on 25 June 1950, eight hours 
after its ground forces launched their first attack. The lack of air threats in 
the south and poor weather conditions prevented North Korea from early 
commitment of its airpower at the initial stage of its ground attack. As the 
weather began to clear around 9: 00 a. m., NKAF air activities started, but the 
enemy disregarded the cardinal principle that the most effective use of 
airpower lies in the full exploitation of its unique potentialities and its 
concentrated employment. ' Instead, they opted for the piecemeal projection 
of their airpower. North Korea's airpower was used primarily for harassment 
and reconnaissance, not as an offensive power aimed at neutralising South 
Korean forces and military installations. They disregarded the importance of 
neutralising the runways of Kimpo and Seoul airfields. This failure later 
proved to facilitate both ROKAF and USAF air operations at these 
'untargeted' runways. 
NKArs air reconnaissance raid at noon was immediately followed by 
its first fighter bombing attack with four YAK fighters, strafing and 
7 ROK Air Force, ! /w7g-Go ?g Jo n-&i: 11'an-Gook Jonf peng (17ºe history of the Air War: The 
Korean War) (Seoul, Korea: ROKAF History Office, 1989). p. 74. This was produced for internal 
dissemination as an in-house document, not for public We. Hereafter cited as Il'cmg-GongJon-Sa. 
US Air Force, United States Air Force Manual 1-1: E unctions and Basic Doctrine of ON 
United States Air Force (Washington, DC: Department of Air Force, 1979) (hereafter cited as 
USAFM 1.1 (1979)), Ch. 3, pp. 3.1,2,3,4,5; Ch. 5, pp. 5.1/5-7. 
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bombing Yongsan and Seoul railway marshaling yards. At four o'clock in 
the afternoon, three YAKs raided Seoul Yo'E Do Airfield and destroyed one 
ROKAF T-6 trainer aircraft. Another two YAK fighters attacked Kimpo 
Airfield, damaging one US Air Force (USAF) C-54, which was later 
completely destroyed by an additional attack of six YAKs at seven o'clock in 
the evening, ' 
ROK Air Force Chief of Staff Brigadier General Kim Chung-Yul, 
and his senior officers met at the Command Post, which was promptly 
established at Seoul WE Do Airfield soon after the first air raid, and 
decided to maximise the use of all ROKAF aircraft to support ground troops 
by any means available. Upon this decision, three flights of nine surviving 
T-6s were launched under the command of Colonel Lee Kun-suk, 
Commanding Officer of the ROK Flying Group, to conduct combat 
reconnaissance missions over Kacsong, Munsan, Uijong'bu, Pochon, 
Tong'tuchon and Chunchon areas. They reported a large concentration of 
enemy ground forces north of Pochon and a group of enemy tanks south of 
Kaesong. Each of the nine T-6s was armed with eight to ten 15 kg (30 Lß) 
bombs. 10 The pilots encountered severe anti-aircraft artillery fire, but 
proceeded to hand drop bombs by the back-scat pilots. The aircraft flew over 
at 200 feet against tanks and convoys to enable the'bombardicr' in the back 
scat to aim more accurately at his target. 
Their attempts at bombing were so inaccurate that a group of 
maintenance officers at Seoul WE Do Airfield formed an ad hoc team to 
design bomb racks for the T-6s. Early in the morning on 26 June, they 
' It is worth noting that the American C-54 cargo plane was set afire as it result of YAK fighters' 
strafing and exploded, while the South Korean T-6 did not explode, although it was hit in its fuel 
tank, because it was empty, At the time it was the policy to dc-fuel all aircraft after daily training 
missions due to the perceived risk of defection by South Korean pilots. Interview, author with Lt. 
t 
General (Ret) C. R. Chang, 16 September 1994. 








succeeded in loading eight bombs under the wings of each T-6. The 
subsequent T-6 combat missions were successfully executed against enemy 
convoys and troops. The L-4s/L-5s were also mobilised to fly similar 
'tactical' missions, but again bombing by hand from the back seats with two 
bombs each. Although the results of the attacks were minimal, the 
psychological impact was considerable. " 
Disappointed to see their pilots unable to cope with the KPA tanks, 
ROKAF leaders strongly appealed to President Syngman Rhec to request 
fighter aircraft from the United States government. Accordingly, President 
Rhee asked for the assistance of fighters through Ambassador John J. 
Muccio. The United States Far East Air Forces Command (FEAF) responded 
to this request by arranging a staff visit to Korea early on 26 June. The 
American FEAF visitors recognised ROK's need for fighter aircraft, and 
gave immediate verbal approval for ten F-51 Mustang fighters. Late in the 
afternoon, ten ROKAF pilots were selected, flown to Japan and began the 
conversion training at USAF 38th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the 8th 
Fighter-Bomber Wing (FBW) at ltazukc Air Force Base (AFB). 12 
On 27 June, the 8th FBW of the US 5th Air Force organised the 
'Bout-One' Project, to which ten USAF instructor-pilots were assigned. 
Under the leadership of Major Dean E. Hess, these instructor-pilots, four 
ground officers, and a hundred enlisted airmen were tasked to train South 
Korean pilots in the F-51 Mustang fighters. 13 Due to the lack of dual-seat F- 
51s, USAF T-6s were used for the transition flying training in parallel with 
11 Ibid., p. 76. 12 Futrell, The USAF In Korea, 1950-Sl, p. 89; Gongd uan Sa (1), 1949.1953, pp. 119.121; 11'an- 
CcxA Jan. & (The War !!!. story of Korea). p. 789. The numbs of the aircraft was decided as ten, 
because of the number of available tighter-experienced Korean pilots. ! fang-Gow J0044 p. 91; 
ROKAF, 'f ran-Gook Jon-Jaeng Myon-D'am Rok Jae 1 Kwon' (The Oral History on the Korean 
War, Vol. 1'), ROKAF Dung-Rok lion-Ito (Registered Number) 0708 (1965). ROKAF historical 
records. Headquarters ROKAF, Taejon, Korea. Hereafter cited as ROKAF Oral History (1) RN 
#708. ' 
13 Futrell, The USAF In Korea 1950-53, p. 89. 
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ground training until the arrival of ten F-S l s. The urgency of the war 
permitted the ROKAF pilots only one sortie of thirty minutes in the F-51 s 
before they personally ferried the planes on 2 July to Tacgu Air Base (or'K- 
2, ' as it was soon designated). " (Figure 3-2) With their previous experience 
in flying similar ferry flights across the Straits of Japan during the Second 
World War, Korean pilots flew their F-51s without American instructors' 
escort. " Ground crews of 'Bout-One moved to K-2 Base ahead of them 
on the eve of 30 June as a USAF provisional unit, and there reported to the 
local Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). " 
The ROKAF pilots flew their first combat missions in F-51 fighters on 
3 July 1950, the day after their return from Japan. A flight of four F-S Is, led 
by Major Park lice-dong, destroyed an enemy POL (petroleum, oil, and 
lubricants) dump near See'hung, ten miles south of Seoul. Major Park's 
flight was soon followed in the afternoon by Colonel Lee Kun-suk's second 
flight of four F-51s and Park's third flight (his second mission of the day) of 
three F-S Is. A total of eleven sorties were flown on the ROKAF's first 
combat mission. '1 The rapid pace, however, to execute combat missions 
without consideration of the pilots' inexperience in new and heavier fighter 
aircraft led to an unfortunate early loss of a Second World War fighter ace, 
Colonel Lee Kun-suk. 
14 Taegu is located about 150 miles south of Seoul. Soon after its active intervention, the US 5th 
Air Force began to introduce new designations of all airfields in the Korean peninsula by use of 
numerical numbers prefixed by the capital letter W. This was done to minimise confusion occurring 
from the Korean names of airfields, which were phonetically spelled in an unstandardised manner, 
and also to make it easy for English-speaking American pilots to understand. Nowadays, some of 
them, such as air bases at Seoul, Taegu, Chinhae, Sachon, and Kangnung, are SO more commonly 
referred to as K-16, K-2, K-10, K-4, and K-18 Bases respectively among Korean pilots. See Figure 
3-2: K-Designation of ROK Air Bases. is H, W'9-GWxJun-Sa, pp. 91-93. This was also verified by an interview, author with Lt. General 
(Ret. ) Chang Sung Whan, 26 April 1935. Chang was one of the original ten Korean pilots who 
mied the first ten F-S I s. 
Futrell, Vie USAF In Korea 1950-53, p. 89. For details of the USAF advisory establishment 
during the Korean War, see Section 4.1 in Ch. 4. 
17 Two tanks, three vehicles, and one ammunition depot were destroyed, and 30 enemy soldiers 
were killed in Yong'dongpo, on the suburb south of Seoul. 11'ang-GNtgJcn-Sa, p. 96. 
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Figure 3-2: K-Designation of ROK Air Bases" 
K-1 : Kimhae (Pusan West) (35*1IN - 128056'119 
K-2 : Taegu 135153'N -128*39'E( K-3: Pohang (35 9T1.129.25'E] 
K-4: Sachon (35*05'N - 128*04'EJ 
K-5: Taejon (36'20"N - 127 3'EJ K-6: Pyong? ack [36.57 N- 12 " 'EJ 
K-8: Kunsan (3554'N. 126.37'E] 
K-9: Su-young (Pusan East) (35009N- 1: 
K-10: Chin hat (35'08'N -128'41'EJ 
K-13: Suwon [37*15'N -127*00ý 
K-14: Kimpo (Seoul West) 
[37*33'N -126*48'Ej 
K-16: Yo'E Do (Seoul East) 
[37*31'N -126*55'E[ 
K-18: Kangnung 137*45'N -128"55'E) 
K-24: Mirim (Pyongyang East) 
139.01'N -125*50'E) 
K-25: Wonsan [39.10N - 127029'E] 
K"39: Mosulpo (Cheju Island South) 
133.12'N " 126.17E] 
, 
100 
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K-40: Cheju-Si (Cheju Island North) 
133'30'1-126'31'EJ 
K-46: Hoeng'song [37.26N - 127458'EJ K-47: Chunchon (37'32'1-127'43'E] 
K-55: Osan [37* 13'N -127"02'E] 
K -4° 
"39 
is Gennil Order No. 320,1ubj: Designation of tir6elds. dated I May 1951. '3AF 1ristory, I 
{a nary 
1951- 30 June 1951; int. VoL 3, pp. 205.206. K-730.01, J&n-Jun 1951, v. 3. ARM. 
Legend: 1 ]: location; ": degree; ': minute. 
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Taking off from Taegu K-2 Base at 11: 00 am on 4 July, two days after 
their return from Japan, Colonel Lee's flight of four F-5 is spotted an enemy 
convoy led by twenty enemy tanks advancing south toward Anyang, Been 
miles south of Seoul. Shortly after Lee attempted a split-S diving attack, he 
was hit by enemy ground fire, and his plane crashed into an enemy tank. I lis 
death was the first F-51 casualty of the ROK Air Force during the Korean 
War. 2° There is an argument over the cause of Colonel Lce's crash. 
According to the testimony of a USAF pilot who flew Mustangs with 
ROKAF pilots during the war, Colonel Lee, a Second World War ace who 
flew with the Japanese and shot down twenty American planes, was 
extremely confident as a pilot, feeling that' he could handle anything that 
flew. Lie was rather dubious about the prospect of learning anything new 
from Americans. 
This was a double mistake, for the Zero's maneuverability 
permitted it to make a letter S-a llipovcr onto its back during a 
dive for a quicker pullout - at altitudes as low as 1,400 feet. 
Heavier [and faster than the Japanese Zero fighter he flew], the F- 
51 needed to be at least at 2,000 feet to describe such a tight arc. 
Trying this tactic now, Colonel tee dived into the ground and was 
killcd. 21 
Colonel Lee probably'forgot he [was] not in Zero. tie got absentminded, and 
he did a Zero dive. Fie was a little short and went right into the ground, ' 
recollected Major General Earl C. Partridge, Commander of 5th Air Force. 22 
20 ROKAF Operational Order No. 23.1I'wg 'J nSa. PP. 96-97; Gc+rg-Cu on Sa (1). 1949. 
933, p. 123. t1 less, Battle ltymn, p. 84. Colonel Frank E. Merritt. Executive Office of Major General Bari E. 
Partridge, Commander of Sth Air Force, opined also that Colonel Lee 'peeled off at 1,500 feet on the 
[KPA] tank, but he went in with the tank. ' U. S. Air Force Oral Iiistory Program K239.0312-1112: 
Colonel Frank E. Merritt, 8 December 1977, p. 31. U. S. Air Force historical records, 1t239.0512. 
112,77/12/08.1 tereafer cited as 'Colonel Merritt' Oral I iistory. ' 22 U. S. Air Force Oral I iistory Program: K239,0512.729. General Earl E. Partridge, 23.23 April 
1974, p. 577. U. S. Air Force historical records. K239.0312.729,74/4/25. US Air Force historical 
Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. I hereafter cited as 'General Partridge's Oral 
Ilistory. ' 
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The day following Colonel Lee's crash, President Rhee invited all 
surviving nine Korean Mustang pilots to his temporary office in downtown 
Tacgu, consoling them over the loss of Colonel Lee, and recognising their 
valuable role in the ROKAF. Despite their previous tighter experience 
during the Second World War, Korean pilots were still inexperienced in 
their new heavy American fighters. Deeply concerned with the safety of his 
young and immature fighter pilots, Ithce advised them to be patient and 
leave combat missions with American pilots for the time being, until their 
flying skill with the heavier Mustang fighters reached a sufficient level so 
that they could carry out their missions safely. 23 
The South Korean Air Force leaders suggested a compromise 
wherein General Kim proposed to his American adviser, Major Iless, that 
they conduct ROK-US combined combat missions, led by American flight 
leaders, because there were no qualified Korean flight leaders in F-51 fighter 
aircraft. Major I less responded that because of international law, it would 
be difficult for Americans to be over enemy lines flying planes marked with 
the ROK symbols, but Major I less was sympathetic. Ile tried to be 
cooperative by stating that he would willingly be prepared to do so if 
permitted by the United States' higher authorities. " 
As the situation was urgent, the ROKAF pilots continued to conduct 
combat missions by themselves in those initial days, until ROKAF-USAF 
combined missions were arranged. During the period of 5-11 July, forty 
sorties of ROKAF F-5 Is were flown over Yong'tungpo, No'ryangjin, Suwon, 
Pyongtack, Osan, Chon'an and Jo'chiwon areas 25 In the meantime, the issue 
of the ROKAF-USAF combined combat missions was solved by an 
23 ROKAF, Gong-G(xxr At)-m-D am J, p Jot ! Kw n: Kong Ilo. R> vi Jcxv-Jarg (7 he ROKAF 
Oral Ilisway Volume 111: 8r! guher Genemd Kong Ilaivon) (Seoul, Korea: ROKAF history 
Office, 1983), p. 100. 24 Gong-Goon Sa (/), 1949-195l, p. 123,1 less. lain e 11)7"n. p. 85. 23 Four supply depots and nine vehicles were destroyed, and 140 enemy troops were killed. ll'wrg- 
GargJon-So, p. 98. 
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agreement between Major General Earl C. Partridge, Commanding General 
of the US 5th Air Force, and General Kim, when the former visited Taegu 
Base (K-2) on 13 July 1950.26 
On 16 July, a flight of four Mustangs, with Major 1 icss Icading thrcc 
ROKAF pilots, was launched to support friendly ground troops in the 
Sung'whan area, some sixty miles south of Seoul. This was the peak of the 
monsoon season on the southern peninsula. Due to poor visibility and low 
ceiling over the target area, the first ROK-US combined combat mission had 
to return without attacking the enemy on the ground. Adverse weather 
limited combat sorties to an average of four a day in the period of 17-26 
July. 27 
One of the most serious problems encountered at the initial stage of 
combat was the lack of an operational coordination system between the 
mission fighter pilots and the ground troop commanders, who required 
urgent air strikes to repel overwhelming KPA attacks. As a Tactical Air 
Control System for the command and control of joint air-ground operations 
did not exist in the first weck of hostilities, requests for air strikes were scnt 
to the KMAG, which forwarded them to the fur East Command 
I leadquarters (FEC). FEC, in turn, forwarded them to the Far East Air Force 
I icadquartcrs (FEAF), which relayed them to 5th Air Force at Itazuke AFB, 
Japan. The average time for these requests to reach 5th AF from a field 
commander was over four hours. To overcome this delay, a Joint Operations 
Center (JOC) was foamed by 5th AF on 3 July to control air-ground 
operations between a field army and a tactical air force. Here, ground 
requests for air strikes were made known, and approved requests were 
26 Interview, author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Chang Sung-When. Chang was former ROKAF Chief 
yf Staff (1962-64). 
From 3 July to 26 July, a total of 91 ROICAF F-51 sorties were flown, destroying 7 tanks, 17 
vehicles, 18 ammunition depots and POLS, 9 enemy artillery positions and killing 300 enemy troops. 
JI'cnrg-GongJo n-Sa, pp. 98-99. 
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implemented with mission orders to tactical air units. This improvised JOC 
and two Tactical Aircraft Control Parties (TACP) were flown from Japan to 
the Korean theatre in order to help request and supervise air strikes. 21 Each 
TACP consisted of one USAF fighter pilot, one radio operator and one radio- 
mounted jeep. These two TACPs were the only tactical air strike request 
networks between the ground units in the front-line and the USAF fighter 
and bomber forces in Japan. 
A JOC without a means of communication to the air and ground units 
was helpless; thus it was also necessary to establish a Tactical Air Control 
Center (TACC) without delay. The TACC is the focal point for aircraft 
control and warning activities. Through it, the tactical air force commander 
controls all activities of his air force, such as air warning and counter air 
operations (air superiority), air interdiction, close air support (CAS), tactical 
airlift, and combat rescue operations. For the first three to four weeks before 
the TACC was formed on 14 July, and colocatcd with the JOC at Taegu on 
19 July, 29 joint air-ground operations were random. Most air strikes for 
ground support in that disorganised period were 'haphazardly' accomplished 
by the ingenuity of mission pilots at the scene and the ground unit's action 
oflicers. 30 Whoever had quicker access to the ROKAF F-51 unit and made 
radio contact first with the mission fighter aircraft had priority. 31 The nine 
ROKAF Mustangs were the only UNC combat aircraft based on the 
peninsula, until US 5th Air Force Mustangs from Itazukc, Japan commenced 
initial air strikes early on the morning of 10 July (sixteenth day of the 
invasion), and then landed at Tacgu and replenished for several more 
missions during the day. 32 
28 FEAF Report (2), p. 81. 29 Enemy pressure forced the 1OC to move back from Taejon to Taegu. 30 The ground unit's action officers refer to the air liaison officer and GFACI dispatched to the 
ground unit as well as G-3Air/S-3Air ground operations officers. 
Chang, My Life as wo Aºlarar, pp. 23.24. 32 Futrell, The USAF In Korea 1950-53. p. 91. 
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At first the air strike requests for the friendly ground troops came 
directly from the unit in the field to the local KMAG attached to the ROKAF 
Flying Group. On several occasions Lt. General Walton If. Walker, 
Commander of US Eighth Army, who established his headquarters in 
downtown Taegu, came directly to the K-2 Base to request air strikes. Most 
requests for missions were informal. Major Hess, head of the KMAG's 
USAF detachment at Taegu K-2 Base, was quoted in an evaluation of the 
USAF effectiveness in the Korean campaign: 'I recall on one occasion 
individuals came out from KMAG in the middle of the night, about three 
o'clock in the morning, and they requested an air strike verbally just by 
sticking their heads in the tent and requesting an air strike over a city at a 
certain time and then they disappeared in the night'' 
The pre-war policy of dc-emphasising airpowcr within the ROK 
internal security structure resulted in a paucity of usable airfields and support 
facilities. 34 (Figure 3-3) This was especially true regarding jet aircraft, which 
would demand harder and longer paved runways. Early in July Tacgu K-2 
Base alone was barely ready for immediate occupancy for F-5I fighter 
operations, but it had little to offer. a sod-and-gravel runway which was full 
of pot holes, two concrete buildings, and a wooden mess hall built by the 
Japanese. Structures which existed in unusable conditions required extensive 
improvements to meet operational requirements, discouraging the early 
deployment of USAF forces to the peninsula. " The newly organised USAF 
51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) of the 5th Air Force flew its first combat 
missions on 15 July, upon its activation at Taegu Air Base on 10 July. " 
33 Marcus Report, bk. 3; pp. 94-120. K168.041.1,25 Jun-Doc 1930. AFIIRA. 34 FF. AFReport (I), p. 15. 35 The fall of Kimpo and Seoul airfields into the KPA's hands left only Taegu airfield available for 
limited operations of propeller-driven fighters, due to its condition as the best among other unpaved 
ay runways. See 'South Korean Airfield Status, ' in FEW. Re wh (I). p. 15. 
! fang-Go'ºgJonn, p. 117. 
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Figurc 3-3: South Korean Airfield Status? 
Airfield Runway Data Condition Facilities Construction 
(As of 25 June 1950) (Ju1'S0-3u1' 53) 
Kimpo 6200 x 150' Asph m Good Municipal Airport 8200' runway 
(K-14) 3600 x 150' Cone' POI, hangars, etc. Add facilitics 
Seoul- 5700x 100' Asph. Good Municipal Airport 7000' runway 
Yo-E'Do (K-16) Add facilities 
Suwon 5200 x 200' Conc. Fair ROKAF Ikt~ 9000' runway 
(K-13) Add facilities 
Taegu 4800 x 150' Clay Fair ROKAF Dct. 9000' runway 
(K-2) 
Kwangju 3300 x 150' Grav. 4 Poor ROKAF Dct. Add facilities 
(K-7) 
Pusan W. 4850 x 150' Conc. Poor None 8000' runvºzy 
(K-1) Add facilities 
Kunsan 2750 x 300' Sod Poor ROKAF Dct. 8000' runway 
(K. 8) Add facilities 
Pohang 4500 x 150' Conc. Poor None 8000' runway 
(K-3) Add facilities 
As the USAF-led air campaign gradually escalated, the tactical air 
control system had to be reinforced correspondingly. By the end of July, the 
5th Air Force fielded ten TACPs to support the frontal ground units. The 
difficulty in controlling close air support (CAS) aircraft lay in finding the 
exact target. The front was so fluid and much of the terrain so mountainous 
that forward controllers stationed on the front line could not sec the centre of 





enemy attack or defence. " In response to the two problems - inadequate 
time in the combat zone, by USAF F-80s flying from Japan, and an inability 
to positively identify targets - the USAF 5th Air Force reinforced the tactical 
air control system by introducing fifty two-scat, slow speed T-6s, which were 
formed into a group-level tactical unit in August 1950 as the USAF 6147th 
Tactical Air Control Group. " They were known throughout the war as 
'Mosquitos, ' which was a radio call sign used to identify T-6 TACs. The 
6147th TAC Group had a third squadron, which was assigned the FAC 
(Forward Air Controller) function of marking targets on the ground and 
directing fighters' attacks on them. Upon the introduction of the 'Mosquitos, ' 
the mission success rate of the close air support drastically improved. In the 
following months they became the chief tactical control mechanism and a 
major source of day-by-day intelligence (visual airborne reconnaissance) for 
the UN command. Flying every day as weather permitted, 'Mosquitos' 
developed in combat a new 'speedier' (than the previous L-Ss) tactical 
weapon, the airborne forward air controller (AFAC), which was charged to 
control air strikes and aerial reconnaissance from the air, in close 
coordination with the FAC on the ground (GFAC) 44 
Soon after the formation of the USAF 51st Fighter Squadron, 
followed by the establishment of the 5th Air Force Advon (Advanced 
Command Post) at Tacgu on 24 July, the ROKAF lighter unit had to vacate 
K-2 Base by 29 July to provide space for the incoming USAF forces. In the 
meantime Major Kess, his American instructor-pilots/advisers and support 
personnel of 'Bout One' were approved to form USAF 6146th Air Base 
Squadron (AUS) on 31 July. As the Commanding Officer of the 6146th 
42 J. Farmer and M. J. Strumwuscr, The E: ºvlu1Ion of the Airborne Forward Air Controller: An 
Analysis of Maluhu Operations in Korea (Santa Monica, CA; RAND Corporation. 1967). p. 19. 
1 ereaßer cited as Alwquito Op. rutimm ý3 'FCAF Report (2); p. 81. u Initially the airborne forward air controller (AFAC) was referred to as the tactical air coordinator 
(TAC) during the Korean War. Strumwuur, Mosquito Oj'crations, pp. 19.20. 
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ABS, Major Iiess was tasked to train ROKAF combat pilots and provide the 
ROKAF with such logistic support as aircraft maintenance, armament, and 
supply as well as acquisition and maintenance of emergency airfields. " As 
these functions suggest, Major Iiess was given the task of literally fulfilling 
the role of 'American Commanding Officer' of the ROK Air Force flying unit 
under the guise of'adviser. ' The reason for this arrangement was that the 
ROKAF could not function as an independent air force organisation due to 
its lack of trained support personnel and experienced leadership above the 
flight leader level or the rank of captain. In a practical sense, the ROKAF 
had to depend totally (planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, 
training, etc) on the American Air Force (5th Air Force). 
By the end of July the front line was far below Taejon, denying use of 
Kunsan (K-8) and Kwangju (K-7) airfields. There was only one abandoned 
airstrip (K-10) available at Chinhac, twenty miles west of Pusan, which had 
been built to support the former Japanese naval units in Chinhae naval port 
station. Its runway was too short and the facilities were in need of repair. 
The F-51s needed at least a 3,200 foot runway for their operations, and it 
took two weeks to extend the runway from 2,750 feet to 3,500 feet. In the 
meantime, ROKAF combat missions were temporarily suspended for 
additional combat training. The combination of Colonel Lee's crash on 4 
July and the operational requirement of USAF's fighter deployment to Tacgu 
Air Base (Al)) increased the ROKAF's need for additional combat 
reinforcement training. " 
At Chinhac AB during the first two weeks of August, the ROKAF 
F-S1 pilots underwent intensive combat training, such as short field takeoffs 
and landings, instrument and navigation flights, and ground attack gunnery 
45 In May 1931, the 6146th ABS was officially recognised as the existing KMAGs USAF Korean 
Advisory Detachment. i1'wt -G tgJun.. &s, pp. 118.119. 46 ! 6/J., p. 116; W. M. Cleveland, Alosqultos in Korea (Portsmouth, N11: Peter C. Randall. 1991). 
pp. 183.184. 
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missions. Afterwards, they practiced through actual combat missions, 
escorted by their American instructor-pilotsladviscrs. At the time the only 
weapon which could be carried by F-51 fighters to destroy KPA's T-34 tanks 
was the 5-inch high-velocity aerial rocket (I IVAR). But ROKAF pilots did 
not have them. Initially South Korean pilots were allowed only machine 
guns and bombs due to their lack of higher flying skill with that specific 
Mustang aircraft. A few months later Korean pilots finally began to use 
rockets and napalm -jellied gasoline incendiary, the so-called'lire bomb' - in 
actual combat missions, supervised by their escorting American instructors, 
because the lack of available gunnery ranges and the turmoil of the conflict 
precluded separate training. Their high standard of flying proficiency and 
previous experience, averaging over 1,000 hours each in Japanese or 
Chinese lighters, enabled ROKAF pilots to respond to the crisis without 
excessive practice. 
Meanwhile Tacgu K-2 Rase had been expanded during ROKAF's 
absence and could now accommodate the ROKAF planes. They were 
redeployed to Taegu on 15 September when the Inchon landing began. It 
was not until September 21 that ROKAF launched a flight of four Mustangs, 
armed with rockets, to attack enemy convoy trains entering the tunnel near 
Yong'chon, twenty miles northeast of Taegu. This was the first time the 
ROKAF planes were launched into combat with bombs and rockets. The 
USAF joined the attack with four F-80 jet fighters and finished the 
destruction of the trains. ' This mission demonstrated the combat 
proficiency of the ROKAF, and they continued to fly combat missions armed 
with high explosive rockets and machine guns in support of friendly ground 
troops around the Pusan perimeter. 
47 (, atg -G(xmi Lt (1). 1949-53, p. 132. 
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3.2. Advance to Pyongyang Airfield and Retreat to Cheju 
Island (24 September 1950 - 19.1une 1951) 
With high morale, boosted by the UNC's successful Inchon landing on 
15 September 1950, the ROK Marine's 2nd Battalion crossed the Ilan River 
and advanced to downtown Seoul on 19 September 1950 with the US Ist 
Marine Division. Upon their return to Seoul Yo'C Do Air Base (K-16) on 21 
September, ROKAF Mustang pilots prepared themselves for combat 
missions. Eight newly qualified pilots increased the number of the ROK. AF's 
F-51 combat pilots to seventeen. " The figure might look meagre, but it 
represented an eighty percent increase of South Korean Mustang lighter 
pilots in less than three months. 
This incrcasc demonstrated how young Korcan pilots wcrc cagcr to 
learn and join the combat as quickly as possible. The addition was possible 
only because ROKAF leaders had continued to keep their pilots with earlier 
Japanese or Chinese experience proficient in flying T-6s prior to the start of 
the hostilities. Although the ROKAF leaders failed to acquire righter aircraft, 
they recognised the necessity of maintaining high flying proficiency through 
the T-6. This resultant flying proficiency was sufficient to allow smooth and 
early transition to the F-51 fighter aircraft. I lad the ROKAF not proven its 
determination to learn and fight, its very existence might have been 
threatened at the early stages of the war, because from America's standpoint, 
an inept South Korean Air Force would be a military liability. Therefore, 
American advisers served as flight leaders on nearly half of ROKAF combat 
missions from 23 September to 13 October 1950. Of the 74 sorties flown 
from Seoul Yo'C Do (K-16) Air Base, 34 were led by American advisers. "' 
This pattern was to be repeated again by the Americans during the Vietnam 
18 1l'ang-Ga'tg Ami- &:. p. 11 S. 49 11'an-&x it Jan., '. p. 825; rmW cxan . aa (7). 1949-3J, p. 149. 
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War, when USAF pilots flew in aircraft with Vietnamese Air Force 
markings. SO 
Noteworthy was the ROKAPs bombing mission in North Korea from 
Seoul Air Base. On 13 October 1950, a ROK-US combined flight of four F- 
51 s armed with four 500-pound bombs and four 5 inch rockets per plane, led 
by an American adviser as its flight leader, attacked the KPA's General 
headquarters building on the outskirts of Pyongyang. The building itself 
was not of significant military value, but the air strike against Kim 11 Sung's 
military command post by the ROK F-51 fighters, clearly painted with the 
Tae-Geuk national symbol and piloted by South Korean pilots, had a positive 
effect on ROKAF morale. 
As the front line moved north across the 38th Parallel, Kimpo (K- 
14) and Seoul (K-16) Bases became overcrowded with incoming American 
planes, which again forced the ROKAF to seek another air base to house 
itself. Although the ROKAF was the host nation's military organisation and 
should have been entitled to use its own countrys air bases with priority, the 
reality did not permit it. Instead, the ROKAF gave higher priority to 
whatever American military requirements demanded. The ROKAF 
leadership recognised this reality and tried to be cooperative with the 
conduct of air operations under the operational control of the UNCIFEAF 
(5th Air Force). " The ROKAF leaders, young and less experienced, deferred 
to their American counterparts in the spirit of positive cooperation. They 
50 Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Fimc in Soulheart Asia: The AJi izvy Yeas to 1965 
Vashington, DC: Of ice of Air Force 1 istory, United States Air Force, 1981)' pp. 122,267. 
Ltr, Rhce to MacArthur, 14 Jul 54, concerning assignment of conunand authority over all ROK 
forces to UNC during the Korean War. Il-Yon lion-1 lo 226 Boon-Ryoo Bon-I lo 741.14 Jo- 624" 
Goon. ROK government historical records. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Oe-JUKE J4M So 
Gaol Afok-Rok (Jae I Gong-Kae Ja-«w) (A Catalogue of Dip/ wile Uucimenu: lkclawjled 
Volume 1) (Seoul, Korea: ROK Ministry of Foreign Agars. 1994). p. 99. hereafter cited as ROK 
MFA 226: 741.14 Jo-624-Goon. See also ! l'an-Go kA. p. 262. See also Sec. 7.3. The Issue of 
Returning Operational Control to the ROK in Ch. 7 of this study. 
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were aware that their survival and growth were dependent on American 
advisers, who in actuality played de facto commanders' roles. 
When ROK Army 1st Division captured Pyongyang on 19 October 
1950, its airfield in the Mirim area on the eastern suburb became available 
to the ROKAF. The redeployment of the ROKAF Flying Group to 
Pyongyang-Mirim airfield (K-24) was completed on 30 October. The runway 
was intact and in excellent condition, as were other facilities. A usable 
aircraft hangar, which had served the former Imperial Japanese Anny 
Aviation Corps as an aircraft maintenance depot, was available. NKAFs 
evacuation from Pyongyang was made in such haste that warehouses still 
remained full of aircraft spare parts, military provisions and war supplics. 32 
UN/US intelligence reports of increased night time enemy movement 
demanded the shift of USAF combat missions from day to night. The 
decreased demand of day time air strike requests from the UNC ground 
forces and diversion of UN air forces' efforts to night time operations 
deprived the ROKAF Mustang pilots of combat missions, and confined them 
to limited combat orientation unit training. Worried about flight safety, the 
ROKAF leadership allowed Korean pilots only non-tactical navigation 
training at night, because of the high risk of night time tactical air-to-ground 
attack missions. As winter approached, and daylight time became shorter, the 
need for night flying skills of Korean pilots increased. (When Korean pilots 
took off for combat missions Iatc in the aßcrnoon, their return to base was 
usually after dark in winter. ) Although they were not allowed to fly night 
time combat missions, their non-tactical sorties (navigation and touch-and-go 
landings) at night during this respite hclpcd maintain thcir flying proficicncy. 
ROKAF T-6 pilots also flcw combat support missions as airborne 
tactical air co-ordinators to hclp thcir F-S1 pilots idcntify targcts. Taking 
52 Gong-Goon Sa (7), 1949-53, p. 151. 
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advantage of the extra scat, T-6 pilots found targets on the ground through 
co-ordination with ROK Army flight observers in their back scats. Their 
exposure to enemy ground fire was as great as those of their F-51 
counterparts. In many cases their missions proved to be more dangerous, 
because of the T-6's slower speed and longer exposure over target areas. 
ROKAF T-6 pilots flew 334 sorties of airborne tactical air coordinator and 
reconnaissance missions, and also flew 364 sorties of liaison and leaflet. 
dropping missions from the start of hostilities until the massive Chinese 
intervention in November 1950. The ROKAF's L-typc aircraft also flew to 
support liaison and artillery observation missions of the frontal ROK Army 
Corps from its formation as ROKAF Air Reconnaissance Squadron on 16 
October, headed by Lt. Coloncl Oh Jom-suk. They flew a total of 3,600 
sorties until their withdrawal late in May 1951.53 
3.2.1. ROKAF's Retreat to Cheju Island and Regrouping 
The active intervention of Chinese Communist Forces (CCP) forced 
the ROKAF to evacuate Pyongyang airfields' The ROKAF Flying Group 
was withrawn to Taejon airstrip (K-5) on 30 November 1950.33 Due to the 
rapid Chinese advance of the front line and limited facilities at K-5, the 
ROKAF had to move its lighters to Cheju Island airstrip (K-40), leaving only 
one detachment of twenty non-flying personnel, which soon formed Back- 
Goo Boo-Dae (the White Gull Unit) headed by Lt. Col. Kim Shin. ' Taejon 
airstrip was not suitable for operating F-51 fighters due to the insufficient 
53 
$4 
lb1d, pp. 152.153; I1'wt-&xrgJon. & p. 133. 
Evacuation from Pyongyang due to the Chinese intervention was a preemptive surprise to 
ROKAF leaders, who strongly believed that UNC/US military forces, In particular superior 
American airpower, could cope with any threat from China, whose military forces were considered 
basically primitive guerrilla forces and ill-equipped in terms of firepower compared to the advanced 
4merican forces. Interview, author with Lt. General (Ret) Kim Chang-Kyu, 28 September 1995. 
36 
ROKAF Operational Order No. 53, dated 14 November 1950.11'wrg4; oWJon, Sa, p. 147, 
The 'White Gull Unit' was tasked originally to provide air base support at Taejon All. After its 
redeployment to Seoul AD on March 1931, the unit was augmented by Mu. Uw« fighters and pilots. 
It then became a flying unit. JUL. pp. 147.150,154.158,243. 
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length of its runway, which was barely 3,500 feet long. But it would be of 
great importance as a forward operating base (FOB) in the vicinity of the 
front line. Recognising the necessity of maintaining Taejon airstrip as a 
FOB, USAF 5th Air Force instructed Lt. Col. liess to keep the airstrip 'alive. ' 
Lt. Colonel flcss' 6146th Air Base Squadron became the'host, ' with Lt. Col. 
Kim's White Gull Unit as a 'tenant, ' after the ROKAFs mainstay of F-51 
lighters left for Cheju Island on 20 December 1950. The Taejon base became 
the FOB for the ROKAF in support of USAF tactical airlift operations at the 
front lines. " 
In the meantime, President Rhec, in a letter to Ambassador Muccio 
on 5 March 1951, rc-emphasised his hopes that the additional aircraft he had 
previously requested in his letter of 25 October 1950 - one hundred F-51 Is, 
sixty T-6s, and fifteen C-47s - would be made available to the ROK Air 
Force. Ile also requested training of Korean Air Force personnel both in 
Japan and the United States. Muccio explained that such allocations of 
aircraft were being considered and implied that a delay could be expected 
since allocations would require integration with overall strategic planning. s" 
Regarding the training of ROK Air Force personnel, a programme was 
initiated during April and May 1951 for the ground training of ROK pilots in 
Japan. 59 On 11 April 1951,5th Air Force notified the ROKAF of the newly 
approved ROKAF fighter UAE (Unit Authorized Equipment) from ten to 
twenty F-51 aircraft `'0 
sT /bid. p. 154, Hess was promoted to Lt. Colonel on 1 September 1950. /bid, p. I SO. sö US Air Force, 7 rstory of the Fifth Air Force, I July 1951 - 31 December 1931, Volume 3, p. 
168.11cadquaners, Fifth Air Force, APO 970, Air Force historical records, K-730.01, Vol. III, 1 Jul 
- 31 Doc 1931, US Air Force historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 
IIereaRer cited as'SAF I listory, Jul-Dec 1951, mt, v. 3. AF1IRA. 9 Twenty pilots received the instrument flying simulator training at Johnson AFB in Japan in two 
classes. Sixteen ROKAF senior officers, mostly above the rank of Lt. Colonel, attended USAF Air 
Command and Staff College in the United States during the Korean Wu. Gvn&%-Gotm Sa (1), J94i+- 
53, p. 271. ('U'SAF Ilistory, Jul-Doc 1951; ms., v. 3, p. 168. K"730.01, Jul-Doc 1951, v. 3. AFIIRA; N'uºr- 
rovA Jwo-Sv, p. 826. 
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As the fighter strength increased, the ROKAF Flying Group at Cheju 
Island was regrouped into two flying units in April 1951 - 11th Fighter 
Squadron (FS) and 12th Fighter Training Squadron (FTS) - as well as one 
maintenance squadron and one supply squadron. Equipped with twenty F- 
51 s, the ROKAF Flying Group now emerged as an independent operating 
fighter unit. The 11th FS was tasked to conduct combat reinforcement 
training for the already qualified F-51 fighter pilots, whereas the 12th FTS 
was to train new student pilots for their combat mission qualification in F- 
51s. Thcl2th FTS was augmented by five USAF instructor-pilots/adviscrs. 
During the period of 20 December 1950 through 30 June 1951, twenty-four 
newly qualified ROKAF F-S1 tighter pilots were trained. "' A substantial 
amount of hours of their previous flying experience in Japanese airplanes, T- 
6s and L-type aircraft made it possible for those experienced student pilots 
to undertake only eight hours of transition training before they became 
qualified in F-51s: five hours of air work, one hour of combat formation 
! light, and two hours of air-to-ground gunnery. 
3.2.2. White Gull Fighter Squadron at Seoul K-16 Base 
As the front lincs becamc stabiliscd and the combat situation started 
improving early in March 1951, Taejon AB became busy as a FOB for 
USAF transport forces, airlifting war supplies to the front. The increased 
volume of US airlift forces soon crowded Taejon, again forcing the ROKAF 
to relocate its White Gull Unit. Soon after Seoul was recaptured on 15 
March 1951 by UN forces, the White Gull Unit, together with USAF 6146th 
Air Base Squadron moved to Seoul AB. The ROKAF's White Gull Unit was 
immediately augmented on 31 March by six F-S 1s and three ROKAF pilots, 
who had just finished their combat qualification training at 12th FTS on 
61 Gmg-! xxan So (1), 1949-5), p. 165. 
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Cheju Island. At the same time, all American instructor-pilots at 12th FTS 
were also recalled to reinforce the White Gull Unit at Seoul AB, leaving 
teaching of gunnery training to Korean instructors. b= 
On I April 1951, the ROKAF 101st Basc Support Group was 
established at Seoul Al) to support newly arrived ROKAF fighters. Escorted 
by four American instructors, the South Korean pilots resumed ROKAF's 
combat missions on 3 April in the Western and Central front lines of E-chon, 
l laeju, Kacsong, Sibyon-ri, and Kumwha areas. The entire 11th FS was 
moved from Cheju Al) to Seoul All on 19 April 1951, and absorbed the 
White Gull Unit. 11th Fighter Squadron then became known as the White 
Gull Squadron. " 
On I May 1951, Whitc Gull Squadron was again augmcnted by two 
F-51 s and four pilots, two Korean and two American. The squadron's 
strength at Seoul Al) grew to a total of eight F-51s and fifteen pilots, 
including six American instructors. They continued their combat missions in 
May over Sariwon, Yon'uhn and Knesong areas, responding to the diversion 
of the Chinese communist forces' offensive from the eastern front to the 
western. American instructors/adviscrs gave high credit to their Korean 
student pilots for their courageous and positive effort: The Korean pilots 
accepted their responsibility in a manner that left very little doubt as to their 
courage and willingness to light the common enemy, ' noted the US 5th Air 
Force history. " During May Lt. Col. liess completed his 250th combat 
mission while Major George N. Metcalf and Ist Lt. James J. Gillespie flew 
their 100th combat missions respectively. General Kim Chung-Yul paid the 
American instructors/adviscrs of the 6146th Squadron a great tribute when 
62 ibid, p. 166, bs Ibid. pp. 166.167. 64 'SAF I liitory, Jan-Jun 195 1; m. t., vol. 2, p. 244. K"730AI Jan-Doe 193 1, v. 2. AFHRA. 
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he presented Lt. Colonel ! less and his men with the ROK Presidential Unit 
Citation. " 
In the meantime, the ROKAF pilots were at last allowed to use 
napalm for the first time in their combat missions in May 1951. To drop 
napalm, pilots were required to fly straight and steady (non-manoeuvering) at 
very low altitude - normally at treetop level - to make an accurate delivery 
against enemy targets. Consequently they were exposed to enemy ground-fire 
for longer periods. Napalm was used against troops, especially gunners in 
enemy anti-aircraft (AAA) gun positions. The fire bombs were particularly 
demoralising to North Korean foot soldiers. One of the USAF Mustang 
pilots commented upon return from a napalm attack mission: The enemy 
didn't seem to mind being blown up or shot. I {o%vcver, as soon as we would 
start dropping the napalm in their vicinity they would immediately scatter 
and break any forward movement. «'6 Napalm was also useful against tanks. 
The Russian-built tanks had a good bit of rubber in their treads and even a 
near miss with napalm would usually ignite and destroy the armoured tank 67 
The US Army on the Korean front wanted all UNCIUSAF jet fighter- 
bombers capable of carrying napalm, because American troops were 
impressed with its tremendous efTccts, "A US Department of Defense battle 
damage survey during the Korean War reveals that napalm was assessed 'as 
the most effective air weapon against tanks. *9 Fifty-seven percent of the total 
KPA tanks killed in the first five months of the Korean War was attributed 
to the napalm air attack. 7° Despite its combat effectiveness, the use of 
6s /hid, pp. 244,246. t16 Futrell, rite I/mrji, Korea 19J0-53. pp. 94-93. 67 13srcus fad. Rpt., appen., bk. 3, pp. 106.107. K168 041.1. AFI IRA. (ON Allen R. Millet. 'Korea, 1950.1933; in Benjamin Franklin Cooling (ed), (fisteVtudies in the 
1kw Io/; ment of Claw Air Su/º/iort (Washington, DC: Office of US Air Force I listory, 1990), p. 362. 
For Millet's full account, see /bid, pp. 345-110. 69 [: dmund Dews and Felix Koracrka. Air /ntert/ictwn: l es, ', um f wm Past ('am/, uigin A RAND 
Note prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary Of Defense/Program Analysis and Evaluation. 
Gantt Monica, CA: 1981), p. 59; Fuirclt, Ihr (1. VI"1n Korea 1950-53, pp. 95,317.358. ýi' 
Dews and Kozaczka, Air /nierdictumt, p. 60. 
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napalm, 'a cruel form of warfare affecting the civilian populations, ' drew 
repercussions from American allies, particularly Great Britain. 7' UNC/USAF 
bombing policy, however, permitted employment of napalm weapons against 
military targets in the crowded areas, because the KPA oflcn attempted to 
conceal its military supply storage in the inhabited areas in an attempt to 
discourage UNC air strikes. " 
3.3. Combat Pilot Training at Sachon Air Base (K-4) 
(20 . tune - 27 September 1951) 
As the front lines began to stagnate along the 38th Parallel alter the 
CCF's spring offensive failed, and available resources of US and UN 
airpowcr appeared to increase, the air strike requests from the ROK frontal 
ground forces to the ROKAF were reduced. Therefore, ROK Air Force 
Chief of Staff Major General Kim Chung-Yul proposed to his American 
advisers to increase pilot training for the sake of long-term enhancement of 
ROKAF combat rcadiness. 73 When General Kim's attempt to persuade his 
American advisers to agree to his proposal for the temporary respite of 
ROKAF combat missions failed, he wrote directly to General Partridge, an 
official memorandum entitled 'A Proposal on the ROKAF Force 
Improvement, ' unilaterally notifying the USAF that 'in order to prepare 
ROKAF for its self-reliant execution of combat missions in the future, the 
South Korean Air Force will temporarily suspend ROK-US combined 
combat missions from 31 May 1951. " 
71 Michael L. Dockrill, 'The Foreign Ofiice, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean Truce 
Negotiations July 1931-July 1933. In James Cotton and Ian Neary (ode), ihr Kaman War in lllstury 
cAtlantic I lighlands, NJ; Humanities Press International, 1989), P. 108. 
2 As most of the worthwhile targets in North Korea were destroyed by the fall of 1952, the napalm 
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Gcncral Kim's unilatcral action ran the risk of causing an advcrsc 
effect on USAF-ROKAF wartime cooperation, but as the commander of the 
Korean Air Force, the responsibility of providing his pilots with additional 
training was of higher priority once the front line activities decreased. In the 
event, no serious backlash ensued and thus, upon the landing of White Gull 
Squadron's last flight of Mustangs at 3: 35 pm on 30 May 1951, the ROKAF 
was temporarily relieved of combat operations, in order to facilitate 
reorganisation and training to produce more righter pilots. In the last ten 
months since its acquisition of ten F"S 1s on 2 July 1950, the ROKAF had 
flown a total of 519 combat sorties, including 205 sorties flown by 
American instructors. Not until II October 1951 was the ROK Air Force 
again placed on combat status. " 
Sachon Air Base (K-4) was available as a suitable airfield for the 
training of Korean pilots because of its location at the southern tip of the 
peninsula, remote from combat operations on the front lines. Other bases in 
South Korea were already in heavy use by USAF forces. Sachon was also the 
only airfield with a sufficient length of runway for F-S I operations. From 
20-24 June 1951, all ROKAF units scattered in Seoul, Taegu, and Chcju 
Island, converged into Sachon AB in accordance with ROKAF directives. 7' 
The combat and training elements of the ROK Air Force were consolidated 
at Sachon AB, where ground and flying training were conducted with the 
assistance of the USAF 6146th Air Base Squadron. The squadron provided 
technical equipment not authorised for direct issue to the ROK Air Force. 
Fifth Air Force continued to permit the 6146th ABS to issue supplies and 
I Volume 17. ) (Seoul, Korea: Military I liuory Compilation CommittealMND, 1972), p. 898. Us was 
j oduced in 8 volumes for internal dissemination only as an in-house document, not for public salt;. 
rcý-Gx n 5a (1), 1949.53, pp. 174,191. 7° Operational Order No. 31: 11th FS (Whlto Gull Squadron) And 101st Base Support Group on 20 
Juno, 12th FTS and ROKAF Flying Group and Its subordinate supporting squadrons on 22 June, and 
Air Reconnaissance Squadron on 24 June. ß g-Gxm Str (1). 1949-33, p. 173; '3AF Ilistory, Jul- 
Doc 1951, ' nrx, vol. 1, p. 175. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1931, v. 1. AF11RA. 
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equipment to the South Korean Air Force. " 
After consolidating all of its scattered units at Sachon, the ROKAF 
began to reorganise its flying units. The Flying Group was restructured 
upwards into a wing to satisfy increased combat demand and was 
redesignated as the ROKAF Ist Fighter Wing (FW) on 1 August 1951. 
Brigadier General Chang Duk-Chang, a former commercial transport pilot 
for the Japanese, became the wing commander. The 10th Fighter Group 
was activated as a subordinate unit of the Ist FW. Under General Chang's 
command, there were four separate groups: 10th Fighter Group, 30th 
Logistic Support Group, 101st Base Support Group, and 201 Medical 
Service Group. 7 (Figure 3-4) In the meantime, 5th Air Force reconfirmed 
its approval of official authorisation of manpower and equipment: twenty F- 
51 s, six T-6s, and twenty-one L-type planes. This reconfirmation provided 
the 6146th Air Base Squadron with legal authority and guidelines for its 
logistic support to the ROKAF. 79 At the end of July, a planned and 
directed training programme was put into effect under the supervision of 
American instructors of the 6146th AUS, whose mission was to train ROK 
personnel and provide maintenance to ROKAF airplanes. Until that time, 
training had been partially coordinated between the ROK Air Force and 
American advisers with moderate emphasis on transition, formation and 
ground gunnery. Under the new plan the training was completed in different 
phases similar to USAF policies. 
Each phase consisted of a specific number of hours which each 
Korean pilot was required to complete before being recognised as 
77 'SAF I listory, Jul-Dec 1931, ' ms, vol. 1. p. 175. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1951, v. I. AFI IRA. 
2nd Reconnaissance Group was formed at Sachong AB, which was operating L-4/S and T-6 
aircraft under the direct command of ROKAF headquarters. ll'ang-Gang , lc n Sa, pp. 167.168; Cleveland, Mavquitos in Korea, p. 184. " The authorisation was made as of 9 September 1931. Until then, the logistic support for the 
ROKAF F-3 Is was informally arranged by the USAF 6146th Air Base Squadron through its U. S. 
logistic channel. 'SAF 1listory, Jul-Doc 1951, '=. vol. 1, p. 175. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1951, v. I. 
AFI IRA. 
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Figure 3-4: Organisation of the ROKAF Ist Fighter Wing 
(I August 1951) 
Adjutant (D) 
Pcrsonncl & Admin. (C) 
Comptrollcr(E) 
Commander (AA) 
Ist Fighter Wing 
Operations (B) 
(C) 
Public Information (E) 
10th Fighter Group (A) 
11th Fighter Sq (ß) 
(White Gull Squadron) 
12th Fighter Sq (D) 
14th Fighter Sq (B) 
3 th Logistic Support Group (ß) 
31st Maintenance Sq (C) 
71st Security Sq (D) 
33rd Transportation Sq (D) 
101st Base Support Group (A) 
61st Communication Sq (C) 
32nd Supply Sq (C) 
91st Food Scrvicc Sq (D) 
201st Medical Gp (B) 
Legend: AA: Brigadier General; A: Colonel; B: Lt. Colonel; C: Major. DD. Captain; l?: 1 at 
Lieutenant; Admin: Administration; Gp: Group; Sq: Squadron. 
Source: Gong-(nx n , Sa Jae I Jip, 1949-53.6 (71w History of the ROKAIr Fare, Volume /, 1949-June 1953) (Seoul. Korea: ROK Air Force I listory Office. 1991). p. 174. 
9 1st Civil Engineering Sq (C) 
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adequately trained to fly a F-51. The ROKAF pilots were classified into 
three categories, based on their individual flying proficiency and experience. 
At the time there were seventeen Category A pilots, who were former 
Japanese military aviators with some ninety flying hours in F-51s. Three 
pilots with an average of twelve F-51 hours currently undergoing F-51 
conversion training belonged to Category B. The remaining Category C 
pilots were those flying T-6s who had an average of twenty hours of T-6s. 
Upon attaining the minimum thirty-live hours of T-6 training, the 
pilot began the F-51 conversion training. USAF instructors' constant escort 
of combat missions had deprived ROKAF pilots of self-reliant map reading 
and piloting. Therefore, navigation training was emphasised in the training 
syllabus, and the training programme focused on self-reliant combat mission 
capability without American escort. The thirty-hour-long flying training 
syllabus of Category A pilots emphasised basics of navigation and instrument 
flying, air-to-ground gunnery, join-up and map reading. Two classes of 
Category A and Category B pilots received 20-hour instrument flying 
simulator training at USAF 6162th Air Base Squadron, Johnson AFB in 
Japan during the period of 2-16 April and 7 April - 12 May 1951. From I 
August, instrument flying training commenced with dual-scat F-51s at 
Sachon AB. Air-to-ground gunnery training was conducted at the Naktong 
gunnery range, fifteen miles north of Taegu AB in cooperation with USAF 
18th Fighter Wing. The lack of airborne moving targets confined the 
ROKAF air-to-air gunnery mission to simulated training with gun-camera 
assessment only. ' 
lt was hoped that the new training program would enable the unit to 
be placed on combat status once again. On 2 August 1951, the 10th Fighter 
Group, commanded by Colonel Kim Young-Whan, was given the task of 
w This paragraph is summarised from /! 'wtg"-Go: gJoHn-&r, pp. 169-171. 
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supporting counter-insurgency operations in the nearby Chiri Mountain area 
in South Kyung-Sang Province. The forested mountains located in the 
southwestern region of the mainland were utilised as their stronghold by 
over 9,000 communist guerrillas (bandits, communist sympathisers, and 
KPA stragglers). 81 These counter-insurgency operations in the rear area 
were part of the combat training. In order to rc-qualify for combat missions, 
ROKAF had to go through an official Operational Readiness Inspection 
(ORI). The USAF ORI was a most demanding inspection, the failure of 
which would cause the termination of the careers of the unit commanders 
inspected. 
In the fear of possible failure, some of General Kim's deputies 
expressed reluctance to undergo the ORI. Ilowcver, General Kim, confident 
of his Korean pilots' proficiency, pressed the American advisers for a full- 
scale formal inspection by USAF standards. '2 During this period of counter- 
guerrilla operations, US 5th Air Force conducted an Operational Readiness 
Inspection of the 10th Fighter Group. 83 It was understood that the inspection 
would determine whether the ROKAF would be placed on combat status or 
remain solely a training organisation. This was a critical watershed in 
ROKAF history, because if the 10th FG (the only combat capable unit of the 
ROKAF at that time) had failed, the entire ROKAF might have died with it. 
A tactical inspection team of the 5th Air Force arrived at Sachon AB 
on 27 August and began inspection of the ROKAFs combat capabilities. The 
criteria and standards of the OR[ were very high, with USAF pilots flying 
dt For a succinct English account on the counter-guerrilla operations during the Korean War. see 
Carl Rosenthal, 'Korea (1950-1953); in John M. Lord, et al.. A Study of Rear Area Security 
Measures: Greece (World War 11). France (World War ! 1), China (1937-1945). Korea (1950.1953). 
Nicaragua (1926-1933) (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office/The American 
University. 1965). pp. 109-144. See also ROK Ministry of Defense, Korean War 111s: ory jor One 
Year: I May 1950 to 30 June 1951 (Seoul, Korea: War I listory Compilation CommitteelTroop 
Education and Information Bureau of the MND. 1951), pp. A16, A67, A104-106. 12 Interview, author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Chang Chi-Ryang. 16 September 1994. 
B1 11'ang-Gong Jon-Sa. pp. 17$, Gtwg-Gx n Sa (1), 1949-53, pp. 180.181. 
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along as inspectors. In connection with the inspection, several missions were 
flown to assist the Korean National Police in the Chiri Mountain area, and 
railcuts were made above the bomb line north of Haeju. 84 Seventy-seven 
sorties had been flown in August against communist guerrillas, utilising 
machine gun fire, bombs and rockets. "' Despite the revelation of shortages 
of essential combat equipment, the ROKAF successfully passed the ORI on 1 
September. " At last the 5th Air Force officially approved the resumption of 
ROKAF combat missions, but now without the requirement to be led or 
accompanied by USAF advisers: 
The fine spirit and sincere attempt of the Republic of Korea Air 
Force to enter combat operations early in September was 
observed by the inspection party... 1 October 1951 [will] now be 
designated as the date [the] Republic of Korea Air Force shall 
commence combat operations in forward area. This headquarters 
[will be] taking action to provide [the] Republic of Korea Air 
Force necessary material to overcome existing shortages of 
equipment and supplics. 87 
By September 1951, the ROKAF aircraft strength had grown to forty- 
nine planes consisting of twenty-one F-51 s, one C-47, six T-6s and twenty- 
one liaison type aircraft. The personnel strength consisted of 967 officers, 
four warrant officers, 3,681 airmen and 130 cadets -a total of 4,782 men as 
compared to the authorised strength of 5,800. Fifty-eight of the officers were 
rated pilots. `' 
84 The bomb line is the geographic limit for air strikes not under positive close control, commonly 
known as the outer limits of the effective range of the army's corps artillery. Millet, 'Korea, 1950- 
1? 53; p. 350. a 11'ang--CvarrgJon-Sa, pp. 167.168. 86 The revealed shortages were mainly refueling units and equipment for handling heavy armament. 
Air Intelligence Information Report. 2 September 1951. 'Materiel in Possession of ROKAF. ' in'SAF 
I iistory, Jul-Doc 1951; nos., vol. 3, p. 175. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1951, v. 3. AFI IRA 
17 Message OPP 7067 from CO SAF to C/S ROKAF, 7 September 19S I. ibid. p. 174. 
its Ibid, p. 176. The ROKAF total personnel strength grew to be 5,451 by the end of 1931. Goºrg- 
Goon Sa (1), 1949-53, p. 269. 
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3.4. Self-Reliant Combat Operations at Kangnung (K-18) 
Air Base (28 September 1951 - 27 July 1953) 
As the stalemate of ground combat continued, the ROKAF expedited 
preparation for its F-51 squadron's self-reliant combat operations at the 
forward base closer to the ROKA I Corps in the eastern front line. Upon 
lengthening the runway from 2,700 feet to 5,000 feet and expanding 
accommodation facilities at the Kangnung AB (K-18), the 10th Fighter 
Group, the combat element of the Ist Fighter Wing, accompanied by 
Detachment 2 of the 6146th ABS, was transferred to Kangnung AB to 
resume combat missions. From 28 September ROKAF maintained a combat 
element of twelve F-51 Is at K-18 and continued to conduct maintenance and 
training at Sachon AB (K-4) as its rear tendering base. "' The 10th Fighter 
Group, consisting of sixty-three officers and 222 airmen, plus one officer and 
seven airmen of the USAF 6146th Air Base Squadron, hastily prepared for 
battle with the aid of US Marine Air Group 12, also stationed at Kangnung 
AB. 90 The primary mission of the 10th Fighter Group was to interdict and 
destroy railways, roads, and bridges in the hostile rear area including 
Wonsan, which is one of the largest port cities in North Korea on the cast 
coast. 91 
Recognising that the destruction of the main north-south routes would 
make useless lateral rail routes on the 'Ii'-shaped rail network in North 
Korea, United Nations air forces, concurrently with the US Eighth Army's 
attack northward late in May 1951, had implemented Operation Strangle. 
This operation sought to 'interfere with and disrupt the enemy's lines of 
communications to such an extent that the enemy will be unable to contain a 
89 10th Fighter Group's deployment to Kangnung Air Base (K. 18) was completed on 28 September 
1951 in accordance with ROKAF Operations Order No. 36 dated 3 September 1931. !! 'ang-Gwig 
Am-&, pp. 180-181. 
90 'SAF I tistory, Jul-Doc 1951; nm, vol. 1, p. 238. K"730.01 Jut-Doc 1951, v. 1. AFI IRA. 91 Gong-Goon Sa (1), 1949-53, p. 174; Cleveland, dl "Itos in Kor+ra, p. 84. 
99 
determined offensive by friendly forces or be unable to mount a sustained 
offensive himselfi92 During the period of 5 June-20 November 1951, UNC 
air forces aimed their heaviest air attacks against the enemy to paralyse its 
transportation in the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel 
(approximately Pyongyang-Wonsan line) and the 38th Parallel (around the 
area of front lines). The key north-south traffic arteries were divided into 
three sections for intensive attack by units of the 5th AF, the US Ist Marine 
Air Wing, and US Navy Task Force 77. Systematic exploitation of all means 
of aerial interdiction was sought: bridge attacks, tunnel attacks, cratcred 
roadbeds, and delayed action bombs. It was known that the name of Strangle 
was devised to 'glamorize the task for the benefit of ground officers who had 
never been charmed by [aerial] interdiction. ' Upon its cessation, Operation 
Strangle was followed by Operation Saturate on 2S February 1952, which 
was designed to implement 'round-the-clock concentration of available 
railway-interdiction efforts against short segments of railway track in North 
Korca. '93 
To support Operation Strangle, the first combat mission of the ROK 
Air Force from Kangnung Air Base was launched on 11 October 1951 
against enemy lines of communications (LOCs) in the areas of I Iwachon and 
Yangku behind the central eastern front lines of the Chinese 68th Field Army 
and the KPA II Corps. The flight, led by Colonel Kim Young-Whan, 
Commanding Officer of the ROKAF 10th Fighter Group, and observed by 
Lt. La Gro, the USAF adviser to the Korean Air Force at Kangnung, was 
completed without mishap. " During the first week of operations, bombing 
accuracy was poor. This problem resulted from the number of new pilots in 
the group. However, as the days went by, the railcut percentage hit a high 
92 Futrell, The USAFIn Korea 1950-53, pp. 437,442. 93 - This is summarised from Futrell, The U&4FIn Korea 1950-53, pp. 324-323.437-461. 94 1 1! 'ang-GongJon-,. Va, pp. 189.192. 
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mark, and by the end of the month the ROK F-51 s were successfully 
bombing rail lines and other targets. " Outstanding results of air strikes 
continued in November, and for the second straight month the efforts of the 
Korean Air Force were focused on air interdiction. 1lowever, on I 
December 1951, all combat elements of ROKAF F-51s at Kangnung AB 
were diverted back to Sachon AB to participate in Operation Rattrap, the 
clean-up campaign the ROK Army was conducting to eliminate communist 
guerrillas in the southern mountainous area of South Korea. The ROK Air 
Force provided close support for the ground troops. At the close of this 
campaign on 14 December, the ROK planes returned to Knngnung and 
resumed combat missions, mainly air interdiction, against targets in North 
Korea. Later in the month these ROK F-51s flew down to Chinhae AB (K- 
10) again to take part in a ROK-US combined operation with the USAF 18th 
Fighter-Bomber Wing in the second phase of Operation Rattrap. '6 
Three ROK F"5 Is were lost in accidents from 11 October 1951, when 
the unit returned to combat status, to 31 December 1951. During the same 
period one F-51 received major battle damage and one was destroyed by 
enemy ground fire, with its pilot killed in action. Another pilot died in an 
aircraft crash. Despite these setbacks the morale of Korean righter pilots 
remained high and 'their precision flying, courage and tenacity in battle' won 
the admiration of United Nations forces throughout Korea. 97 Considering 
that the ROK unit at Kangnung AB possessed only twelve aircraii, ROK 
maintenance personnel performed a notable feat in enabling the ROK Air 
Force to mount 236 combat sorties in October, 250 in November and 222 in 
93 The toll of enemy resources claimed by the ROKAF Included 76 railcuts, 10 buildings, 13 supply 
dumps, 14 flak positions, 36 vehicles and 10 railway bridges destroyed. /rcntg-G Ja-*&, p. 192. W) 11'arg-(nmgJun+Sa, p. 193, 'SAF I listory, Jul-Doc 1951; eis.. vol. 1, p. 240. K"730.01 Jul- 
ý)oc 1931, v. 1. AFI IRA. 
'SAF I Eistory, Jul-Doc 195 1; ms., vol. 1, pp. 240-242. K-730.01 Jul-Doc 1931, v. 1. AFlIRA. 
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December, for a total of 708 combat sorties since beginning self-reliant 
combat operations on 11 October 195 1. ` 
During the early months of 1952, intelligence reports called for 
reassessment of interdiction targeting, because it was revealed that complete 
destruction of enemy supplies or denial of their movement into North Korea 
was not possible with the forces and weapons available to UNC air forces" 
The situation was quite simple: the enemy's low logistic requirement made it 
possible for communist troops to keep their limited supply line open through 
improvised transportation systems operating under cover of darkness and 
using either humans or oxen for portcrage. 10° In the aerial interdiction 
programme, every effort was made to exact from the enemy the greatest cost 
in manpower and material to prevent it from launching and sustaining 
another large scale assault against South Korean territory. In implementing 
this policy, UNC/US 5th Air Force began to concentrate the major portion of 
its strength on the railcut program (Operation Saturate), which called for 
'constant attacks on specific portions of the main rail lines - by fighter 
bombers during the day and by ß-26s at night'1°' According to the 5th Air 
force intelligence assessment report, the initial effect of this operation 
considerably slowed the transport of enemy supplies by rail and hampered its 
overall logistical activities in moving supplies from Manchuria into North 
Korea. It also forced the enemy to divert huge forces of manpower and large 
96 The total combat claims of the ROKAF during the period between II October and 31 December 
1951 were: 196 railcuts; 17 roadcuts; 192 buildings destroyed; 63 supply dumps; 30 carts; 16 
railway bridges; 101 gun positions; 48 vehicles; 41 bunkers; and 198 enemy troops killed. Mang. 
l', r Jun.. Sa, p. 194. 99 On 0 November 1951, General Ridgway directed the UNC forces to cease offensive operations 
and begin an active defense of its front' The communists apitatised on the respite (stalemated low 
combat activities) to fortify their front lines, and secured their battle positions. Thus the Rods 
reduced their logistical support required at the front lines by moving troops rearward. Futrell, li e 
(IMF in Korea 1950-53, p. 448. " Oxen and cows were valuable supply sources during the war. The IPA used the cattle in 
occupied South Korea for military provisions (beef) as well as auxiliary transportation means. H'u$- 
ýºook Am-&, p. 831; (lang- ucm Sir (1), 1949-53, p. 171. 01 Futrell, 77, e USAF in Korea, 195"), p. 431. 
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quantities of material to repair their battered rail lincs. 102 Although the 
ROKAF mission to support Operation Saturate was successful in its combat 
execution, it is questionable whether the strategic objectives of such an air 
interdiction campaign were actually achieved. 
In the middle of January 1952, Pyongyang served as the distributing 
point of increased Chinese supplies to the front lines. The railway bridge at 
Sung-ho Ri into Pyongyang was targeted by the US 5th Air Force for 
destruction, but was reinforced by the North Koreans after it sustained initial 
damage. The mission to destroy the hardened bridge, which lay ten 
kilometers (about six miles) cast of Pyongyang, was given to the ROKAF. 
After two failed attempts on 12 January 1952 at destroying the target, 
ROKAF pilots analysed the tactics used. They found the main problem was 
the bombing accuracy. Unless pin-point accuracy was attained, the target 
could not be successfully destroyed due to its reinforced construction. When 
the Sung-ho Ri railway bridge was previously damaged by US fighter 
bombers, North Koreans built an alternative bridge 200 meters farther north 
of its original location and reinforced it with ten right-angled, hollow pillars 
of thick timber filled with sandbags. Anti-aircraft guns were reinforced 
around it as well. The ROKAF pilots assigned to the task finally determined 
that the American Air Force's high angle dive-bombing tactics were 
inappropriate for the South Korean pilots to achieve the required bombing 
accuracy. Therefore, the ROKAF pilots approached the target from 4,000 
feet, instead of 8,000 feet, dropped the ordnance at 1,500 feet, instead of 
3,000 feet, and finally destroyed the bridge and at the same time a number of 
corollary targets such as gun positions, supply concentrations and bunkcrs. '03 
102 'SAF History. Jan-Jun 1932, ' ins.. vol. I, p. x. K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1952, v. 1. AFI IRA. 103 Interview, ROKAF historians with ßrigadia General Kim Shin. 16 March 1963. Myon-gam 
Sa-Ryo #3309-4 (oral historical records 033094) in ROKAF, '1fan-Gook Jon-Jacng Myon-D'am 
Rok Jac 3 Kwon' (The Oral I listory on the Korean War. ' Volume 3), is.. pp. 4.6.1Icreafcr cited as 
ROKAF Oral History (2). ' See also 'ROKAF Oral History (3X' m. &. pp. 437439; ROKAF Oral 
History (4); in.., pp. 194-200. General Kim later became ROKAF Chief of Staff (1964-1966). 
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These ROKAF pilots proved their proficiency by analysing the 
problem, changing tactics, and solving the problem without American 
guidance. In fact, American advisers opposed the Korean pilots' new tactics, 
because of the increased vulnerability to enemy ground fire at lower altitude. 
The Korean pilots' ingenuity, demonstrated in combat, made American 
advisers aware that the ROKAF was now capable of functioning as a combat 
force on its own without necessarily being escorted by American advisers. 
This achievement was officially recognised at the Fighter Wing 
Commanders' meeting of the Sth Air Force on 21 February 1952. Colonel 
Kim Shin, Commanding Officer of the 10th Fighter Group, accepted the 
United States Presidential Unit Citation for the successful destruction of the 
Sung-ho Ri railway bridge. 10' 
Based on the success of the Sung-ho Ri mission, the ROKAF 10th 
Fighter Group was given the task of destroying the steel mill at Song-rim, 30 
miles south of Pyongyang on 28 March 1952. A total of 116 sorties of 
ROKAF Mustang fighters, each armed with two S00-pound bombs and four 
5-inch I IVAR rockets, destroyed the mill after a week of attacks. 1 ' This 
was the first ROKAF air raid against an industrial target in North Korea. 
This unique success not only inflicted heavy damage upon North Korean 
steel plate and coil production, but also boosted the morale of the South 
Korean pilots. 106 
Ilaving been reborn as a tactical airpowcr in battle and matured by 
combat success, the ROKAF now became capable of joining UNC air forces 
in the massive air raids against Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea 
104 At the meeting it was known that two commanding officers of American fighter-bomber wings 
bet on whether the ROKAF pilots could successfully destroy the bridge against which the USAF 
pilots had failed in several attempts. The winning commanding officer related the story of the bet to 
Colonel Kim. 'ROKAF Oral I listory (4), 'M. 9., pp. 198.200. tug 11'w g4wrg Jtmt, % p. 200. IM The Song-rim steel mill was built in 1918 by the Japanese and installed with five funaces. three 
1 SO-ton clan and two 200-ton class, Steel products were: pig Iron, plate, rail and coil. IbkL. pp. 
199-200. 
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as a part of an Air Pressure strategy, which was designed to force North 
Korea and China to the bargaining table. From 11 July 1952 to 29 August 
1952, the combined UNC air forces bombarded and scorched Pyongyang. 
The South Korean Air Force, barely two years old, but well-seasoned from 
its combat missions, successfully performed with the other UNC air forces. 107 
Professionally and emotionally, this retaliation by ROKAF fighter pilots was 
the fulfillment of a two-year dream to obliterate the humiliation of the fall of 
Seoul. 
Although the UNC's massive air attacks on enemy supply and 
industrial targets undoubtedly made the logistical task of the communists 
immensely more difficult, they did not and could not prevent all supplies 
from entering and accumulating in North Korea. The short supply line from 
Manchuria into North Korea made it relatively easy to maintain a moderate 
flow of supplies to the battle area. With the aircraft and men available to 
UNC/US 5th Air Force, the static front, and the existing prohibitions against 
attacking north of the Yalu River, completely stopping the movement of 
supplies into North Korea was impossible. A review of air interdiction 
results of the preceding months indicated a need for a shift in interdiction 
emphasis, this time to selective destruction of supplies, equipment, and 
personnel concentrated in proximity to the front. 
The prospect of preparing the ROKAF combat force for close air 
support (now usually referred to as CAS) in the eastern front had long been 
the hope and plan of commanders of various American units as well as 
ROKA I Corps division commanders. Successful combat experience in 
previous interdiction missions paved the way for ROKAF lighters to provide 
air fire support to ground troops of ROKA I Corps in the eastern front. This 
107 Futrell, The USAF In Korea 193043, p. 204. For detailed accounts of an Air lW-tsvrv 
strategy, see Ch. 15: Toward an Air-Pressure Strategy, lbli, pp. 475-489, and Ch. 18: Sustained 
Air-Pressure Operations, Ibld, pp. 603.645. See also 11'ang-G JJa Sa pp. 204-206. 
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was an important recognition of combat maturity of the ROKAF fighter 
pilots. Since the close air support mission is a trilateral joint operation, 
involving ground-borne forward air controllers (GFACs/TACPs), airborne 
forward air controllers (AFACs), and mission fighter pilots, the CAS 
mission required orchestrated co-ordination between command and control 
of friendly ground forces and air force lighters. Otherwise the risk of 
attacking friendly forces and mid-air collisions among friendly aircraft 
(mission fighters and AFACs) might occur. 
ROKAF pilots were constantly rcmindcd of the difficulty of the 
fighter strike (CAS) mission. AFACs who were guiding fighter strikes from 
their slow speed light airplanes often complained of 'blind spots' they had 
found when looking out for other airplanes in their flying area. Any aircraft 
in front of them and at a lower altitude could not be seen, nor could any 
aircraft directly below or above them. In directing the strikes of high- 
performance aircraft, these slow speed AFAC pilots had found a need to 
divert their attention from their missions to be doubly alert to avoid mid-air 
collisions. In spite of their precautions, however, some of these missions 
ended in disaster. One such fatality took place on 18 October 1950 when Lt. 
John Stanton of the US Army 24th Division aviation section, along with his 
observer, Lt. John Watkins, was leading a flight of four American F-51 
Mustangs in a righter strike in the vicinity of Sinmak. thirty miles north of 
Panmunjom. One of the fighters, in pulling up after a strafing run, collided 
with Lt. Stanton's L-17 AFAC aircraft. All three of the flyers were killcd. 10" 
108 This Is summariscd from Dario Politelle, UpcrWIon GracshOMr ( Wichita, KS: Robot R. 
Longo Co., 1958), pp. 36,178. LL17 Is a four-seat all metal liaison plane with high power, which 
was used extensively by the U. S. Army for observation and liaison minions during the Korean War. 
John W. Kitchens, 'Army Aviation Between WW 11 and the Korean Con lict, 1945.1950, UniuJ 
Stures Army Aºlorlon Digest (September-October 1992), p. 20. L-17 also trrvod well for 
transportation of VIPs and commanding generals (such at Generals MacArthur, Ridgway and Clark) 
on their personal inspections of the Korean battlefront. Richard Tierney, The Army Aºlatk a Spy 
(Northport. AL: Colonial Press 1963), pp. 226-227. 
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This mid-air collision was preceded by a more disastrous incident 
during a close air support mission at the early stage of the Korean War. A 
flight of four American F-51 fighter bombers mistakenly strafed and 
napalmed British troops who were engaged in battle with KPA troops across 
the Naktong River north of Tacgu in late July 1950. The exact number of 
British casualties was not disclosed. General Partridge, Commander of 5th 
Air Force, presumed the number to be about twenty or more who were 
burned with napalm. General Partridge recollected that this mishap occurred 
due to the failure of close coordination between the forward air controllers 
(airborne and ground) and the CAS mission pilots. "" 
The same mistake was repeated four decades later in Desert Storm by 
two USAF A-10 tightcrs against two British annourcd vehicles. '[T]wo US 
A-10 pilots, confident they were over the Iraqi armored column they were to 
attack, f ircd [AGM-65] Maverick [anti-armour) missiles against what turned 
out to be thirty-seven British Warrior armored vehicles parked in the Iraqi 
desert. ' Nine British soldiers were killed and eleven wounded by this 
inadvertent friendly air attack on 26 February 1991.110 
US Marine Corps Major General It B. Johnston, deputy commander 
of U. S. Central Command, said that both American mission pilots and a 
British ground controller should share responsibility for that friendly fire 
incident. General Johnston %kTote in his investigation report: '[T]here was a 
failure by both the ground controller and the pilots to ensure a thorough 
understanding of the situation and environment. "" A total of thirty US and 
British friendly fire incidents occurred during Desert Storm, of which ten 
109 'General Partridge's Oral I listory' pp. 627.628. Ito Stewart M. Powell, 'Friendly Fire, ' Air Fiat Alaga: ine 74: 12 (December 1991), p. 61. For 
Powell's full account, see /blot, pp. 38-63. For further accounts on the U. S. and British friendly fire 
Incidents, see Julie Bird, 'Friendly Fire: Deadly Mistakes in U. S. Air Attacks Studied for Solutions, ' 
Air Force Times 32: 3 (August 26,1991), pp. 12.13 *. hereafter cited as Bird, 'Friendly Fire! See 
also Julie Bird, '2 U. S. Pilots. British Controller Blamed in Gulf-War Fratricide, ' Air Funs. Times 52: 
16 (November 25,1991), p. 3+. 1 Iereafter cited as Bird, 'Gulf-War Fratricide. ' 11 Bird, 'Gulf-War Fratricide, ' p. 3. 
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were CAS attacks. American aircraft were involved in at least five of the ten 
- four cases involved A-10 attack aircraft and one involved an F-4G Advance 
Wild Weasel air defense suppression aircrali. 12 A thorough coordination 
between mission pilot and ground troop action officers (mainly forward air 
controllers or air liaison onicers) is constantly needed to prevent casualties 
in the conduct of close air support under stressful conditions. In other 
words, the hazards of close air support have never diminished over the years, 
because the stress of combat remains the same despite great technological 
advances. 
The idea of the ROKAF providing CAS to ground units of the 
ROKA I Corps became a reality on 20 October 1952 when the 10th Fighter 
Group completed its first successful CAS mission. While the ground righting 
went into a stalemate again, and the issue of exchanging prisoners of war 
became a focal point at Panmunjom, the enemy capitalised on this combat 
respite to reinforce its troops and harden its defences on the front lines. On 
28 October 1952, the communist forces launched an attack against ROKA 
forces at I till 351, south of Kosong (in the eastern front, different from 
Kacsong in the western area) and 50 miles north of the 38th Parallel. Loss of 
this hill would threaten the further defence of the ROK's entire eastern front 
because of its tactically advantageous topography and its strategic location as 
an important transportation hub linking cast coastline roads between Wonsan 
and Kangnung. Upon receipt of the air strike request, the 10th Fighter Group 
launched two flights of eight Mustangs and successfully helped the ROK 
ground forces defend the hill. The enemy's attempts to capture this hill 
continued in the following months until 26 March 1953, when four flights of 
sixteen ROKAF Mustang lighters, each armed with two 500-pound general 
112 Bird, 'Friendly Fire, ' p. 12. In actuality, in the conduct of close air support. especially inherent 
risks of operating high performance aircraft in close proximity is well known. and worried about. by 
every pilot who flies an attack-mode aircraft. Each and every one of them, as he or she breaks 
toward the target, says 'please, God. " don't let it be me. ' Author's experience. 
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purpose bombs, four 5-inch high explosive rockets, and high speed machine 
guns of 1,200 rounds, wiped out the enemy threat by destroying two caves 
and twenty hardened bunkers on the hill. "' 
In the meantime, the 10th Fighter Group at Kangnung Al) (K-18) 
had expanded to become the 10th Fighter Wing on 15 February 1953, 
independent of its former parent unit, Ist Fighter Wing at Sachon, which 
was subsequently redesignated the ROKAF Ist Flying Training Wing. 
(Figure 3-5) In April 1953, the 10th Fighter Wing began flying 
general support missions just behind the front lines, in addition to its regular 
close air support missions. "' Each of these interdiction missions, consisting 
of fourteen to thirty-eight aircraft, was led by one highly experienced 
ROKAF pilot and one American instructor/adviser flying to mark targets. 
Arriving at the target a few minutes prior to the attackers, the US-ROK 
pathfinder clement identified, fixed by radio, and marked the target with 
bombs. This practice proved quite satisfactory. The attack missions, except 
the pathfinder element, were flown solely by ROKAF pilots, for their 
flight leadership had improved, and all front-line tactical air control parties 
were manned by Korean speaking ROK personnel. '" 
Throughout the period from the formation of the USAF advisory unit 
attached to the ROKAF on 30 June 1950 until the end of hostilities on 27 
July 1953, American instructors/advisers devoted their efforts toward 
increasing the coordination, flexibility, and effectiveness of ROKAF combat 
missions by personally participating in actual combat missions as either 
leaders or observers. Critiques were held upon completion of missions and 
corrections were made. American advisers initiated a continuing program of 
instruction, which led to safer and more efficient operating procedures by 
11) ! 1'wi -Cný+q, ºJon-Sa, pp. 227.229. 114 wig-(; cxxr Sa (l). 1949-53, p. 233. 113 1! 'wrg4; cxc,, ºJ(w,. s( pp. 228-229. 
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Figurc 3-5: Organisation of the RO1-L1F 10th Fighter Wing 
(15 February 1953) 
Commander (A) 
I0th Fighter Wing 
Adjutant (D -Operations (B) 
Personnel & Admin. (C) JJ Logistics (C) 
Comptroller (E P10 (E) 
10th Fighter Group (A) 
101st righter Sq (13) 
102nd Fighter Sq (13) 
10th Maintcrwncc & 
Supply Group (ß) 
0th Maintenance Sq (C) 
-10th Supply Sq (C) 
L 
10th Trans, Sq (D) 
10th Medical Scrvice Group (D) 
10th Base Support (ß) 
10th Comm Sq (C) 
10th Weather Sq D) 
I0th Civil Eng. Sq(C) 
10th Air Police 
Sq (D) 
IOth Food Service 
Sq (D) 
Legend: A: Colonel; I3: Lt. Colonel; C: Major. D: Captain; E: Ist Lieutenant; Admin: 
Administration; Comm: Communication; Eng: Engineering; P10: Public Information 
Otlicc; Trans: Transportation. 
Source: (kxtg-Cxxm Sa Jas I Jip, 1949,53.6 (l be III. %SOry of Ow ROK Air I wrs, J o/ tm J, 
1949-June 1953) (Seoul, Korea: ROK Air Force I liuory Office. 1991), pp. 233.234. 
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the ROKAF pilots. 116 Enthusiastically responding to their Chief of StafFs 
emphasis on maintenance of an amiable relationship with Americans, 
ROKAF pilots willingly accepted advice and assistance from their American 
advisers. 
General Kim's emphasis on the ROKArs deference to the USAF was 
reinforced by his awareness of a humiliating incident of a ROKA division's 
disastrous defeat at the hands of the North Koreans. It took place on 22 
April 1951, involving the flight of the ROKA 6th Division before inferior 
enemy forces and endangering the entire United Nations line. It was serious 
enough to command the personal attention of Commander in Chief of the 
United Nations Command (CINCUNC) General Matthew B. Ridgway. 
Ridgway immediately conducted a study to determine what should be done 
to increase the effectiveness of the ROK Army. Following conferences with 
General James Van Fleet, Ambassador Muccio, and President Rhec, General 
Ridgway concluded that the ROK Army's primary needs were leadership and 
training, not manpower and equipment. In other words, and quite bluntly, 
until the ROK forces could demonstrate an ability to perform suitably, there 
seemed to be little point in arming and equipping them. Because of the 
ROK's lack of experienced military leaders, one possibility considered in 
Washington during the study was that US Army officers be used to 
command elements of the Korean Army. General Ridgway and Ambassador 
Muccio rejected this course of action as impractical in view of the large 
number of American officers that would be required, the ever-present 
language barrier, and the fact that successful command of Korean units by 
116 To wit: quick left-hand join-ups after tak"f, standard formations and power settings to and 
from the target, a single pass at the target per euch type of ordnance used, a minimum pull-out 
altitude of 3,000 feet, better coordination with 'Mosquito" TAC controllers with leas radio trains, 
standard 1,000 foot power-off landing breaks, better spacing in the landing pattern and the 
expeditious clearing of the runway by the landing aircraft' '6146 AFAG I llstory, Jan-Jun 1933; Ms. 
pp. 37.58. K-GP"TNG-6146-111, Jan"Jun 1953. AFI IRA. 
US officers would require a prerequisite of complete authority to administer 
discipline to forces and personnel of a friendly sovereign nation. I" 
General Kim was chagrined over the cowardice revealed by his Army 
colleagues. Aware that fear is contagious, Kim became concerned over the 
possible spread of defeatism to the ROKAF. He therefore insisted upon 
successful combat missions in 'thorough' co-operation with American 
advisers, in the hope that ROK credibility could be restored. Accordingly 
ROKAF's co-operation in both combat and social functions was highly 
stressed, and General Kim was keen on the outcome of the ROKAF combat 
missions, as well as the first hand aller-action reports prepared by American 
advisers. He thought that unless ROKAF personnel proved their 
effectiveness and credibility to American counterparts, the prospect of 
survival of the ROKAF itself, let alone its expansion, could not be 
expected. "' 
The American Army in the field would also have preferred to have 
ROK airpowcr integrated into the ROK Army, especially following the 
confinement of ROKArs mission to the close air strikes, supporting the 
ROK divisions of the ROK I Corps. This situation sat well with most army 
officers, for many of whom the support of engaged ground forces seemed to 
represent the only legitimate mission for air forces. 119 Such views came as a 
shock to the ROK Air Force leaders who were functioning successfully on 
1 17 Such a possibility had personally been proposed to the Chairman of the JCS. General of the 
Army Omar 11. Bradley by the South Korean UN envoy Colonel Ren C. Limb, Defense Secretary 
George C. Marshall had expressed interest in the idea, Robert K. Sawyer. US Military Group to the 
Republic of Korea, pt. 3 (Draft). 1945.1951; m. S, pp. 274.273. K-171.602.1 A, 1945.1931. pt. 3. 
ýFi IRA. 
a General Kim Chung-Yul mentioned this on S March 1990 in a personal conversation with the 
author at a reception at the ROKAF Academy. Authors memorandum of records, did 7 March 
1990. See also ROKAF, 'Oral i listory. General Kim Chung-Yul and Colonel Lee Chang-Yoon. ' 
(Seoul, Korea: ROKAF I listory Office. 1968), PP. 48.32. 
119 General Ridgway once argued that the ROK Air Force maintained at its current strength would 
be ineffectual and extravagant. ' Sehnabel, James F. and Watson. Robert J. 71w //awry of spar Jo1,.: 
Chiefs o/Sn ifi The Joins Chacfr of Staff wa11Vaurwril Polley: {'ahme l/1: The Korea's º4 w. Part I 
(hereafter cited as Schnabel and Watson, lltut»y of he JCS. v. 3. pt. I Wilmington, DC: Michael 
Glazier. 1979), p. 803. 
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the operational level with American advisers. Was the ROKAF to become 
another casualty of the war? Would it continue to be supported once the war 
ended? US Army General Mark W, Clark's arrival answered these questions 
in favour of the South Korean Air Force, and reversed the situation. General 
Clark, who had replaced General Ridgway on 2 May 1952, firmly believed 
that every means possible should be exerted to create the nucleus of an air 
force and build it up as situations permitted: 
At the very first briefing conference I was given in Washington 
after my appointment to the command in the Far East, I got the 
feeling that we should build up the ROK Army to its maximum 
capability. I favored a military establishment in which the ground 
forces were predominant, but also' believed we should do 
everything possible to create the nucleus of a navy and air force 
and expand them as technical skills of the Koreans permitted and 
as equipment became available. 120 
General Clark submitted his view in recommendations to Washington soon 
after his arrival in Tokyo. On 30 June 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
reaffirmed General Clark's post-war goals for South Korea: 'An Army of ten 
divisions and 250,000 men and other services (Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 
Force) of approximately their present size. ''Z' Thus the ROK Air Force was 
saved. 
The ROKAF was revived and revitalised as a tactical power in 
battle during the Korean War under American sponsorship. Facing the North 
Korean invasion without a single fighter aircraft, the ROKAF quickly 
adapted out of the sheer necessity for survival. The ROKAF had grown from 
fourteen liaison planes and 1,100 men in 1949 to one hundred and eighteen 
aircraft with seventy-eight F-51 fighters and 11,481 personnel with 1,386 
120 Mark W. Clark, From the Danube 10 the Yalu (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 171. 
121 Schnabel and Watson, History of the JCS, v. 3, pt. 1, p. 809. 
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officers in 1953.122 Over a nine month period from II October 1952, when 
they first commenced their own independent combat missions, until the end 
of hostilities on 27 July 1953, ROKAF pilots flew more than 2,656 CAS 
sorties in support of ROKA I Corps in the eastern front. The total number of 
ROKAF F-51 pilots who took part in these interdiction and close air support 
combat missions during the period of the war was one hundred and fifteen, 
with forty of them (35%) recorded as having flown more than one hundred 
combat missions each. Despite the loss of thirty-nine pilots and 117 aircraft, 
including sixty-eight F-51s, the ROKAF accomplished a total of 8,495 
sorties in combat, second only to United States air forccs. 123 
ROKAF missions had evolved from administrative liaison to such 
tactical combat missions as air interdiction and close air support. The South 
Korean pilots had matured into combat hardened fighter veterans. At the 
beginning of war, they had had to respond to crisis on a case-by-case basis, 
with neither prc-planning nor organised support. Three years later, they had 
analysed missions, corrected tactics, functioned as independent teams, and 
successfully engaged the enemy, fully trained and capable. Thus the South 
Korean Air Force grew to be a tactical airpowcr during the Korean War. On 
numerous occasions, however, it frequently appeared that it would die in its 
infancy. I lad the ROKAF not proven its determination to learn and fight, its 
very existence might have been threatened at the early stages of war. From 
America's standpoint, the South Korean Air Force would be a military 
112 Gong-Goon So (7) 1949.33, p. 429. Throughout the Korean War, the American government 
supplied a total of 198 aircraft to the ROKAF: fifty 1. type aircraß,, fourteen T-6s, one C-47 and 133 
F-S 1 t. ! 1'mrg-Gw Jon, Sa, pp. 218,231.235, ßy the end of hostilities. NKAF had 1,780 pilots out 
of its total personnel strength of about 20,000 persons and 255 Miß-1S jet righters out of 489 
ircralt in five air divisions " four righter and one bomber. Gong-Goon Sir (Il), 1933-37, pp. 67-68. =2s 
! l'ungdnrrg Jon &z, pp. 230-231; Cleveland, Alaxutios in Korea, p. 184. The ROKAF was 
also second only to the USAF In terms of manpower numbers committed to the Korean War. The 
breakdown of ROK and UNC air forces was: US Air Forces 93.4 V.; other participating UN air 
forces 1.0 V.; and the ROKAF 3.7 %. Matray. Historical Dlctluvwy of the Koma Nw, pp. 507- 
508. 
114 
liability, because its small size (one fighter squadron) could not contribute 
much to the conduct of an air campaign. 
Noncthclcss, ROKAF Icadcrs, young and less cxpcricnccd, deferred 
to their American counterparts in the spirit of positive cooperation, as they 
were aware that their survival and growth were highly dependent on 
American advisers. The efforts and overall purpose of American advisers 
had been successful. I low they constituted an important cornerstone in the 
foundation of the growth and improvements of the South Korean Air Force 
during the war will be further discussed in the following chapter. 
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c, IAI'rI: R FOUR 
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ADVISORY ACTIVITIES 
DURING THE KOREAN «'AR, 1950-1953 
Upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the inability of the Republic 
of Korea to support its Air Force was immediately recognised by the United 
States. Thus, almost from the beginning of the conflict, US 5th Air Force 
assumed the responsibility for supporting the ROKAF. 5th Air Force was 
authorised to provide air force equipment, POL, aviation ammunition, 
ordnance, and such other logistic support as might be necessary for the 
operation of the ROK Air Force. ' The US 5th Air Force advisory mission in 
South Korea encompassed many fields of endeavour and affected almost 
every corner of the ROK Air Force. It was a demanding exercise of 
professional duties and a unique human experience for the American air 
advisers who had to struggle not only with problems of environmental and 
cultural differences, while facing the complexities and hazards of the war, 
but also devote their time and energy to nurture South Korean airmen's 
limited experience with US Air Force mature professionalism. 
To the South Korean Air Force officers and airmen who benefited 
from their American air advisers' expertise and experience, the advisers were 
both mentors and samaritans. Regardless of their ranks and assignments, 
they could be characterised by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and 
devotion to those they advised. Whatever their approach to advisory duties, 
they always performed with dedication and competence. This chapter 
examines the evolution of the USAF advisory system to include how it was 
organised and involved with the 1(OK Air Force, and how it functioned to 
t '5th AF I listory, July-Dec 193 1; Appendix 66. K"730.01, Jul-Doc 195 1, Al IRA, 
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help the ROKAF simultaneously implement its pilot training and conduct 
combat missions in the 'buddy-system' formations with American advisers 
during the Korean War. 
4.1 The Establishment of US 6146th Air Force Advisory Group 
Upon completion of US troop withdrawal from Korea on 30 June 
1949, the existing Provisionary Military Advisory Group (PMAG) was 
transformed the following day into an official permanent entity, designated 
the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea 
(KMAG), which was tasked to carry on the training missions previously 
undertaker., by the US occupation forces in Korea. It became an integral part 
of the American Mission in Korea (AMKI), along with the US Embassy at 
Seoul-2 But none of the United States Air Force personnel among its 
authorised strength of 500 men were tasked to advise an air force. ' KMAG 
was reluctant to take responsibility for'nurturing a ROK Air Force, ' because 
'the US [was] in no way committed to support a Korean Air Force with 
advisors or materiel. ' The fourteen liaison planes, KMAG further argued, 
had been turned over to the South Koreans, 'for an air liaison detachment for 
the Korean Army, and nothing more'4 But when the South Korean Air 
Force became a separate service in October 1949 a few months after 
completion of the US troop withdrawal, 'the fall accompli of a Republic of 
Korea Air Force' dictated that KMAG recommend on 7 December 1949 two 
instructor pilots and eight enlisted specialists from the United States Air 
Force be assigned in Korea as advisers. KMAG made further efforts several 
months later to recommend six officers and eleven enlisted men be 
2 Sawyer. Afi iiurykkisor, p. 43. 3 James P. Finley, Me US Military F. xp i'rinxt in Korea. 1871.1932: In the t'wg nl o/ROK"US 
Relations (Seoul, Korea: Command I Iistorian's OAicel 1 tqs, USFK/EUSA, 1983), p. 33. 
4 Sawyer, Military Advisors, p. 93. 
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added to its authorised strength. ' I lowcvcr, there is no evidence that any of 
the US Air Force advisory personnel recommended by the KMAG actually 
arrived in Korea prior to the Korean War. So, when the Korean War broke 
out on 25 June 1950, ROK Air Force had no US Air Force personnel as air 
advisers in Korea. Advisory assistance related to the ROKAF was provided 
by the US Army advisory personnel 6 
Simultaneous with Far East Air Forces' transfer of ten F-51 fighter 
aircraft to the ROKAF on 2 July (a week after the commencement of 
hostilities) in accordance with 'Bout One' project, responsibility for the 
support of these F-S 1s was assigned to the 5th Air Force. At Itazuke Air 
Base, Japan, the temporarily created 'Bout One' team was formed and tasked 
with the transition training of ROKAF pilots for the ten F-51 fighters. 
Having feared at first that the South Korean pilots might not be able to fly 
safely the ten F-51 Mustang fighters (faster and heavier than the Zero 
fighters Koreans had flown with the Japanese military during the Second 
World War), the 5th Air Force assigned nine USAF instructor pilots to the 
'Bout One' project. r Detachment #1 of the USAF 6002nd Air Base Group 
was formed at Itazuke, with Major Dean C. Hess, a Second World War 
veteran fighter pilot, as its commanding officer. Major Hess was charged 
with the responsibility of advising and supervising the operations of these ten 
aircraft on loan to the ROK Air Force. Major Iless and his Korean and 
American ground support personnel moved from Itazukc, Japan to Tacgu, 
Korea in the evening of 30 June, and there reported to the local KMAG 
headquarters. $ These American crewmen were the first personnel assistance 
s Sawyer, Mi hraryAtAlsxs. pp, 94-9S. 
6 Telephone Interviews, author with Lt. Generals (Ret) Chang Chi-Ryang and Chang Sung-Whin 
29 October 1995. 
7 'Bout One' was the code name for the formation of the composite unit of American and South 
Korean airmen, Futrell, Ilse WAFIn A'orra 1950,8. p. 89. 
a /! 'uwrg. ( :g Am f-, pp. 92.93,95, Cn -(; (NA" . Si (1). 194943. pp. 120.122; Futrell, 17w 
USAF in Korea 1950-53, p. 89. Major Dean E, Ifeu cited ten American pilots Instead of nine. 
1less. Battle h)mn. p. 73. 
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to the ROKAF since its inception as a separate air force. But they were not 
yet officially designated as air adviscrs. 9 
Because the initial authorisation for providing F-51 aircraft to the 
Republic of Korea Air Force did not at first include authority for providing 
the ground equipment and supplies required for their operation and 
maintenance, Detachment #1 of the 6002nd Air Base Group was 
deactivated. To provide this authority, 6146th Air Base Unit was activated 
on 27 July 1950 at Taegu with a strength of nineteen pilots (ten Koreans and 
nine Americans), six ground officers (two Koreans and four Americans), and 
one hundred airmen (58 Koreans and 42 Americans). Major ! less remained 
as its Commanding Officer, whose task was to provide the ROK Air Force 
logistical support, in addition to advising and supervising the ROKAF 
combat operations and training. '0 
General Kim, having flown several reconnaissance missions in L-5s 
and T-6s during the opening days of the war, pressed his American 
counterpart: 'What we need is a Korean Air Advisory Group to be formed in 
order to improve the efficiency of logistical assistance from the United 
States" The need for a separate air advisory team dedicated solely to the 
ROKAF headquarters was distinctive only in the sense of its absence within 
the KMAG. General Kim's request, however, did not receive any immediate 
response from the 5th Air Force. A declassified USAF archive reveals that 
during the two months of September and October 1950, there was 
considerable discussion between the 5th AF and FCAF, which resulted in a 
USAF policy decision to the effect that : the formal formation of a USAF 
Advisory Group in Korea should be reserved until receipt of details of ROK 
9 Ltr, I Iq, SAF, Subj: Fifth Air Force Support of the ROK Air Force, did 24 Dec 1951 In '5th AF 
I listory, I July -31 Dec 1951; int., vol. 3. p. 166. K-730.01, )ul-Doc 1951. v. 3. AFI IRA. 10 Ltr, IIq, SAF, OPP 092, Subj: Korean Air Advisory Group, dtd 23 July 1951, In'5th AF iGstory, 
I July - 31 Dec 1931; rn. t., vol. 3, p. 177. K"730.01, Jul-Doc 1931, v. 3. AF1IRA. Sie also IPang- 
Gong Jon., Sa, p. 119. (; on . (iotm &1 (1), 1949-Si, p, 129, 11 Gong-G)on Sa (1), 1949ß, p. 129. ROKAF Oral I listory (1) RN 0708. Authors translation. 
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government's request; and existing assistance cforts to the ROKAF and 'the 
proposed organisation to provide advisory assistance was concurred in, but 
that no action should be taken which might be construed as a United States 
commitment to underwrite a post-hostilities Korean Air Force. "2 
A few days of er its formation, 6146th Air Eiase Unit moved to 
Chinhac (K-10) where the ROKAF Flying Group was already in place. Upon 
arrival there, 6146th ABU started supervising the conduct of ROKAF 
combat pilot training. 13 Contingent upon the fluidity of the front line alter 
the Inchon landing in September and Chinese intervention in November 
1950, and the consequent redeployments of the ROKAF Flying Group, the 
US 5th Air Force 6146th Air Base Unit also moved back and forth, and 
supported the operations of the ROKAF combat missions and pilot training; 
24 September - 13 October 1950 at Seoul-Yo'E Do (K-16); 24 October -1 
December 1950 at Pyongyang-Mirim (K-24); 2.16 December 1951 at Taejon 
(K-5); 17 December 1950 - 26 March 1951 at Cheju Island (K-40); 31 
March - 18 June 1951 at Seoul-Yo'C Do (K-16). '4 
In addition to training, 6146th ABU personnel had to perform other 
supporting duties (e. g., supply, maintenance, administrative tasks, etc) to 
make up for the lack of skilled technicians in the Korean Air Force. On 18 
May 1951, General Kim once again suggested to the 5th Air Force that a 
Korean Air Advisory Group be established. " In the meantime, the strength 
of the 6146th Air Base Unit was gradually increased to provide adequate 
personnel for additional duties, and the unit was upgraded and redesignated 
6146th Air Base Squadron on 25 May 1951. Kim's renewed effort 
persuaded the 5th Air Force to take actions on 23 July necessary for FCAF's 
12 Ltr, I Iq, SAF, OPP 092, Subj: Korean Air Advisory Group. did 23 July 1951, in '5th AF History, 
I July - 31 Dec 1951; mi. vol. 3, p. 167. K"730.01. Jul-Doc 1951, v. 3. AFI IRA. 13 !1 mg. C. v g Jo S4 p. 119; Gong -Carat Sa (1), I949-S!. P. 129. 
14 J1'wtg-GargJon-& passim. pp. 116.161; Gong drexm Sa (1). 1949-S!, Jxuýum.. pp. 128.173. 
is Ltr, I Iq. SAF, OPP 092, Subj: Korean Air Advisory Group, did 23 July 1951, in'Sth AF History, 
July - 31 Dec 195 1; nix., vol. 3, p. 167. K-730.04, Jul-Doc 193 1, v. 3. AFI IRA. 
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approval of its study on the authorisation of personnel strength for a Korean 
Air Advisory Group, and a tabic of distribution and allowanccs (TID&A) for 
a twcnty F-51 ROKAF squadron. 16 
On 2 Novcmbcr 1951, FEAF approvcd 5th Air Forcc's proposals 
regarding official recognition of an air advisory group and the future status 
of the ROK Air Forcc. '7 By the end of 1951, FEAF defined 5th Air Force's 
responsibility for supporting the ROKAF in the following terms: (1) The 
authorised logistic support was to include the provision of air force 
equipment, POL, aviation ammunition, and ordnance required for the 
operation and maintenance of twenty F-51 s, six T-6s and twenty-one liaison 
type aircraft; (2) The 6146th Air Base Squadron was to provide assistance in 
organisation, training, and combat operations of the ROK Air Force; and (3) 
The use of technical service equipment not authorised for direct issue to the 
ROK Air Force was to be provided by the 6146th Air Base Squadron to 
other United States 119 
At long last, the establishment of a Korean air advisory group was 
approved. Effective on 16 August 1952,6146th Air Base Squadron was 
redesignated 6146th Air Advisory Group (ROKAF), 19 which became known 
as 6146th Air Force Advisory Group or 6146th AFAG. 20 Although the 
reorganisation was made without change in American advisory personnel 
strength and their assigned status, ROKAF leaders were pleased to see that 
what had long been the actual situation was now formally approved; the 
16 Ltr. I Iq, 5AF. Subj: Fifth Air Force Support of the ROK Air Forme, did 24 Doc 1951 in 15th AF 
I listory, I July - 31 Doc 1931; ms., vol. 3, p. 177. K-730.01, Jul-Doc 1931. v. 3. AF1IRA. 17 Ibld, p. 170. 
tg /bid, p. 172. 
19 General Order #495,11q 3AF, Subj: Rodesignation of Unit and Amendment to General Order. 
did 14 Aug 1952.1 listory of Det #2 of 6146th AFAG, 24 January " 30 June 1953, m:. K-GP-TNG- 
6146-111, Jan-Jun 1953. AFI IRA. ROKAF records show that rod signuion was made cfcctivo on 
1 Sth instead of 16th of August 1952. (ng-Gx)n Sa (I! ), 1953-37, p. 89. 
20 Gang -G(x)n Sv (11), 1933-57, p. 89; 1 listory of Detachment 01 of 6146th Air Force Advisory 
Group (ROKAF), I July " 31 December 1933, m&, Vol. 2. K-GP-6146-111(Det. 1). Jul-Doc 1953. 
AFI IRA. 
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ROKAF now had the direct format connection with the USAF that it had 
long sought and finally achieved. (See Figure 4-1 for the authorised 
pcrsonncl. ) 
4.2. Command Relationship of Headquarters ROKAF to 6146th 
AFAG 
A month after the formation of the Advisory Group, it moved to 
Taegu, where it was collocated with headquarters ROK Air Force. As 
depicted in the Table of Authorised Personnel Distribution (Figure 4-1), 
the 6146th AFAG consisted of three main directorates: (1) OPERATIONS 
for the supervision of training and combat operations together with advising 
and coordinating of ROKAF planning and programming; (2) MATERIEL 
for logistics (aircraft maintenance and supply); and (3) PERSONNEL AND 
ADMINISTRATION for all relevant administrative support of the advisory 
group. 
The establishment of 6146th AFAG enhanced staff activities by 
providing the ROKAF with English assistance for the paper work pertaining 
to the US military assistance programme. Since almost all ROKAF logistic 
support came from US military assistance, the implementation needed to 
be accomplished in English and in accordance with US regulations. By 
promoting ROKAF-USAF staff coordination through the collocation, the 
American advisers added substantial amounts of catalytic motivation and 
efficiency to the performance of staff work in the headquarters ROK Air 
Force. 21 Despite the best efforts of the American advisers to minimise any 
inferiority complex Koreans might feel, it sometimes appeared as if the 
ROKAF were leaving all the details of programming and funding to the 
donor. It was a general practice accepted by the ROKAF that in stair 
21 Interview, author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu. 24 April 1995. Kim worked as the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. I fq ROKAF (1954.56). 
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Figure 4- 1: Tabic of Authorised Personnel Distribution of 6146th AFAG 
by US Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)22 
AFSC Officer Airman 
OIC 6146th AFAG 2162 1 Colonel 
Apprentice Vehicle Operator 60330 1 CpI 
Clerk 70250 1 Sgt 
Senior Clerk 70250 1S Sgt 
Administrative Supervisor 70270 1T Sgt 
Operations 
Operations and Training Staff' 
Officer (Assistant OIC) 2162 1 Lt Colonel 
Operations Officer 2161 1 Captain 
Air Operations Supervisor 27170 1T Sgt 
Personnel & Administration 
Personnel StafTOf icer 2260 1 Major 
Administrative Officer 2120 1 Captain 
Administrative Supervisor 70270 1M Sgt 
Career Guidance Supervisor 73170 1T Sgt 
Materiel 
Supply and Evaluation Staff Officer 4010 1 Major 
Supply Officer, General 4000 1 Captain 
Technical Supply Officer 4902 1 Captain 
Aircraft Engineer Officer (Armament) 4823 1 Captain 
Aircraft Maintenance Technician 43171 1M Sgt 
Weapons Maintenance Supervisor 46270 IT Sgt 
Supply Inspection Technician 64172 1M Sgt 
Supply Records Supervisor 64174 1M Sgt 
Stock Control Technician 64175 1T Sgt 
Supply Records Specialist 64152 1S Sgt 
Senior Clerk 70250 1 Sgt 
Total 9 Officers 14 Airmen 
Legend: Numerical figure: Air Force Specialty Code; Cpl: Corporal; Sgt: Sergeant; M Sgt: Master 
Sgt; S Sgt: Staff Sgt; T Sgt: Technical Sgt. 
22 Figure 4-1 was the initial proposed table. Ltr. Iiq, SAF. OPP 092, Subj: Korean Air Advisory 
Group, dtd 23 July 1951, in '5th AF I listory, I July - 31 Doc 1951; nix. vol. 3, p. 177. K-730.01, 
Jul-Doc 195 1, v. 3. AFIIRA. 
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work in English Mating to US assistancc mattcrs, Amcrican advisers 
presented their ROKAF counterparts with a draticd plan with the hope that 
this plan would be translated into Korean and implemented. 
There were also instances in which an adviser would just briefly make 
some remark or suggest an idea as to the course of action that the ROKAF 
staff could take. The American adviser thus tactfully encouraged his Korean 
counterpart to elaborate on a suggested idea and develop his own plan based 
on it. In this way, the plan appeared to be a product that the ROKAF staff 
had originated. Examples of this approach could be found in numerous 
correspondences between the ROKAF and USAIr/5AF/6146th AFAG, which 
were usually drafted in English by American advisers first. There was rarely 
a ROKAF plan which would not have had prior coordination with American 
advisers. The ROKAF Three Year Force Improvement Plan was one of the 
cardinal examples of successful US"Korcan joint staff work under American 
advisers' supervision. 23 
43. Inter-Service Rivalry Among American Advisers 
Thcrc was no serious inter-scrvicc rivalry bctwccn the ROK Air force 
and ROK Army during the Korean War. This was mainly due to the basic 
nature of the ROK military's heavy rcliancc for its maintenance on American 
military assistancc. 24 Since the United States government's policy of military 
assistancc to the ROK Armcd Forms - i. c., allocation and apportionment of 
23 Subsequently, in 1933, the Provisional Military Assistance and Advisory Group (PROVMAAG- 
K) was established for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of the KMAG, the Air Force Advisory 
Group and the Naval Advisory Group (NAVAG). This establishment remained generally unchanged 
until 1 April 1971, when the American military advisers' mission shifed from advising and training to 
logistics and implementation of the Military Assistance Program (MAP), and the USAF 6146th 
AFAG came under the jurisdiction of the reorganised Joint US Military Affitirs Group in Korea 
(JUSMAG-K), which incorporated the KMAG and NAVAG. Interviews, author with USAF 
Colonel Laney K. Connncy, Director of Air Force Programs for the JUSMAG"K, and Mr. James 
Tong, JUSMAG-K Air Force section historian, 23 April 1995. 
24 Interview, ROKAF historians with Brigadier General Kim Too-Man, IS February 1965 in 
'ROKAF Oral Ilistory (3), ' nrx, p. 432. 
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the assistance budget - derived primarily from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based 
on the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff of the individual US military 
services, there were occasional instances of friction and inter-service rivalry 
between the US 5th Air Force and US 8th Army. Whenever issues arose that 
would help the strengthening of the ROK Air Force, American air advisers 
positively responded for the benefit of the ROKAF, as long as those issues 
remained within the limits of the overall US government's security policy 
toward the ROK govcmment. 
The issue of jurisdiction of the light airplanes of the ROK military 
establishment was an example of how the American air advisers and the 5th 
Air Force staff members worked hard to resolve the issue favourably to the 
ROK Air Force. When the issue arose and a discussion began between the 
Far East Command and the Far East Air Forces in Tokyo in September 1951, 
General Matthew B. Ridgway, CINCFEC, commented that the mission of 
ROK light aviation should be given to the existing ROK Air Force, because 
the ROK government was unable to afford two air forces (one separate, one 
as a part of the army) owing to its shortages of resources and technical 
personnel. 11 further recommended that the ROK Air Force should be 
allowed 'complete freedom of action in utilising and controlling light aircraft 
available over and above the ROK Army rcquircmcnts'23 
In close coordination with his American air advisers, who were kept 
informed of the FCAF/5th Air Force's position, General Kim lobbied his 
ROK Army counterpart. Lt General Lee Jong-Chan, ROK Army Chief of 
Staff', not only agreed with General Kim, but also made it clear to Lees 
American advisers that both Chiefs of Staff were in complete concurrence 
'with the current procedure of the ROK Air Force controlling all ROK 
25 Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FCAF, Subj: Future Status of ROK Air Forte, dated I January 1952 In Sth 
AF I Iistory, 1 July 1951 - 31 December 1931, vol. 3. nit.. Appaxlix 66, p. 171. K"730.01 Jul-Doc 
1931, V. 3. AFlIRA. 
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aircraft and providing liaison pilots for duty with the ROK Army for 
reconnaissance and liaison functions. '26 Both ROK Air Force and ROK 
Army Chiefs of Staff further jointly recommended that immediate action be 
taken to provide the ROK Air Force with a total of seventy liaison type 
aircraft to be used as: (1) thirty aircraft for duty with the ROK Army; and (2) 
forty aircraft for ROK Air Force use to include all pilot training and maintain 
a level of thirty in commission aircraft for the ROK Army. 27 
The concurrence of ROK Air Force and ROK Army Chiefs of Staff, 
however, ran into unexpected opposition from the Eighth US Army in Korea 
(EUSAK). In the process of staff coordination between the CUSAK and 5th 
Air Force, the former asserted that light aircraft be assigned to the ROK 
Army (ROKA) because the ROK Air Force had failed to provide sufficient 
aircraft for the ROKA requirements. This was not a fair assertion, and 5th 
Air Force counter-argued that it was because the ROKAF had not been 
assigned enough aircraft by the EUSAK to meet both ROK Army and ROK 
Air Force rcquircmcnts. 2 When the number of seventy light aircraft was 
discussed between the Chiefs of Staff of ROK Air Force and ROK Army, the 
thirty in commission aircraft, with crews maintained by the ROK Air Force 
for ROK Army use, were to be employed as follows: 
a. Two aircraft to each of ten ROK Army Divisions for 
observation and liaison. 
b. Two aircraft to I ROK Corps I icadquartcrs for observation and 
liaison. 
26 Ibid. TAPE with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim C1nuºg-Yu1. 
27 Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FEAF, Subj: Future Status of ROK Air Force, datod I January 1952 In 
't listory of Sth Air Force I listory, I July 19S 1- 31 December 19S 1, Vol. 3, ma., Appendix 66, p. 
171. K-730.01 Jul-Doc 1951, v. 3. AFI IRA; TAPE with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul. 
2$ Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FCAF, Subj: Fifth Air Force Support of the ROK Air Force, dated 24 
December 1951, in 7 History of 5th Air Force, 1 July 1951 - 31 December 1931; vol. 3, mx, 
Appendix 66, p. 171. K-730.01 Jul-Doc 1951, v. 3. AFI IRA. 
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c. One aircraft to each of four ROK Army 155 howitzcr 
battalions for obscrvation. 
d. Three aircraft assigned to ROK Army E leadquartcrs for 
command liaison. 
c. One aircraft assigned to the ROK Army Training Command 
for liaison between Army schools. 29 
The remaining forty aircraft would be assigned to the ROKAF 2nd 
Reconnaissance Squadron for use in pilot training and instruction in 
reconnaissance and observation tactics. 34 Of the seventy aircraft considered 
necessary, an average of twenty aircraft would be estimated out of 
commission for inspection and maintenance. The provision of thirty 
commissioned aircraft to the ROK Army, therefore, would leave the ROKAF 
a balance of approximately twenty operational aircraft for flying training. 
The ROK Air Force had been assigned only twenty-one. 3' At the time the 
number of ROKAF instructor personnel assigned for flying training was 
thirty. ROKAF was also asked to train a number of ROIL Army personnel at 
such time as additional liaison airplanes might become available. )' 
The differing opinions of the American Air Force and Army on the 
jurisdiction of the ROK light airplanes were not reconciled. CUSAK 
formally proposed to the 5th Air Force in its commanding general's letter of I 
November 1951 that 'the organization and employment of light aircraft in the 
29 Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FCAF, Subj: Liaison Aircraft for ROK Air Force, dated 21 October 1951 in 
'I listory of 5th Air Force, I July 1931 - 31 December 1931, vol. 3. mt. Appendix 72, pp. 180.181. 
K"730,01 Jul-Doc 1931, v, 3. AFIIRA; lI'wrl,, diwrgJrvs ti, i. p. 161. 
Ltr. CG/SAF to CG/FLAF, Subj: Liaison Aircraft for ROK Air Force. dated 21 October 1931 in 
'history of 5th Air Force, I July 1951 - 31 December 1931; vol. 3, m. x, Appendix 72, p. 181. K. 
730.01 Jul-Dec 1931, v, 3. AFIIRA; ( »g-(icx't. W (l), 1949.19.53, p, 174, 
31 Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FCAF, Subj: Liaison Aircraft for ROK Air Force, dated 21 October 1951 in 
'1 iistory of Sth Air Force, I July 1951 - 31 December 1931; vol. 3, mx, Appendix 72. p. 181. K- 
730.01 Jul-Dec 1931, v. 3. AFI IRA; JJ'wrX-licrºrxJaýý14 p, 161. 
3= Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FEAF, Subj. Liaison Aircraft for ROK Air Force, dated 21 October 1951 in 
'1 iistory of 5th Air Force. I July 1951 - 31 December 1931; vol, 3. ms., Appendix 72, p. 181. K- 
730.01 Jul-Doc 1951, v. 3. AFI IRA, (twig-G nLi (1). 1949-1953, pp. 175.176. 
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ROK Army parallel that of organic light aircraft in the U. S. Army. "s Fifth 
Air Force reminded EUSAK of the valid reason for the American Air Force's 
current control over American Army Aviation training - i. e., 'the primary 
flight training program that the Air Force still conducted with Air Force 
instructors. '34 Fifth Air Force also counter-argued to no avail that the 
EUSAK's proposal was not agreeable because it might 'result in divided 
emphasis being placed on the development of ROK military aviation and 
dissipation of an already inadequate force of qualified aircraft technicians 
within the ROK military establishment. '" 
The issue of the jurisdiction of ROK light airplanes at length 
disappeared after 21 December 1951, when 5th Air Force rcclarificd its 
responsibility for supporting the ROK Air Force, which did not include any 
stipulation about ROKAF provision of light aircraft to the ROK Army. M 
Upon failure of the 5th Air Force - EUSAK negotiation, the ROK Army set 
up a separate Army Aviation Training School, and the first class of its Army 
aviators was graduated on 4 May 1952.37 lt was detrimental to the ROK Air 
Force to have been restrained in its growth, not by the US government's 
policy, but by the parochialism of the American Army commander in the 
field in an inter-service rivalry with his Air Force counterpart. '$ 
33 Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FEAF, Subj: Fifth Air Force Support of the ROK Air Force, dated 24 
December 1951, in 'f iistory of 5th Air Force. I July 1951 - 31 December 1951; vol. 3, ms., 
Appendix 66, pp. 171.172. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1931, v. 3. AFI IRA. 34 By mid-1950, the primary flight training for the U. S. Army was provided by the U. S. Air Force 
in accordance with the Key West Agreement (the so-called 'Function Papers') of 26 March 1948, 
which assigned to the U. S. Air Force the continued function of controlling U. S. Army Aviation 
training. Kitchens, 'Army Aviation, ' p. 27. For Dr. Kitchens' full account, see pp. 18-28. 
35 Ltr, CG/SAF to CG/FE-AF. Subj: Fifth Air Force Support of the ROK Air Force, dated 24 
December 1951, in 'History of 5th Air Force. I July 1951 - 31 December 1931; vol. 3, ms., 
Appendix 66, p. 172. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1951, v. 3. AFI IRA. 
36 ! bjL 
37 Politella, Operallon GratUKrper, p. 181. 
38 Cooperation between American military air and ground advisers had been improved decades later, 
when the U. S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV), headed by a US Army general. 
allowed the Vietnamese Air Force to control all Vietnamese light military aircraft. including $00 
Ulf-1 helicopters. Cao Van Viers, et. at., The U. S Adviser. Indochina Monograph (Washington. DC: 
U. S. Army Center of Military 1listory, 1980), pp. 159-160. General Vien was the former Chairman 
of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff: 
128 
In rctrospcct, it was unfortunatc that Korcan military Icadcrs, both air 
and ground, failed to press this issue harder, since they completely agreed 
that light aircraft should be brought under ROKAF jurisdiction. Instead, 
they allowed the issue to be determined by Americans, without seeking 
support from President Rhec. 39 Rhce's air-mindedneseO might have 
influenced the outcome of the issue to the advantage of ROKAF's non- 
offensive yet quantitative growth. Then, there arises a question: Why did not 
both ROKAF and ROKA leaders bring the issue to President ithec's 
attention? Although there is no Korean archival evidence pertaining to this 
issue, it may be presumed that higher priority issues in the period of October 
- December 1951 might have held the attention of both ROKAF and ROKA 
leaders. 
The ROK Army sought to expand its infantry divisions and '[t]he 
training program for the ROK ten-division army was just beginning to bear 
fruit'4' The ROKAF was also keen on its expansion of tighter forces from 
one F-51 squadron to two squadrons. ROKAF was busily upgrading its 
fighter forces in October 1951 when its 10th Fighter Group was deployed 
from Sachon (K-4) to Kangnung (K-18) forward air base, and started its first 
close air support missions on its own, without accompanying American air 
adviscrs. 42 The issue of the jurisdiction of light aircraft, however, was not 
pursued, and once again the opportunity for the potential growth of ROKAF 
strength was lost. The ROKAFs organisational increase (manpower, 
infrastructure, budget, etc. ) that would have accrued from the added function 
39 There is neither Korean archival evidence nor Korean literature pertaining to the issue of the 
light aircraft, Available are U. S. Air Force archives only. none of which mentioned ROK 
government's efforts, 
'° '5th AF Ilistory, Jan-Jun 1932, 'r L, vol. 1. p. 261. K-730.01. Jan-Jun 1932. v. 1. AFIIRA. 
41 Walter G. 1lermes, United Stares Army in the Korean Wir: Truce Tens and Fighting Front 
(Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center of Military 1 Guory. 1992). p. 212. I lee afer cited as I lermes, 
1Yvev Tent wad l"'Ighting Front. 
42 lit g-Goon Sir (1), 1949-1933. pp. 191.192; 11'arw, & sgJwr-44 pp. 187.192; 1listory of 5th 
AFB July-Doc 1931; ms., Vol. 1, pp. 238.240, K-730.01, Jul-Dec 1931. v. l. AF11RA. 
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of controlling ROK Army aviation could have aided in redressing the 
perennial imbalance between the ROK Army and ROK Air Force, at least 
partially, without alarming Americans concerned with ROKAPs offensive 
clout. 43 
4.4. USAF Advisory Activities In the Field 
American air advisers' professional assistance was demanded not only 
at the ROKAF headquarters level but also at all echelons of ROKAF units. 
When the 10th Fighter Group of ROKAF Ist Fighter Wing advanced to 
Kangnung Air Base (K-18) in September 1951, Detachment #2 of 6146th 
Air Base Squadron (the predecessor of 6146th AFAG) was formed and 
dispatched there along with the ROKAF. 44 however, Detachment #I was not 
activated immediately. When the Headquarters of the 6146th Air Force 
Advisory Group, which had been stationed at Sachon Air Base (K. 4), moved 
to Headquarters ROKAF at Tacgu on 14 January 1953, Detachment #1 was 
activated to support ROKAF Ist Fighter Wing at Sachon. 4s (Figure 4-2) 
These two detachments were tasked with the dual mission of advising 
and supporting the two ROKAF wings, as well as providing support to any 
nearby US forces. Their mission was specified as follows: ' 
a. Act in an advisory capacity to the ROK Air Form -Ist Training 
Wing (Dct 1t 1) and 10th Fightcr Wing'7 (Dct #2) - on all mattcrs 
pcrtaining to organisation and opcrations of thosc units. 
43 ROKAF jurisdiction of the ROKA light airplanes would have eventually provided additional 
numbers of flying squadrons together with increases of budget, personnel and organisation. At least 
more than a few brigade-size organisational expansions and a few general rank officers could have 
been authorised additionally for the ROKAF. Interviews, author with Lt. Generals (Ret. ) Kim 
Chang-Kyu and Chang Sung-When, 24.28 April 1995. 
as 'History of 6146th Air Advisory Group (ROKAF), 1 July - 31 December 1932, ' m. s., p. 13. K. 
GP-6146-III, Jul-Dec 1952. AFI1RA; Grwrg-(irxNI SSa (1). 1949.1953, p. 188. 
43 'history of 6146th Air Force Advisory Group (ROKAF) (hereafter cited as History of 6146th 
AFAG), I January - 30 June 1933, ' m. x, p. 25. K-GP-6146.111, Jan-Jun 1953. AFI IRA. 46 l Iq 6146 AFAG GROUP Regulation 24-2 dtd 22 Oct $3.1listory of 6146th AFAG (Del N2), 1 
July - 31 Dec 1953; ms., vol. 3, p. I. K"GP-6146.1 If (Del. 2), Jul-Dec 1953. AFI IRA; 
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b. Act as the agcncy bctwccn the ROK Air Form (1st Training 
Wing and 10th Fightcr Wing), and othcr USAF units. 
c. Act as a support unit at K-18 Air Base (Dct #2), for UNC/US 
units in the vicinity of that area requiring support. 
Figure 4-2: Command Relationship, ROKAF to USAF/6146th AFAG"s 





A-I A-2 A-3 A-4----------------A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 
I st Flying Training Wing- ----- Dct #1 
10th Fighter Wing--------------------- -Dct #2 
Legend: A-I: Personnel and Administration; A-2: Education and Training; A-3: Communications; 
A-4: Matericl; Det: Detachment; GP: Group. 
Command Advice----------- 
Detachment #1, averaging 13 ofliccrs and 58 enlisted men, was 
maintained at Sachon under the command of a Lt. Colonel, who was charged 
with the responsibility to advise and supervise ROKAF pilot training for F- 
47 M of IS February 1933. I Oth Fighter Group was redesignated 10th Fighter Wing. ! f'wmg-GoW 
Jon-., p. 21 S. 
1$ 1 iistory of 6146th Air Advisory Group (ROKAF), I January 1933.30 June 1933; mm. pp. 4. 
49. K-GP-TNG-6146. III, Jan-Jun 1953. AFIIRA. 
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S 1, T-6, and liaison type aircraft ' Detachment #1 was able to concentrate 
on assisting the ROKAF training activities, without being distracted by the 
secondary function of providing logistical support to any adjacent US units, 
which were not existent in the Sachon area throughout the period. 
But this was not the case for Detachment #2 at Kangnung AB (K"18). 
Although Detachment #2 was a larger organisation headed by a major and 
manned with additional strength (averaging 13.15 officers and 96-133 
airmen), it had some difficulty in manning its authorised slots with qualified 
advisory personnel. Due to an increase in the logistical support required for 
American units in the area, the primary mission of advising the ROKAF 
(10th FW) had 'not reached the desired optimum point, ' because the 
detachment was the only supply point in the area and performed many 
functions of an air base unit. In the area, thcrc were ten US military units 
including one US Marine Fighter Squadron Detachment at K"18 and one 
USAF radar site stationed nearby. Consequently, the increased ancillary 
mission inevitably caused 'very little advising to the 10th Fighter Wing 
ROKAF. '° 
One difficulty, common to all activities, was the language barrier, 
which was an obvious limiting factor affecting both the American advisers 
and their ROKAF counterparts. In an effort to reduce the scale of this 
problem, English speaking non-rated (non-flying) Korean officers were 
recruited. During the war, qualified Korean college professors and English- 
majors, as under- and post-graduate students, were readily available among 
the Korean officer corps. But all of them were non-rated personnel without 
previous knowledge of aviation. Therefore, it was not easy for them to 
translate pilot phraseology into comprehensive Korean, particularly on the 
49 '! tistory of Dct N1 of 6146th AFAG, 1 July - 31 December 1933; mt., p. 1. K-GP"TNG-6146- 
III (Def. 1), Jul-Doc 1933. AFI IRA. 
50 1 History of Dct H2 of 6146th AFAO. I July - 31 December 1953, ' mt., p. 1. K-GP"TNO-6146- 
I It (Dct. 2). Jul-Dec 1953. AFI IRA. 
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flight line. American advisers later recollected that it was difficult to get 
ideas in technical terms across to the Koreans, but 'the Korean personnel that 
the USAF advisors work with arc very cooperative in all respects and arc 
eager to learn the best methods and techniques that we can show thcm. '5I 
Nevertheless, those college students who were selected to work either at the 
American advisory offices or ROKAF headquarters in fact benefited from 
their frequent exposure to English speaking American advisers. American 
advisory offices usually employed several qualified civilian interpreters on a 
permanent basis, in addition to one or two ROKAF liaison officers. 52 
Among important effects of the American advisory roles during the 
Korean War were the Koreans' educational benefits and technical training 
accrued from the close working relationship on the flight line between 
American advisers and ROKAF personnel. Every aspect of flight line 
activity, from the OM (Organisational Maintenance on the flight line, such 
as changing aircraft tires, loading bombs, and refueling the aircraft) to the 
FM (Field Maintenance in the aircraft hangar such as 100- and 500-hour 
periodic maintenance including change of engines), was first demonstrated 
by Americans and then taught to Koreans as on-the-job training. Not only did 
Koreans learn another language, they also learned advanced aviation skills, 
and familiarisation with American culture. " 
st 'Historyof Det 02 of 6146th Air Force Advisory Group, I January- 30 December 1953; ms,, p. 
25. K-GP-TNG-6146-111 (Det. 2), Jan-Jun 1953. AFIIRA. U. S. Air Force Oral History Interview: 
Colonel Frank G. Merritt, 8 December 1977, pp. 33.34. K239.0312.1112,77/12/8. AFIIRA; U. S. 
Air Force Oral history Interview: General Earl G. Partridge, 23.23 April 1974, p. 658. K239.0512. 
729,75/4/25. AFI IRA. 
52 Tape recorded interview with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, maintained at OlTce of Air 
Force History Studies, I leadquarters, ROKAF. General Kim Chang-Kyu was a former Chief of Staff 
of the ROK Air Force (1958-60). hereafter cited as TAPE with U. General (Ret) Kim Chang-Kyu. 
This was also verified by the author's interviews with General Kim on 24 April and 28 September 
1995. 
js Interview, author with U. General Chang Chi-Ryang, 16 September 1994. These experiences 
were catalytic later in the succcsstW conversion to F-86F jet fighters and C-46 transport aircraft 
under the supervision of American instructors, and the rapid advancement of the ROKAF onto the 
world military scene, Ulien the U. S. Pacific Air Force sponsored an annual meeting of allied Asian 
fighters each year during the period of 1939 - 1962 at Clark Air Force Base, Philippines - called 
'Flying Brothers' and including air forces from the Philippiner, South Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, 
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4.5. Mentorship and Role Model 
To cnsurc adequatc support for combat opcrations, Amcrican adviscrs 
usually had to accomplish all coordination activities from planning to 
actually delivering the support assets or supplies. They were also active in 
actual combat missions with ROKAF pilots. '4 Their positive participation in 
combat was well illustrated by their combat records. Out of a total of some 
twenty advisers who flew with the ROKAF in actual combat missions during 
the Korean War, one third of them accomplished more than one hundred 
combat sorties each, excluding Lt. Colonel Dean liess, Commanding Officer 
of 6146th ABS, who had been recently promoted and completed over two 
hundred fifty missions. " Their accomplishment was also at the sacrifice of 
five killed in combat. 
lt was fortunate for the ROK Air Force to have had Lt. Colonel Dean 
E. I less as the chief of the US air advisory team from the early stage of war 
('Bout One, ' 6146th Air Base Unit) through the summer of 1951 (6146th Air 
Base Squadron). His leadership epitomised professionalism, airmanship, 
devotion to duty, and exemplary role model not only to his own men, but also 
to the ROKAF personnel. liess worked at the policy level as Commanding 
Officer of 6146th Air Base Squadron and primary adviser to the ROKAF 
Chief of Stag', as well as point of contact for the 5th Air Force. In addition, 
he flew combat missions as flight leader, and worked on the flight line with 
Korean and American enlisted mechanics and logistic personnel. Apart from 
his combat record, remarkable enough in itself. he was the key person who 
Australia, New Zealand and Japan - South Korean pilots in F-86Fs proved their proficiency by 
achieving outstanding records in air-to-air and air-to-Wound gunnery. G mg. Gar t .i (11! ). 1938- 1962. pp. 154.156. 
54 See sections 3.2.3.4 in Ch. 3. 
ss 'ROKAF, ' in '5th AF history, I Jan - 30 June 1951, ma., vol. 2. p. 244. K-730.01, Jan-Jun 
1951, v. 2. AFIIRA. See also I less, lAurlt ! Ufnn. P. 237. 
No record is available about the official number of American advisers killed in combat during the 
Korean War. This is the number concluded by the author from the ROKAF history and Colonel 
Dean E. I less' writing. 11'cnin-(: wgJon. Sat passim.; ! less, Rattle 11)mn, pasxl n. 
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made the survival of the ROKAF possible. Resourceful in his duty and 
amiable in his personal association with both Americans and Koreans, I less 
was held in high esteem by both Korean and American Air Force leaders. " 
I its affection for the 'infant ROK Air Force was exactly that of a parent - 
ficrce, possessive, single-minded. " 
The respect in which [then Major] liess was held by ROKAF leaders 
was established almost immediately. Soon after the'Bout One' Unit moved to 
Taegu on 30 June 1950, the 5th Air Force began a massive deployment of its 
fighters to South Korea and a 6002nd Fightcr"Bombcr Wing was to be 
formed at Taegu Air Base (K-2). The USAF colonel designated to command 
the 6002nd quite possibly had no idea of what'Bout One' was all about, but 
he could see Americans already at Taegu AB whom he could put to good use 
solving his own personnel problems. Accordingly, the colonel tried to press 
f less into releasing the American pilots, crew chiefs, and airmen who were 
the core of'Bout One. ' liess objected that once those cadre members were 
gone, the entire 'Bout One would have to be disbanded. But'Bout One was 
the only cohesive fighter unit ROKAF had. 'Once broken, an organisation, 
especially one of such strange components as 'Bout One, ' like (lumpty 
Dumpty, can never be fully put back together again, ' and consequently, 
ROKAF F-51 pilots would have to be grounded. In a word, 'there would be 
no more Korean air force. '59 When advised of these matters, the ROKAF 
Chief of Statt' threatened to disband his air force and send it to the ROK 
Army to tight on the ground, where all available bodies were badly needed. 
Major Hess, on his own initiative, privately visited Brigadier General 
Edward J. Timberlake, Vice Commander of the 5th Air Force, and 
37 TAPE with Lt. General (Rct. ) Kim Chung-Yut; Chung, Illy L1/e. p. 37; U. S. Air Force Oral 
History Interview: General Cart E. Partridge, 23-25 April 1974, p. 657. K239,0512-729,73/4/25. 
U. S. AFIIRA. 
SK 11ess, Hartle ll)rnn, p. 113. 
59 TAPE with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul; l leu, haute 11wnn, p. 108. 
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succcssfully pcrsuadcd him to rcjcct the proposal to gut 'Bout Onc, ' which 
survivcd and resumed its combat opcrations'º I less had savcd the day, - and 
the ROKAF. 61 
Lt. Colonel [then promotcdj 11css also impressed ROKAF pilots and 
mechanics. His outward appearance alone inspired discipline and 
studiousness. Tall, healthy, masculine, handsome in his clean flying suit and 
shining flying boots, he conveyed the perfect image of neatness and 
military clegance. '2 Four virtues of a successful leader emphasised in a 
Korean axiom arc: (1) Shin, PHYSIQUE, APPEARANCE; (2) On, 
ELOQUENCE, COMMUNICATION; (3) So. INTELLIGENCE, WISDOM; 
and (4) Pahn, JUDGMENT, INSIGIIT. 6) Thesc virtues were evident in 
Colonel Iless. An ordained minister prior to joining the Air Force, Iless 
preached sermons, conducted Sunday school classes, and was an ardent 
evangelist for Christianity. His boundless energy in all aspects of his life 
inspired every one who came into contact with him "+ 
Although Lt. Colonel I less was assigned in Korea for only a year, this 
period from the end of June 1950 to the middle of 1951 was the most critical 
60 1 less and Timberlake flew together In Europe during the Second World War. TAPE with Lt. 
General (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul: I less, Battle 11)7nn, p. 110. 
bt TAPE with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul. (loth Major General Cart C. Partridge, 
Commander of Sth AF, and Brigadier General Edward J. Timberlake, Vice Commander of Sth AF 
were 'a constant source of Inspiration and encouragement and tolerant of my (I less') unorthodox 
procedures' during I less' tour in Korea. i iess, 1kutle Irons, Arocuispiece. See also, U. S. Air Force 
Oral History Interview: General Carl E. Partridge. 23-25 April 1974, p. 657. K239.0512.729, 
73/4/25. U. S. Air Force historical records. U. S. Air Force I listorical Research Agency, Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama. 
62 Chang, Afy lit as an Aº1J1nr, p. 37. Lt. General (Ret. ) Chang Sung-Whan was one of ten 
ROKAF pilots who were sent to ltan ke Air Base, Japan, and ferried a ROKAF F-SI to Taegu, 
Korea on 2 July 1950. Ile flew many combat missions with Lt. Colonel Dean IL lless during the 
early stages of the Korean War. Chang later became an air attache in Washington. DC (1952-34), 
and ROKAF Chief of Staff (1962-64). 
bt Chintae SO, 'A Korean's Perception of a Leadership Profile, ' Air Unh r. uiy Rntew 33: 1 
(November-December 1981), p. IOS. (Air Unlwrxiry Rn4ew was retitled as Airpmvp Js rmr! In 
1987. Alrxr-sierJuunw! is the current title of the USAF Air University quarterly) For Colonel SO's 
full account, see pp. 104.107. 
64 Colonel lless was ordaInod before he enrolled in the U. S. Army Air Corps In the summer of 
1942. I less. Bank ! /)mn, p. 3S; U. S. Air Force Oral I Gstory Interview: General rut Iw Partridge, 
23.23 April 1974, p. 577. K239,0512-729.75/4125. U. S. AFIIRA. 
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year for the establishment of the South Korean Air Force. By the time he 
Ich, ROKAF had expanded from nil to over twenty F-S I tighter planes, with 
an increase of personnel strength from under two thousand to nearly six 
thousand, including over sixty 17-5 1 fighter pilots'5 
In addition to Colonel l less, and inspired in part by his own example, 
most of the American advisers, regardless of rank and specialty, were 
endowed with broad professional competence and knowledgeable in their 
special areas of responsibility. Difficult points or questions encountered by 
ROKAF personnel, especially maintenance and supply personnel on the 
flight line, were explained quickly and carefully by American advisers. If the 
American advisers were in doubt about something they had in their answers 
to Koreans' questions, they always took time to consult their USAF manuals 
or associates and came back with the correct answers in a succinct and 
precise manner. This approach by American advisers, especially their 
willingness and honesty to express occasional doubt or uncertainty, exerted 
a good influence on ROKAF officers and NCOs in charge, who eventually 
tried to eliminate their poor habit of improvising inaccurate answers 
apparently to save facc. '6 
Additionally, the American advisers' approach to their task was 
democratic and reasonable. They were neither coercive nor commanding. 
They were suave and patient in listening to their Korean counterparts, and 
apt to win over Koreans by virtue of reason or logic based on their broad 
professional knowledge. Koreans were impressed by their American advisers 
who were methodical, careful, thorough and well-prepared. The American 
way of working was in sharp contrast to what most of the Korean junior 
officers and enlisted men were currently experiencing under their Korean 
as Goºg-rxxm . fit (/). 1949-5J. pp. 176,272. ('6 Interview, author with 1Master Sergeant (Ret. ) Kim I lyun-Sik, $ October 1994. Kim was a F-S 1 
mechanic at Seoul-Yco'L Do (K"16) and Kangnung (K"18) Air Bases during the Korean War. 
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leaders, who were previously exposed to a coercive and arrogant leadership 
in the Japanese and Chinese military. 67 
While disciplined and duty-minded during duty hours, American 
advisers were also liberal- and humane-minded. The advisory task was an 
effort involving human relations. To ensure success, it had to be carried out 
with a full understanding of human psychology, a deep devotion to duty, a 
knowledge of strengths and weaknesses and in a tactful and courteous 
manncr. '« After work, they easily mingled with their Korean counterparts, 
and enjoyed their free time together as colleagues. They were also generous. 
Very often American advisers bought a considerable amount of food and 
beverages at the base exchange out of their own pockets and gave them to 
Korean friends for free. Korean officers were allowed to use the American 
officers club at the base. For Koreans it was a privilege to have good food 
and drink at the 'modern' facility in the harsh wartime environment. The 
Korean government could not pay them well at that time 69 In turn, ROKAF 
personnel displayed an eager willingness to accept advice and assistance 
from the American adviscrs. 70 
On the other side of the coin, the generous solicitude and largesse of 
American advisers produced some less happy side effects. I lcavy reliance on 
American advisory assistance from start to finish pertaining to regulations 
and doctrines resulted in ROKAF leaders and their deputies neglecting to 
write their own regulations and doctrine, tailored to Korea's indigenous 
conditions. The impact of this neglect still exerts a counter-productive 
influence on the course of ROKAFs own doctrinal research and 
67 Interview, author with Major Genoral (Ret. ) Chun Ilyung-11, I May 1995. Chun made 100 
combat missions flying F"5I a at Kangnung (K"I8) during the Korean War. 
Cao Van Vier, The U. S Aa%lur, p. 44, 
['9 American advisers had their own separate dining and recreational facilities at their stations. 
Interview, author with Major General (Rot. ) Chun I lyung-11, I May 1995. 
70 7listory of 6146th AFAG, I July - 31 December 1952, ' ms, p. 16. K. GP. TNG-6146-1 IJ, Jul-Doc 
1952. AFIIRA. 
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development and Korcanisation of ROKAF regulations and protocols. 
Today, four and a half decades later, most of the technical orders and flight 
manuals are still undergoing conversion into Korean. But owing to the 
intrinsic lack of proper Korean vocabularies and terminologies, translation 
would take time. " 
American extravagance and opulence of materials inadvertently 
discouraged Koreans' traditional frugality. The inability of many Americans 
to adapt to local living conditions led to the creation of Americans' own 
living environments within the same base complex, here ROKArs 
substandard living conditions co-existed. It was considered more or less 
mandatory for Americans to have their own Base Exchanges* (equivalent to 
PX in US Army or NAAFI in Royal Armed Forces), O(liccrs/NCOs/Ainnen 
Clubs, and other recreational facilities wherever they were stationed. In 
time, the 13X* and American compound on the ROKAF air base became 
monumental institutions of American culture in South Korea. To ordinary 
ROKAF personnel, especially those from the rural areas, these constituted a 
totally different world, a world so distant that Koreans seldom felt close to 
Americans in a cultural sense. Exposure to American material opulence 
induced envy and greed that led to the practice of illegal business, i. e., black 
markctccring. By the end of the Korean War, the illegal practice was 
'largely curtailed and the [6146th Air Force Advisory] Group and the CID 
[(Criminal Investigation Detachment)) were able to breathe easicr. '72 
An undisclosed aspect of the American advisory mission with 
Koreans was the surveillance of ROKAF activities implicit in the 'buddy 
71 Authors experience. The author was actively involved in translation of USAF ! light manuals and 
technical orders as a member of the ROKAF Ad I/ux Translation Committee from Jul 1963.1an 
1967. 
7= 'I listory of 6146th AFAG. I July " 31 December 1933. 'my., p. 17. K-GP. TNG-6146-III, Jul-Dec 
1953. AFI IRA. " Base exchanges in the US and ROK Air Forces are commonly referred to as ßXs. 
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system' adopted for flying opcrations. 73 The F-51 was the only oiTcnsivc 
weapon which might be used by ['resident Rhcc in pursuit of unilateral 
action, i. e., 'March-North-For-Unification. ' The close interface between the 
American advisers and ROKAF personnel at every level not only enhanced 
ROKAF combat capability, but also eliminated any possibility for the 
ROKAF to attempt a clandestine action without it coming to the attention of 
Americans. In piloting a tighter aircraft, the one area where any unilateral 
action might be attempted by the ROKAF, the ubiquitous presence of the 
American advisers as part of the'buddy systcm'74 precluded any such action 
by Korean pilots. (At first, every combat mission was conducted by an 
American adviser as the flight leader. Later, when Korean pilots were 
qualif icd, Americans flew in position of wingman as observers. ) 
Rcstraincd as thcy were by limitations in personnel and differences in 
culture, the American advisers worked on equal terms with Koreans. Their 
overall purpose and efforts 'constituted an important cornerstone in the 
foundation of the growth of the Republic of Korea Air Force. '75 Their 
dedicated endeavour contributed immeasurably to the very survival of the 
ROK Air Force - let alone its development - during the trying period of the 
Korean War. I (owever, American support for the continued existence of the 
South Korean Air Force was sporadic and extemporaneous. The US 
government's preponderant emphasis on ROK ground troops resulted in the 
severe disparity between the ROK Army and Air Force. Ilow the United 
States policy had been consistently oriented to Korean ground forces and 
» Authors memorandum of record, dtd 13 December 1968. For an implication of USAF advisers' 
surveillance on the ROKAF, we 'Air Intelligence Information Repots, dtd 7 August 1951, Subj: 
ROKAF - Origin and Political Background, ' in '5th AF I Gatory. 1 Jan - 30 June 1952, ' ins.. vol. 2, 
343.349. K-730.01,1ut-Jun 1932, v. 2. AFI IRA. 
I less, Rank 11)mn, p. 128. 
73 Ltr, Iiq SAF. OPO 370, Subj: Minion Letter, dtd 2 Aug SI, u quoted in U. S. Air Force, 
I tistory of 6146th Air Force Advisory Group. I July 1952 - 31 December 1932, ' mi. p. 16. U. S. 
Air Force historical records, K. GP. TNG-6146.11[, Jul-Doc 1952. U. S. Air Force Historical 
Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama. 
140 
how this policy limited the growth of the South Korean Air Force during the 





ON THE GROWTH OF THE ROK 
AIR FORCE AFTER THE ARMISTICE, 1953-1956 
The United States policy toward South Korea after the Armistice, as 
interpreted by the US Air Force, remained basically the same as prior to and 
during the Korean War, i. e., 'to secure an armed force in the ROK large 
enough to maintain order, but not so large as to strain the country's economy 
or so powerful as to provide the means for. ROK aggression against North 
Korea. " The money-saving, 'long haul' policy of the Eisenhower 
administration dictated American forces be redeployed from Korea. The so- 
called New Look policy emphasised strategic airpower as the primary means 
of attaining containment, along with 'dccmphasis of conventional forces 
through reduction of overseas garrisons and the creation of a mobile strategic 
reserve in the United States. ' To effect this policy, the United States 
government was committed to increase 'its reliance on allied forces for local 
defcnse, '2 in order to make American relations with its allies 'more effective 
[and] less costly. '3 Accordingly, the ROK Air Force was permitted to 
modcrnisc its capability as a compensatory measure for the redeployment of 
the US Air Forces from Korea. however, the intrinsic limitations of US 
IU VIF Uperadranr in Kona Jun-Nov 1950. p. vii; Futrell, The USAF in Korea, 1930-53, p. 17; 
Schnabel, folly u rl Direction, pp. 34.33; U. S. Congress. Clouse. Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
! IacAgroun / ! º{formarion on Korea Report ... 
81st Cong. 2d seas. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 
1950), p. 34. 
2 Russell F. Weigley, The American If ay of µur: A history of United States Military Swaiegy 
and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1976), p. 402. For an overview of the Eisenhower 
administration's defence policy in these respects, ice Said Dockrill, 'Cooperation and Suspicion: The 
Unitod States' Alliance Diplomacy for the Security of Western Europe, ' Diplomacy A Srarecrrfl, 3: 1 
(March 1994), pp. 138.182. 3 John Foster Dulles, 'The Evolution of Foreign Policy, ' The De1wrnnenm of State Bulletin 
30: 761(January 25,1954), p. 108. For Dulles' full text, see pp. 97.110. 
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policy on ROK's tactical air capability never lessened. In other words, the 
US policy restraints were invoked to modernise the existing South Korean 
Air Force, without increasing the number of its fighter aircraft - i. e., it was 
allowed to convert to jets in the one existing tighter wing only. 
Disregarding a US high ranking official's promise of'immediate and 
automatic military reaction, ' and taking into account the potential for 
American abandonment with the second withdrawal of their forces from 
Korea, President Rhee continued to seek from the United States government 
a written defence trcaty. 4 The Eisenhower administration, on the other hand, 
desired to link its participation in the defence treaty to the ROK 
government's allegiance to US government policy. Accordingly, the United 
States intended to formulate written guidelines of its compensatory 
assistance so that the ROK government could be kept from taking any 
unilateral action detrimental to America's interests. The guidelines were 
formulated into the Agreed Minute of Understanding between the two 
governments. The force structure of the ROK military after the Armistice 
was spelled out in this document. 
The Republic of Korea Air Force was the youngest, smallest and in 
terms of budget allocation, the least costly of the Korean military 
establishment. Yet any policy that affected the ROK Armed Forces had 
direct subsequent impact upon the development of South Korean airpower. 
Consequently, the ROKAF simply cannot be treated in isolation from the 
ROK Army. Since the US viewed the ROK Army as the core force in the 
Agreed Minute, the ROK Air Force and Army were treated as two sides of 
the same, albeit unbalanced, coin. This chapter examines the validity of the 
t Secretary of State Dulles assured President Rhoe of US government's support in his letter of 24 
July 1953. The Dulles letter was insufficient to Rhos because the US constitutional process 
requiring congressional approval could negate Dulles' promise of immediate military reaction. The 
Secretary of State to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhoe). July 24,1953' In FR(2S 1952- 
54, v. 15. pt. 2, p. 1430; 'Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Once of Northeast 
Asian Affairs (Young), August 7,1933' in Jbld, p. 1846. 
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ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the significance of the Agreed Minute, 
especially with regard to their effects on the ROK Air Force. Since these 
two documents came into being as a result of US disengagement from Korea 
aller the Armistice, the chapter opens with an assessment of US force 
redeployment. 
5.1. US Post- Korean War Policy and Its Force Redeployment 
Thcre was strong US public scntimcnt to bring Amcrican troops homo 
and reduce defence spending when the Korean War ended. On 30 October 
1953, three months following the Armistice in Korea, President Eisenhower 
signed off on NSC 16212. This policy paper posited a continuation of the 
containment policy and called for both increased strategic air forces and an 
expanded air defence for the continental United States. ' 
Elcnceforth, US planners were no longer to assume that limited war 
on a large scale should be conducted without atomic weapons; indeed, the 
Joint Chiefs of Statt' were instructed to plan on using nuclear weapons 
whenever their use could be seen as militarily desirable' The new emphasis 
on deterrence through the implied threat of employing such weapons - to 
include the newly emerging class of so-called 'tactical, ' or low yield, 
battlefield weapons (e. g., the Army's new 280 mm cannon) - went largely 
unnoticed by the American public until Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
addressed the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on 25 January 
1954. Implying the Eisenhower administration's reluctance to engage in 
renewed ground combat in Asia, Dulles made it clear that no local defence, 
$ William E. Berry, Jr., 'Alliance Commitments And Strategies: Asis, ' in Schuyler Foerster and 
Cdward N. Wright, eds., American 1)efcnct Policy. 6th edition (Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990), p. 225; Weigley, ]he American May of War, pp. 402-403. For a succinct 
analysis of NSC 162/2, we S. Dockrill, 'Cooperation sind Suspicion, ' pp. 153.154. 
6 Appendix 'A': Major Implementing Actions to Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the 
Secretary of Defense ({Ikon). Subj: U. S. Courses of Action in Korea. FRUS 1952-Se'. v. 15. pt. 2, 
p. 1628. 
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no matter how numerous in infantry and tactical aircraft, could by itself 
contain the manpower of the communist world. i icnceforth, local defence 
must be reinforced by the deterrent of massive atomic retaliatory power. The 
United States, then, could hope to deter local aggression by maintaining 'a 
great capacity to retaliate instantly by means and in places of [its] own 
choosing. '? 
This so-called New Look' strategy was driven partly by economic 
considerations. In its simplest terms, widely used by the US press at the 
time, the goal was to achieve 'more bang for the buck over the long haul. ' 
President Eisenhower believed very strongly that America's well-being in the 
future depended upon a balance among three elements of strength - military, 
economic, and moral (the latter not specifically defined but involving a large 
dose of anti-communism). Thcrefore, military expenditures would have to be 
reduced to a level that could be safely maintained over time - the'long haul'; 
this could be achieved by relying on atomic-armed airpowcr ('more bang) 
rather than on a more costly large standing American army stationed 
overseas. Thus, the actual military defence of South Korea after the 
Armistice was only one small part of a much larger equation. Some 
combination of local (Korean) forces, backed up by the threat of US atomic 
airpowcr, would have to suffice. Accordingly, the United States decided to 
redeploy most of its forces from both Japan and Korea as soon as possible. 
(Troop levels in Japan, for example, were to be cut by one-half between 1954 
and 1956. )lt 
In the meantime, Far East Air Forces notified the ROKAF of USAF 
redeployments from Korea in a memorandum, dated 4 September 1954 of 
Major General Jacob C. Smart, Deputy for Operations, FEAF, to Lt. General 
7 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Address to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York 
on 25 January 1934. Ucp vtment of State Nalketln, 30: 761 (January 25,1954), p. 108. 
K Berry; Alliance Commitments, ' p. 225. Derr succinct account on the Eisenhower administration's 
Asian policy can be found on pp. 223-225. 
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Kim Chung-Yul, 9 stating that four light bomber/fighter-bomber wings (3d, 
17th, 8th, 18th) and one tactical reconnaissance wing (67th) would be 
withdrawn from Korea at an early date. But these units would continue to 
maintain one squadron each on a rotational basis. Two Fighter Bomber 
Groups (58th, 474th) would remain in Korea, until those units completed 
their redeployment to the United States, which was scheduled for FY 1955. 
In his memorandum, General Smart promised that the logistic system would 
be maintained to permit immediate and sustained combat operations in case 
of a resumption of hostilities, and Far East Air Forces would continue to 
promote their combat capabilities to help South Korea's air defence after 
redeployment from Korea. He noted that as FEAF's tactical air units in 
South Korea were all in forward areas vulnerable to an enemys surprise air 
attack, their redeployment would be to less vulnerable areas, e. g., Japan, 
Ryukyu Islands, and Hawaii, from which they could immediately launch 
attacks against enemy targets in the event of renewed hostilities. 10 
Based on the results of the redeployments, and in the light of the 
possibility of reducing forces in Korea below the initial two-division goal, 
the JCS recommended on 31 December 1954 that the First Marine Air Wing 
be withdrawn from Korea so that the US First Marine Division could be 
freed from its static, defensive mission in Korea. 1' To offset this loss in 
tactical airpowcr, they recommended that one of the two US lighter bomber 
9 General Kim was promoted from Major General In March 1933. Upon his resignation as ROKAF 
Chief of Staff in December 1932, he headed the ROK Military Liaison Office of the United Nations 
Command in Tokyo until May 1934, when he returned to Seoul to become a special assistant to the 
Minister of National Defense. Six months aller his return, he resumed his second tenure as ROKAF 
Chief of Stall (1934-56). Kim, Kim Chung Ywl AkmWr, p. 491. 
10 Memo, MGen Jacob C. Smart to LtGcn Kim Chung Yul. 4 September 1934. 'Redeployments of 
USAF Units In Korea. ' In 'SAF l iistory, 1 July 1954 - 31 December 1934; ms.. Appendix 10. K- 
730.01 Jul-Doc 1954, v. 3. An IRA. 
11 The intention of withdrawing US Marine units i Vom Korea was also to add their strength to the 
mobile strategic reserve based In the United States. New York Thee; 21 December 1934, p. 1. 
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wings scheduled for withdrawal in 1955 be retained in the Far East at least 
to the end of the calendar ycar. '2 
Thus, most of the US Air Forcc tactical aircraft would depart the 
Korean peninsula. By the time the redeployment was to be completed in 
approximately nine months, ') American fighter forces retained in South 
Korea would be reduced to two Fighter Bomber Groups and less than 13 
squadrons, from 19 groups and 69 squadrons controlled by the United States 
Far East Air Forces at the end of the Korean War. '4 With departure of non- 
American UN fighter squadrons, the three squadrons of the ROKAF 10th 
Fighter Wing would become the only clement of the UN air forces other than 
the USAF. " In effect, the ROKAF F-51 squadrons of Second World War 
vintage would be left alone as the only air arm on the Korean peninsula to 
assist the American Air Force on behalf of the United Nations. 
Nevertheless, the expansion of ROK's airpowcr was not an acceptable 
issue to the Eisenhower administration, which stressed nuclear deterrence 
airpowcr (SAC) and increased local (non-US) conventional ground forces. 16 
South Korean political leaders did not press their American counterparts to 
agree to ROK's repeated requests for the increase of ROK's air defence 
12 Memo, JCS to SecDef+ Redeployment of Forces from the Far Cast - Western Pacific Area. ' 31 
Doc 54. JCS 2147/123. CCS 381 Far East (11.28.50) sec 24, Box 17; Geographical File (GF) 
1954-56; Records of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Record Group (RG) 218. National 
Archives, Washington, DC. (NA/WDC). 
13 The phased withdrawal of US troops from Korea began on 12 September 1934, and was to be 
completed by the end of the same year. 'Second Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating 
Board to the National Security Council on NSC 170/1. Subj: United States Objectives and Courses 
of Action with Respect to Korea. December 29.1954. ' In FRUS 1952-54. V. 1ST pt. 2. p. 1953. 
14 Six squadrons of F-86Fs, three squadrons each of 58th and 474th Fighter Bomber Groups. would 
be stationed at Oun AD (K"55) and Taegu AD (K-2) respectively. The remaining squadrons (one 
squadron each of 3d and 17th Light Bomb Wings, and 8th and 18th Fighter Bomber Wings) would 
remain in Korea on a rotational basis. Memo, MGen Jacob B. Smart to LtGen Kim Chung Yul, 4 
September 1954. Redeployments of USAF Units in Korea. ' in '5AF History. 1 July 1954 - 31 
December 1954; mt., K"730.01 Jul-Dec 1954, v. 3, Appendix 10. AFI IRA. 
Is Counting an average of seven squadrons of US Marines and four fighter squadrons from 
Australia, South Attica, South Korea and the United Kingdom, FEAF controlled over 1.500 aircraft 
at the end of war in July 1953. 'FEAF Statistical Digest, 31 July 1933; p. 8; `USAF Statistical 
Digest. FY-1953, p. IS' in Futrell, 71w USAFInKorra, 1954.53. p. 689. 
16 W iglcy 71w American H4 of K ýrr, pp. 402403. 
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capability. Instead, President Rhec and his staff focused their negotiations 
mainly on an increase of ROK infantry forces, citing a specific number of 
additional divisions. " Diplomatically, the signing of a written defence 
agreement increased US government's security commitment to South Korea. 
But practically speaking, did the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty help 
enhance the actual capability of ROK's own air defence? Did it ensure that 
the ROKAF could defend its territorial air space before assistance arrived? 
5.2. ROK-US Defence Pact: Its Effect on ROK Air Defence 
Posture 
When the United States government agreed to sign the ROK-US 
Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 October 1953, it was the first officially 
documented defence insurance South Koreans ever had with a big power not 
territorially adjacent to the peninsula. " Some nationalistic Korean 
historians might give credit to President Rhce for the diplomatic 
accomplishment. However, was it really an accomplishment in terms of 
practical improvement of the ROK's national defence posture? What was 
the purpose of the treaty? The answer is contained in Article 111, the heart of 
the treaty: 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on 
each of the Parties in territories now under their respective 
administrative control, or hcrcaficr recognized by one of the 
Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the 
other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
17 Memo. 3CS (Radford) to SocState, 17 March 1954. FRUS 1952-54. v. 1ST pt. 2, pp. 1764- 
1765. 
18 The U. S. -Korean Mutual Defense Treaty was signed 
in Washington on 1 October 1953, about 
two months after the Korean War ended. The treaty entered two force as of 17 November 1954. 
The Armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. Department of State, A 1II. go cal Summary of the 
United States-Korean Relations: With a ChroroAy of Importort Develop wnlx 1834-1962. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1962). pp. 27.30. 
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declares that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processcs. 19 
The ROK government also granted the United States 'the right to 
dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and around the territory of 
the Republic of Korea, ' as stated in Article IV of the treaty. This meant 
South Korea permitted in advance the United States to station American 
military forces in South Korea as needed. Based on this article, US forces 
are presently in Korea, but the United States could withdraw its forces from 
Korea, if it seemed cxpedient. 2° Consequently, the issue of America's troop 
commitment is more a political matter than a consideration of law or treaty 
interpretation. 
It is a widely-accepted view that the mutual defence pact was a 
concession that the United States made to the ROK government in return for 
President Syngman Rhec's acceptance of the Korean Annisticc. =' The hidden 
main concern of the United States policymakcrs was the possible effect of a 
communist dominated Korean peninsula on America's security with regard to 
'an area of vital strategic importance to the United States, namely, the 
offshore island chain in the Far East, and above all the key clement in that 
chain, the Japanese islands. '22 To achieve the security of these islands, the 
United States used the US-South Korean defence pact to establish the 
19 U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Alutral Ucferese Treaty with Korea, 
Report on Executive A. 83rd Cong., 2nd iess. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1954), p. 3. 
20 Richard T. Detrio. Strategic Par hers: Simth Korea and the United States (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University Press, 1989), p. 14. 
21 Chang jin Park, Ile Influence of Small Stated Upon the Superpowers: United States-South 
Korean Relations as a Case Study, 1930-53, H'vºhl Politics 28: 1 (October 1975), p. 111; 11ak joon 
Kim, I! 'an-Goak Aloon- Ase (The Korean Question). p. 126. 
22 General Matthew D. Ridgway testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ? he 
United States has long since learned that to keep war from its shores an enemy must be held far from 
its territory. The Republic of Korea could make a direct contribution to the security of the United 
States in the event of general war or of a renewal of hostilities in that area, for if Communist forces 
were to overrun the Korean peninsula, they would directly and seriously threaten... ' the defence 
perimeter of the United States. U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 'Mutual 
Defense Treaty With Korea, ' I leanings on Executive A ... 83rd Cong., 2nd soss. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1954), p. 28. 
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Korcan pcninsula as a buffer bctwccn communist North Korca/China and 
Japan. South Korea, on the other hand, vicwcd the treaty as an instrument to 
achieve nation-building and a foundation for the eventual unification of the 
peninsula by ensuring America's security commitment in a written form. " 
A basic premise in defence planning - institutionalised in the ROK- 
US Mutual Defense Treaty and necessary to ensure that South Korea had 
significant resources to apply to the paramount objectives of nation-building 
was that deterrence and defence were US-South Korean joint 
responsibilities. In practice, this means that South Korea would provide the 
great bulk of the infantry-oriented standing forces while the United States 
would complement those forces in peace and war, principally with high 
technology (e. g., airpower, and later, satellite-based air surveillance, etc. ), 
sophisticated combat-support systems and logistical support. Despite the 
supportive congressional hearings on the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it 
would not be easy 'to determine precisely either the South Korean or the 
American perception of the US commitment, ' due to their respective 
interpretations of obligations and limitations.! / 
The possibility of America revoking its security commitment remains 
a serious concern for Koreans. The United States became involved in the 
Republic of Korea, not as the result of accumulated American interests built 
steadily over a period of time (like Japan and China), but as an 'accidental 
byproduct' of Cold War circumstances-25 Therefore, it became apparent to 
23 Yong-Shik Kim, Kim Yang Shah (k-Kyo 33-Nj+vn:. Sat-lS vh At Yak-&A (A Pnv+nl u at Dawn: 
Kim Yong Shlk's 33-)'tar Diplomatic tuner) (Seoul. Korea: Kim-Young Sa, 1993), p. 192. For an 
account on the working staffs background story of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, see pp. 
190-194. Kim was one of Rhoe's diplomatic staff deeply involved in the treaty negotiation. 
Ambassador Kim Is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1963-64). 
21 Claude A. Buss, The United Starts uni the Republic of Korea. Background for Policy (Stanford, 
CA: I loover Institution Press, 1982), p. 68. 
=s Interview, 27 March 1993, author with Dr. Kim I [akjoon, Professor of Seoul National University 
(1977.1990) and Special Assistant to President Roh Tae Woo (1990-1992). 
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South Koreans that at any time Americans might repeal their commitments at 
their unilateral discrction. 26 
President Rhcc's preoccupation with the acquisition of written 
assurance of US commitment to South Korea's security overshadowed the 
demand for South Korea's air posture after the Armistice, in particular after 
the extraction of most US air forces from Korea. The ROK government's 
concentration on the defence treaty deflected attention away from the real 
(practical) issue of South Korea's air defence capability. Instead, the defence 
pact resulted in generating a false impression that American airpowcr would 
protect South Korea when conflict occurred, despite the fact that the clement 
of time is crucially important in the conduct of air defence operations under 
the limited early warning time and limited air manocuvcring space, i. e., air 
defence depth. 27 In due consideration of the inevitable organisational delay 
prior to US Air Force intervention, a compensatory measure should have 
been provided by further increasing the number of fighter squadrons and 
aircraft control & warning system (AC&W) in the South Korean Air Force. 
The paucity of ROK airpowcr dictated that its air defence posture be 
totally dependent upon American air support. Disengagement of America's 
committed airpowcr in Korea, however, could be quick, and accomplished in 
a relatively short time. The air units stationed in the Korean peninsula could 
be flown out swiftly, if the American government did not want direct 
26 President Jimmy Caner used the human rights issue as a political excuse to withdraw troops 
from South Korea in 1977. Ltr, President Caner to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the I louse of 
Representatives, 21 Oct 77, concerning 'Transfer of Certain Defense Articles to the Republic of 
Korea. ' If ecAly Compilation of /Wsi kmlat Documents 13: 43 (October 24,1977), pp. 1376.1377; 
Dctrio, Strategic Partners, p. 14. 
27 It was estimated that North Korea's preemptive attack could be made possible with less than 
eighteen hours' warning. Charles A. Sorrels, Planning U. S Puri ose Forces: Forces Mated to Asia 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office. 1977), p. 36 fn 7. General Richard O. Stilwell, a 
former commander of American forces in Korea reckoned that North Korea could strike with only a 
few hours' warning. Richard O. Stilwell, Tommentary: The United States, Japan and the Security of 
Korea, ' international Security vol. 2 (Fall 1977), p. 93. 
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involvement in the tighting. 28 In the obvious sense, all air base facilities and 
ground support elements without US fighter aircraft are useless, because the 
loss of fighters incapacitates all remaining elements of airpowcr. The salient 
political and psychological difference between ground forces and air units is 
well summarised by Lefcvices quoting of an American official: War planes 
are like geese. They can honk and fly away. 29 
In this regard, the defence pact might enhance the ROK's defence 
posture diplomatically, but not much militarily, unless further actions be 
taken to improve ROK's indigenous airpowcr, sufficient enough at least to 
cope with the immediate initial threat from North Korea until the arrival of 
US assistance. The likelihood of swift, certain reinforcement by the United 
States would be problematic at best; the willingness to do so in a future crisis 
could never be assured. Even in the best political circumstances from the 
Korean standpoint - e. g., a sympathetic American president, unencumbered 
by other on-going crises -a minimum of several days would elapse before 
United States strike aircraft could participate. And the high probability is 
that three to four days late would be equal to loo late in the event of North 
Korea's blitzkrieg attack. 30 Recognising the necessity for the ROK to 
establish a foundation for the capability to defend its air space prior to the 
arrival of external assistance, the ROKAF sought to increase its efforts for 
further expansion. 
5.3. ROKAF's Demand for Further Expansion and America's 
Response 
28 Ralph N. Clough, Drlerrerav urn! lkfv u' in Korea: The Me of U. S Forces (Washington. 
DC: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 18. 
29 Ernest W. Lefever. 'Withdrawal from Korea: A Perplexing Decision, ' Strwegic Review 6: 1 
(Winter 1978). p. 34. For Lefevers full account. we pp. 28.35. 
30 Richard G. Stilwell, 'The Need for U. S. Ground Forces in Korci, ' AFJ Urfeme RnMew. No. 2 
(1977), P. 22. 
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ROKAFs first official demand for expansion to the United States 
government was attempted during the Korean War. While South Korean 
fighter pilots flew combat missions, Major General Kim Chung"Yul and his 
staff were equally busy planning the expansion of the ROK Air Force. In 
May 1951, General Kim reiterated the ROKAFs long range concern to have 
a larger air force, and reminded his American advisers of the ROK 
government's authorisation to increase the ROKAF personnel strength from 
5,800 to 7,000 by August 1952.31 In the meantime, the ROK Army strength 
was increased to ten infantry divisions by the end of 1951, while the ROKAF 
fighter strength still remained at one squadron. To support the ten-division 
ROK Army, the ROK Air Force prepared an ambitious programme for its 
expansion early in March 1952. Known as the ROKAF Three Year Plan, it 
was immediately sent to 5th Air Force in General Kim's letter of 10 March 
1952.32 
5.3.1. The Three-Year Plan 
The Three Year Plan aimed to enlarge the ROK Air Force to three 
hundred F-84 jet fighter bomber aircraft over a three year period from I 
April 1952 to 31 March 1955. The plan called for the eventual growth of the 
total ROKAF personnel strength to 23,700 by March 1955, including four 
fighter wings, with seventy-five aircraft per wing, to be achieved by 
acquiring one hundred aircraft each year for three years. The plan also 
proposed the establishment of four major commands - (1) Combat Air 
Command, (2) Air Traffic Control Command, (3) Air Maintenance Depot, 
and (4) General 1 ieadquarters of Education and Training. "3 The plan was 
31 'SAF History, Jul-Doc 1952. ' ms~ vol. 3, p. 41. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1952, v. 3. AF11RA: Gong- Goon Li (7), 1949-53, p. 266. 32 With President Rhee's approval, the 7hrre )far 1'! zr was reported in advance to Lt. General F. 
F. Everest, Commanding General of Sth Air Force, before it was officially approved by the ROK 
Cabinet Council on 16 May 1952. Gang-Guar Sa (11), 1953-57, p. 89. 
33 11'ang-&»tgJon-Sa (7he !! l. uoryc (t .' Air War), pp. 212.214-21S. 
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not a result of prior consultations with high level American military 
authorities. (It was informally shown in haste to working level American 
advisers. ) FCAF/5th Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff refused to 
recognise 'such unilateral plans as have been developed by the Chief of Staff, 
Republic of Korea Air Forcc. '34 From the American standpoint, any buildup 
plan of ROKAF strength should have been preceded by an extensive review 
by the USAF first, because of its logistical support responsibilities. One of 
the immediate problems was that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet 
given formal recognition to the ROKAF fighter and flying training units. As 
a result, the logistical support to the ROK Air Force came from US Army 
stocks in the Far East that were no longer replaceable from the continental 
United States (CONUS). "s ! fence, any augmentation in the ROK Air Force 
strength would result in a further drain on local US Army stockpilcs. M 
The review of the ROK Air Force logistical and manpower needs was 
undertaken after FEAF sent 5th Air Force a letter on 10 September from Far 
East Command (FEC), which requested detailed justification as to (1) why 
Army logistical support of the ROK Air Force should not be limited 
immediately to supporting an outfit of 5,800 personnel and (2) why a ROK 
Air Force of even 5,800 was needed to support its present aircraft strength. 
There was a special irony in the second point. here was a fledgling 
air force asking to be increased from 5,800 to 7,000 to support a larger 
number of aircraft, but the question put by the Army-dominated US Far East 
Command turned out to be, in effect, Why do these guys need even 5,800 to 
34 '5AF 1 listory, Jul-Dec 1932, ms., vol. I, p. 132. K-730.01 Jul-Doc 1932, v. 1. AFI MA. 
35 CONUS differentiates itself from the terms 'overscas' or `theatre' American official papers use 
this term regularly, occasionally substituting It he ZP (zone of the interior) with exactly the same 
meaning. In these respects, the states of Hawaii and Alaska are explicitly excluded. (In the U. S. 
military, for example, both are considered 'overseas assignments. I 
36 During the Korean War, the primary logistic support of non-flying equipment and materiel for the 
ROKAF was provided through the ROK Army logistic system, which was brought under control of 
the Commanding Generals, US Eighth Army and Korean Communications Zone. 'SAF I Gstory, Jul. 
Doc 1932; mx, vol. 3, p. 54. K-730.01 Jul-Doc 1932, v. 3. AFIIRA. 
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run a piddling less than one hundred aircrat7 The questions were raised, 
according to the Far East Command, to obtain authorisation from the US 
Army for interim logistical support and to determine the troop basis for a 
ROKAF table of organisation (T/O) and equipment (T/C), upon which Army 
logistical support could be based during the period of hostilities. (Given that 
the USAF had just become an independent service in 1947, the US Army 
was upset that it still had to support a separate air force with Army money 
and equipment. ) In its reply to FEAF on 19 September, 5th Air Force stated 
that pending a restudy of the entire problem of logistical support for the ROK 
Air Force, it could not defend either the 5,800 or the 7,000 personnel 
tigures. 37 
Mcanwhile, Gencral Kim asccrtaincd at 5th Air Forces requcst the 
basis for the ROK government's authorisation to increase ROKAF personnel. 
In a letter to 5th Air Force on 18 September 1952, the ROKAF Chief of Staff 
pointed out that the ROK government had previously authorised a strength 
of 5,800 personnel to be reached by the end of March 1952, increasing to 
7,346 by 31 August 1952, and finally to 11,500 by 31 March 1953. The 
righter strength of the ROKAF had recently increased from twenty to forty 
aircraft and plans existed to establish a complete fighter wing and one 
training wing, plus the necessary command and supporting elements. 
General Kim also stressed such factors as the disparity of the ROK Air Force 
strength in relation to the ROK Army strength and the extensive training 
needs of Air Force personnel as important reasons for justifying manpower 
incrcascs. 3 
» 'SAF I listory, Jul-Doc 1952; ms., vol. 3, p. 43. K"730.01 Jul-Doc 1932, v. 3. AFI IRA. 
38 As it part of the rbrre Year Plan, ROK government desired the growth of Its Air Force 
manpower strength to 11,500 by March 1953, the initial year, und 23,700 by 1935. the end year of 
the plan. Ltr, I1q, ROKAF to CO. SAF, I8 Sep 52, sub: 'Strength of the ROK Air Force for the 
ROK Fiscal Year 1952! Same file, pp. 44-46.53-54. 
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The 5th Air Force finally completed its own study entitled 
'Manpower and Organization Study of the Republic of Korea Air Force' and 
submitted it to FEAF on 22 October 1952.39 On the basis of its data, 5th Air 
Force working staff pointed out that a minimum of 4,447 personnel were 
required by USAF standards to support the ROK Air Force at its current 
aircraft strength plus certain 'special activitics'0 Allowing that Korean 
training and other standards were lower and that additional personnel would 
be needed if the ROK Air Force expanded to a strength of two wings, it was 
recommended that this figure be augmented by 1,353 personnel for a total of 
5,800 officers and airmen. This figure, 5th Air Force believed, would be 
sufficient to support a ROK Air Force composed of one combat wing of 
seventy-live F-51s, a training wing of twenty F-51s, twenty T-6s, thirty L- 
5/19 aircraft plus such units as a special activity, a security services and an 
air policc. 41 
Supporting his stall's manpower study of the ROKAF, 5th Air Force 
Commander Lt. General F. F. Everest expressed a negative view of the 
ROKAF Three Year Plan, which he thought went well beyond 'the initial 
establishment of a ROK Air Force of one fighter wing, one training wing, a 
transport squadron, and the necessary command and support elements. ' 
General Everest pointed out that there were no existing requirements for a 
Combat Air Command and Air Traffic Control Command as presented in the 
plan. Given the size of ROKAF fighter strength and its limited role at the 
time, the consensus finally arrived at by the American Air Force authorities 
opposed separate ROKAF subordinate commands, which General Everest 
said would require additional manpower and 'heavy organisational structure. 
19 Ltr, 1 tq. SAF to CO. FHAF, OPP-P 400,22 Oct 52, sub: 'Logistical Support of the Republic of 
Korea Air Force' /bid, pp. 48-52. 10 In collaboration with Far East Air Fore, the ROKAF formed a special intelligence unit for 
commando and guerrilla operations in support of combat rescue of downed UNC pilots during the 
Korean War. Gong-Ewan Sa (l), 1949-53, pp. 314.321. 
41 'SAF Ilistory, Jul-Doc 1952, ' ms.. vol. 3, pp. 47,5 1. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1952, v. 3. AFIIRA. 
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The Sth Air Force Commander further criticised the ROKAFs 'excessive' 
manpower goal, which 'could possibly result in inefficiency and wasted 
personnel. Thus, financial outlays for this purpose could be more suitably 
employed clscwhcrc. '42 
In actuality, however, the Sth Air Force had been conducting a 
positive appraisal of the ROKAF force improvement plan, ever since the 
ROKAFs initial expansion proposal was presented in the spring of 1952. 
US Air Force documents reveal that General Everest reviewed the South 
Korean Air Force's Three Year Force Buildup Plan in a favourable manner, 
and recommended in May 1952 to USAF Headquarters in Washington a 
conversion program for the South Korean Air Force, in which two 
alternative plans for converting the Korean Air Force to jet fighters were 
suggested. 43 Under both plans two ROK squadrons would receive F-80 jets 
and the conversion of the USAF 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing to F-86 Sabres 
would generally coincide with the proposed conversion programme for the 
ROKAF. Thus, the US 8th Fighter Wing's F-80 Shootingsrars would 
transfer to the ROK squadrons. The second plan, however, called for 
converting ROK squadrons to F-84 Thunderfets from the USAF 136th 
Fighter-Bomber Wing beginning on 1 October 1953. If sufficient aircraft 
were available, three ROKAF squadrons would receive the F-84s. F-80 and 
F-51 aircraft would be used in a training squadron. " 
5th Air Force recommended the second plan, which would give the 
ROK Air Force three fighter squadrons of F-84s, and a training squadron 
equipped with the remaining F-80s and F-51 Is by early 1954, thus increasing 
42 Ltr, CC/SAF to C/S ROKAF. 21 May $2. 'SAF I istory, Jan-Jun 1952, ' m:, vol. 2, pp. 367. 
368. K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1952, v. 2. AFI IRA. I leave' Implies a larger than normal staff organisation. 
43 'Future ROKAF Plans' in'SAF History, Jan-Jun 1932, ' mx. vol. 2, pp. 269-271. K-730.01 Jan. 
Jun 1952, v. 7. AFI IRA. 
44 This is summarised from three sources: (I) ! ('wrg-G Nt . Am. a (7 he of that Air 14'w), pp. 
214-215; (2) 'Future ROKAF Plauze' in'SAF 1 istory, Jan-Jun 1952, ' nu., vol. 1, pp. 267.271. K- 
730.01 Jan-Jun 1952, v. 1. Am RA; and (3) 'Ltr from 1 iq SAF to 1 iq FCAF, ' 14 May 1954 in the 
same file vol. 2. Appendix 65, 
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the ROKAF strength to at least one hundred jet fighter aircraft. The 5th Air 
Force recommendation forwarded through FCAF/FEC, however, was 
disregarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staft based on the rationale of the Joint 
Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC). In its report of 13 February 1953, the 
JSPC asserted it would not be advisable to allow the South Korean Air Force 
to convert to jet fighters and form 'an air force of suitable size and type to 
provide sufficient ROK air units to counter the increasing communist jet air 
strength; because it would be more effective and faster to meet the 
communist air threat by the reinforcement of American 'air forces where 
training, supply and maintenance facilities were already in being. ' 
Furthermore, after the cessation of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, the 
JSPC continued to argue, the South Korean Air Force would hardly be able 
to serve as a deterrent to North Korea's renewed aggression unless the 
ROKAF could be allowed to build its own airpowcr comparable to that of the 
North Korean Air Forcc. Is Despite the American government's restrained 
response, the pace of ROKAF's lobbying for expansion never slowed down 
after the cessation of hostilities. 
5.3.2. The Struggle for a Compromise 
Fearing the vacuum of combat readiness left by the US force 
redeployment, the ROK government was vcry concerned about strengthening 
its own forces. When Secretary Dulles visited Seoul in August 1953, 
President Ithcc, through Admiral Sohn Won Yil, Minister of National 
Defense, " presented to Dulics a plan for a major increase in ROK military 
4S Memo, AFCOS to CJCS, 19 Jan 53. 'Augmentation of the Republic of Korea Air Force. 13 
February 1953. ' JCS 1776/3SS. University Press of America (UPA). JCS Rec dt. 1949-Si, pt 2, 
Microfilm Reel XI, frame 0237. Hereafter cited as Microfilm X1.0237, JCS 1949-53. UPA. 
46 1 folding the power of the ROK Army generals In chock. Rhee had never appointed a ROKA 
general as head of the Defense Ministry. Vice Admiral Sohn Won Yd. former Chief of ROK Naval 
Operations, was later replaced by former ROK Air Force Chief of Stall Lt. General Kim Chung-Yul 
in June 1957, Kim, Kim Chung Yul Alcneob, p. 210. 
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forces. Rhee wished the last four ROK infantry divisions of the twenty 
already authorised to be activated immediately, and equipped with the same 
firepower 'as equivalent to that of US divisions. ' Rhee's proposal for the 
South Korean Air Force was to expand it from two flying wings to eight and 
one-third flying wings: 
5 Fighter Wings (15 Fighter Squadrons), 
2 Light Bomb Wings (6 Light Bomb Wings), 
I Reconnaissance Wing (3 Reconnaissance Squadrons), 
1 Air Transport Squadron, 
Necessary command and supporting units; 
The US Air Force would turn over to the ROKAF all its 
aircraft, equipment, and installations in Korea. 47 
Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, who accompanied Mr. Dulles and 
discussed South Korea's military needs with Admiral Sohn, called the ROK's 
goals 'utterly impractical'. 48 
The feasibility of attaining the ROK Army's goal of a twenty division 
force had been argued among American military leaders in Washington for 
some time. For instance, General Ridgway, US Army Chief of Staff and a 
member of the JCS, was dubious about the ROK's twenty-division force goal, 
citing: (1) 'insufficient equipment available in Korea for the last four 
[skeleton] divisions; (2) the Armistice Agreement's prohibition of 'the 
importation of war material'; (3) consideration of 'the requirements of the 
expanding Japanese National Safety Force'; and (4) the necessity to 
reexamine the fact that 'the 20-division goal had been approved while the 
47 Appendix: 'Additional Factors Considered in Conjunction with the Proposed Expansion of the 
ROK Forces' to Memo, JCS to SecDe>y Recommendations of the Korean Minister of Defense 
Concerning Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, ' 31 Mar 54. S/P-NSC Files, lot 61, 
'Korea: Increase in ROK Forces (NSC Action No. 1043-b). ' FRUS, 1952-54, v. 15, pt 2, pp. 1781- 
1785. 
48 Memo, SecA to SecDef Report on the Dulles Mission to Korea, ' 22 Aug 53, CCS 383.21 Korea 
(3-19-45) sec 135, as quoted in Robert Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
National Policy 1953-1954 vol. 5 (Washington, D. C.: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Stau, 
1986), p. 234. Hereafter cited as Watson, JCS History, 1953-S4. 
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war was still in progress, ' and hence might no longer be valid. Ridgway 
offered instead merely to expedite the organisation of 'cadres for the final 
four ROK divisions. '49 The Joint Chiefs of Staff finally approved the validity 
of ROK's twenty-division force goal on 31 March 1954. In addition, the 
ROK Navy's personnel ceiling was increased to 15,000 and its ship strength 
from fifty-six to eighty-three, including sixteen landing craft and two 
destroyer escorts. 5° 
As for the ROKAF, no increase was approved. The official reasoning 
behind this decision was best revealed by Admiral Radford on 31 March 
1954 in his memorandum to Secretary of Defense Wilson. Radford argued 
that any expansion of South Korean airpöwer as requested by the ROK 
government would not relieve the United States of its responsibility for 
deterrence, because '[t]he major deterrent to renewed aggression in Korea 
should be Chinese communists' and North Koreans' fear of atomic retaliation, 
coupled with the announced intention [of the United States] to resist 
renewed aggression. '51 Behind such language, but left unstated, was 
American apprehension that a powerful South Korean airpower could 
become the offensive instrument for a unilateral resumption of hostilities by 
the ROK government. 52 
Unaware of the deliberations in Washington, in October 1953 the 
ROK National Defense Minister attempted twice, in writing to the American 
49 Ibid 
Memo, JCS to SecDef, Ultimate Goal for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy, ' 6 Oct 53, JCS 
1776/391. CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45) sec. 137, Box 45; GF 1951-53; Records of the JCS, RG 
218; NA/WDC. 
51 'Additional Factors Considered in Conjuction With the Proposed Expansion of the ROK Forces, ' 
appendixed to Memo, JCS to SecDef (Wilson), Subj: Recommendations of the Korean Minister of 
Defense Concerning Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, 31 March 1954. FRUS 
1952-54, v. 15, pt. 2, p. 1784. 
52 Lecture by Professor Rhee Sang-Woo, Sogang University, 21 May 1991, Air Force Academy, 
Chongju, Korea. Professor Rhee's view was endorsed by the incumbent Minister of National 
Defense Lee Yang-Ho and former ROKAF Chiefs of Staff (Lt. Generals (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, 
Chang Sung-Whan, and Chang Chi-Ryang. Telephone interviews, author with interviewees, 27-31 
October 1995. 
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Dcfcnsc Sccrctary, to sock approval of ROKAF's rcadjustcd forcc goals - live 
tactical wings: " 
Four Fighter Wings 
11 F-86 fighter squadrons 
I F-94 all weather interceptor squadron 
One Compositc Wing 
I RF-86 tactical rcconnaissancc squadron 
I Rß-29 tactical rcconnaissancc squadron 
2 ß-26 light bombcr squadrons 
ROKAF to take over, maintain and operate 
existing USAF radar, communications and 
weather systems in Korea 
These proposals by the ROK government, albeit in a reduced scale compared 
to the previous 8 1/3 wing-proposal, were still too ambitious for American 
military planners. The United States government replied it was 'very 
interested in strengthening the ROK forces, ' but equally aware of 'the 
problems involved in maintaining the complex equipment that would be 
required to expand the ROK Air Force, ' and its expenses would need to be 
covered by the US govcmment. 54 In other words, the cost of additional 
training of Korean pilots, technicians, radar-observer bombardiers, etc. that 
would be required to operate these aircraft could not be justified. In 
particular, American air advisers in Seoul and Tokyo recommended to 
Washington that D-26 bombers should not be included in any plan, because 
of the offensive nature of such aircraft, and bad weather missions were to be 
33 'Development of the Republic of Korea Air Force' In 7 iistory of Far East Air Forces, 1 July 1953 
- 31 December 1953, Volume I; p. 33., ins., USAF historical records, K-720.01 Jul-Doc 1953, v. 1. 
US Air Force historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Hereafter cited as 
'FEAF I [istory, Jul-Doc 1933, v. 1' 
54 Letters of 7 and 21 October 1953 from ROK Defense Minister Sohn Won-yd to US Defense 
Secretary Charles E. Wilson. Watson, JCS ! Finery, 1953.4, pp. 234-235; 'Additional Factors 
Considered in Conjunction With the Proposed Expansion of the ROK Forces' appendixed to 
'Memorandum by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)' March 31,1954 in FRUS 102,54 
v. 15. pt 2. p. 1781. For further discussion of American policy planners' considerations on the ROK 
force expansion, we pp. 1781.1783. 
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flown exclusively by the USAF. " The US government also feared that the 
proposed ROKAF expansion would be equivalent to the size of a USAF 
numbered Air Force, which the South Korean Air Force simply could not 
afford. 56 
On 22 January 1954, the ROK government reiterated its previous 
request for increasing ROK infantry forces, and asked America for even 
further assistance 'in organizing no less than 15-20 additional divisions' (i. e., 
beyond the 20 already requested). $7 But this request was rejected by the US 
government, because in its view the additional increase of ROK infantry 
divisions made 'no secret of the fact that these were wanted for attack rather 
than for defense. 'S8 The ROKAF expansion proposal was also refused, and 
readjusted in a down-sized scale, based on FEAFs reassessment report of 12 
February 1954, which included neither bombers nor reconnaissance planes: 
6 Fighter Bomber Squadrons (2 wings of 3 squadrons 
each) 
1 Composite Group (1 Fighter Squadron and I Transport 
Squadron) 
I Air Tactical Control Squadron 
1 Communications Group 
Sufficient personnel and equipment to man a 9-airbase 
complex on an austerity basis. 39 
The JCS did allow for the conversion of the existing fighter wing to jet 
aircraft and the establishment of a tactical air control organisation 'within 
existing personnel ceilings; but no ROKAF expansion was approved 60 
33 'FEAF I listory, Jul-Doc 1953, v. pp. 33.34. K-720.01 Jul-Doc 1953, v. 1. AF} IRA. 
36 1b/L, p. 34. 
57 FRUS 1932.54, v. 1 S. pt 2, p. 1781. 
sx Watson, cp. ct., p. 235. 
39 'Considerations Affecting the ROK Air Force Expansion, ' in 'Appendix: Additional Factors 
Considered in Conjunction With the Proposed Expansion of the ROK Forces to Memorandum by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), (Subject: Recommendations of the 
Korean Minister of Defense Concerning Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces)' in 
I'US, 1932.5I, v. 15. pt 2. p. 1783; 'FEAF 1 Eistory, Jul-Doc 1953, v. 1, ' m ., p. 33. K-720.01 Jul- Doc 1953, v. 1. AF11RA. 
60 IRUS, 1932-34, v. I S. pt 2, p. 178). 
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Why did American military planners refuse the ROKAF expansion 
plan, while at the same time advocating its jet conversion? There arc a 
number of reasons for this. First, in terms of financial affordability, the 
proposed ROK military expansion demanded money that exceeded the limits 
of the ROK's economy. The National Security Council estimated in April 
1954 that it would cost the ROK government an outlay of at least $1 billion 
per year to maintain its proposed forces under peacetime conditions. $400 
million would be needed for military equipment and supplies. The remaining 
$600 million of the annual cost would have to be budgeted by the ROK 
government to cover the operation, military construction, etc. Since the 
ROK civilian economy could not afford to carry this financial burden, the 
US government would have to be charged with the annual 'maintenance of 
the presently approved ROK forces, partly through direct military assistance 
and partly through economic or defense support aid. '' 
Moreover, it was estimated that the ROKAF's jet conversion would 
cost about $43.5 million, including the necessary transition training. This 
cost would be less than six percent of $750 million, the budget the ROK 
Army would require for initial equipment of its twenty infantry divisions. 
The ROK Navy and Marines would require roughly $12 million and $25 
million respectively for their force improvcment. '2 Although the ROKAF's 
augmentation would cost more than the Marines' and Navy s, its jet transition 
was not an expensive scheme in terms of increasing ROK's indigenous 
firepower and combat effectiveness. 
Apart from financial affordability, the Americans thought it was 
unreasonable for the South Korean government at that time to ask for more 
than what the United States had stipulated, i. e., a 720,000-troop ceiling. 
61 'Rough Costs Involves! In Expansion of Republic of Korea Armed Forces Cost of Initial 
Equipment' Memo, SecDef, 193d NSC Mtg. 13 April 1954 In FR(! S, 1952-54 v. IS. pt 2, p. 1789. 
62 lhkL, pp. 1788.1789. 
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According to an assessment of the Foreign Operations Administration 
(FOA, predecessor of the AID: Administration of International 
Development) in June 1954, out of the total South Korean population of 
approximately 23,500,000, there were less than two million males between 
the ages of 17 and 40 available for service in the ROK armed forces. This 
review estimated that 1,041,000 able-bodied men would be the maximum 
that could be put into the NIP) In other words, the additional fifteen to 
twenty divisions as requested by the ROK government would well exceed 
the ROK's total available manpower resources. 
Secondly, from the standpoint of logistical supportability, the 
operational capability of the ROK Air Force would steadily decrease, unless 
ROKAFs obsolescent propeller-driven F-51 aircraft, suffering from an acute 
shortage of replacement spart parts, were replaced with modern equipment 
with adequate spare parts. Apart from the logistic difficulty. the ROK righter 
wing, equipped with obsolete non jet aircraft, would be ineffective either in 
a ground support or an air defence role against a superior North Korean Air 
Force. The effectiveness of jet fighters versus propeller-driven F-51s was 
well illustrated by an American airpowcr analyst. Allen R. Millet, in his 
study of the operational efficiency of jet aircraft during the Korean War, 
asserts the jets were more effective for three reasons: (1) the jet fighters were 
capable of generating twice the daily sorties of the propeller-driven F-51; (2) 
the operational readiness rate of the jets was higher because the maintenance 
time of the jets was only half of the F-51's and jets' spare parts availability 
was better, and (3) in combat, the jet fighters proved less vulnerable to 
ground fire because of their speed " 
63 'Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary. same 
subject. dated April 7,1934)' In /R(/S 1952-54. v. 13. pt 2, pp. 1786; 'Memorandum for the 
Record, by Walter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, June 9.1954 (Subject: 
Debriefing of Gcncral Maxwell Taylor)' In MOO. p. 1803. 
64 Millen, 'Korea. 1930.1933; p. 365. 
164 
In addition to the approval of ROKAF's jet conversion, the JCS 
endorsed establishment of an of ective Korean tactical control organisation 
(air defence radar system for the aircraft control and warning), in order to 
compensate for the US Air Force withdrawal from Korea. Such an 
organisation, equipped with ground-based air surveillance radar as well as 
command, control, and communication networks, was purely defensive, and 
necessary for ROKAF operations. The transfer of the tactical control radar 
system to the Korean Air Force would be a viable military assistance 
programme for the United States to implement, not only for the ROKAF but 
also for its own Air Force, because: (1) it was not an offensive weapon 
system; and (2) if operated efficiently by the ROKAF, a radar-equipped and 
ground"bascd tactical air control system 'would facilitate operation of USAF 
aircraft in support of ROK forces upon a renewal of hostilities. '6S The JCS 
also suggested the possibility of a South Korean Armed Forces reserve 
programme to justify further reductions in the active forces of the nation. 
(The Joint Strategic Plans Committee had earlier studied a potential ROK 
reserve programme, and tentatively decided that 'it was impractical, because 
South Korea lacked the necessary manpower, particularly officers and 
cquipment. 'y, 6 
While the ROKAF was struggling for its early conversion to jets, the 
NKAF, within six months Wier the Armistice, had five tactical wings (4 
fighter, I bomber), and about live hundred aircraft, including over 250 MiG- 
65 Memo, ExSec to NSC, 'Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces, ' 7 April 1954 in J"RUS 1952- 
54, v. IS, pt 2, p. 1784. 
66 As quoted in Watson, cyx ct., p. 402 fn 79. Some of the sources that Dr. Robert J. Watson used 
at the National Archives are still classified, although he. as an official agency historian of the Joint 
Chiefs, was able to use them. Meaty. JCS to SecDel 'Recommendations of the Korean Minister of 
Defense Concerning Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces, ' 31 March 1954. JCS 
17761447,2 Apr 54 (CCS 381.21 Korea (3.19-43), sec 148; GF 19$4.56; Records of the JCS. RG 
218; NA/WDCJCS) is not declassified. The author has requested the release of this document in 
accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (S U. S. C. 552) through the office of the Military 
Reference Branch (NNRM) of the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D. C. 
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15 jet fighters and more than 40 11-28 jet light bombers 67 In addition, since 
the United States Air Force had already removed all propeller-driven F-51 s 
from its fighter inventory, the ROK Air Force had to convert to jets to permit 
USAF-ROKAF intcropcrability both in fighter operations and logistic 
support in case of North Korea's renewed hostilities. Thus, the ROK fighter 
wing had to be converted to jet fighters if it was to be retained as an effective 
combat unit. 
Conversion of the ROK tighter wing to jet aircraft (F-86F) would also 
lead to increased ROKAF capabilities. Because of their improved 
performance (speed and manocuvcrability) and fire control system (radar- 
controlled gun sight and six 50-caliber machine guns), F-86F jet fighters 
would broaden ROKAF roles and missions, which had so far been confined 
to air-to-ground profiles only. " F-86F Sabre jets, which had already proved 
their superior combat ability against the communist fighters over MiG-Alley 
during the Korean War, would provide ROKAF with an air-to-air combat 
capability, which Korean fighter pilots had long sought in the defence of 
their country's territorial air spaCC. 69 But, to reiterate, an important 
consideration of the intrinsic American policy was that the Korean Air Force 
be provided only 'with a token force in the interest of morale and national 
prestigc. '70 From the US viewpoint in the event of renewed hostilities, 
therefore, a force of the existing size (one fighter wing and one training 
wing), if equipped with a limited number of aircraft, would be adequate for a 
holding force pending arrival of USAF reinforcements. 
67 Gong-Goon Sa (U), 1933.57, p. 73. 
" Soon aller the Korean War, the USAF began to equip its F-86s with AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air 
heat-socking missiles. ROKAF F-86Fs, introduced after 1918, were all equipped with Sidewinders. 
Authors experience. 
69 There were different models of F-86 Sabre jet: A-, Ir- F-, and I I. models were for day-lighters; 
D- and [-models for night/adverse weather interceptors. 
70 'Additional Factors Considered in Conjunction With the Proposed Expansion of the ROK Forces, ' 
appendixod to Memo, JCS to SocDef (Wilson). 31 March 1954 in I RUS 1952-34, v. 13. pt 2. p. 
1784. 
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Consequently, the security of South Korea would depend on the 
deterrent effect of American military posture and on the immediate 
employment of American forces in support of Korean forces during war. In 
view of requirements of aerodrome facilities in the Korean peninsula, it 
would be beneficial for the United States to help the ROKAF maintain air 
bases in peacetime. Because of its mission to act as a deterrent to general 
war, as well as to air attack by the North Korean Air Force, the USAF 5th 
Air Force would have a continuing requirement for certain South Korean air 
bases and facilities for peacetime deployments. 71 The United States Air 
Force was also concerned with the rule of austerity in regard to US Korean 
military assistance policy. From the United States' standpoint of economic 
use of worldwide material resources, it would be wiser to have 'maximum 
effect with minimum logistic investment" as the rule in equipping the ROK 
Air Force. 72 I Icnee it would be to the American advantage that the existing 
air base complex in South Korea be maintained and capable of sustaining 
combat operations, because an 'austere' ROK Air Force would be sufficient 
to permit the maintenance of the bases in South Korea in an operational 
status, which would in turn extend the range and flexibility of the fightcr- 
bomber and reconnaissance units of 5th Air Force based in Japan and the 
Pacific islands. 73 
What should not be overlooked in investigating America's reluctance 
to strengthen South Korea's airpowcr was a key strategic concern: Japan. 
American policymakcrs considered that Korea, surrounded by three powerful 
neighbours (China, Russia, and Japan), could hardly sustain itself against 
71 Two USAF fighter wings are permanently stationed in South Korea today, However, at that time 
when the American military redeployment commenced soon after the Armistice, the U. S. Air Force 
initially intended to station its fighter forces in Korea on a rotation basis. Interview, author with Lt. 
General (Ret. ) Chang Chi-Ryang, 16 September 1994. 
72 Memo. 193d Mtg of NSC. 'Memorandum of Discussion at the 193d Meeting of the National 
Security Council, ' 13 April 1954 in FRUS 1952-54 v. 15, pt 2. p. 1786. 
77 Air Intelligence Information Report. 7 August 1951 In'SAF IGstory. 1 January 1952 - 30 June 
1952, ' Vol. 2., ms.. p. 352. K"730.01 Jan-Jun 1952. v. 2. AFi IRA. 
167 
any of these neighbours unless supported by the United States. Accordingly, 
they reckoned that Korea would have to align itself with Japan (the only one 
of these three friendly to the West), 'or forever be a millstone around the 
neck of the United States. ' South Korea's value to the United States was only 
in the degree it could 'protect Japan militarily and support Japan 
cconomically. '74 American policymakcrs, therefore, sought a way to 
encourage Korea to cooperate with Japan. I lowever, unless Korea felt the 
need for such cooperation with Japan, it would be difficult for the United 
States to bring her two allies together. Accordingly, any further 
strengthening of the ROK Air Force as well as other Korean military arms 
without ROK's alignment with Japan would only prolong the period in 
which the United States must be prepared to commit powerful military forces 
to the Far East. '" 
In short, the perennial fear of the US government that any offensive 
means given to the ROK could be used unilaterally against either North 
Korea or Japan was persistently reflected in the US policy to restrain the 
growth of the ROK Air Force. I iowever, the inviolate prerogatives of a 
sovereign state to protect its territorial integrity demand the ability to defend 
itself, particularly its air space at the critical initial stage of war, before 
external assistance arrives. Furthermore, the right of self-defence would not 
be limited only to instances of actual attack. So, South Korea should be able 
to act if an external attack were imminent, 76 because the purpose of South 
Korea's right to act in self-defence 'should be preventive [(deterrence)] in 
nature rather than retributive. "7To preclude or restrain this ability denigrates 
the sovereign state's potential to eventually assume its own defence 
74 Msg, CINCFE (1 full) to ACOS (Ridgway), 5 July 1954, in PREIS. 1932.54. v. 15. pt 2, p. 1823. 75 1blil, p. 1824. 76 Richard G. Maxon, Nature's Eldest Law: A Survey of a Nation's Right To Act in Soff-Defense, ' 
Parameters 25: 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 56. For Maxon' IUI account, see pp. 55-68. r D. W. 13owett, Self-Defenst in Interrrulavw! Law (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 20 
as cited in Ibid. p. 67. 
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responsibilitcs. Such arguments, when put to 5th AF/FEAF advisers, elicited 
sympathy from many of them, but no one was in a position to force change at 
the US/JCS/NSC level of decision. Even there, though, an occasional 
devil's argument along such lines fell on deaf Cars. » 
5.4. ROK-US Agreed Minute and South Korea's Air Force Levels 
Despite his earlier promise to President Eisenhower, President Rhce 
only four months later reiterated, in another letter dated 16 November 1953 
to Eisenhower, his 'possible intention to take unilateral action to unify 
Korea. ' (Such dramatic shifts of position, indeed policy in general, were not 
unusual in the often chaotic two years following the Armistice. ) Rhec stated 
that if the United States was not prepared to support a military offensive to 
take the north, it could support a three-part alternative programme; (1) 
provide adequate air, naval and logistic support for twenty ROK Army 
divisions to prevent a surprise enemy breakthrough; (2) increase the ROK 
Army to a strength of thirty to forty divisions; and (3) assign General James 
Van Fleet to train the ROK ground forces. " 
The prospect of renewed war - this time by South Korea " in Asia 
precipitated a strong reaction from the United States. President Eisenhower 
made it clear in his answer on 20 March 1954 to President Rhce that the 
United States would refuse to support any military action to unify Korea, and 
also advised him that the request for additional ROK Army divisions would 
'dangerously overtax the human and material resources of your country. 'KO 
79 There is no archival evidence available to explain whether ROKAF presented its view on the issue 
of self-defence capability formally or informally. A witness presumed that the issue was often 
mentioned during General Kim Chung-Yurs social association with his American advisers. 
Interview, author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu (General Kim Chung-Yuri deputy). 30 
October (telephone) and 24 April 1995. 
79 Memo, JCS (Radford) to SecState, 17 March 1954. FRUS 19J2.54. v. IS, pt. 2, pp. 1764- 
1763. 
80 Msg. State 748 to Seoul. 20 Mar 54. JCS/1776/447, CCS 383.21 Korea (3.1943), 1 Mu 34, 
sec 147. Box 27; GF 1934-36; Records of the JCS, RG 218, NA/WDC. 
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Three days aller the arrival of President Eisenhower's letter, President Rhec 
presided over a strategic meeting attended by the National Defense Minister, 
Chairman of the ROK JCS, Chiefs of Staff of ROK's three services, and First 
Army Commander. At the meeting, all ROK top military leaders 'informed 
Rhee flatly he could not hope to succeed in unifying Korea by unilateral 
ROK military action. '' 
On 31 March 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their previous 
view that forces larger than those planned by their predecessors during the 
Truman administration could not be maintained by South Korean manpower 
and economic resources, and 'could only be supplied by depleting US 
reserves of equipment! Instead of quantitative expansion, they recommended 
some qualitative improvements within approved manpower ceilings. The 
ongoing reorganisation of the ROK Army into a field army on the US model, 
with army and corps headquarters, was encouraged. The Navy would be 
adequate when its authorised goal was reached, and the Marine Corps should 
be reorganised into a division instead of various small units t2 American 
policymakers were generally of the same view that ROKAFs conversion to 
jets should be accelerated. Ilowcvcr, the issue of ROKAF's additional jet 
fighter wing was reserved by the Department of State, which only 
conditionally agreed to allow'thc door to be left open' in case the second jet 
wing would be provided at a later time. 83 
On the very day that the Eisenhower administration signed off on 
these US decisions about ROK military force improvement, President Rhee 
wrote again, this time to Admiral Radford, reiterating his threefold request 
for ROK force expansion - economic aid, military assistance and the dispatch 
st Msg, Ambassador to Korea (Briggs) to State Dept, 23 Mar 54. FRUS 1932-54, Y. 15. p! 2, p. 
1766. 
82 'Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), Much 31. 
1954; in Ibid.. Pp. 1780.1781. 
xs Memo, ExSec to NSC. 'Expansion of Republic of Korea Forces, ' 7 April 1954 in FRUW 1952- 
1954, v. IS, pt 2, p. 1786. 
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of General Van Fleet (now retired, but still Rhcc's favourite among the 
Americans) to oversee the training of the ROK troops. If the ROK Army 
were to be doubled in strength and given commensurate air and naval 
support, Rhcc asserted, all UN forces in Korea could be withdrawn and 
South Korean forces could take full responsibility for defending the nation. 
Admiral Radford referred Rhcc's threefold proposal to the National Security 
Council, whose members decided on 13 April 1954 that General Van Flcct 
should go to South Korea to determine the proper size and composition of its 
armed forces. Two weeks later, Secretary Wilson issued formal instructions 
to General Van Flcct to conduct a survey of US military assistance 
programmes in the Far East as well as South Korca. U 
While General Van Fleet was conducting a fact-finding survey in 
Seoul, the US government decided upon a different approach with regard to 
the South Korean President, i. e., an official invitation of Rhee to the United 
States. President Eisenhower made his announcement that President Rhee 
would come to Washington on 26 July. " In preparation for a general 
discussion of US-ROK military problems, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided 
a memorandum for the NSC on 22 July 1954, which stated: (I) [T]he 
redeployment schedule that they had submitted on 1 April 1954 should be 
approved; (2) Currently authorised force goals were adequate and were the 
largest that the Republic of Korea could support; (3) The UN Commander 
should retain full command over all forces, including those of South Korea, 
so long as he was responsible for the security of that nation after the UN/US 
redeployment from Korea; and (4) US support and assistance for ROK forces 
would be withdrawn if Rhee removed them from the UNC. 6 
94 'Ltr SecDef to Van Flect, ' 26 Apr 54, JCS 1776/464,3 May 54. CCS 383.21 Korea (3.19-43) 
sec 154. Box 28; GF 1954-56; Records of the JCS. R0 218, NA/WDC. 
83 Public Papers, El wnlxmer, 1954, p. 629; Kim, Kim Chung } ul M Moir, p. 16$. 
86 Paraphrased from Memo, JCS to SecDet: Treparation of U. S. Position papers in connection 
with President Rhea's Visit to This Country; 16 July 1934 Korea. CCS 383.21 Korea (3.19-45) sec 
154. Box 28; GF 1954.56; Records of the JCS, RO 218 ; NA/WDC. The JCS prepared position 
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When the first meeting of the Korean-American talks was held in the 
morning of 27 July 1954, President Rhcc urged the rapid expansion of ROK 
forces, reminding Americans of the Korean War Icsson: 
Specifically, we need more divisions, more air and more sea 
forces. Let me tell you why. In 1948 General Roberts came to see 
me, 87 I told him at that time that we needed more tanks and 
200,000 more trained soldiers. I was told at that time that such a 
demand was outrageous, that the Korean economy could not 
stand it. I was told that tanks in Asia were no good. I was told 
that the Reds would never come down south - but in 1950 they 
came south. So, that being our experience, we need and want 
larger forccs. 88 
North Korca would have the initiativc at first, but unless it could 
score quickly, its forces would likely be worn down and defeated by the 
follow-on external reinforcement. Such a quick war would demand an 
orchestrated and highly responsive defence posture, based on such intangible 
superior elements as strategy, training and leadership in addition to tangible 
quantity (numerical strength) and quality (weapons). Americans assessed 
that weakness in military leadership and training would restrict the ROK 
Army's operational capability to a relatively low level, despite its persistent 
quest for expansion. A State Department Memorandum for the Record of 9 
June 1954 charged: The [ROK] troops would not put up an adequate right 
without American advisers as far down as regimental lcvcl. '89 Nevertheless, 
a few weeks later, General John B. hull, CINCUNC, recommended that the 
ROK Army be reorganised into thirty divisions, of which nine would be 
active and twenty-one reserve, and that the strength of each division be 
papers in response to Acting Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson's request on 16 July for their 
advice on: (1) the question of redeployment of US forces tiom Korea; (2) the augmentation of the forces of South Korea. and (3) the relation between the UN Command and ROK forces. /bid 87 Brigadier General William L. Roberts was the commander of the Korean Military Advisory 
Group (KMAG). 
ss 1 lagerty Diary. July 27.1954. FRUS, 1932-1954. V. 1 S. pt 2. p. 1845. 
s9 Memorandum for the Record, by Waiter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 
June 1954' in /RUX. 1952-1954. v. IS, pt 2. pp. 1805.1806. 
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reduced from 15,000 to 10,000. General dull also supported the idea to 
establish reserve forces of the ROKAF and ROKN, and reiterated his earlier 
proposal that the South Korean Air Force be expanded to two tighter wings, 
one of which would contain F-86F jet fighters 9° 
General Van Fleet meanwhile returned to Washington from his survey 
of South Korea's military needs and resources. Van Fleet's recommendations, 
submitted on 23 July 1954, the day before Rhee's arrival in Washington, 
paralleled some of General Hull's proposals, but Van Fleet's recommendation 
regarding the active versus reserve forces was starkly different. Van Fleet 
called for an Army composed of both regular and reserve divisions, totaling 
thirty (30) in number, and for the creation of Navy and Air Force reserves. 
However, under his plan, twenty-four (versus hull's nine) Army divisions 
would be active and only six (versus hull's twenty-one) reserve. The 
increase from twenty to twenty-four active divisions, General Van Fleet 
thought, would take up the 'slack' left by the impending departure of four US 
divisions. Van Fleet advocated ROK military expansion for a cost-effective 
reason : '[F]or the same money we can build up approximately five ROK 
divisions for each US division withdrawn.... and since we stand shoulder 
to shoulder with ROKs in the common struggle against communism as such 
in the Far East, [we] should cooperate with [ROK]' with reduced strength of 
divisional artillery and the elimination of some support units. 91 
90 Memo, CINCFE to CJCS, 'ROK Armed Forces, ' 29 June 1934. Defense " Special Assistant Van 
Fleet Report Files, 1954, Box 10, RO 330. NA/WD- 
9t Msg. Ambassador to Korea (Briggs) to State Dept., May 10,1954. FRUS, 1952.1954, v. 15, pt 
2, p. 1792. At the time when Van Fleet visited Seoul, the ROK Army had only sixteen out of twenty 
divisions fully manned, and US military planners reckoned that the remaining four ROK'skeleton' 
divisions would be reinforced by the leftover' equipment of the departing four US divisions. without 
increasing the already authorised personnel ceiling. (The ROK military personnel ceilings approved 
by the Eisenhower administration in May 1953 were 635.000 for the Army, 10,000 for the Navy, 
23,500 for the Marine Corps, and 9,000 for the Air Force "a total of 697,500. ) 1lermes, Trued Tent 
urxl I'Ighrbrx 1-Irrmut, pp. 210.214,340-345,357.361,439-441. As of 31 July 1953 soon after the 
Armistice, the actual strength of ROK ground forces, Including ROK Marine Corps personnel under 
operational control of the US Army, totaled 590,911 (/bki, p. 513), and of the Air Force 11,481 
(Gong-Goon Sa (7), 1949-53, p. 429). 
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The US Embassy in Seoul noted that Gcncral Van Fleet's advocacy of 
ROK infantry expansion was in direct opposition to the current thinking of 
the JCS 'to cut expenditures to the bone. ' Van Fleet's unawareness of the 
American government's emerging military assistance policy - 'building up 
ROK strength proportionately as [American troops) withdrew' - was soon 
pointed out in US Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs' follow-on wired report that 
Van Fleet left the 'impression of not being acutely aware [oi] detailed 
financial and most modern logistical thinking and overall political, economic 
and sociological developments [in the] Far East or our [overall] budgetary 
problcros. '92 (in retrospect, Van Fleet may not have been the right choice for 
the advocacy of US interests. )" 
Van Fleet also recommended the ROK Air Force should be allowed a 
'somewhat larger personnel ceiling (15,000), and its speedy conversion to 
jcts. 94 He further endorsed the previous observation of US Eighth Army 
Commander General Maxwell D. Taylor. In his report, dated 9 June 1954, 
General Taylor had pointed out that the ROK Air Force programme lacked 
adequate tactical aircraft, and a moderate South Korean Air Force was 
necessary to help protect the investment which Americans had put into 
Korea. 'Presently, the [ROKJ Air Force is totally inadequate, he continued. 
'Modernizing the Korean Air Force and converting it to jets would take from 
3 to 4 years. '95 Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the idea of 
92 'Ambassador In Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State, ' Seoul, 10 May 1954 in f RUS 1932. 
34 v. IS, pt. 2. p. 1792. 
93 General Van Fleet was highly respected by Korean generals because of his dedicated efforts to 
improve ROK Army's combat readiness during his tour in Korea as Commanding General of US 
Eighth Army (1931.52). Ile is known as the father of the Korean Mny. Ile also had a personal 
relationship with President Rhoe, who considered General Van Fleet as his 'American son. ' Because 
of his combat experience with Korean soldiers during the Korean War and close relationship with 
President Ithee, Van fleet may have generated an impression that he WAS a bit biased, as 
Ambassador Briggs suggested in his report to the US State Department aller the meeting between 
Rhee, Van Fleet and Briggs. 
94 Memo, CINCFE to CJCS, 'ROK Armed Forces, ' 29 June 1954. Defense " Special Assistant Van 
Fleet Report Files, 1954, Box 10, RO 330. NA/WDC. 
95 Memo by Walter Treumann, June 9,1934, Subj: Debriefing of General Maxwell Taylor. IR&S 
1932-1934, v. IS. pt 2, p. 1805. 
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doubling the tighter strength of the Korean Air Force, whereas they 
approved CINCUNC's plan for the 30-division ROK Army (9 active, 21 
reserve), recommending the ROK military's new personnel ceilings totaling 
718,500 men, as compared with the authorised 702,500.96 
South Korean President's visit to Washington afforded an opportunity 
for officials of both nations to review the goals of ROK military force levels. 
A plan for the expansion and reorganisation of the ROK military 
establishment was discussed between US and ROK representatives: 
Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, Generals hull and Van Fleet, and other 
US military and civilian representatives of the Departments of State and 
Defense; as well as Admiral Sohn, and ROK Army and Air Force generals, 
who accompanied Rhcc. 97 
Upon arrival in the United States on 26 July 1954, President Rhcc 
irritated the Americans once again by the belligerent tone of his first speech. 
At Washington National Airport he said that it was 'American cold feet' that 
had thus far impeded the unification of Korea, and 'God Almighty will see to 
it that we shall carry out our program')" President Rhcc's purpose was 
neither to conciliate nor to apologisc to the Eisenhower administration, 
which felt aggrieved by Rhcc's independent stand. Rhec's aim in visiting the 
United States was twofold: (1) he sought greater Korean control over 
expenditure of the US postwar aid programme designed for force 
% These figures are detailed in Draft Memorandum for the Soaetary of Defense. ' attached to JCS 
1776/491.26 Aug 1954. CCS 383.21 Korea (3.1945), Sec. 156, Box 29; GF 1954-56; Records of 
the JCS, RG 218; NA/'WDC. 
97 Korean military attendees were: General Chung 11-Kwon, Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of 
Stall, Lt. General Kim Chung-Yul. ROKAF Vice Chief of Staff for Plans and Special Assistant to 
the Minister of National Defense and Major General Choe Tok-Shin. KOKA, ROK Observer at 
Panmunjom. General Kim was chosen because he spoke English whereas Lt. General Choi Yong. 
Duk, ROKAF Chief of Stall'. did not. Msg, Ambassador to Korea (Biggs) to State Dept., July 10, 
1954. FRU3 1952.1954. v. IS. pt. 2. pp. 1831; United States Summary Minutes of the Second 
Meeting of Unitod States -Republic of Korea Talks, July 28, ' dated 2 Aug 54, IbU. p. 1847; United 
States Summary Minutes of the Third Meeting of United States-Republic of Korea Talks, July 29, 
1954; dated 2 Aug 34, Ibid, p. 1849. 
`m Robert T. Oliver, Sýrgmwr I)hev wit/American Involvement In Korea, 1942.1960 (Seoul, 
Korea: Panmun Book Co., 1978), p. 446. 
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improvement and the rehabilitation of South Korea; and (2) he wanted to 
persuade the United States government to reconsider its global strategy, 
which was, in ithee's view, little short of 'surrender' to communist 
imperialism. Ithec wanted to agitate American public opinion and use it to 
counter President Eisenhower and his policymakcrs. 
In addressing a joint session of Congress on 28 July 1954, Rhec 
wamcd of North Korea's increased air threat: 'Communist airfields, newly 
constructed in defiance of armistice terms, and furnished with jet bombers, 
lie within ten minutes of our National Assembly. Yet death is scarcely closer 
to Seoul than to Washington, for the destruction of the United States is the 
prime objective of the conspirators in the Kremlin's In his concluding 
remarks in the Congress, Rhcc tried to remind the American public of a 
unified Korea: 
Lct us takc courage and stand up in dcfcnsc of the idcals and 
principles upheld by the fathers of American independence, 
Gcorgc Washington and Thomas Jefferson, and again by the 
Great Emancipator, Abraham Lincoln, who did not hesitate to 
fight in defense of the union which could not survive half slave 
and half free. '00 
Ilowcvcr, if the geographical unification of the Korean peninsula involved 
large expenditures of men and money, Korean unification would hardly be a 
viable issue to the American Congress. A divided Korea might even provide 
two buffer zones, and it would therefore be better, as long as either one could 
be considered friendly, or at least not hostile, to the United States. 
99 1 Iongkcc Karl, Rlhct S)vrgºmaºt AN-Tong ! {y"W Borg-Ma Soo-Hoeng Kee (I esi kni Sjngman 
Rhet's Journey to America) (Seoul: Office of Public Information, 1955), pp. 25.26; Se-jin Kim, 
'Introduction, ' in Se-jin Kim cd.. Korea Unillaulon: source Materials vi ih an Inmxhrctlorr (Seoul. 
Korea: Research Center For Peace and Unification, 1976), pp. 5453. See also Viral Speeches of the 
Dw 20: 21 (August 15,1954), pp. 643-644. 
t Karl, ! 'resWent Rhee's Journey to America, p. 29; I? to!. V veches of the IAy 20: 21 (August IS. 
1954), p. 644. 
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The National Security Council met on 29 July 1954, the day following 
Rhce's inflammatory speech to the US Congress, and the ROK's latest force 
improvement proposal was discussed. Secretary Dulles had 'grave 
reservations' about America's provision of 'mobile, instruments of war' to 
South Korea. Dulles wondered why it was necessary to provide Koreans 
with jet fighters. I Ic pointed out that should jet fighters be supplied, they 
might be'used to drop bombs across the Yalu'10' Admiral Radford, however, 
argued that propeller-driven F-51 aircraft, which Korean pilots operated so 
well during the Korean War, were as much mobile instruments of war as 
jets, and suggested that the Koreans deserved consideration for additional 
air strength 'by the excellent work their air force had done so far. ' Admiral 
Radford's view prcvailed. 102 In fact, South Korean tighter pilots adhered 
strictly to the rules of engagement. During the Korean War, they made no 
serious mistakes in their conduct of combat missions. They attacked neither 
unauthorised targets nor friendly ground forces. There were no officially 
confirmed defections of ROKAF pilots to North Korea nor any serious 
violations of the Armistice terms caused by crossing the DMZ-1113 Their 
flying safety records in F-51 S were excellent. 'a The incessant efforts of 
tot Memorandum of Discussion at the 208th Meeting of the National Security Council, July 29, 
1954. ! "RUS, 1952-1954, v. 15, pt. 2, p. 1854. 102 Ibld For an earlier example of disagreement between the Secretary of State and the JCS. see S. 
Dockrill, 'Cox perartnn and Sucplclon. ' Pp. 142.143. 
103 No aircraft defection was recorded in the ROKAF history. I lowever, a likely defection of one 
ROKAF F-S1 shortly after the cessation of hostilities was mentioned briefly in the USAF archives. 
Captain Kim Sung-ßae, who had previously been grounded by ROKAF I headquarters for continued 
violation of flying regulations, 'appropriated an F-51. sitting at the puking ramp for maintenance 
inspection. ' Captain Kim departed in his F-S1(ROK H27[aircraft tail number)) at 1218 local time on 
19 October 1953 without benefit of parachute, helmet, radio contact. or clearance, and did not 
return. 'Many assumptions were made during the next few days, but it wasn't until approximately 26 
October 1953, that the North Korean Radio announced the arrival of a South Korean pilot in an 
obsolete propeller driven aircraft. This, we assumed, was Captain Kim and ROK N 27' I listory of 
Detachment One of 6146th Air Force Advisory Group, I July 1933.31 December 1953; m&, p. 11. 
K-GP"TNO. 6146-111 (Dct 1), Jul-Dec 1953. AFIIRA. See also Message, CINCFB (J-2) to 
DEPTAR/ JCS. Subject: Defection of ROK AF officer pilot to Communists 19 Oct. CCS 383.21 
Korea (3.19-43) sec. 139 Box 46. Geographical File 1931.53; RO 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs 
of Stall. National Archives, Washington, DC. 
104 The average ROKAF's flying safety record In peacetime between August 1953 and June 1935 
was less than the average goal of 3.0 for the US Air Force fighters in peacetime. The value of 1.0 
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South Korean Air Force leaders and fighter pilots to do their best in combat 
and their cooperation with Americans in peacetime paid of Although it was 
not known to the Korean public, Admiral Radford's recognition of the 
Korean pilots was a great compliment to the entire ROK Air Force in terms 
of ROKAPs credibility and growth potential. 
When Secretary Wilson presented at the NSC meeting the proposed 
increase of the ROK Air Force, which would consist of three squadrons of 
jets, one transport squadron, and two squadrons of rc-equipped F-S 1s (a total 
of 200 additional aircraft with six additional squadrons), General Hull 
proposed adding three more squadrons (or one wing) of jet fighters and 
another of transport aircraft for a total of ten squadrons. '°s It would be an 
encouragement to the ROKAF to sec its fighter force doubled. Equally 
important was General hull's proposal of adding another cargo plane 
squadron. Airlift embodies a key facet of a fundamental air force capability - 
rapid, flexible and long range mobility. 106 Airlift could be used to support 
joint operations, as well as military assistance and civilian relief 
programmes. The ROKAFs ability to resupply the ROK Army in a timely 
manner would build confidence and stability. The mountainous geography 
and limited road systems might likely impede maintenance of ground lines of 
communications (GLOC) in renewed hostilities in Korea, and thereby 
demand enhancement of air lines of communications (ALOC). 
In this respect, General Hull's recommendation to increase the 
ROKAFs airlift capability from one to two squadrons was more politically 
acceptable to American policy planners. Because transport aircraft would 
not be considered offensive, they would be commensurate with the United 
equals to one aircraft accident (crash or irreparable damage) out of 100,000 flying hours. Gong- 
Ccxm Sa (ll), 1953.57, pp. 333.334. tos Memorandum of Discussion at the 208th Meeting of the National Security Council, July 29, 
1954. fRUS 1952-1954. v. IS, pt. 2, p. 1934. 
106 The long-range' strategic airlift aircraft of the period was four-engined C-124s; tactical' inter- 
theater airlift consisted of C"119s. C-54 s. C-46s, and C-47s. 
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States' Korean policy. However, his proposal was not accepted by Defense 
Secretary Wilson, who felt that 'there was no need to hurry. 'lOl Because of 
their preoccupation with the numerical increase of infantry divisions and 
tighter forces, no Korean leaders exerted any official effort to appeal to 
Americans to specifically support and implement General Hull's 
recommendation for increasing the ROKAF's airlift capability. 
Consequently, an important opportunity for increasing a viable and 
significant clement of ROK's airpower was once again lost to the Korean Air 
Force. Quantitatively, one squadron of sixteen medium sized cargo airplanes 
had the maximum capacity to simultaneously carry less than five hundred 
combat troops each time, provided all available aircraft could be taskcd. t08 
Therefore, the approved number of ROKAF cargo aircraft, which could only 
transport less than one infantry battalion and less than twenty tons of 
supplies at one time, was totally inadequate to carry out the airlift mission 
demanded by the logistic air supply for twenty ROK Army divisions. Apart 
from the disparity between the Army and the Air Force, an internal 
asymmetry within the ROKAF's own force posture between fighter and 
combat support aircraft began to emerge. 109 
The ROK's force composition was finally agreed upon during the 
summit meeting between American and South Korean presidents on 30 July 
1954. The terms of this agreement were written in an Agreed Minute of 
107 Memorandum of Discussion at the 208th Meeting of the National Security Council, July 29, 
1954. FRU .. S 1952-1954, v. IS. pt. Z, p. 18$4. tux In reality, this estimation is too optimistic. because of the limited number of actually flyable 
aircraft and mission apportionment (allocation of available Sorties). Therefore, even transporting five 
hundred troops would be a best case scenario. One C-46 could carry 35 to 40 troops; its average in- 
commission-rate (rate of flyable aircraft) was lea then 80 %. 
109 The imbalance between fighter and support airplanes within the ROKAF aircraft inventory has 
not been redressed. Even today when the ROK government can financially afford it. the Korean Air 
Force maintains less than forty cargo planes (10 C-11011s, 12 CN-233s, and IS C-123s) to support 
ten ROKA airborne commando brigades and 20 infantry divisions. International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Abluwy 13a1awxt 1994.1995 (London, UK: Brasseys (UK) Ltd., 1994), p. 181. 
Currently, it is not because of the US Korean policy, but the ROK Army's dominant influence over 
the ROK military budget. which precludes correcting this internal disparity. 
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Understanding after the talks. The core of the Agreed Minute was: (1) The 
United States promised to defend South Korea in case of unprovoked attack; 
to support Korean unification by all peaceful means; and to provide 
economic and military assistance for FY 1955 up to a maximum of $700 
million, or more than $100 million above the amount previously planned; (2) 
South Korea would cooperate with America's efforts toward peaceful 
unification, and promised to disavow any intemperate action for unification 
purposes; and (3) Personnel ceilings for the ROK forces for FY 1955 were 
661,000 for the Army, 15,000 for the Navy, 27,500 for the Marine Corps, 
and 16,500 for the Air Force -a total of 720,000. The Minute also stipulated 
that South Korean forces were to remain under the operational control of the 
UN Command. 110 
Noticeable in the Minute were two items: the emphasis on the UNCs 
operational control of the ROK forces and the unchanged proportions of 
ROK military composition. In fact, the American intention of the written 
understanding between the two governments was to confirm the ROK's 
allegiance to the UNC so that ROK unilateral action could be prevented. 
The revised personnel ceilings in the Minute remained unchanged in terms 
of the manpower proportion of three services - Army versus Air Force and 
Navy. The foot soldiers, including the ROK Marines, occupied an 
overwhelming majority of over 96 % (688,500) of the entire ROK military 
establishment, which was unprecedented in the free world. "' 
1 10 Msg. DcpArmy to CINCUNC (l lull), Septcrnbcr 15,1954. FRUS, 1952-1954, v. 15. pt. 2, 
pp. 1876-1878. For the full text and Appendix A of the Agreed Minute. see Urgcarment of Statt 
Bulletin 31: 805 (Nov 29,1954). pp. 810-811. For the fill text of Appendix B, see Appendix 5.1 of 
this study. 
III Despite the enormous size of the ROK Army personnel. the South Korean military's war 
reserve stocks (military stores and equipment) were always kept at the lowest possible supply level' 
that would permit operations for less than a week, thereby enabling the US government to effectively 
restrain the ROK by manipulating logistical leverage. Debriefing of General Taylor; in 
Memorandum for the Record, by Walter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. June 9. 
1954 in 17 SS 1952-54, v. 15, pt. 2, p. 1805. 
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After Fiscal Year 1955 (June 1955), these strengths would be reduced 
as trained men, released from active service, became available for the 
reserves. A goal of ten reserve divisions was established, to be attained by 
the end of calendar year 1955. In the case of the South Korean Air Force, the 
CINCUNCs proposal to create a ROK Air Force reserve was rejected by the 
JCS on 4 September 1954, based on the 5th Air Force recommendations. 
The 5th AF refused a ROKAF reserve scheme because of personnel and 
equipment shortages. The infant ROKAF was coping with the priority task of 
organising and training its personnel of 16,500 men. Therefore, it would be 
impractical to assign certain ROKAF personnel released from duty into an 
organised reserve program in view of the training efforts necessary to 
organise and maintain the initial ROKAF establishment. In addition there 
were insufficient aircraft and support equipment in the USAF resources, 
which would be necessary for the reserve force in the event of hostilities. fl2 
There was to be no expansion of the ROK Air Force, but the United States 
would allow it to convert to jets by the end of FY 1956 (June 1956). "3 
President Eisenhower approved the Agreed Minute on 10 September 
1954.114 This document had two appendices. Appendix A delineated an 
economic program, and Appendix B outlined measures for an effective 
military program with an overall prescription of South Korea's force levels 
for Fiscal Year 1955, as well as US assignment of F"86F jet fighter and C-46 
transport aircraft as follows: 
1. The United States will assist in supporting the following 
maximum number of military pcrsonncl (ROK) during the FY 55: 
Army 661,000 
Navy 15,000 
Ili 'OK Air Force, ' in'SAF history, I July 1954 - 31 December 1954, ins,. vol. 2, p. 438. K- 
730.01 Jul " Doc 1954, v. 2. AF1IRA. 113 lkpartment of Slate Bulletin 31.805 (Nov 29,1954 ), pp. 810-811. 114 Watson. op. cl., p. 243. 
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Marinc 27,500 
Air Forcc 16,500115 
Adjustments in numbers will be acceptable to the United States as 
long as the 720,000 total is not exceeded .... 
8. The United States will make available jet lighters and training 
aircraft to the Korean Air Force in such quantities and at such 
times as the Korean pilots have demonstrated a capability to 
utilize this equipment properly. Determination of this capability 
will be made by the CINCUNC. The United States will plan to 
make available ten T-33 jet type trainers, and subsequently as 
need is demonstrated, 30 F- 86F and 16 C-46 aircraft during 
1955, and the remainder of one jet fighter wing (45 additional F- 
86Fs for attrition) by end of FY-1956.116 
There was room for the ROK to increase its Air Force personnel to more 
than 16,500. (Figure 5-1) 'Inasmuch as an overall personnel ceiling of 
720,000 was agreed to, the 1,500 personnel unaccounted for [in the Minute] 
should be allocated among the four Services at CINCFCs discretion. '"" 
But the ROK Air Force leaders took no action to acquire additional 
personnel out of the 1,500 unaccounted for. I'$ 
In the mcantimc, the Amcrican govcmmcnt's position was that all the 
agreements constituted a single package; if South Korea failed to prove its 
allegiance to the US policy (i. e., compliance with the terms stipulated in the 
Agreed Minute), the Eisenhower administration would reserve its obligation 
either to execute plans for modernising the ROK forces or to ratify the 
I is See Appendix 5.1: Breakdown of I6,500-man Spaces of the ROK Air Force. 
116 'Appendix ß to the Agreed Minute Between the Governments of the United States and Korea: 
Measures for an Effective Military Program, ' in'SAF History, I July 1954.31 December 1954; mx., 
K-730.01 Jul-Doc 1954, v. 3. AFI IRA; Kim, Kim Chung Tal Memoir, pp. 452.433. 
117 Reorganization of the ROK Armed Forces, ' JCS 1776/491,26 August 1934. CCS 381.21 Korea 
(3.19-45) sec 156, Box 29; GF 1954.56; Records of the JCS, R0 218; NAN=. 
I to There is no archival evidence to suggest why ROKAF leaders took no action. Presumably, they 
were more concerned about the speedy execution of jet conversion, and any peripheral argument 
might cause the delay of ROKAF modernisation. Telephone interviews. author with former Chiefs 
of ROKAF, Lt. Generals (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, Chang Sung-Wham, and Chang Chi-Ryang, 28-30 
October 1995. 
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Figurc 5 -1 
Breakdown of 16,500-man spaces of the ROK Air Force119 
Base Support OFFICERS AIRMEN TOTAL 
K-I (Pusan W. ) 31 377 408 
K-2 (Taegu) 51 657 708 
K-3 (Pohang) 21 311 332 
K-4 (Sachon) 100 1403 1503 
K-S (Taejon) 30 265 295 
K-6 (Pyongtack) 30 326 356 
K-8 (Kunsan) 30 326 356 
K-14 (Kimpo) 30 326 356 
K-16 (Seoul) 54 700 754 
K-55 (Osan) 44 536 580 
1lq, ROKAF 210 220 430 
I1q, Training Command 362 728 1090 
1lq, Air Force Academy 108 137 245 
Air Command & Staff School 27 23 50 
I (q, Air Material Command 78 157 235 
I lq, Tactical AF 74 105 179 
Fighter Bomb Wing (Jet) 249 1304 1553 
Air Trans Svc 176 560 736 
Air int Sv Gp 110 640 750 
Comm Gp I Iq 30 431 461 
Air Weather Gp 129 418 $47 
AACS Gp 49 798 847 
Maintenance Depot 94 1130 1224 
Supply Depot 48 198 246 
Acro Medical Lab 20 35 55 
TP & Carrier Sq 13 117 130 
Comm Operations Sq (Tac) 8 112 120 
Air Rescue Fit 15 28 43 
Air Operations School 11 24 35 
AC &W 107 596 703 
Air Tac Constr Sq 16 31 47 
OSI 83 69 152 
TOTALS 2438 13087 15525 
Pipeline (Students, Others) 220 755 975 
GRAND TOTALS 2658 13842 16500 
119 Thcse are the authorised spaces, not actually on hand. The Republic of Korea Air Force. ' 
111stury of the 1"(fth Air Force, 1 January 1935 - 31 June 1915. vol. 2. p. 374. AFI IRA K730.0I 
Jan-Jun 1955, v. 2. 
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defence pact, until the ROK govcmmcnt had signed the Agreed Minute. 120 
But America's fear turned out to be unfounded, as Rhee signed it without 
resistancc. '2' The text was initialed by representatives of both nations in 
Seoul on 17 November 1954, while at the same time the ROK-US 
Mutual Defence Treaty was ratified in Washington. '22 
Soon after the Agreed Minute was signed, Colonel Chang Chi"Ryang, 
ROK air attache in Washington, D. C., notified ROKAF I ieadquartcrs in 
Seoul of a United States' plan for a reduction of ROK Army strength, to 
levels below those just agreed to. In a tclegrammc dated 5 January 1955 to 
Lt. General Kim Chung-Yul, Colonel Chang reported that the US 
Department of Defense was reviewing a plan for a gradual reduction of the 
20-division ROK Army over the following three years: fourteen (14), 
twelve (12), and eight (8) by FY 1956,1957, and 1958, respectively. 
After having listened to General Kim's report at a strategic conference at the 
Kyung-Mu Dac, President Rhce instructed ROK military leaders to make an 
effort to minimise the ROK Army rcduction. 123 
President Rhcc later emphasised his displeasure over such prospective 
reductions to General Kim, when Rhec appointed him as the ROK 
National Defense Minister in July 1957. It was a prime chance for Kim to 
negotiate with Americans to increase ROKAF righter wings. If the 
Americans wanted to reduce the number of divisions in the ROK Army, the 
'lost firepower' could be compensated for by enlarging the ROKAF. General 
120 Memo, SecDef to SccA et al., -Proposed Agreed Minute Between the United States and Korea 
Based on recent US-Korea Conferences, ' 17 Sep 54. JCS 1776/499,27 Sep 54, CCS 383.21 Korea 
(3.19-43), sec 157. Box 28; GF 1954-36; Records of the JCS. RU 218. NMWDC. 
III US State Department officials fearod that 'friction with South Korea would probably continue, 
primarily over the question of unification. But the danger of violent or intemperate action by 
President Rhee no longer loomed so large as it once had. ' Memo, OCh to Exec Say, NSC. 
Progress Report on NSC 170/1 (Korea). ' 30 Doc 54, JCS 1776/513,5 Jan $5, CCS 383.21 Korea 
(3.1945) (2) sec 1, Box 5; GF 1954.56; Records of the JCS. RG 218. NA/WDC. 
122 For the exchange of instruments of ratification. see Chown /MAO, 17 November 1954, p. 1; Now 
York Tlmcs, 18 November 1954, p. 5. 
123 Kim, Kim Chung Yul Alemolr, p. 209. 
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Kim, however, did not capitalise on the opportunity during sixteen months of 
negotiations. Instead, Kim succeeded on 26 November 1958 only in 
obtaining a US concession to resolve the issue by stipulating, in the 
Appendix 13 of the 1958 Revision of the 1954 Agreed Minute, a reduction of 
two army divisions, and an overall personnel reduction of 90,000 men, 
including a large number of non-combat personnel. The ROK military 
personnel ceiling was to be reduced from 720,000 to 630,000 by 1958.124 
The number of the ROK Army divisions would decrease from 20 to 18. 
Instead, the personnel strength of the Air Force and Navy was increased by 
5,900 and 1,600 respectively. The breakdown of the reduced ROK military 
personnel ceiling by 1958 was: 565,000 (Army), 16,600 (Navy), 26,000 
(Marine), 22,400 (Air Force). tis This revision of ROK Army's force 
reduction was kept secret at the time to prevent a possible exploitation by 
North Koreans, as well as the demoralisation of the South Korean public. 126 
To redress the disparity between the ROK Army and Air Force, it was 
possible either to increase ROK airpowcr, or to reduce ROK Army infantry 
forces. To do so, Minister of National Defense Kim Chung-Yul could have 
asked the United States government for compensatory fire power as a quid 
pro quo. In addition to the military logic of increased ROK airpower, there 
were also political implications of an unbalanced ROK military structure. 
Had the ROK Army been reduced at the time to the eight-division strength 
as envisioned by one United States plan, for example, the disparity of ROK 
Air Force vis-ü-vis ROK Army could be reduced accordingly. Moreover, 
additionally available US assistance, accrued from the ROK Army's 
124 Ibid., p. 210. Donald Stone Macdonald cites 60,000 men instead of 90,000 men for the figure 
of actually reduced number of personnel by 1958. Macdonald asseru that since the previous ceiling 
of 720,000 had not been reached, a new force ceiling of 630,000 meant an actual reduction of 
60,000. Donald Stone Macdonald. U. S-Korean Relations franc LJbanuion to self-Reliarn : 77W 
N-enty-Year Record (An interpretative summary of the archives of the U. S. Department of State for 
the period 1913 to 1963). (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 99. 
125 Kim, Kist Chung }ülAlcmoir, pp. 209-210.457. 
126 Ibid. p. 210. 
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reduction, would have greatly helped the rehabilitation of the South Korean 
economy. At the same time, the subsequent political influence of the ROK 
Army might have been, to at least some extent, curtailed. 
The South Korean Air Force partially benefited from the USAF 
redeployment, because the ROKAF modernisation would not have occurred 
if the US had not withdrawn its forces from Korea. However, despite the 
diplomatic accomplishment, the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty did not 
directly benefit the ROK Air Force in terms of its mission capability, for the 
ROKAF was not allowed to expand its lighter forces to eventually assume its 
air defence on its own. The Agreed Minute was an accomplishment for both 
the ROK and US governments. To America, it confirmed President Rhec's 
allegiance to US policy - i. e., to retain the ROK forces under the UNGUS 
operational control, and to not resort to unilateral action. To South Korea, 
the Agreed Minute guaranteed a detailed commitment on the part of the 
United States to modernise ROK military forces. This document reassured 
the ROKAF, in particular, of jet conversion, albeit on a limited scale (one 
existing wing only). 
The long-awaited cra of the jet age of the South Korean Air Force 
started blooming in September 1954, under the auspices of the ROK-US 
Agreed Minute of Understanding, which continued to reiterate the intrinsic 
policy limitations of the American government to restrain a potentially 
powerful ROK Air Force, while at the same time permitting the continued 
increase of ROK infantry forces. The modernisation of the ROKAF began 
with the force level of 16,500 personnel, and with the introduction of ninety- 
five jet aircraft and sixteen C-46 transport planes into the ROKAF aircraft 
inventory. The modernisation commenced with great enthusiasm, based on 
advance preparation. Many challenges, however, were encountered. flow 
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the ROK Air Force dealt with challenges in the actual process of its 
modcmisation will be examined in the following chapter. 
187 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE PROCESS OF NIODEI4NISING 
THE REPUBLIC O1ý KOREA AIR FORCE, 1954 -1956 
With the signing of the ROK-US Agreed Minute of Understanding, 
ROK civilian and Air Force leaders redoubled their efforts to create a new 
era for the ROK Air Force, that of the jet age. By October 1953, the North 
Korean Air Force was thought to have over 480 aircraft, including 250 MiG- 
15 jet fighters, whereas South Korea had less than 80 F-51 propeller-driven 
Second World War vintage lighters. ' The United States officially approved 
and implemented modernisation of the South Korean Air Force in September 
of 1954, soon after President Rhcc's visit to America. This chapter examines 
the ROKAF's manpower expansion and aircraft modernisation in accordance 
with the Agreed Minute, focusing on flying units, especially jet conversion 
(F-86F), transition to the twin-cngined, medium transport aircraft (C-46), 
and the establishment of a ROKAF tactical air control unit, all significant 
steps in the actual process of modernising the South Korean Air Force. 
6.1. ROKAF's Lobbying for Expansion 
Prior to the Agreed Minute, early in 1954, the Republic of Korea 
cxcrtcd additional pressure on 5th Air Force to cxpcdite the modcmisation of 
I ROKAF had & total of 118 aircraft, including 78 F-S 1 s. NKAF had a total of 489 aircraft: 255 
MiG-1Ss; 42 IL-28s; S TU-2s; 30 LA-9s; 39 YAK-9s; 4711--tO$; 3S YAK-11&; 28 YAK"28s; 6 PO- 
2s; and 2 IL-128. ROKAF, GKxjX-(; Lr Av 1 Jip (The IIIsrory of the Air Fort ". 1), 1949-53 
(hereafter cited as GKm "-(kion Su (1). 1949-53). p. 429. See also Appendix A (Enemy Air 
Situation) of the ROKAF Expansion Proposal, 13 Nov 53, in Lt. Gencial (rct. ) Kim Chung"Yurs 
Personal File-5th Air Force-1954. General Kim, form« ROKAF Chief of SWT(I949"32,1954.56), 
kept in his personal files copies of documents, memos, manuscripts. worksheets and correspondence 
prepared for or exchanged between the ROK and US Air Forces through either his or the National 
Defense Minister's office. These files were made available to the author by the gracious assistance of 
General Kim's widow. I lereaflcr cited as Kim's PF-SAF"1954. 
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the ROK Air Force. ROK National Dcfcnsc Minister Sohn Won Yil sent a 
letter on 17 Fcbruary to Lt. General S. C. Andcrson, 5th Air Forcc 
Commandcr, asking for ROKAF pilots' carly jct training: 
The necessity of training Korean pilots for jet-planes has long 
been felt by the Korean Govt and the defense of this country 
against future Communist aggression is far from adequate without 
Koreans knowing how to handle jct-planes. I wish to request that 
you will very kindly make arrangements so that a certain number 
of Korean pilots may get special training in Korea for jet-planes 
with the least possible dclay. 2 
General Anderson replied that he had referred Minister Sohn's request to Far 
East Air Forces I icadquartcrs because such a programme was not within his 
purview, and suggested the 5th Air Force was unable to train ROKAF jet 
pilots due to insufficient aircraft At the time, there were only 37 T-33 two- 
scat jet trainers available for the 5th Air Force to keep its own aircrews (over 
1,100 pilots) proficient in instrument flying, which was urgently required for 
successful combat operations during the monsoon season in Korca. 3 
Before the finalisation of the Agreed Minute of Understanding, 
ROKAF leaders had already been working closely with their American 
advisers to exchange the preliminary information required for ROKAF 
mordcmisation. The training of ROKAF mechanics had been approved by 
USAF 5th Air Force in March, based on the predetermined need to have 
mechanics ready to service the new jet aircrail, before pilot training bcgan. 4 
2 Msg. Gen Anderson (CGSAF) to Gen Wegtand (CGFCAF), 19 Sep 54. K"730.01 Jul-Doc 1954, 
V. 3, Appendix 164. AFI IRA, 
3 Soon utter, Minister Sohn received a note from General 0. P. Wegtand, Fu East Air Forces 
Commander, who stated that the problem was 'under study. ' Ibld 
4 Msg, Gen Anderson to Gen Weyland, 19 Feb 54. 'SAF History. Jul. Dec 1954, ms.. vol. 3, 
Appendix 164. K730.01 Jul-Doc 1954, v. 3. AFI IRA; Gong-Gcxw Sa (11), 195! . S7, pp. 96.98. 
See also 'ROK Air Force, ' in vol. 2, pp. 424-425, tame file. Korean mechanic training began in 
August 1954, one month ahead of pilot training. This will be discussed further in the following Sec. 
6.2.2: Jet Mechanic Training. 
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General Otto P. Wcyland, CINCFCAF, forwarded ROK Minister 
Sohn's request for expedition of Korean pilots' jet training to Air Force 
Headquarters in Washington, asking that the Far East Air Forces be kept 
informed regarding plans for modcmising the ROKAF. s US Air Force 
Headquarters replied that the 'size and composition of (the] ROKAF (was] 
still under consideration by the JCS, [and any] move to train ROKAF 
personnel in jets would be inappropriate at this timc. '6 In his letter of 20 July 
1954 to Lt. General Roger M. Ramey, who had replaced General Anderson, 
ROKAF Chief of Stair Lieutenant General Choi Yong-Duk, who replaced 
General Kim, urged the early beginning of ROKAF jet training. ' General 
Ramey, in his reply to General Choi on 31 July, asserted that he personally 
agreed with General Choi that the best way to shorten 'years' for the Republic 
of Korea Air Force to convert to a jet air force was to start training at once. $ 
The ROKAF modcmisation programme actually got underway earlier 
when US Air Force headquarters passed its 13 September message to Far 
East Air Forces, which quoted Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson's 28 
August decision 'to authorize f iq USAF to proceed with implementation of 
the training portion of the modernization program, under the assumption 
such training would be required by present ROK forccs'9 This message was 
accepted by sympathetic 5th AF officers as sufficient authorisation to 
develop final plans and inaugurate jet and jet-affiliated training. The 
message also stated that a modernisation programme had already been 
prepared by US Air Force Headquarters and submitted by Secretary of the 
Air Force Harold E. Talbott on 5 August to Secretary Wilson. The Secretary 
of Defense withheld approval of delivery of aircraft under this programme 
s hisg, COMFEAF to COFS USAF, 10 Mar 54, the tame file. Appendix 165. 6 Msg, COMFEAF to Cmdr SAF, 13 klar 54, Appendix 166, the same file. 
7 Goi: g-Gvun Sc, (/! ), 1933 - 57, p. 107. x Ltr, LtGen Ramey to LtGen Choi, 31 Jul 54. K730.01 Jul-Dec 1934, v. 3. Appendix 167. 
AF11RA. 
9 Msg. FEAF to Cmdr SAF (A-DO-P &P 8352), 16 Sep 54, Appendix 168, the same file. 
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until the ROK and US governments initialed the minutes of the conference 
between President Rhce and President Eisenhower, 27-30 July 1954.10 
Fifth Air Force had been preparing for the 'sweeping overhaul' of the 
South Korean Air Force and, coincidentally, on the same day (13 September 
1954) USAF headquarters wired FEAF its approval, and a concrete plan for 
ROKAF modernisation was presented in the publication of Sth Air Force 
Operations Plan 19-54. The plan focused on the jet conversion to F-86F 
aircraft and the composition and location of ROKAF units, within a 
personnel ceiling of 9,000 - one fighter bomber wing, flying and technical 
training units, a tactical control organisation, and accompanying support 
units. The USAF Advisory Group was elected to carry the largest share of 
responsibility for the success of this plan. Its duties, in part, were to: 'be 
responsible for establishing ROKAF training requirements; advise ROKAF 
on effective training techniques and monitor the training program; 
coordinate with commanders of Fifth Air Force installations to insure that 
desired training can be accomplished, then allocate ROKAF training quotas 
equitably; and advise ROKAF in all phases of tactical operations. "' 
6.2. The Process of ROKAF Weapon System Modernisation 
Although the ROKAF manpower strength tcntativcly approved by 
I leadquartcrs USAF was confined to the 9,000-man ceiling, talks between 
the US and ROK governments during President Rhec's visit to the United 
States in July 1954 had explored the possibility of a considerably larger ROK 
Air Force - 16,500 mcn. '2 This was further proof, were any required, that the 
painstaking analyses of military staffs arc sometimes given short shrift by 
10 lbkL 
II SAF Operations Plan 19-54,13 Sep 54. 'SAP I Iistory, Jul . Dec 1954, ' ms, vol. 2, pp. 413414. 
K"730.01 Jul-Doc 1954, v. 2. AH IRA. 
12 Mxg, DcpArmy to CINCUNC (I lull). September 15,1954.1"RUS 1952-1954. v. I S. pt. 2, pp. 
1876-1878. 
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their political masters. Thus, with the signing of the Agreed Minute of 
Understanding by President Eisenhower on 10 September, 5th Air Force 
revised its plan for modernisation of the ROKAF from the 9,000-man to the 
16,500-man personnel cciling. » The ROKArs conversion programmes of F- 
86F jet fighters, C-46 transport aircraft, and modernisation-affiliated training 
started rolling at last. The Agreed Minute (paragraph eight of Appendix B) 
was to be used as a basis by the USAF 5th Air Force for organising, 
equipping and training the South Korean Air Force. 
The overall dcvclopmcnt of the ROKAF modemisation programme, 
particularly materiel, however, had been slowed by several reasons: the 
partial withdrawal of USAF forces; the suspended disposition of the bases; 
the delay in approval of plans; the language difficulties between ROK-US 
working staff, and the slippage in trainer aircraft delivery schedules. The 
last of these factors presented a problem in accomplishing the ROKArs jet 
conversion training in Korea. ROKAF Chief of Staff Lt. General Choi 
Yong-Duk appealed to General Nathan F. Twining, USAF Chief of Stag', to 
speed the aircraft delivery through the commander of the USAF 6146th Air 
Force Advisory Group, who made a trip to the Pentagon in January 1955 on 
behalf of the USAF programme of assistance to the ROK Air Force. Delays, 
however, could not be avoided, and the USAF 6146th AFAG Commander 
reminded the Headquarters US Air Force of the seriousness of the delay in 
his report of 15 June: The ROKAF is relatively weak and out-of-balance 
compared with ROK ground forces. Any sustained action by the ROK 
Armed Forces will require an early augmentation of airpowcr. ' The report 
warned that the failure of the USAF to meet the provisions of the Agreed 
13 SAF Opcrttiona Plan 19-54,13 Sep 54. 'SAF i [istory, Jul -Doc 1954, ' m&, vol. 2, p. 41 S. K. 
730.01 Jul-Doc 1934, v. 2. AFI IRA. 
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Minute pertaining to delivery of aircraft (F-86s, T-33s and C-46s) tended 'to 
lowcr the high opinion hcld by the ROKAF for the USAF" 
The problem was further complicated by the awkward position of the 
ROKAF Chief of Staft who faced potential repercussions from ROK Army 
generals. Although no serious inter-service rivalry surfaced, the ROK Army 
was not happy to sec a rapid build-up and modernisation of the ROK Air 
Force. Given the fixed overall personnel ceiling, the ROK Army would be 
expected to provide the additional ROKAF manpower requirement by 
depleting the Army manpower and budgetary resources. Specifically, the 
ROKAF modernisation programme could require the transfer of 6,020 
personnel spaces from the ROK Army to the ROKAF in order to establish a 
force goal of 16,500 personnel for the ROKAF, as stipulated in the Agreed 
Minute. ls In the meantime, the 5th Air Force approved the 6146th AFAG's 
recommendation that ten T-33s be drawn from units within FEAF and placed 
on temporary loan to the ROKAF. In anticipation of the day when the thirty 
F-86Fs would arrive, a jet training programme had finally begun in 
September 1954. ROKAF pilots and support personnel were trained not only 
in Korea, but also at US Air Force bases in Japan and the United States. 16 
6.2.1. Jet Pilot Conversion Training in 1'-86F's 
Jet training in the CONUS was scheduled for thirty ROKAF F"5) 
pilots in increments of ten from 9 September 1954 to 23 April 1955. The 
training would last thirty wccks. '7 The first class of tcn ROKAF pilots would 
rcccivc thcir training from 9 Septcmbcr 1954 to 23 March 1955, and the 
14 'SAF History, Jan-Jun 1953. ' ms., vol. 2, pp. 353.334. K-730.03 Jan-Jun 1933, v. 2. AFIIRA. 
is '5th Air Force Ops Plan 113.58; in'SAF History. Jul-Doc 1958, ' ma, vol. 4, p. A-2. K-730.03 
Jul-Doc 1958, v. 4. AFI IRA, 
tg 'SAF Ihistory Jul 1954 - Doc 1954, ' ms., vol. 2, pp. 417-418, 'Republic of Korea Air Force, ' in 
'SAF history Jan " Jun 1935, ' ms.. vol. 2, p. 354. K-7301 I Jan-Jun 1935, v. 2. AFIIRA; Gong- 
Goon Sa (11). 1953.37, pp. 91,96. 
17 The length of actual flying training for each class was twenty-four weeks, preceded by a six 
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additional two increments from 27 September 1954 to 6 April 1955 and from 
23 October 1954 to 23 April 1955, respectively. Five of them additionally 
received jet pilot instructor training. ' Successful completion by these thirty 
Korean pilots of F-86F fighter jet conversion was followed by another group 
of ROKAF pilots who went through a series of flying training courses in the 
CONUS, which included: jet pilot instructor, instrument pilot instructor. RF- 
86F tactical reconnaissance conversion, instrument instructor upgrading in 
the ß-25, and search and rescue helicopter training in the 11-19. From the 
time ROKAF modernisation started in September 1954 to the end of 1956 
when the ROKAF expansion programme entered a stable truck, a total of 
seventy-two pilots either completed or were undertaking flying training in 
the CONUS, including fifty-seven jet pilots. 19 
In fact, the main CONUS jet conversion training was preceded six 
months earlier by a special trial class. Two elite r-51 pilots, both ROKAF 
Air Force Academy honour graduates who excelled in English and military 
competence, were specially selected to go through an instrument pilot 
instructor course in a E3-25 propeller-driven/twin-engined light bomber- 
turned trainer at the USAF Instrument School at Moody AFB, Georgia. They 
successfully received the training from 30 April to 31 August 1954. This 
was the first ROKAF flying training in CONUS, preceding the Jet 
Conversion Training. The reason had not been mentioned, but presumably 
it might have been a trial programme in preparation for the forthcoming 
comparatively massive ROKAF jet conversion training in CONUS. 20 In 
tb Pilots who continued to go through a Jet Pilot Instructor School were: Captains Um Sang-Sup, 
Ma Jong-in, Kim Young-Min, and Let Kyo Ahn. Lt. Colonel Lee Kee. Hyup. who was initially 
included, was killed on 7 April 1955, when his F-86F crashed near Nellis AF13 during a gunnery 
training mission. Ibld, pp. 91.92. For the roster of jet conversion training dass in the United 
States, see Appendix 6-1 of this study. 19 The total number of Korean pilots who completed flying training in the CONUS by the end of 
1957 increased to ninety-seven: 84 for jets, 9 for B-25s (Instrument Flying), and 4 for helicopters. 
C+g-Gaon Su (11). 1933-57, p. 92. ° The two trainees were Captains Yoon Ja-bong and Kim Joong-Bo. Both later flew C-16s and F- 
8617s. Yoon later made four stars and became ROKAF Chief of Staff (1981-1993). Kim made two 
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addition to CONUS flying training, a total of one hundred and sixteen jet 
pilots in seven classes completed the aero-physiological (low-pressure 
chamber) flight training from October 1956 to March 1957 at Kadcna Air 
Force Base in Okinawa, Japan. 21 
Keeping pace with the CONUS conversion programme, additional jet 
training had also started in Korea with T-33 jet trainers. The Fifth Air Force 
Standardization and Indoctrination School (FAFSIS) of the USAF 6157th 
Operations Squadron at Osan AFB (K-55) was charged with organising and 
managing a broad programme to train ninety ROKAF pilots who were 
already qualified in F-51s. The FAFSIS set up a sixty-hour flying training 
syllabus, which emphasised acrobatics, particularly string (or 'in-trail') 
acrobatics, which was an important phase of righter pilot training in 
preparation for the air-to-air gunnery for aerial dogfighting. This new air-to- 
air mission broadened the doctrinal spectrum of ROKAF pilots, most of 
whom were oriented by their earlier experience only to the ground-attack 
role. The course, at the request of the ROKAF leadership, would be 
conducted on a proved proficiency basis, rather than an hourly basis, 22 with 
special attention devoted to high altitude tactics, jet instrument procedures, 
cruise control, navigation, A-4 radar gunsight, high speed jet strafing, dive- 
bombing, and aerial gunnery, in which live ('hot') gunnery would be deleted 
due to USAF policy. Only simulated ('dry) gunnery was allowed. 23 
stars and became Superintendent of the ROK Air Force Academy (1974.1976). Interviews. author 
with chief historian of the ROKAF and General (Ret. ) Yoon Ja-Joong. 16-20 September 1994. See 
also If story of Detachment One. 6146th Air Force Advisory Group. I July 1934 - 31 December 
1954; ms., vol. 3, p. 20. K-GP. TNG-6146-lII (Det. 1). Jul-Doc 1954, v. 3. AFI IRA. 
21 Gong-Goon Sa (11). 1933-57, pp. 91-93. The aero-physiological training is a compulsory 
requirement for jet pilots prior to their exposure to high altitude flying missions. During the training 
on the ground in a pressure-controlled chamber (low-pressure chamber'). they were to experience 
simulated high altitude aero-medical symptoms such as hypoxia (low-oxygen) and spatial 
disorientation. 
22 The difference was explicit. One passed the course by demonstrating specific competence as laid 
out in the training syllabus. The earlier system had required k' hours of fixed time. without 
aspocifically demonstrated competence at each assigned task. 
2 Sixty-hour flying training syllabus: (I) nine hours of familiarisation and orientation ; (2) eight 
hours of formation; (3) four hours of acrobatics; (4) instruments and night transition, fifteen and four 
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Class 55-1, the first group of ten ROK Air Force pilots selected for jet 
training in Korea, reported to the FAFSIS at Osan Air Force Base on 9 
December 1954. The following day, the training phase began with an 
introductory ride in a T-33 jet trainer. Following this first experience with 
jet flying, the ten trainees settled down to five days that contained seventy- 
one classroom lcctures. 24 The flight training began on 14 December. The 
first solo flight was made on 18 December and the entire class was flying 
solo by 23 December. Ten students, lieutenant colonels and majors in rank, 
were all combat-experienced in F-51 Mustangs, having flown more than one 
hundred combat missions each during the Korean War. They finished the 
entire course in two months (on 15 February 1955). Class 55-2 of tcn 
ROKAF captains, much younger and less experienced, opened on 1S January 
1955 and finished two and half months later. 23 The successful progress of jet 
conversion training in Korea was attributed mainly to two reasons: (1) 
Korean pilots' combat-experienced flying skills and enthusiasm; and (2) high 
quality of USAF instructors. The thorough training programme closely 
paralleled instruction given to American pilots learning to fly jets in the 
USAF. All of the American instructor-pilots of the FAFSIS were 
outstanding instructors formerly assigned to the USAF Air Training 
Command, and had considerable experience instructing both USAF and 
foreign national students. 
hours respectively; (S) air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery. swat and four hours each., (6) ten hours 
of tactics. 'ROK Air Force, ' in'SAF I listory, Jul - Doc 1954' ms., vol. 2, p. 419. K-730.01 Jul-Dee 
1954, v. 2. AFIIRA. See also 'ROK F-86 Program, 8 Sept S4'the same rile v. 3. Appendix 174. 
The reason for omission of live air-to-air gunnery was not known. The dearth of available tow 
targets (aerial targets towed in the air by aircratl) was presumed to be one of the reasons by a 
participating trainee at the time. Interview (telephone), author with Major General (Rot, ) Chun 
lyung-11 (Class 35-2), 6 March 1995. 
24 Seventy-one hour ground school: (1) fifteen hours each of aircraft operations and practical 
maintenance; (2) twelve hours of armament and fighter gunnery; (3) tactical intelligence, 
physiological indoctrination and flying safety, five, four and six hours each; (4) Navigation. ten 
hours; (5) gun camera film and target assessing. four hours. 'SAF history, Jul - Doc 1954; Ms,, vol. 
2, p. 421. K-730.01 Jul-Doc 1954, v. 2. AFI IRA. 
23 For the roster of ROKAF jet pilot trainees, see Appendix 6.1 of this study. 
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ROKAF leaders made it clear to the American instructor pilots that 
quality was preferred to quantity. Therefore, the American instructors 
determined the extent of flying training that would be required for the 
ROKAF students. Encouraged by ROKAF leaders to promote good relations 
with and make a good impression on Americans, Korean trainees, all 
qualified F-51 pilots, worked hard, and were highly responsive to American 
instructors. One of the American instructors noted: The enthusiasm of the 
[Korean] students has been terrific and they arc eager to learn as much as 
possible about jet flying. 26 
While ROKAF pilots' jet conversion training was being conducted 
both in the CONUS and Korea, the air staff at ROK Air Force Headquarters 
was busy preparing for the activation of a jet fighter wing. As the Agreed 
Minute did not permit an additional tighter wing, ROKAF had no choice but 
to convert the existing 10th Fighter Wing from F-5 Is to F-86s. The location 
of the existing 10th FW was not suitable for jet conversion, because its home 
base at Kangnung (K-18) on the cast coast of Korea was constantly stricken 
by poor weather and by the unsuitable surrounding terrain. Another location 
was deemed more desirable. Fortunately, the 5th Air Force's progressive 
withdrawal from Korea Ieft some air bases available to the ROKAF. Soon 
after the USAF 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing departed Suwon AB (K-13), 
the ROKAF 10th Fighter Wing began moving on 4 October 1954 to K-13 on 
the west, twenty-live miles south of Seoul. The entire Wing became 
operational (although still with F-S Is) at the new site by 26 November, and 
two days later took over jurisdiction of the base from 5th Air Force. 27 
=6 '1listory of the 314th Air Division. 15 March "30 June 19SS; nº. r.. pp. 5-6. K-AD-314.111.15 
Mar-Jun 1933. AFIIRA. 
17 Qmrg-Gov, kr (l! ), 1953-37, p. 108. During this movement extreme transportation difficulties 
were encountered. Since Kangnung All was not connected by railroad at that time and was cut off 
by high mountains from the rest of Korea, all loads were carried out in ROK Navy LST$ to Masan, a 
southern port located twenty miles west of Pusan. where they were transferred to land transportation 
facilities for Suwon AB. 
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On 10 February 1955 a ROKAF T-33 Training Detachment of 10th 
Fighter Wing was activated at Osan All, in preparation for ROKAF's 
eventual takeover of jet conversion training from the FAFSIS. At first this 
ROKAF flight detachment was a static organisation, manned by the 
minimum number of ROKAF staff, and received on-the-job flight 
management training under supervision of FAFSIS. The ROKAPs jet 
training meanwhile continued and the number of jet qualified ROKAF pilots 
increased with the influx of CONUS and in-country-trained pilots. Upon the 
delivery of T-33 trainers to ROKAF, the ROKAF T-33 Training Detachment 
at Osan Al) was expanded to become 104th Flight Training Squadron, and 
began the T-33 transition training at Suwon Al) on 25 May 1955. The T-33 
course consisted of three weeks of academic instruction and nine weeks of 
flying training, as conducted by the ROKAF instructors under American 
advisers' supervision. Sixteen trainees completed the course on 16 
December. Five pilots completed the F-86F Staff and Indoctrination Course 
on 24 December. At the end of 1955, there were thirty-three pilots qualified 
to fly F-86Fs and sixteen in training. In the T-33 program there were fifteen 
pilots available and fourteen in training. 2 
Despite all this progress in flight training, slippage developed in the 
programme for the delivery of F-86Fs to the ROKAF during FY 1955, and 
none had been delivered by the middle of June 1955. With five F-86Fs lent 
to the ROK Air Force from the FEAF resources, an official ceremony, 
attended by dignitaries including President Rhec, was held at Suwon on 20 
June to mark the ROKAF's historical receipt of its first jet fighters, during 
which the ROKAF 10th Fighter Wing was awarded a US Presidential Unit 
Citation. 29 In its report as the introduction of war-tested F-86F jet fighters, 
24 The majority of flight instructors were on loan in adviccr capacity from FAFSIS. Go tg-(: rxxt Na 
(11), 1953-57. p. 94, iistory of the 314th Air Division, 15 March . 30 June 1935, ms., p. 8. K-AD- 314-111,15 Mar-Jun 1933. AFI IRA. :9 Gag-(Jm ma (//). 1953-57, p. 104. 
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the Chosun llbo reiterated the significance of the ROK's indigenous air 
defence power: 'Now our Air Force is jet capable and can contribute not only 
to the defence of the Korean peninsula, but also to the maintenance of 
freedom in the Far East for world peace in close coordination with the 
United States Air Force and United Nations. Because of this new global 
mission, everyone should wholeheartedly support the continued growth of 
our national airpower. '3° 
These rive aircraft were assigned to the 103rd Fightcr Squadron of the 
10th Fighter Wing. After the delivery of the five F-86Fs at Suwon AB, 
qualified F-86F ROKAF pilots were able to obtain part of their required 
proficiency flying time in these aircraft. Because these five aircraft were 
insufficient for the number of pilots, however, the pilots had to receive 
additional flying time in USAF aircraft at Osan Aß. 3' 
One serious problem encountered in the ROKArs jet conversion was 
the 10th Fighter Wing's operational readiness. Combat preparedness in the F- 
51 squadron had decreased noticeably following the departure of a number 
of skilled pilots for jet training. But the readiness problem was soon 
alleviated by the return of those CONUS-traincd in April and graduation of 
in-country (domestic) trained pilots in May 1955. The return to the 10th 
Fighter Wing of these pilots improved the morale and operational 
effectiveness of the wing. In contrast, the combat capability of 101st and 
102nd Fighter Squadrons of propeller-driven F-S Is did not improve, because 
the sending of qualified combat veterans to jet training dictated that pilot 
replenishment be provided by recent graduates of flying school without 
much flying experience. In effect, it was one of the most vulnerable periods 
30 Clmaun ! lbn, 21 June 1933, p. 3. 11 'Opcrations. ' in 7listory of 6146th Air Force Advisory Group, I January " 30 June 1953; ma, p. 
55. K. GP-TTVG-6146.111 Jan-Jun 1953. AF] IRA; Corºg-Gtxtn Sa (11), 1953-57. P. 104. 
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for the ROKAF. Without continued US Air Force presence, the air defence 
posture on the peninsula would have been jcopardised. 32 
6.2.2. Jet Mechanic Training 
The training of ROKAF ground personnel in jet aircraft maintenance 
had started prior to their pilots' training. On 19 March 1954, six months 
before the Korean pilots entered flying training in the CONUS, 5th Air Force 
approved jet mechanics' training in advance. 5th AF logistic staff 
recommended that one of three alternatives be adopted to train ROKAF jet 
mechanics by: (I) conducting on-the job-training at 5th Air Force 
installations in Korea; (2) bringing a MTU (Mobile Training Unit) to Korea; 
or (3) sending ROKAF personnel to FEAF bases elsewhere in the Pacific 
area, where MTUs were already in operation. The third alternative was 
deemed the best, " provided the ROKAF could clear diplomatic obstacles 
with the Japanese government over permitting Korean nationals to visit 
Japan. The scheme for the ROKAF jet mechanic training would provide a 
month's training at a mobile training unit at 5th Air Force bases in Japan 
followed by on-the-job training at 5th Air Force installations in Korea. 31 
Accordingly, upon notification of the availability of MTUs in FEAF 
for the ROKAF mechanic training, the ROK government sought diplomatic 
clearance for the first group of trainees, but visas from the Japanese 
government were denied. " When the Korean pilots were trained in Japan 
soon after the hostilities broke out, Korean pilots did not need Japanese 
32 Interview, author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu. 24 April 1995. 33 The MTUs were already in operation, and staled with professional trainers. 34 Mag, Gen Anderson to Gen Weytand, 19 Feb 54. 'SAF 1 Gatory, Jul - Doc 1954; mc. vol. 3. 
Appendix 164. K730.01 Jul-Doc 1954, v. 3. AFIIRA. See also'ROK Air Force, ' in vol. 2, pp. 424- 
425, same file. 
35 'The Republic of Korea Air Force. ' in 'SAF 1 Gatory, Jan - Jun 1954; ms., vol. 1. p. 423. K- 
730.01 Jan-Jun 1954, v. 1; Telephone interview, author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, 30 
October 1995. 
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government visas, because Japan was still under US Military Occupation 
jurisdiction. Koreans instead travelled on USAF 5th Air force travel orders. 
However, when the Korean mechanics were to be sent to US air bases in 
Japan after the Korean War, Japanese visas were required because by that 
time Japan was no longer under US occupation, having regained sovereignty 
with the signing of the US-Japan Peace Treaty in 1951.36 
On 19 April 1954, ROKAF proposed sending Korean trainees to 
Japan on USAF 5th Air Force-issued travel orders, confining their activities 
to USAF bases in Japan and thus bypassing visas and passports. This 
proposal was not accepted because of 5th Air Force's fear of a possible 
diplomatic dispute. After efforts by the ROK government through both 
American and Korean diplomatic channels in Seoul and Tokyo, ROKAF 
trainees finally obtained visas. The first group of fifty-four ROKAF 
mechanics (twenty-three officers and thirty-one NCOs) received F-86F 
maintenance training at Tsuiki US Air Force Base in Japan (20 August - 27 
September 1954). Given the fear of the 5th Air Force authorities and the 
ROK government of possible harassment by North Korea-affiliated Korean 
residents living in the Tsuiki area, at first no ROKAF personnel were 
permitted to leave Tsuiki Air Base while in training. As the training 
progressed smoothly, and ROKAF personnel proved to be highly disciplined. 
Korean students were ultimately allowed to leave the base when 
accompanied by American personnel. " 
Under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Kim Suk-11wan, ROKAF 
mechanic trainees worked hard and all successfully completed the training 
36 Interview (telephone), author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, 30 October 199S. 
37 The North Korean government had clandestine relations with a number of the Korean residents 
in Japan. Over 600,000 Koreans were estimated to reside in Japan. They were politically divided 
into two groups: ROK-afiliated Min-Dan (MD) and DPRK-connectod Cho-Chong Ryon (CCR). 
at American authorities worried about was possible harassment of ROKAF personnel by the 
CCR-affiliated Korean residents in the Tuuiki area. 1 he Republic of Korea Air Force. ' in 'SAF 
I Gstory, Jan - Jun 1954; errs., vol. 1. p. 423. K"730.01 Jan-Jun 1934, v. 1. An IRA. 
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in Japan without incident. USAF instructors were pleased with the trainees' 
enthusiastic performance. One American instructor revealed: Test records of 
the ROK's have been better than those made by an average USAF class of 
students. '3 As planned, they underwent an additional month of training with 
the USAF 58th Fighter Bomber Wing at Taegu (K-2) Air Base upon their 
return from Japan. At this point, the training of jet mechanics bogged down, 
due to the delayed arrival of the F-86 Mobile Training Detachment from the 
CONUS. With the unexpected delay, the training of ROKAF jet 
maintenance personnel did not keep pace with ROKAF pilot training. By the 
end of 1954, the ROKAF had only thirty-two F-86F mechanics on OJT 
status with USAF units in Korea. The. ROKAF T-33 pilot training 
programme at Osan AB (K-55) was in progress and programmmed to 
produce ten ROKAF pilots each month, beginning with ten graduates on 15 
February 1955. The 6146th Air Force Advisory Group urged 5th Air Force 
to speed delivery of the promised F-86F MTD on which ROKAF jet 
mechanic training had to be based: '[S]ome 25 ROKAF F-86F pilots trained 
in the ZI [(CONUS)] would return to Korea in March and April of 1955 and 
unless immediate action is taken to implement the ROKAF jet maintenance 
training program, USAF maintenance support would be required to maintain 
ROKAF F-86 pilot transition training. '79 Arrival of the USAF F-86F Mobile 
Training Detachment (MTD) at Osan AFB in April 1955 revitalised 
ROKAF's jet mechanic training. In the meantime 113 ROKAF mechanics, 
including fifty-two officers, received training in CONUS. a 
3' 'Report of Stall' Visit, 16 Aug 54; in'SAF I Cistory, Jul - Doc 1954, ms, vol. 3. Appendix 176. K- 
730,01 Jul-Doc 1954, v, 3, AFIIRA ; Trip Rpt, Ma) Hertel (to Tsuiki AB), 8 Sep 54. ' Ibid. 
Appendix 178, same file. 
39 Msg. Cmdr 6146th AFAG to SAF, 28 Doc 54. 'SAF I listory, Jul - Doc 1954, ' Ms, vol. 3, 
Appendix 179. K-730.01 Jul-Dec 1954, v. 3. AFi IRA. 
40 Due to the limited spaces in CONUS training capacity as well as limited qualified ROKAF 
enlisted mechanics, out of GAy-two ROKAF officers only thirteen received F-86 maintenance 
officer's course; the remainder had to join the enlisted technician's course. Go g-Go m 50 (11), 1953- 
. 57, p. 96. 
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6.23. C-46 Transport Transition 
In parallel with jet conversion, C-46 transport transition commenced 
at the start of 1955. C-46 training, while programmed on a smaller scale than 
the F-86F jet training, was nevertheless of considerable importance. Cargo 
aircraft were to be used as a key support clement of the modernised ROKAF, 
and opened new possibilities for expanded ROKAF roles. The C-46 was the 
first 'heavy twin-engined cargo aircraft officially authorised for the ROKAF 
airlift mission, which had been virtually ignored because of the emphasis on 
its fighter expansion. Yet speed and mobility arc among the distinctive 
characteristics of airpowcr, and airlift could enhance both. Airlift should 
always be treated as one of the indispensable missions of an air force. Not 
only is it faster than any form of surface movement, particularly in such 
mountainous areas as Korea, but also in war air transport might become the 
only viable option to keep the line of communications open. In this respect, 
introduction of C-46 transport aircraft into the ROKAF inventory paved the 
way for the Korean Air Force to promote the doctrinal improvement of its 
airlift and air resupply missions in support of ROK Armed Forces. 
Bringing vital logistic resupply to tanks and infantry at roadside fields 
during the Korean war, the airlift had enabled ROK armored columns to 
keep pushing forward. Long supply lines on the ground were unnecessary; 
air drops supplied platoons, companies, even battalions with the considerable 
amount of supplies they needed to wage war. Particularly. air resupply was 
absolutely essential for the ground troops when they were surrounded by the 
cncmy. The importance of the tactical airlift operations was well illustrated 
in US Marine operations during the Korean War. The successful US Ist 
Marines' withdrawal operations from the Changjin (Choshin) Reservoir, 
pursued by Chinese forces in the winter of 1950 in North Korea, eloquently 
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illustrated the vital role of the tactical airlift force in the conduct of combat 
service support mission in the battle area. 
During the period of rctrcat operations (27 Novcmbcr-15 Dcccmbcr 
1950) in the besieged Changjin (Choshin) Reservoir area, US Marines relied 
totally on air supply for their logistic supply of food, winter clothing, 
munitions, and fuel. Impressive and worth noting tactically was an airdrop 
of eight two-ton spans of a bridge by the USAF Airlift Command's C-119 
Flying Boxcars. This allowed US Marine engineers to successfully repair a 
blown-out bridge across a dam for the safe passage of retreating Marines. 
From 28 November to 6 December 1950, C-119 cargo planes air-supplied 
over 1,700 tons of supplies. During the same period, over 4,600 sick and 
wounded troops were flown out by USAF C47 medium cargo planes, which 
made over 200 landings at an improvised airstrip in the besieged battle area. 
Unless air resupply and air medical evacuation by such transport aircraft had 
been conducted in a timely fashion, the trapped US 1st Marines would not 
have been able to fight their way out to safety. 4' 
This lesson of the Korean War necessitated the early introduction of 
transport aircraft into the Korean Air Force. Under terms of the Agreed 
Minute, sixteen C46 transport aircraft for one squadron were to be delivered 
to the ROK Air Force before the end of Fiscal Year 1955. The 5th Air Force 
was again committed to take charge of the ROKArs C-46 training. As one 
of the first steps, the USAF 6156th Flying Training Squadron (Transport- 
ROKAF) was established at Taegu AB (K-2) to train Korean personnel and 
was attached to the USAF 58th Fighter Bomber Wing there for operational 
st A 2,300 foot-long dirt strip was improvisod in the valley of l laguu. d,, a few kilometers south of 
the Changjin Reservoir. The C-47 was the only cargo plane at the time allowed to operate on the 
unpaved yet frozen air strip. William 11. Tuner, Oº+rr slit lhmp (Washington, DC: Of ace of US 
Air Force l üstory. 1985), pp. 253.257; Charles C. Miller, A/rltf Ax'Mne (Maxwell AFB. Alabama: 
Air University Press, 1988), pp. 198.199; Futrell. 71w USAF In Korea 1950-53, pp. 258.239. See 
also Pegasus, Air Puwyr in Action. Koma 1950.51 (New York: Fairchild Engine and Airplane 
Corp., 1952), pp. 32-33. 
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control, administration, and logistic support. The objective of the ROKAF 
C-46 training course was set by USAF standards: 'to qualify ROKAF pilots 
as white card, C-46 transport pilots capable of operations within the same 
general limitations as USAF transport pilots. '12 
The course was four months in duration and required a total of 162 
hours of ground schooling and 120 hours of flying training to prepare 
ROKAF pilots (who were currently flying T-6 and /or F-51 type aircraft) for 
qualifying in the C-46. In addition, the course aimed to improve their 
qualifications for weather flying, navigation, flight planning, and 
communication in the C-46 aircraft. With the arrival of six C-46 aircraft at 
the end of the year, the 6156th Squadron started the 16-week course of 
ROKAF C-46 training on 3 January 1955 for the first class of eleven 
ROKAF pilots, seven maintenance officers and forty-one maintenance 
airmen. Graduation of the first class on 28 April 1955 was followed by the 
second class of seven ROKAF pilots, two maintenance officers and fifty- 
eight maintenance airmen, who started 9 May 1955 and were graduated on 
26 August 1956! 3 
During the period, they flew missions in a loaded aircraft to qualify in 
handling the C-46 under varying load conditions. Through adroit flight 
scheduling by the professional USAF instructors/adviscrs, all ROKAF flying 
trainees received instrument instructions under actual weather conditions. 
Instrument training under actual weather conditions proved to be very 
beneficial, because the ROKAF transport pilots would have to fly 'real' 
42 %OK Air Force, ' in'SAF I Gstory, Jul " Dcc 1954, ' nrs, vol. 2, pp. 358,431.433. K"730.01 Jul- 
Doc 1934, v. 2. AFI IRA. USAF used two ratings of instrument flying qualifications: one was basic 
and the other advanced, coded in colours. White was the colour of the certificate for the basic 
instrument flight rating which allowed the individual pilot to fly in . limited weather condition. 
Green card holders were allowed to fly in the worst weather conditions. The colour codad dual 
ratings were later replaced by one standardised rating system in the I960s. 
ss This is summarisod from three sources: (1)'SAF Course Outline (C46), Flying Tn? t$ (ROKAF), ' 
15 Doc 54. same file, Appendix 182, (2) 1 Eistory of 6156th Flying Training Squadron, 13 December 
1954 - 14 September 1955; mx, Table VI. K"SQ-TNG-6156.111 15 Dec 1954 " 14 Sep 1953, 
AFI IRA; and (3) Gwtg-Gv on. Sa (I/), 1953.57, p. 98. 
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missions during poor weather as a part of training requirements. Prior to 
their transition to the C-46 transport aircraft, ROKAF pilots usually flew in 
clear weather, given their limited proficiency in instrument flying and lack of 
appropriate instrument flying equipment in their aircraft. Such aircraft as T- 
6s and F-51s were designed to fly under visual (clear) weather conditions 
without sophisticated instruments. During the training of the two classes, a 
total of 2,300 hours of flying time and more than 5,000 take-offs and 
landings were accomplished without a single accident. This achievement 
resulted from both the quality of training by USAF instructors and the 
enthusiasm of ROKAF's disciplined and motivated student pilots. 41 
The flying proficiency of Korean C-46 pilots was demonstrated twice. 
In March 1956, during the period when the ROK Army was snowbound on 
the eastern area south of the DMZ, twenty C46 sorties were flown to furnish 
logistical support to the Army. 4' On 25 June 1956, four ROKAF C-46 
aircraft, manned by ROKAF crews, were flown to Ilong Kong, China, for 
depot maintenance. This was the first overseas long range ferry mission of 
the ROKAF, and the flight was completed without incident. Thus the new 
role of ROKAF airlift mission, albeit small scale, successfully commenced. 
The introduction of C-46 transport aircraft into the ROKAF inventory 
paved the way for the Korean transport pilots to enhance their potential 
value, not only to the development of the doctrinal spectrum for inter- and 
intra-theatre airlift (air rc-supply and air medical evacuation), but also in the 
growth of the Korean civil aviation industry. The ROK government's 
commencement of dispatching its troops to South Vietnam in 1965 was 
followed a year later by deployment of two C-46s to provide air logistic 
44 1 listory of 6156th Flying Training Squadron. 15 December 1954.14 September 1935: Ms.. p. 4. 
K"SQ-TNa-6136-1 11 IS Dec 1934.14 Sep 1933. AFIIRA. 
45 One sortie is one flight of one aircraft. If one aircraft (lies two flights. the number of flights is 
counted as two sorties. Twenty sorties could be flown either by each of four aircraft with five 
flights or five aircraft with four flights. 
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support there. (Soon aller, the C-46 detachment was joined by ROKAF C- 
54s. ) When the ROK government agreed with the United States to 
participate in the evacuation of Korean casualties from Vietnam, the Korean 
transport aircrew were prepared to convert to 4-cngincd C-54 cargo planes. 
Upon conversion, they formed the 8th Airlift Squadron, nicknamed 'Back- 
Goo Boo-Dae' (The Silver horse; ) to conduct the medical evacuation 
mission from September 1966 to February 1973.4' The importance of 
ROKAF's transport conversion later became apparent when the Korean 
National Airlines (KNA) was privatised and replaced by the formation of the 
Korean Airlines (KAL) in 1969. The majority of the KAL's air crews and 
ground mechanics came from ROKAF personnel sources, which were the 
main suppliers of experienced aviation pcrsonncl. 17 
6.2.4. Formation of an Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron 
One indispensable facet of ROKAF modcmisation was the 30th 
Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, activated at Suwon AB (K-13) on I 
September 1955. Previously, with conventional F-51s, the ROKAF fighter 
operations had been limited to air-to-ground missions. These missions could 
be conducted visually at any altitude below 10,000 feet and at speeds of less 
than 250 miles an hour. With conversion to F-86F jet fighters, which flew 
faster and required more room to operate (more than five hundred miles an 
hour and from sea level up to over 35,000 feet of altitude), the conduct of 
ROKAF's diversified air operations, especially the air-to-air mission, was not 
possible without assistance from radar on the ground. Radar was the 
backbone of the Korean Tactical Air Control System (KTACS). ROKAF air- 
to-air aerial defence missions were to be conducted in accordance with the 
46 C g-Goon Sa (117.1963-67, pp. 99-100,109.113. 47 Interviews, author with Major General (Ret. ) Park Yong-lik. a former oaf member of the KAI 
10 January 1995, and Lee Tao-Won, executive vice president of the KAI, 2$ September 199$. 
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four doctrinal phases of air defence operations: detection, identification, 
interception and destruction. The first two phases of detection and 
identification of the intruding unknown ! lying objects were to be handled 
initially by the KTACS radar network, which consisted of eight radar sites 
throughout the country. " These KTACS radar sites, manned by USAF 
personnel, played an important role in helping American F-86 Sabre pilots 
outmanocuvcr the communist fighters in MiG-Alley during the Korean 
War. 49 Because of high speed and great altitude separation between 
opposing fighters, both communist MiGs and USAF Sabres had to rely 
heavily on the ground radars for aerial combat operations. Combined with 
the superior skill of the American pilots, improved version of the F-86F, the 
extensive coverage of the US ground radars and its support (aircraft control 
and warning) resulted in 'FCAF domination of the Communist Chinese Air 
Forcc. '50 
With the continued withdrawal of the USAF from South Korea, the 
transfer of USAF's aircraft control and warning (AC & W) capability to the 
ROK Air Force was desirable for two reasons. Firstly, radar was an 
intrinsically non-offensive system. Secondly, even if somewhat obtusely, it 
would provide the ROKAF with the opportunity to expand its manpower, 
and thus help curb the emphasis given the ROK Army in the Agreed Minute- 
approved manpower ceiling. Considering the Agreed Minute's stipulation 
that 'adjustments in numbers will be acceptable to the United States as long 
as the 720,000 total is not exceeded, the ROK air staff initially 
recommended the establishment of a wing-size ROKAF Aircraft Control and 
Warning (AC&W) system. ROK Air Force leaders, however, ran into a 
Is Gcng-Qxm Sa (11). 19S! -S7, p. 111. 49 For an account of USAF pilots'scrial combat missions against MiGs in the'MEG Alley' (ova 
the area between the Chongchon and Yalu Rivas in northwestern Korea) during the Korean Wu. 
we Futrell, 71, e USA! 'In Kona, pp. 289.300,310. S0 also Figure 3.1 of this study (P. 68). 
50 /bid. pp. 305-315.607.617. 
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'political' impediment again. The prcpondcrant influence of the ROK Army 
generals at the national defence policy-making level curtailed ROKAF 
efforts to increase manpower by taking over the US Air Force's KTACS. 
Again, ROK Army manpower and budgetary resources would not be 
relinquished for a larger ROK Air Force. 31 
6.2.5. Combat Readiness of ROKAF Jet Fighter Wing 
Despite the inability to expand the ROKAFs ground personnel, the 
additional graduates ofjct conversion training, as well as increased numbers 
of delivered jet aircraft, demanded the reorganisation of ROKAF flying units 
and redeployment of fighter forces. All conventional F-51 s were sent to 
Taegu AB (K-2) and assigned to the new 5th Composite Wing, which had 
jurisdiction over two flying groups - Sth Fighter (F-51) Flying Training 
Group and 5th Transport (C-46) Flying Group. The 102nd and 103rd 
Fighter Squadrons at Suwon Al) (K-13) converted to F-86Fs in April 1956. 
The arrival of an additional number of F-86Fs at Suwon Al) made it possible 
for the 10th Fighter Wing to establish the 105th Advanced Flying Training 
Squadron in September 1956. Jet squadrons at Suwon AB were divided into 
two flying groups: The 10th Fighter Group of 101st, 102nd and 103rd 
Fighter Squadrons; l0th Flying Training Group of 104th Basic Flying 
Training Squadron and 105th Advanced Flying Training Squadron. All 
ROKAF units at Suwon AB were integrated into the expanded 10th Fighter 
Wing command structure the following years2 (Figure 6-1) 
31 Interviews, author, 19 November 1992 with U. Genaal Chang Chi-Ryang, former Chief of Stag 
ROKAF (1968.70), Director for Plans, IIQ ROKAF(1933-56)ß Air Attache In Washington. DC 
(1956-59); 24 April 1995 with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, former Chief of Staff ROKAF 
(1958.1960). 
52 Sth Fighter Group was deactivated upon phase-out of all ROKAF F-S Is on 29 tune 1957. 
Gmig-C, x rm Sa (71). 103-57, pp. 109,1 S 1.152.1 S I. 
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Figure 6-1: Organisation of ROKAF 10th Fighter Wing 
(31 Dccember 1957) 
I0th Fightcr Wing 
Commandcr 
10th Fighter Group 10th Flying Training Gp 10th Maint/Supply Gp' 
101st Squadron 104th Squadron (T-33) 
02nd Squadron 105th Squadron 10th Air Base Group 
103rd Squadron 10th Acromedical 
Group 
" Gp: Group; Maint: Maintaunce 
Source: ROKAF, (iarg- xw Sir Jcit 2 Jsp, 19SJ-1937 (7ht Ill.. Mv y ojrlu ROK A/r 
Pearce, {Wumt 11,1953.1957) (Scout, Korea: ROKAF 1liatory Ofi'ºce, 1961), p. 
109. 
The ROKAF 10th Fightcr Wing meanwhile intensified its unit 
training, focusing on enhancing combat readiness in F-86F jet fighters. The 
wing successfully participated in two large scale air defence exercises - 
coded Chosen Feud and Dragon Fly - sponsored by the USAF 314th Air 
Division. " ROKAF leaders encouraged their newly qualified F-86F pilots to 
obtain 'good grades' in the exercises from the USAF evaluators. Although 
ostensibly both exercises (Chosen Feud on 14.15 June and Dragon Fly on 4. 
6 October 1956) were designed 'to test the Republic of Korea Air Force and 
53 Upon redeployment of its hcadquaners to Japan by February 1935, Sth Air Force created the 
314th Air Division at Osan AB on IS March 195$ and charged It with the air defence mission in 
Korea, bringing all USAF fighter forces on the peninsula under its command. 'SAF I tirtory, Jan " 
June 1935; m. x, vol. 3. Appendix 32. K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1933, v. 3. AFI IRA. 
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the United States Air Force in coordinated manocuvcrs, ' 4 their practical 
objectives were to evaluate the proficiency of ROKAF pilots and support 
personnel integrated in the USAF-sponsored Korean air defence system. 
Consequently, the outcome of ROKA["s participation in these two exercises 
would have an important impact on USAF's official evaluation of the 10th 
Fighter Wing's combat readiness and subsequent creation of an additional 
ROKAF F-86F fighter wing. 
In impressive fashion, the 10th Fighter Wing demonstrated the ability 
to'scramble' interceptor aircraft in minimum time. " The average scramble 
time for eleven scrambles involving twenty-four aircraft during Exercise 
Dragon Fly was 2.13 minutes. The longest scramble was three minutes and 
the shortest was one minute and thirty seconds. The average turnaround time 
needed to prepare an aircraft for air-to-air combat was nineteen minutes. - 
The Korean pilots' determined cliorts to excel paid off. USAF evaluators 
praised the ROKAF performance during the exercises: 
(G]ivcn some additional logistic support in the form of aircraft 
spare parts, radar spare parts... and some emphasis given to 
adequate communications ..., the 10th Fighter Wing (ROK) and the 30th AC&W Squadron (ROK) can play a vital role in the air 
defense of South Korea. They should be commended for 
accomplishing so much in such a short time, with so little. " 
At last, the 10th Fighter Wing became combat-rcady to dcfcnd South 
Korea's territorial air space with F-86F jet lighters. The ROKAF's successful 
performance in both Chosen Feud and Dragon Fly large scale air defence 
54 1 listory of the 314th Air Division, I January " 30 June 1956. ' art. p. 31. K"DIV"314.111 Jan-Jun 
1956. AFI IRA. 
35 The normAl. alerted air defence posture, always in theory, often in practice, Is to have a fully 
armed and manned aircraft sitting near the end of the runway, awaiting only an order to Launch. 
Sometimes the pilots are near rather than actually in the aircraft. The use of the word 'scramble to 
describe what ensues is typical of the allegedly dry humour for which pilots like to pride themselves. 
Turnaround time is the time that expires between a given aircraft landing and its r rbishmcnt to 
the point of being able to launch again. 17 'ROKAF in Dragon Fly. ' in I tistory of the 314th Air Division. I July " 31 December 1936, ' m. c. 
p. 25. K-DIV-314-1 It Jul-Doc 1956. AFI IRA. 
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exercises paved the way for the creation of an additional F-86F fighter wing 
of the expanded (22,000-man) ROK Air Force in less than two years. $' By 
the end of 1956, the Republic of Korea Air Force had five wing-size units - 
three flying wings and two non-flying technical support wings. (Figure 6-2) 
ROKAF's manpower strength increased to 16,241 on hand out of 
16,500 authorised, including 254 righter pilots (113 F-86F- and 141 F- 
51-qualified) and thirty-three C-46 transport pilots. From the commencement of 
the ROKAF modernisation programme in September 1954 to the end of 
1956, the United States supplied the ROKAF with ninety jet (81 F-86Fs, 9 
T-33s) and eighteen C-46 cargo planes. 59 Thus the ROKAF modernisation 
was satisfactorily realised in general, although some issues and problems 
still remained. 
Modernisation of the ROKAF was not accomplished overnight. It 
was the result of the combined efforts of ROKAF leaders and USAF 
advisers, and reflected coordination and advance planning. The conversion 
from propeller to jet fighters not only modernised the aircraft, but also 
diversified the roles and missions of the South Korean Air Force. The 
significance of the conversion was that the jet fighters vastly increased the 
potential for air operations in adverse weather - in and above the clouds. It 
expanded the area of ROKAF's operations with respect to manocuvcrability 
and responsiveness. Jet fighters, together with the tactical air surveillance 
ss 5th Air Force planned for the activation of an additional wing for ROKAF to be called the 11th 
Fighter Wing, and directed 314th Air Division on S May 1957 to initiate required preliminary 
planning activities in conjunction with the inactivation of its 58th Fighter-Bomber Wing at Osan Air 
Base in Korea. 'ROKAF, ' in 'SAF 1 listory. Jan - Jun 1957' ms, vol. 4. p. 153. K730.01 Jan-Jun 
1957, v. 4. AFHHRA. ROKAF 11th Fighter Wing was established at Kimpo AB on I August 1958 In 
accordance with ROK MND (Air Force) Order 026 (1958.7.20) and USAF Sth Air Force 
Operation Plan 113.58 dated S September 1958. By the end of 1958 the authorised manpower 
strength of the ROKAF increased to 22,400 men. Gong-(klon La (111). 1958-62, pp. 98,320. See 
also'Sth AF Ops Plan 113-58; in'SAF I listory, Jul - Doc 1958; mi. vol. 4. K730.01 Jul-Doc 1958, 
v. 4. AFIIRA. 
59 The remaining aircraft (4 F-86Fs, I T-33) were delivered in the following year. Go+tg-Gx n 5a 
(11). 1953.57, pp. 100,106.107. 
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Figurc 6-2: Structure of 11OK Air Force on 31 December 1956w 
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system, promoted the South Korean Air Force potential for command and 
control, in cooperation with the American Air Force. For the first time, the 
ROKAF was allowed to take part in the defence of its own territorial 
airspace, albeit as a supplementary role in support of the USAF in Korea. 
Equally important was the fact that an airlift capability with C-46s was 
provided to the ROKAF and the first ROKAF aircraft control and warning 
(AC & W) squadron was activated, thereby paving the way for the future 
expansion of ROKAF manpower and support systems. Once jet fighters, 
transport aircraft and the tactical air surveillance equipment (radar) were 
introduced into the ROKAF inventory, it would open the door to the multiple 
roles demanded of a modem air force. Ilowever, the acquisition of modern 
weapon systems and the ensuing training of pilots and support personnel 
rapidly revealed diflicultics and deficiencies, the most important of which 
arc treated in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ISSUES ARISING FROM 
TILE MODERNISATION PROCESS 
In the process of its modernisation, the ROKAF confronted a series of 
interrelated issues and problems. Among these were four distinctive and yet 
recurring issues. Firstly, English is the official universal aviation language 
required for use in the air in accordance with the regulations of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). To assure the safe traffic 
control of all aircraft, domestic and international, as well as military and 
civilian, ROKAF pilots had to learn to use correct voice procedures in 
English. Secondly, as the area of air operations in the region surrounding the 
Korean peninsula is contiguous and adjoining that of Japan, a need arose for 
cooperation in the air operations between Japan and South Korea, owing to 
the expanded radius of operations of the new jet aircraft. Thirdly, the United 
States operational control (OPCON) over the ROK Armed Forces, which 
was given to the UNC/US Military Commander in the Korean theater during 
the Korean War, became an issue among some ROK officials when the 
American and UN troops started their withdrawal after the cessation of 
hostilities. Lastly, since the Armistice, the ROKAF has faced a doctrinal 
problem coping with the air threat from the North, because of a lack of air 
mancuvouring depth to defend the capital city of Seoul. This chapter 
examines how the ROKAF either overcame or still continues to cope with 
these interrelated issues, each of which profoundly affects both the 
peacetime readiness and wartime capability of the South Korean Air Force. 
21$ 
7.1. Aviation English Requirements To Acquire 
Instrument Flying Qualifications 
Previously, when Korean pilots had flown propeller-driven F-51 s, 
they had not encountered any serious language difficulties in the air, because 
their relatively simple and visual flight missions did not require high 
proficiency in aviation English. Most of their flying activities could be 
managed with hand signals in accordance with visual flight rules (VFR) in 
clear weather. The F-51s were designed to fly VFR missions only, and did 
not have adequate instruments on board for IFR (instrument flight rules) 
missions in adverse weather conditions. Therefore, Korean pilots managed 
to fly F-51s without the serious difficulties of aviation English. h owwwever, F- 
86F jet and C-46 transport aircraft, both of which were designed for the IFR 
missions, demanded thorough understanding of international air traffic 
control rules and aviation procedures. ROKAF pilots needed to pass the 
instrument Flying Qualification test in English. This requirement came as a 
shock to many pilots, who thought they needed to be proficient only in flying 
skills., 
What the author calls 'aviation English' is a specialised 
vocabulary/terminology that applies to pilot procedures while in flight - e. g., 
takeoff (SID: Standard Instrument Departure) and landing (instrument 
Approach) instructions, flight route changes, radio contacts (Air Traffic 
Control Contacts/ air-to-air or air-to-ground), etc. This specialised 
vocabulary, with its attendant minimal grammar, must be mastered by pilots. 
But its limits arc specific, and should not be construed to imply proficiency 
in day-to-day conversational English. 
I 'Policy on ROKAF IFR Clearance on Airways, ' in'5AF Ilistory. Jan - Jun 193S; M. L. vol. 4. 
Appendix 181. K"730.01 ! an-Jun 1955, v. 4. AFI IRA; ROK Air Force, Coºrg-C on Sa Jar 2 Jip, 
1933.7.27 - 1957.12.3! (71n Il/story of the Air Panel. Volume 2.27 July ! 93! " !! ) (hereafter 
cited as Gong-Ga)n Sir (11), ! 93!, 57), pp. 91.96; Telephone Interviews author with Lt. Generals 
(Ret. ) Chang Sung-Whan and Chang Chi-Ryang, 28.30 October 1995. 
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In adverse weather conditions the flight itself should be totally on 
instrument flying, under positive control of ground radar and constant 
instructions spoken in English by American air traffic controllers. At the 
time only American controllers were available. Air traffic control procedures 
in English based on ICAO regulations were universally applicable to both 
civil and military aircraft. 2 The need to have a sufficient command of 
aviation English to understand all air traffic control instructions given by 
ground controllers was a new challenge to many Korean pilots. The 
frustration level of both American advisers and Korean students was high 
because of flying safety, especially while flying under iFR conditions, in 
which hazardous situations - including mid-air collision during IFR flights 
(e. g., in clouds) on airways, GCA (ground-controlled approach) or in-flight 
emergency situations - would likely result from an inability to understand 
instructions, rather than from improper flying technique. 
C-46 transport pilots on airlift missions such as air resupply and 
acromedical evacuation would probably fly more oftcn during peacetime in 
adverse weather conditions than would fighter pilots. Restrictions driven by 
poor weather would render them potentially useless. Yet F-86 pilots also 
needed an aviation English proficiency, because many fighter missions 
occurred in and above the clouds, demanding strict compliance with 
international IFR air traffic control rules. Korean jet pilots were under more 
stress than those flying transports, for the rapid pace of jet flight (e. g., 
change of direction, altitude or speed) demanded that they instantly 
understand the ATC instructions in English, because the time required to 
alter their thought processes and courses of action would not adequately 
conform to the two important elements - time and fuel - intrinsic to jet flying. 
Most jet fighter aircraft could stay in the air for only one and a half to two 
2 Cekk o/F&. rat Jtegukvio r: llile 14- CI iI At*; don, Part 26, Paragraph le. (Wuhington, 
DC: USGPO, 1949), p. 342. 
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hours without refueling. Flight time would be related directly to the amount 
of fuel consumption. 3 
Initially, the American advisers estimated that only'fifty percent of the 
ROKAF pilot graduates were capable of performing an IFR flight on airways 
in conformation with USAF minimums' ROKAF leaders were disappointed 
to sec only six in one class of eleven jet students pass qualifications for white 
card instrument rating, which was the basic minimum qualification given to 
fly under marginal weather conditions. American instructors observed that 
the Korean pilots who failed the language requirement were not to be 
considered dull or careless, but were, on the contrary, 'all good pilots and 
(could] pass a white card instrument check except for language difcultics" 
On the ground, if needed, they were provided English interpreters in their 
classrooms and flight lines. Suddenly with the advent of the jet and transport 
era, they were mandated to use English while flying without interpreters 
available. 
The failure to acquire the planned number of qualified pilots due to 
the English deficiency threatened to delay the activation of F-86 and C46 
squadrons. As a result, the ROKAF proposed the use of an English-Korean 
bi-lingual air control system. The proposal was reviewed by a joint ROK-US 
air traffic control coordinating committee, but ROKAF's proposal was 
rejected. Why did Americans refuse the bi-lingual system? They stated that 
the responsibility for the 'safe and expeditious movement of air traffie was 
charged to the United States Air Force. As they further explained, any 
operational concept which required bi-lingual air traffic control instructions 
3 Jet fighter pilots always have to be careful of their fast burning fud consumption. because running 
out of fuel could be an emergency as serious as the flameaut of engines in the air. Auth&s 
experience. 
'Polity on ROKAF IFR Clearance on Airways. ' in'SAF Ilistory, Jan . Jun 19SS; m:. vol. 4. 
Appendix 181. K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1955, v. J. AFI IRA, Fora white card instrument rating. see p. 
203 in 42 of this study. 
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would be unacccptablc to Amcricans. The formal Amcrican rcfusal of a bi- 
lingual ATC system was based on the following reasons: 
1. South Korea is a member state of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO). She accepted the membership and 
its responsibilities without reservation, therefore she is bound to 
the language concepts that ICAO requires. Attachment 'A' to part 
III of Annex 10, Aeronautical Telecommunications covers that 
part which deals with the development of an intcmational 
language for aviation: English. Paragraph 1.2 of this Annex 
requires that English be used or available upon request and 
further, that the primary means of contacting air/ground stations 
will be in the language of the state for that station? 
2. [USAF's] AACS (Air Traffic and Airways Communication 
Service) is responsible for maintaining all navigational aids 
within the Korean airways system. So in accordance with 
paragraph 1.2 of Annex' A', English must be used to contact these 
stations .6 
Apart from the organisational restrictions, Americans pointed out 
further reasons for demanding English: (1) the Korean language would not 
be considered readily adaptable for Air Traffic Control purposes, because of 
its linguistic nature that would not be sufficiently positive or direct; (2) the 
word meanings were obscure, even to Koreans, and varied with inflection 
and accent; (3) it had a very limited technical language for use in Air Traffic 
Control; and (4) contained very few idiomatic expressions to equate with 
such standard commands as'Go Around, 'Cleared To Land, 'Closed Traffic, ' 
ctc. 7 (Up until the American military occupation after the Second World 
War, Korea had been isolated from the Western world. This isolation was 
s At that time, all air traffic control facilities and navigational aid stations in South Korea were 
manned by US Air Force personnel. 6 'Policy on ROKAF IFR Clearance on Airways, ' In'SAF History, Jan - Jun 1935, ma, vol. 4. 
Appendix 181. K"730.01 Jan-Jun 1935, v. 4. AFIIRA. See also Coik of f"edrral Regwlatlnu, p. 
142. Ltr, 1818th AACS Gp to Cdr/314th AD, 12 Apr 55 ('Bilingual Air Traffic Control'), in 'SAF 
1 tistory, Jan - Jun 1935; mi., vol. 4. Appendix 182. K"730.01 Jan-Jun 1955. v. 4. AFI IRA. 
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exacerbated by Japanese colonial rule, which excluded Koreans from being 
educated. An American official report to President Truman in 1946 stated: 
'lt is important to remember that 70 percent of the population of Korea as a 
whole consists of small farmers, using extremely primitive methods of 
agriculture and fishing. The education level was very low and there is little 
knowledge of political, international [and scicntific/technical ] affairs. ')' 
Since neither linguistic expertise nor scientifically standardised 
aeronautical phrases and abbreviations were available at that time, ROKAF 
representatives on the ATC coordinating committee could not argue with 
their American counterparts. Besides the unadaptability of the Korean 
language, what made Koreans succumb to English usage and, indeed, 
international practice, was the likelihood of such situations which could be 
created by the characteristics of the Korean language: 
1. In the case of an ATC clearance which must be translated 
verbatim and relayed through a Korean controller to a Korean 
pilot, there is a possibility of separate interpretations. 
2. It has been confirmed by [American) instructor pilots that the 
translations of a pre-flight check list have been as numerous and 
varied in meaning as there were translators and the Korean pilots 
reverted to USAF English printed check lists. 
3. ATC officers on duty in the control tower have listened to 
Korean controllers giving instructions to Korean pilots which 
were verbose and the controller would finally revert to English 
and say, 'Go Around! 
4. [inasmuch as] Air Traffic Control instructions givcn in Korean 
are lengthy, it would cause [radio] frequency congestion and 
would delay air traffic which is counter to the most basic tenet of 
Air Traffic Control. 9 
a Edwin W. Pauley, Report vn JtpJnc. 4 Aswtu /n Scnlft. Occ pled Korea to the / rsident r jt/n 
Obi/ted Stata.. June 1946 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1946) (Known as the'Paulcy Report. ), p. 2. 
Ltr, 1818th AACS Gp to Cdr/314th AD, 12 Apr 55 ('Bilingual Air Traffic Control'). in `SAF 
I Iistory, Jan - Jun 1955' ms., vol. 4. Appendix 182. K-730,01 Jan-Jun 1953, v. 4. AFI IRA. 
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The high rate of failure of ROKAF pilots in acquiring instrument 
flying qualifications - and the impact of subsequent USAF-imposed 
instrument flight restrictions on their morale - was feared to strain diplomatic 
relations between the two air forces. 10 Operational urgency to produce the 
planned number of qualified pilots to fly the delivered aircraft, as well as 
morale considerations, allowed those 'English-failed' pilots in the first few 
classes to fly conditionally, restricted to clear weather only, under the 
instructor's supervision. The subsequent classes were required to take 
intensive language training at the language schools promptly established by 
Americans at Suwon and Tacgu Air Bases. American advisers were invited 
to join Korean faculty at the schools, but because of the manpower shortages 
of both Air Forces, the available number of qualified Korean instructors and 
American advisers was limited. Consequently, the improvised language 
reinforcement measure did not contribute much to improving the ROKAF 
personnel's aviation English proficiency. f lowcvcr, all equipment and 
instructional materials such as tapes and textbooks were voluntarily provided 
by the American advisers. Although language improvement did not occur 
quickly, the schools did help to motivate the Korean aircrews and ground 
controllers to concentrate on improving their basic knowledge of Air Traffic 
Control rules and procedures in English. " 
To execute the ROKAF missions in adverse weather conditions, the 
instrument flying qualification of the South Korean pilots could not be ovcr- 
emphasiscd. Korea suffers from rainy weather in summer and snow in 
winter. The pressure on the ROKAF personnel to carry out the planned F-86 
and C-46 conversion programmes on schedule forced them to improve their 
proficiency of technical aviation English as quickly as possible. They were 
virtually captives to the English language in their daily exposure to the 
lo /bid. Appendix 180. same file. 11 Interview. author with Lt. Gcnenl (R) Chang Chi"Ryang, 16 September 1994. 
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English-working environment with American advisers. Although they 
experienced difficulties in overcoming the language barrier, one of the 
significant benefits accrued by the 'pressure of learning English' was 
ROKAF's increased ability to accomplish combined air operations with the 
USAF. Although the language difficulties would persist, they could be faced 
directly and, in most cases, individually resolved. The same could not be 
said of the diplomatic complexities affecting the ROKAF role in regional air 
defence. 
7.2. Trilateral Security Cooperation Between US, South 
Korean and Japanese Air Defence Systems 
Soon after the Armistice, 5th Air Forcc planners rcvicwcd a plan for 
the gradual transfer of radar sites in the Korean Tactical Air Control System 
(KTACS) to the ROKAF (to be completed by March 1958). They expressed 
concern that the ROKAF was not yet capable of defending itself in large 
measure against external overt aggression. They reckoned that the ROKAF 
should continue to develop an effective aircraft control, warning and 
communications (AC&W) system together with an air traffic control (ATC) 
capability as quickly as possible. The US military assistance programme 
would be revised to develop peacetime base complexes on the Korean 
peninsula that the USAF could use when and if rcquircd. t= This was a good 
scheme, because it would provide the ROKAF with a chance not only to 
increase its manpower but also diversify its roles. Such a non-flying support 
component of Korean airpowcr was indispensable for the eventual takeover 
of the air defence of the Korean peninsula. It also conformed to the US 
policy of non-offensive weapon systems. 
t= ROKAF, ' in'SAF IGstory, Jul - Doc 1956, ' ms., vol. I, p. 233. K730,01 Jul-Doc 1956, v. 1. 
AFI IRA. 
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With plans to release the AC&W and ATC systems to the ROKAF, a 
combined operating relationship would have to be developed among the 
United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan, as any communist attack on 
Korea also threatened Japan, and vice versa. It was envisaged that 5th Air 
Force would be responsible for the air defence of Korea and for integrating 
the Korean air defence system (KTACS: Korea Tactical Air Control System) 
into that of Japan and Okinawa, as long as major USAF forces would be 
located in Korea. 13 On the surface, the scheme was commendable. From the 
USAPs standpoint of directing a regional air defence network in Northeast 
Asia, the KTACS's interface with the air defence systems of Japan and 
Okinawa would minimise the redundant, overlapping radar networks, and 
thus enhance operational eflicicncy. '4 The whole area would fall within the 
coverage of USAF-owned radars in the region. In addition to the technical 
advantage, it would also enhance command, control and communications 
when the ROKAF air defence operations merged into the overall Northeast 
Asian air defence system under the control of the USAF 5th Air Force. 
Since the Japanese Air Self Defense Force and the ROK Air Force 
flight operational zones (i. e., Japan und Korea Air Defense Identification 
Zones, Flight Information Regions) abut each other, these two countries' air 
arms needed to coordinate together with United States Air Forces so that 
they would not get in each other's way %hcn engaged in routine 
operations or exercises. (Sec Figure 7-1) However, the realisation that the 
scheme was idealistic, if not actually unattainable, dawned later when 
Japan refused to link its radar operations during Air Defence Exercise 
Dragon Fly in October 1956. The Americans sought a rapprochement between 
1) IML, pp, 233.254. 
14 At that time, Okinawa was under US military jurisdiction. Okinawa was returned to Japan in 
1972. New blc vloj% dia l3ritwrnicur, iii/. 8 (London. UK Enc)viopacdia Britannica, 1991), p, 
900. 
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Figure 7-I : United States Air Defense Identification Zones (ADI!, ) 
and International Civil Aviation Organization (I(': %O) 
Flight Information Regions (FIR) in Northeast Asia" 
ýý;, ýý 
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1" The I IS Air 1)ctcnsc Identification Zone was established during the Korean War and the Taegu 
Flight Information Region (TFIR) was initially envisioned as a subsidiary flight information region 
under the jurisdiction of' Japan's Tokyo Flight Information Region. whose establishment was 
approved at the Second ICAO Pacific Area Air Navigation Conference on 15 October 1955 at 
Vancouver, Canada The transfer of the Taegu FIR (3800N, 124001:.. 3R0)Ni 11301% 3710Ni 1 130E. 
3440N/12920E, 3230N/12730E. 3230N/12650E . 3000N/12525EF.. 3000N/12525E": 1 to the ROK 
government's jurisdiction was approved by the ICAO on 10 April 11*3 Air ('ompanent Command. 
(S) AC('R 55-20 (December 1993) (Seoul, Korea ACC/Combined Forces Command. 1993). Pp 2- 
20, Sung-Whan Shin, Kook-Jut' Rol) Awu )meng-( (71w lnncrnalum J/ l, uw and hnraw)4il 
Airgxx*e) (Seoul, Korea ROKAF Air University. 1988), p 174, Hyang-Kyu Paris. Ilan-(kx)k At 
Gong-Yok Koo-Jo Mit Hang-Gong Kyo-Tong Kwan-Jae Chac-Jac Ac Kae-Sun At Kwan"Nan 
Yon-Koo' ('A Study on "How to Improve the Management of Korea's Temtorul Airspace and Air 
Traffic Control System"', (MA thesis) Inha University. Inchon. Korea. 1993. Sae-Young Kim. 'Ilan- 
'Gook At Gong-Yok Kwan-Ri Chae-Jae B'arl-Jon Bang-Ahn' ('A Study on the Improvement of 
Korea's Airspace Management System'). (Research paper a 87-3) ROK [)efense ('allege. Seoul. 
Korea, 1988 ('hintat SO, 'Gong-Goon Ryok At Kyo-Ri Jok Ko-('hal 11'an-(kx* (icxºg-Goon 11 
Joong-Sim U-Ro' ('A 1)octrinal Review of Air Power The ROK Air Force in Focus') (Taejon. 
Korea ROKAF Air Training Command, 1983). p 78 
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their two allies, but nothing of that nature developed. Instead, the Japanese 
continued to deny the use of their bases for the landing of any ROKAF 
aircraft. 16 
Japan refused to cooperate because of Tokyo's reluctance to 
endorse 'US policies intended to strengthen regional security in general 
and South Korean security in particular. " This reluctance derived from the 
Japanese government's concern after the Korean War that 'a rapid and open 
military buildup in and around South Korea might provoke the Soviet Union 
and North Korea into taking countermeasures that might in turn trigger an 
arms escalation in the area. "' Therefore, it was reasoned in Tokyo, whatever 
would enhance ROKAF air operations might not be in Japanese interests. 
The logic of trilateral security cooperation would not be as simple as 
Americans reasoned, without taking into account the historical background 
of the region. To militarily strengthen either Japan or South Korea, without 
regard to maintaining an equitable balance between the two nations, would 
only raise alarms and fears on the part of the perceived 'weaker' state. In 
addition, the United States -a security benefactor" - also had only a limited 
amount of resources to share between its two allies. Long term strategy, 
however, would demand American strengthening of South Korea's 
indigenous airpower to prepare for the eventual withdrawal of American 
fighter-bombers from Korea. 
A continuing American security problem in North East Asia is a 
tendency to see the Korea and Japan situations as one, in which the Korean 
element is perceived to be less important than the Japanese. Such a view- 
16 ROKAF, ' in '5AF I Eistory, Jul " Doc 1956; nix, vol. 1, p. 255. K730.01 Jul-Doc 1956, v. 1. 
AF] IRA. 
t7 Edward A. Olson, 'Contemporary United States-Korean Security Relations, ' in June Teufel 
Dreyer, ed. Asian-Pacific Regi al. Securly (Washington. DC: Washington Institute Press, 1990), 
'89. Detrio, Strategic Partners, p. 91. 19 Both South Korea and Japan are bcnefitod by US security protection. 
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point is looked upon as naive by the Koreans. The Americans complicated 
the problem for themselves by assuming that Koreans and Japanese should 
cooperate with one another. Such a presumption runs counter to the history 
of the twentieth century so far. Japanese show as little interest in treating 
Koreans as equals as Koreans do with regard to Japanese. American security 
planners back in Washington, no matter how frequently informed of such 
latent difficulties, tend to relegate such problems to the 'too hard to solve 
file' and press forward with their preferred plans, all the while hoping that all 
will work out well in the end (as in the case of Franco-German relations in 
NATO). 20 
7.3. The Issue of Returning Operational Control to the ROK 
On 14 July 1950, President Rhce had assigned command authority 
over all his ROK military forces to General MacArthur, CINCUNC, 'during 
the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities! " On 9 
August 1950, the ROKAF came under the operational control of the 
Commanding General of US Sth Air Force under the provision of FEAF's 
General Order No. 46, which also clarified 'the extent to which logistical 
support could be provided the ROK Air Force during the period of the war. '22 
Soon after the Armistice, in the Dulics-Rhec agreement of 8 August 1953, 
President Rhee renewed his commitment to UNC control of ROK forces 
'until the Mutual Defense Treaty can be expected to come into force and 
20 For nearly contemporaneous and similarly difficult NATO problems for the Americans, we Saki 
Pockrill, 'Cooperation and Suspicion, ' especially pp. 142-144,146-147,161.162, and 168. t Ltr Rhee to MacArthur, Transfer of Operational Control of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces 
to the United Nations Command, ' dtd 14 July 1950. Serial No. 1.741.226.741.14 Jo-624-Goon. 
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic records. ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (k-&v) 
R/arnn-So C/w! Alok-Rok (A U. st of Diplumoric IM'umenrt) (Seoul, Korea: ROK GPO, 1994), p. 99; 
Seoul Daily, Ju-Ilan Ali-Groot 30-Wºrw . /943.197.1(30 
liars of W' J knarr in Korea, /945.1978) 
(Seoul, Korea: 11ang-Rim Chool-Pan Sa, 1979), pp. 168.170.1 fereatler cited as 30 Years of U. 1' 
tortes In Korea. See also Finley, 11W U5 A111awy f rperlencv In Korea, p, 59. For a full text of 
thee's letter, see Appendix 7.1 of this study. 2'SAF History, Jul - Dec 195 1; nix.. vol. I. p. 246. K730.01 Jul-Dec 1931. v. 1. AF11RA. 
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of ect. '23 Determining this limit had been of concern to both the US and 
UNC since the effective date of the Armistice (27 July 1953). Continued 
UNC/US control of Korean forces had therefore become 'an clement of US 
policy, ' and was included in the US-ROK Agreed Minute of Understanding. 
It stated: 
[it] is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea to:.. . Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of 
the United Nations Command while that Command has 
responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless 
after consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual 
interests would best be served by a change. 21 
After the Agreed Minute was signed 'on 17 November 1954, several 
ROK officials had indicated a desire to initiate consultations regarding a 
'change', and in some cases had publicly claimed that such consultations 
were in progress. Their suggestions included: 'outright and complete' transfer 
of control; assignment of a ROK officer as Deputy CINCUNC; the 
establishment of the First ROK Army and the US Eighth Army as co-equal 
forces under control of the ROK Army Chief of Staff. 25 But these 
suggestions were offered through an informal channel only. The majority of 
ROK leaders were occupied with the higher priority of national 
rehabilitation after the cessation of hostilities. Particularly in the case of 
ROK Air Force leaders, the return of operational control was not an 
immediate concern. They were busy consulting with American authorities on 
23 30 Years of US Forces in Korea, p. 169. 24 
25 
Department of State Bulletin 31: 805 (November 19,1954), p. 810. 25 Memorandum for Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far Cast and Eighth Unitod 
States Army, APO 343, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, do APO San Francisco, California, and 
Commander, Far East Air Forces, APO 925, Subj: Transfer of Control of ROK Armed Forces to the 
ROK Government (C), 19 April 1955; in'SAF History, Jan " Jun 1955, ' nm vol. 4, Appendix 185. 
K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1955, v. 4. AFRIKA. 
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the plan for ROKAF modernisation, which depended on US military 
assistance recommended by USAF planners. 26 
As far as operational control was concerned, ROKAF had 
experienced neither serious friction nor uncopable difficulties in its 
coordinated operations with the US Air Force. It would not be a great 
exaggeration to say that no ROKAF flight activities during and after the 
Korean War could have been achieved so successfully without USAF 
advisers' dedicated supervision. They had flown together in a 'buddy system' 
and shared combat risks during the Korean War. =" Coordination and 
cooperation between the US and ROK Air Forces had been excellent. In 
effect, the USAF's operational control of the, ROKAF had been the principal 
basis of American aid, and this fact allowed for an enormous amount of 
USAF assistance, material and non-material, to the Korean Air Force. 
Therefore, ROKAF leaders were concerned about discussions of shifting 
operational control to the ROK, because they worried that such debates 
would not be productive, and might generate unnecessary difficulties in 
implementing the ROKAF modernisation programme. 28 
Operational control, commonly called OPCON, is an authority 
confined to the military's operational aspects only, including joint training 
necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not, 'in and of itself, 
include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, 
discipline, internal organization, or unit training' Operational control is 
limited to the authority to perform such functions over subordinate forces as 
'organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, 
designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to 
26 Interviews. author with Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, a former ROKAF Chief of Staff. 
who worked as deputy chief of stall' under Lt. General (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul (1954-56). 30 
=( ctober (telephone) and 24 April 1995. ROKAF pilots and USAF advisers flew together In the same flights of F-S I s. This was called 
the buddy-buddy system, ' or buddy system. ' 211 Telephone interview, author with Lt. General (Ref. ) Kim Chang-Kyu, 30 October 1995. 
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accomplish the mission. "' OPCON is distinguished from command, which 
dictates all aspects of military operations to accomplish the mission, 
including administrative control and logistic support, " 
As the end of the Korean War required re-deployment of American 
forces stationed in South Korea, American military authorities were 
conccmcd that the US/UNC's exercise of operational control of ROK forces 
under the existing arrangement would have to end eventually. A further 
reduction of US forces to one RCT (Regimental Combat Team) had been 
recommended by CINCFE early in 1955. " Accordingly, in April 1955, the 
Far East Command prepared a proposal, which called for returning 
operational control of ROK armed forces to the ROK government, and tried 
to determine when transfer of control would be desirable. The proposal was 
based on a threefold premise that (1) UNC control of ROK forces could not 
indefinitely continue; (2) ROK operational control of US or UN forces 
would be unacceptable; and (3) basic US/UN policies and objectives with 
respect to Korea would remain unchanged in principle for the following two 
years. 32 
The FEC study reviewed the possibility of a unilatcral resumption of 
hostilities by the ROK, and stated: '[T]he fact remains that Rhce can order 
his forces to resume hostilities whether or not they arc under UNC control' It 
also acknowledged that there were no indications that the ROK desire for a 
change in the UNC/US-ROK command arrangement was related to plans for 
Rhcc's unilateral action. As for the ROK Air Force, the FEC proposal 
recommended that transfer of operational control be deferred until the 
29 The Joint Chiefs of Statt The Official Dlctlc ury Of A1114" T rm. c 2nd Edition (Washington, 
DC: Global Professional Publications, 1992). pp. 262-263. 
30 Ibid. p. 77. 31 Transfer of Control of ROK Armed Forces to the ROK Government. 19 April 1933; In 'SAF 
I listory. Jan - Jun 1955; mir vol. 4. Appendix 185. K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1935. v. 4. All IRA. 32 This is summarised from USAF archives as quoted in Jbkf For the full text, see Appendix 7-2 of 
this study. 
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ROKAF possessed adequate equipment and trained airmen as well as 
experienced officers. The FEC also insisted that 'the degree to which the 
ROKAF is satellited [sic] upon the US Fifth Air Force for training during 
conversion to jet aircraft and organization of AC&W and similar specialised 
units would appear to preclude early transfer of operational control of the 
ROKAF as a whole. ' A gradual transfer of control probably could be 
considered after the first jet squadron achieved operational status, but could 
not be completed until the ROKAF 10th Fighter Wing became 'entirely 
operational. ' AC&W units and other specialised units had to'remain closely 
associated with US Air Force units until their training [was] completed'' 
The commander of the 6146th USAF Advisory Group was also 
strongly opposed to an early transfer of control to the ROKAF. He was 
concerned over a possible unilateral action by the ROK government, in 
addition to ROKAF's unpreparedness to control its forces at the times{ The 
Far East Command finally concluded that 'the existing [command] 
arrangement should be continued without significant modification until I 
January 1956 or latee because of ROK's lack of adequate equipment, trained 
enlisted men, and experienced officers with sufficient education to absorb 
technical training. The operational requirement for unified control, under US 
command, if hostilities erupted, would require 'extensive air and naval 
operations and large-scale logistical support: " The actual return of 
US/UNC's operational control to the ROK Air Force and its sister services 
was not separately discussed. ' 
33 Transfer of Control of ROK Armed Forces to the ROK Govenu tent, 19 April 1955' in '3AF 
1tistory Jan-Jun 1955. ' ms., vol. 4, Appendix 185. K-730.01 Jan-Jun 1935, v. 4. An IRA. 
35 
Mid, v. 2, pp. 386-387. same rile. 
Mid, V. 4, Appendix 185, same rile. 36 With the threat of US troop withdrawal by the Caner administration. the OPCON issue surfaced 
formally in the 10th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul in 1977. ROK Ministry or 
Foreign Affairs, llw, -J A (k-A u !4 Nyon, J948.1978 (30 Years of Aw-ran D114(mnaxy. 19I8- 
1978) (Seoul, Korea: ROK GPO. 1979). P. 133. This issue wer partially resolved effective i 
December 1994, when OPCON, albeit during peacetime only, wer returned to the ROK government. 
ROK JCS General Order 944 dated I December 1994, F131S"CAS-94231 (I December 1994), p. 
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From the ROKAF vantage point, US operational control was to be 
handled on a long-term basis. Air operations on the Korean peninsula would 
demand coordination between the ROK and US Air Forces due to the 
complexity of command, control and communications systems, and the 
enormous amount of air space, which would cover the whole of Northeast 
Asia. (Sec Figure 7-1) An advantage of the USAFs operational control was 
sharing the USAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at Osan Air Base, the 
nerve center of the Korean Tactical Air Control System. 
The ROKAF acting alone was incapable of assuming the TACC 
function in a short period of time because of the lack of qualified personnel 
and trained leadership, as well as cost and the required time for training. 37 
American control provided an efficient operational relationship of instructor 
(mentor) vis-A-vis student pilot (client), without infringing upon Korea's self- 
esteem and national prestige in conducting combat operations or unit 
training. 38 The mentor-client (instructor-student) relationship proved 
productive in enhancing ROKAF development, not only in the air but also on 
the ground. Nearly all staff paperwork relevant to ROKAF's operational and 
30, 'U. S. Military Control Transfer to South Korea, ' 1 yenpnag KCNA in English 0446 GMT 2 Doc 
94, FI3IS-EAS-94232 (2 December 1994), p. 34; Chwnn llbo, 30 November and 1 December 
1994; Dang-Ah Ilbo, 30 November and 1 December 1994; Kor+ra. krrnw/ of lkfenvr Anal>%is 7: 1 
(Summer 1995), p. 327, Interviews, author with Minister of National Defense (appointed on 24 
December 1994) and the former Chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (I March 1993 " 23 
December 1994) ROKAF General (Ret. ) Lee Yang-110.31 October (telephone) and 23 September 
1295. 
Previously the USAF command post was called Air Operations Center (AOC). In mid" 1950s, the 
terminology was replaced with the current TACC. The existing fortified TACC building at Osan Air 
Base, Korea, was newly constructed under ROK-US joint venture In 1985. It Is a hardened semi. 
underground command post. jointly manned by American and Korean Air Force personnel. Its 
construction cost the ROK and US governments over ä1O0 million, of which the USAF paid more 
than seventy percent apportioned to purchase sophisticated state-of-an '(C) x 3' equipment, The 
author was one of the members of the ROKAF-USAF Joint Ad 11ac Committee for the project 
during the preparation period, and later worked at the TACC in the capacity of the Deputy Director 
of Combat Operations, Air Component Command of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command at 
Osan AFB in 1986. Restricted by security classification. no source material can be cited at present. 3" Unit training refers to the flying training and exercises conducted by operational units to maintain 
their pilots' proficiency. In a broader sense, it also encompasses all training and exercises conducted 
by both flying and combat support units, e. S., AC&W controller training and airman's basic training 
as well as flying and technical training of pilots and maintenance personnel. 
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logistic plans and programmes were initially drafted in English by American 
advisers. These drafts were later translated into Korean, except for those 
(food, clothing, and pay) requiring the ROK govcmmcnt's administrative 
and budgetary approval. 39 
As the doctrine of both American and Korean air forces emphasised, 
air operations should be conducted in an orderly and timely manner, under 
the principle of 'centralized control and decentralized execution. ' The 
control of airpowcr should be ccntraliscd to permit its optimum use. 
Centralised control implies direction by a single air commander to employ 
airpowcr in a concerted manner, 'if [its] inherent flexibility and ability arc to 
be fully exploited''' Therefore, '[c]entralized planning, decentralized 
execution remains a catchphrasc of [US] Air Force doctrine, much as 'don't 
divide the fleet' preoccupied American naval strategists in earlier times . 
12 
Because air space is indivisible, the employment of aircraft must be 
orchestrated, based on the priorities of missions and targets. This emphasis is 
in contrast to controlling ground forces in geographically separated 
operational areas, while ROKAF pilots, once airborne, had the entire air 
space over the peninsula as their area for combat in wartime and training in 
peacctimc. 43 
39 ROK Air Force, 'ROKAF Oral Ilistory: vol. 1: Lt. General Kim Chung-Yul and Colonel Lee 
Chang-Yoon'(Seoul, Korea: ROKAF History Oft ce, 1968). p. 15; interviews, author with Lt. 
Generals (Ret. ) Kim Chang-Kyu (24 April 199$) and Chang Chi-Ryang (16 September 1994); and 
telephone interview, author with Major General (Ret. ) Chun llyung-11. a Korean War veteran and 
former Director of Personnel, Ministry of National Defense (1977-7912 November 1993. W U. S. War Department, FleIJ Alanual 100-20: Commend any/ 1D? V lº )rnent of Air 11cwrr 
JWashington, DC: USGPO, 1943), P. 2; USAFM 1.1(1979). P. 5-2. t Ibid See also Robert Frank Futrell, ij. aR COMVIX1. Lc c#*w: Basic Thinking in the United 
Stares Air Force, 1907-1960, vol. I (Maxwell All), Alabama: Air University Press, 1987), p. 406. 42 Eliot A. Cohen, 'The Mystique of U. S. Air Power, ' FaTign Affairs 73: 1(lanuary/Fcbtuary 
1994), p. 106. See also USAFM 1.1 (1979X P. S-2. 
43 It is virtually impractical to draw boundaries due to the nature of air operations in speed and 
manoeuvre as well as space limit in the case of the Korean peninsula. In ground operations. 
however, there are distinct geographical boundaries for the operational jurisdiction between US and 
South Korean troops. The western font area. Including Pannwryont, had been under the jurisdiction 
of US Army 2nd Infantry Division, until its redeployment to the present Tongduchon area, some 
fifteen miles north of Seoul (between Seoul and the DMZ), on 12 March 1971. ROK Ministry of 
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As the '[t]actical air power must be under the command of a single 
individual to ensure flexibility and concentration of force ," all flight 
activities, both Korean and American, from takeoff to landing were closely 
monitored and controlled - i. e., mission pilots were to maintain constant 
radar and radio contact with air tactical and traffic controllers on the ground 
- by the USAF 5th Air Force's 314th Air Division Commander through his 
comand post (TACC) by use of 'FRAG Orders. "f It became ROKAf s 
second nature to work with Americans in joint air operations. Constant 
exposure to the USAFs environments, both operational and social, created a 
natural camaraderie. Because of the shared facilities that Americans 
provided, Korean Air Force pilots and AC&W controllers (often stationed at 
radar sites in the remote mountains) were in daily contact with American Air 
Force personnel. " here was a doctrinal imperative - centralised control - 
rccogniscd by both the United States Air Force and Republic of Korea Air 
Force that made the operational control (OPCON) question effectively mute 
so far as the ROKAF was concerned. 
Since its very inception, the ROKAF had worked with Americans on 
a joint partnership basis through the American command, control and 
communications system. The ROK Army did not have a US"ROK joint 
operations command establishment equivalent to the USAF- 
manncd/ROKAF-shared Tactical Air Control Center. The Korean Army 
thus had not been exposed to a similar environment of joint operations 
under American operational control. As long as the integrity of the ROK Air 
National Defense, lxxA-Wang Sa Yon.! 310 (The CJnr W of NaIk»vi! l-rjcnrt lihiney) (Seoul, 
Korea: Institute of National Defense Military History Studies, 1994), p. 364. 44 General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, then US Army Chief of Stag expressed his view In 
November 1947. Memo, Eisenhower to Forrestal, Nov. 14,1947 (S), Vandenberg papas, Box 97. 
ýi library of 
Congress, Washington. DC. 
The frag-order stands for the fragmented air tasking order. Air tasking orders are issued daily to 
each air unit broken down in a fomut fragmented by types of aircraft and missions. 46 At the time, Korean Air Force AC&W personnel were sent for on-the-job-training at radar sites 
manned by USAF personnel. Each Korean air base had one USAF 6146th Advisory Group's 
detachment. 
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Force was honoured, and the efficiency of ROKAF air operations was 
enhanced under American operational control, it was apparent that the 
ROKAF would gain nothing beneficial if the United States relinquished its 
operational control. Instead, if the OPCON transfer were implemented, the 
Korean Air Force would lose most of the operational assistance, material and 
nonmaterial, currently provided by the United States Air Force through 
either formal or informal channels. Because of this unique relationship, as 
well as the intrinsic nature of joint operations through the Korean Tactical 
Air Control System, the thought of criticising the OPCON arrangement 
never occurred to ROK Air Force leaders. Still, whether operational control 
of the ROKAF was to be in American or Korean hands, the central problem 
affecting the air defence of South Korea, and especially Seoul, remains a 
conundrum. 
7.4. ROKAF Air Defence Readiness versus Air Doctrine 
The lack of sufficient air mancuvouring space to dcfcnd the capital 
city of Seoul presents South Korean fighter pilots with an intrinsic doctrinal 
challenge to cope with North Korea's air threat, less than three minutes 
flight time from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Although this issue has 
been a recurring challenge to the defence of South Korea, it had never 
received serious attention from both American and South Korean military 
planners when they agreed with their communist counterparts to draw the 
Military Demarcation Line (MDL) at the present location during the truce 
talks in July 1953.47 The UNC/US inattention to the consequences of the 
47 The Korean Armistice Agreement set a military demarcation lino dividing the two Korcas, 
generally conforming to the forward edge of troop dispositions at the time of signing. This line is 
centered in the four kilometers wide demilitarized zone (DMZ), creating two butter tones. Richard 
0. Stilwell, former CINCUNC, ? he Need for U. S. Ground Forces in Korea' Xovra and Nir/J 
4ffalrs 1: 2 (Summer 1977), p. 142 fn 3. Although the DMZ Is commonly referred to as a dividing 
boundary between the two Koreas. in actuality, especially in regard to air defence fighter operations, 
the boundary must be considered below the MDL. This further restricts the maneuvouring depth of 
234 
MDL's location, with regard to the post-Armistice air defence posture of 
South Korea, derived from United States basic policy toward South Korea, 
i. e., hasty cessation of hostilities in Korea without allowing South Korea to 
take charge with its own air defence aller the Armistice. From the US point 
of view, Korea was a small part of America's global strategy. Thus, Seoul 
was inconsequential, and defence depth was not considered worthwhile in 
prolonging the truce talks. American policymakcrs viewed the Korean 
peninsula as a forward operating base, and the detail of the location and 
defence of Seoul was of little importance to them. The United States 
government decision to terminate the Korean War quickly and redeploy its 
expensive military forces from the Korean peninsula to other parts of the 
world with higher priority dictated their hasty agreement on the existing 
location of the MDL. Although air doctrine stresses the absolute importance 
of forward air defence, the priority attached to terminating the war overrode 
such considerations. (While the result may have been the same, given the 
exigencies of the moment, it is also true that senior American airmen played 
no significant role in the armistice negotiations. ) The inattention to this basic 
concept has resulted in forty years of excessive stress on the capital city and 
ROKAF fighter pilots, who arc constantly placed on three minute runway 
alcrt. 'e (Sec Figure 7-2) 
Dr. Kim Kyung-won, former ROK ambassador to Washington, later 
illustrated the situation facing the South Korean people because of the 
excessively close proximity of their capital city of Seoul to the Military 
Demarcation Line, more commonly known as'DMZ" (Demilitarised Zone): 
tactical air operations, because military operations are strictly prohibited within the DAMZ. Autho's 
experience, 48 A considerable portion of mission-capable tighter aircraft and equivalent number of fightet pilots 
are required to stay on alert on base for 24 hours a day around the year. thorn the authors experience 
during his tenure as the commanding officer of a ROKAF fighter wing in 1986-7, 
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If we imagine that the American Civil War ended in an indecisive 
truce and the South continued to be ruled by the same anti- 
Northern regime, supported by some giant Southern superpower 
whose military capacity reached astronomical proportions 
compared to the Union's self-defense capacity, and the Southern 
forces, armed to the teeth, were deployed somewhere around 
Dulles International Airport [in northern Virginia about twenty 
miles across the Potomac river from Washington, D. C. ], then, I 
would say, our American friends would find it a little easier to 
understand how we in South Korea must feel. " 
If you add to Dr. Kim's illustration one more assumption that in Dullcs 
International Airport you have hostile jet fighters on alert, that is exactly the 
same situation that South Korean fighter pilots arc currently coping with. 
Ideally, the equity of the balance of air defence posture in terms of response 
time and frontal manocuvcring space should have been pursued, so that 
Pyongyang and Seoul would have been equally protected from the air threat 
by timely reaction with early warning. 
To Amcricans, bccausc of thcir cnormous contincr. 'al geographical 
background and a number of available metropolitan cities, the loss of one 
metropolitan city would not be so critically detrimental to the psychology of 
the whole public and the machinery of government. But that is not the case 
in South Korea, which is so centralised that Seoul is the real heart of South 
Korea's life. As Seoul is the centre of communications, the scat of power, 
and the center of ROK government, the capital city's fall into enemy hands 
means not only the loss of ROK 'administration but also that of social, 
professional and political activity. i30 From a practical standpoint, the impact 
19 Kyung-won Kim, Tho Republic of Kona and the Unitod States: Common Interests, Ideals, and 
Differences, ' in Richard B. Foster, James R. Dornen, Jr., and William M. Carpenter, eds., Strategy 
aril Security in Northeast Asia (New York: Crane, Ru-ask . 1979), p. 117. w When Clausewitz listed the three'acts we consider most important for the defeat of the enemy, ' 
second on his list was 'seizure of his capital as it is not only the center of administration but also that 
of social, professional, and political activity. ' Cali Von Clausewitz, On Wor, edited by Michael 
toward and Peter Pares (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 596. This view was 
recently endorsed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Army General John Sh likashvih, who 
reaffirmed the importance of the defence of Seoul. stating that the destruction of Seoul would be a 
grave loss for South Korea. since it is the economic heart of South Korea as well as home to 10 
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of the loss of Seoul would be considerable. It would equate almost to the 
collapse of the entire country, because more than 44.5 percent of the South 
Korean population is concentrated within a radius of fifty kilometers (about 
thirty miles) from the center of the capital, according to the 1992 population 
census. s' National identity is represented by Seoul. This is why the UNC 
tried so hard and paid so much to recapture Seoul after it changed hands four 
times during the Korean War. It is also the reason why Kim 11 Sung 
suspended his blitzkrieg down the peninsula, in order to celebrate for a few 
days in the captured city of Seoul. 32 
When the issue of a truce talk site was first raised, the ROK national 
leadership might have thought to remind the US-lcd United Nations 
Command of the military consequences which would result from the location 
of the talks. Any talks on land would prohibit the front line from moving 
further north into North Korean territory. (it was for this reason that the 
UNC had first suggested the talks take place on a Danish hospital ship, the 
Jullandia, in Wonsan harbour. ) Kaesong was counter-proposed by North 
Korea and accepted by UNC. s" The disadvantages of Kncsong became 
apparent from the outset of the negotiations. The communists benefited 
psychologically and militarily from the truce talks, 'partly because of the 
inevitable psychological letdown induced by the talks among US forces and 
partly because of the immunity of the Kncsong area. ' This gave the 
million people, about one-quarter of South Korea's population' William Matthews, Shale Says 
Attack By North Korea Would Fail, 'Anny Tines, 27 December 1993, p. 6. st II. W. Lee, 'Soo-Do Kwon Jee-Yok In-Koo Moon-lae ('The Issue of the Capital Area 
Population'), Nan-CxxA 1/bo (Korea Tunes). 6 August 1993, p. CS. The over-crowding and 
excessive concentration in the Seoul area, with an estimated population over fifteen million (it the 
transient population is counted) presents a serious problem. Dispersal of the capital area 
concentration is given priority in the study of the ROK contingency planning. Interview, author 
S2 with 
General Lee Yang-1 lo, ROK Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Stag, 13 September 1994. 
As General MacArthur recalled, instead of rushing rapidly forward to Pusan, which he could 
have reached within a week, without the slightest difficulty. the enemy stopped to deploy his andlery 
across the I fan River until 3 July 1950. Han-CcxA Jon-A fg Sv, p. 235. ss Rosemary Foot, A Substitute jar flciory: Me Po11 kt of Pe vnwdtng at the Korean Armisrlce 
Tr14. s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 19%). pp. 4243; I HUx 1951. v. 7, pp. 587.609,617. 
Schnabel and Watson, ll/srury ojtl t JC5 Y. .% pl. 1, p. 603. 
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communists a propaganda advantage. for it meant that the UNC would be 
going to them to negotiate. (North Korean mass media claimed that 'the 
"imperialist agrcssors" were suing for peace because their military adventure 
had failed. ')3 The existence of Kacsong as the meeting site - the ancient 
Korean (Koryo Dynasty) capital, twenty miles within the communist lines 
and three miles below the 38th Parallel - created the impression that the 
communists had made this gain during the war, and 'their troops were still 
[there] in strcngth'56 Thus, Kacsong, as a truce talk site, gave substance to 
the communists' demands that the 38th Parallel be the military demarcation 
line. " 
Strategically, the western area of the Korean peninsula has the best 
terrain for military efforts, particularly offensive operations. Eastern Korea is 
very mountainous. Kacsong is located in the strategic western sector. 
Therefore, meeting at Kaesong, which stood in the route of advancing UNC 
forces all the way up to the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang, 
discouraged and impeded further UNC advances. When Knesong first 
appeared as the site of truce talks, the ROK government was concerned 
about the recovery of lost territory around Kacsong and the Ongjin 
peninsula. Rhec strongly demanded that General James A. Van Fleet, 
Commanding General of US Eighth Army, insist upon the recovery of these 
areas, which previously belonged to the ROK. 5' According to General Van 
Fleet's assessment of the military operations required to accomplish this, at 
least two more infantry divisions were needed. But Van Fleet did not even 
have one regiment to sparc. 19 The issue died and Rhec never again broached 
the subject. This situation became even worse for South Korea when the 
ss Foot. A Subsifure, p. 44. 
56 Mid 
57 For a succinct account of the siting of the truce talks. s« lbkL, pp. 42.61. s$ I lermes, Truce Tent and Rghting FFA, pp. 114.116. 59 Joong-Ahng Daily, l'eopk's 0 7nresc. V. 4, p. 346. 
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UNC negotiators failed to get North Korean agreement on 'prohibition 
against construction of new airfields and rehabilitation of old ones, ' as 
General Ridgway had recommcnded, ' Since North Korea already had 
several air bases between Pyongyang and the MDL, and South Korea had 
none (nor room for any) between Seoul and the MDL, the ROKAF found 
itself at the disadvantage of having all its bases behind Scou) 61 
The lack of air defence depth in terms of defending Seoul is the most 
serious challenge the ROKAF pilots encounter, because time is translated 
into space to allow for flight manoeuvre. For this reason air manocuvcring 
space is critical and this space (air defence depth) should be far deeper than 
the geographical depth required for ground operations. In ground defence 
warfare, lack of defence depth might be partially compensated for by 
alternatives such as anti-tank traps. But air defence precludes such a passive 
measure, because of its intrinsic three-dimensional operations. 
Part of the reason for such strategic shortfalls was that President Rhec 
had virtually no mature military advisers at his side. During the Korean 
War, ROKAF had only five general rank officers - two three-star generals, 
one two-star general, and two one-star generals'2 Among these five, only 
Lt. General Kim Chung-Yul, the first and third ROKAF Chief of Statt' 
(1949-52,1954-56), was recognised and patronised by President Rhcc. 
General Kim, however, was a fighter pilot still in his early thirties, and 
neither experienced nor knowledgeable to advise on strategic issues. ROK 
60 Ridgway, The Korean War, pp. 238-239. 61 Soon after the cessation of hostilities, USAF intelligence estimated there were a total of thirty- 
four airfields in North Korea, which were capable of supporting MiG-1S operations. FEW 
Intelligence Roundup 4: 3 (November 1933), P. 2S. K-720.01, Jul-Dec 1933, v. 3, pt. 1. AFI IRA. 
Currently there are nine airfields south of Pyongyang. six of which are jet-capable to house MiG-29s, 
23s, 21 s, and 19. (i Iwangju, Tactan, I laeju, Koksart. I lyonri, Kumiri), while Seoul has none in front 
of it except Kimpo International Airport, which Is too dose to the DMZ for tactical air action. 
Author's memorandum of records (1985-86). 
62 Major Generals Kim Chung-Yul and Choi Yong"Duk were promoted to the three-star rank on I 
March 1953. Lt. General Choi was incumbent ROKAF Chief of Staff (1952-S4), and Kim was a 
special assistant to the National Defense Minister. Kim later replaced Chol as Chief of Staff for the 
second time. Gong-Goon Sa (If), 195!, 37, p. 260; Kim, Kim Cluing rul Alemoir, p. 491. 
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gcncrals were also unable to provide long"tcnm strategic advice to Rhcc, 
because of their inexperience and immaturity. 63 
These generals did not sufficiently recognise that a successful air 
defence posture for the ROKAF would require operational air space, i. e., air 
defence depth, both for early warning as well as air intercept operations. 
Moreover, all ROKAF air defence plans had to be defensive in compliance 
with US policy. Therefore, adequate advance knowledge of a possible enemy 
attack would be vitally important, because early warning would be essential 
to survival. The more warning time, the less losses in blood and treasure. '" 
II lad the truce meetings been held on board the Jutla dia, the UNC ground 
forces might not necessarily have been bogged down below Kacsong in the 
western front line. Instead, the prospect of extending southern territory for 
the protection of Seoul was lost, when the truce talk site soon after moved 
farther south to Panmunjom. Thus, the forfeiture of extending Seoul's air 
defence depth became a fall accompli. 
Among the four interrelated issues treated in this chapter, only the 
first, aviation English requirements, is susceptible to a relatively simple 
solution, through individual concentration and hard work. Although the 
second issue, tri-lateral air defence cooperation between Korea, Japan and 
the United States, remains unresolved, it will need to be redressed eventually 
for long-term regional security. Thirdly, ROK-US combined air operations 
under USAF operational control through the Tactical Air Control Center (a 
63 Most of Rhec's general officers had been young junior-grade officers in the Japanese military. 
Because of the rapid expansion of the ROK armed forces after the beginning of the Korean War, 
these men, all in their early thirties, were rapidly promoted to fill generals' posts. During the Korean 
War, the priority of combat pushed these men into commanded positions, but their prior education 
and training did not provide them with vision and strategic thinking. ILt. General Chung 11-Kwon, 
Supreme Commander of ROK Armed Forces and ROK Army Chief of Staff (1950.1951) was thirty. 
rive years old. General Paik Sun-Yup was thirty-two years old when he became the first 
four-star 
general and the Army Chief of Staff in 1952. Paik Sun"Yup, Fran pas w so 
r'wuprwnf(n 
Washington, DC: Brasscy's. 1992). pp. 201.202. 
U. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Alrpowvr. Report ... 83th 
Cong. Ist 
soss. (Washington, DC. GPO, 1937). p. 36. (This is commonly known as the Symington Report. ) 
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consolidated USAF-ROKAF combined Command Post) helped enhance the 
effectiveness of ROKAF's newly expanded roles and missions in the jet age. 
The OPCON promoted close relationships between American and Korean 
Air Forces. Upon introduction of jet fighters and multi-cngined transport 
aircraft, South Korean pilots became involved in the doctrinal development 
of their new spectrum of the air defence and tactical airlift missions, the 
fourth issue treated. At the same time, due to the lack of frontal 
mancuvouring air space, ROKAF pilots have been constantly on runway 
alert to defend their capital city of Seoul. Nevertheless, South Korea is the 
only country in Asia in which the United States Air Force successfully 
established a joint integrated air operation system with the indigenous air 
force, thus paving the way for the ROKAF to further enhance its 
contribution to regional security in the Far East. 
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CONCLUSION 
Today, in 1995, the Rcpublic of Korea Air Forcc is composcd of some 
450 combat aircraft and a personnel strength of 53,000. The aircraft (48 F. 
16C/Ds, 96 F-4D/Es, 190 F-SEIFs, 18 RF-4Cs, 10 C-1301 is, 12 CN-235Ms, 
15 C-123J/Ks, 30 Uli-I B/Ns, etc. ) arc equipped to perform the essentially 
tactical roles of interception, interdiction, close air support, tactical 
reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and search & rescue (SAR). The aircraft and 
personnel are arranged in eleven wings, composed of over forty squadrons, 
located at twelve major operating (jet-capable) bases throughout South 
Korea. ' This is certainly an improvement over the situation in 1956, but it 
remains true that the ROK Air Force personnel strength today represents 
less than ten percent of the total number of South Koreans presently in 
military service. By most Western standards, this reflects a considerable 
imbalance between air and surface forces, one that would require the 
ROKAF to have outside assistance should war break out on the peninsula. 
(By way of contrast, for example, the RAF comprises nearly thirty percent of 
U. K. military forces. ) 
The present situation in Korca, espccially the imbalancc bctwccn air 
and ground forces, has deep roots and can be appreciated only by a thorough 
understanding and analysis of events and policies that dominated the decade 
between the end of the Second World War and the post"Korean War 
modernisation of the ROK forces, essentially complete in concept by 1956. 
The principal, over-riding background theme of those years, from the 
perspective of today, can be expressed as the United States government's 
concern that President Syngman Rhec might be led to take unilateral action 
against North Korea. 
I International institute for Strategic Studies. M Alllikuy Bakv%r. 1994.1995 (London, UK: 
ßnssey's (UK) Ltd., 1994), p. 181. 
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Before the Korean War, US military assistance to South Korea was 
predicated upon the policy that the South Korean military establishment was 
an internal security force, which would not need an air arm. This basic 
premise restrained the growth of the South Korean Air Force, as did 
America's fear that the provision of offensive weapons might allow South 
Korea's aggression against North Korea. This fear continued throughout the 
war, and inflicted limitations on the South Korean Air Force modernisation 
after the war. 
The formation of the South Korean Air Force was unique in the 
annals of airpowcr. This force came into being owing primarily to the far- 
sightedness, enthusiasm and determination of the founding members. 
Initially they encountered resistance from both the Korean Army leaders and 
the American military advisers, but their persistence eventually overcame all 
obstacles. Albeit a nominal force structure without a single tactical aircraft, 
the basic foundation (pilots, aircraft, airfields and organisation) was laid 
prior to the commencement of hostilities. 
Through the advocacy of President Rhec and his airmen's tenacious 
efforts, the ROK Air Force ultimately achieved a separate service identity. 
In retrospect, it was almost miraculous for the South Korean Air Force, with 
a miniscule number of liaison airplanes, to become independent from the 
ROK Army. The determined efforts of Korean airmen earned the respect, 
sympathy and professional recognition of their American counterparts, who 
not only dedicated their endeavours to develop the South Korean Air Force 
as a combat unit, but also to create it as a modern air force, capable of 
fulfilling the responsibilities needed by such an establishment, albeit within 
the intrinsic constraints imposed upon them by their country's Korean policy. 
That policy, unchanged during the period treated in these pages, was 
strongly affected by the coupling of two interrelated ideas. The first was 
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that Korea was only one part of a larger issue, - the deterrence of communist 
aggression in the Far East. In this respect, Japan was perceived to be more 
important than Korea and the ROK military, especially the Air Force, would 
have to be restrained, Isst it appear threatening to not only North Korea but 
also Japan. For example, as the US Army Chief of Staff observed in July 
1954, 'Korea's value to the US is only in the degree it protects Japan 
militarily and supports Japan economically. We must find a way to make 
Korea look to Japan for protection n 
The second idea was that America's openly stated policy to dctcr 
aggression by threatening nuclear retaliation in response thereto would prove 
sufficient to discourage any would-be aggressor. The same US Army Chief 
of Staff memorandum of July 1954 stated bluntly that 'the major deterrent to 
renewing aggression in Korea should be Chinese Communist and North 
Korean fear of atomic retaliation coupled with the announced intention to 
resist renewed aggression. ' The ROKAF would also have to be restrained 
from becoming a force capable of a full scale air assault on North Korea in 
the worst case. As the memorandum went on to make clear, even were the 
ROKAF to be significantly expanded, 'the United States would not be 
relieved of responsibility to provide this deterrent. ') An additional 
consideration for the Americans was that an austere ROK Air Force would 
be sufficient to permit the maintenance of bases in South Korea in an 
operational status, which should be to the US advantage in the event of a 
renewal of hostilities, as it would in turn extend the range and flexibility of 
2 Memorandum by the Chief of Stall: U. S. Army. 'Rodeployment of U. S. Forces from the Far East, ' 
JCS 2147/110 (8 July 1954), 181 Far East (11.28.50) sec 21, Box 17. RO 218 Records of the US. 
Joint Chiefs of Stall GF 1914-56. NAIWDC. (lt should be noted hero that the view of the US Army 
Chief of Staff was a secret matter at the time. lt nrkalnly was not one that Koreans, then or now. 
would endorse. ) 
3 Ibld 
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the USAF fighter and bomber forces based in Japan and elsewhere in the 
Pacific! 
The South Korean Air Force, virtually reborn in battle as a tactical 
airpowcr and matured during the Korean War, successfully survived many 
challenges. At the outbreak of the Korean War, Korean pilots had to face the 
onslaught of the North Korean People's Army, and had to improvise their 
light airplanes to perform 'combat missions' by manually dropping explosives 
from the back seat. Given ten F-51 Mustang fighters by the 5th Air Force a 
week after the war started, these Korean pilots had to fly combat missions 
with only one sortie of conversion training, which lasted less than thirty 
minutes. This was accomplished only by. the proficiency of the Korean 
pilots, their enthusiasm for flying combat missions, and the urgency of the 
war. 
To support these Korean pilots, American Sth Air Force immediately 
formed a temporary air base unit called 'Bout One; with American instructor- 
pilots/adviscrs and support personnel. At first American instructors and 
Korean pilots flew together in a so-called 'buddy system. ' These American 
instructors/advisers quickly recognised Korean pilots' skills and ingenuity. 
As their combat proficiency increased, Korean pilots were allowed to fly on 
their own. Although restrained from growing to form more than one fighter 
wing, the South Korean Air Force eventually flew some 8,500 sorties 
during the Korean War, second only to the American Air Forces. 
Soon after the Armistice, the ROK Air Force successfully converted 
its fighters from piston-driven to jet-propelled within a short span of time. 
The ROKAF aircraft inventory grew from twenty-two light airplanes in June 
4 'Considerations Affecting the ROK Air Force Expansion' in Appendix: 'Additional Factors 
Concerned in Conjunction with the Proposed Expansion of the Forces' to 'Memorandum by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson). March 31.1954. Subj: Recommendations of 
the Korean Minister of Defense Concerning Expansion of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces., 
I WO 1952-54, v. 15, pt. 2, p. 1784. 
246 
1950 to over two hundred aircraft, including ninety jets and over sixty F"51 
fighters, in December 1956.5 ROKAF manpower strength increased from 
less than 2,000 men in 1950 to 16,500 men in 1956. The ROKAF mission 
expanded from liaison to such diversified flight profiles as aerial 
interception, air interdiction, close air support, and airlift. Its area of 
operations also grew to encompass the entire peninsula. ' 
ROKAF leaders demonstrated that promotion of cooperation and 
friendship with Americans resulted in favourablc policy consideration of the 
proposed ROKAF modernisation plan (Three Year Plan). This plan finally 
materialised, albeit in a reduced scale, and ensured the separate identity of 
the ROK Air Force. In spite of the existing circumstances, where the 
imbalance of ROK military force structure had not been redressed, ROKAF 
pilots and ground support personnel demonstrated an outstanding capability 
to apply their given air asset effectively against the enemy. Joint operations, 
both in the air (aircraft) and on the ground (AC&W and ATACS)' with 
Americans, helped foment a strong rapport between the United States and 
Republic of Korea Air Forces. Centralised control of air operations, in an 
orderly, orchestrated manner under US Air Force's operational control over 
the ROKAF, enriched the ROK Air Force's combat readiness. By the end of 
the Korean War, the South Korean Air Force had proved its mission growth 
potential to both US and ROK governments. 
As the modernisation of the South Korean Air Force progressed, there 
arose a series of issues and problems which had to be solved through the 
combined efforts of Korean and American airmen as well as both countries' 
s ROKAF had 228 aircraft in total by the end of 1956: 81 F46F jet figMcn; 9 T-33 jet trainers; 68 
F-S 1 t; 18 C-46s; 38 T-6s; and 141. -19s. Cn#W-Gaon Sa 411) 193W 7, pp. 106.107; SAP 1/Arovy, 
Jan-Jun 1957, vol. 3, Appendix 13S. AFI IRA K730.017an-Jun 1957, v, 3. 
6 Tactical air reconnaissance (TAR) and search & rescue (SAR) minions were added to the 
ROKAF upon introduction of RF"86F jet reconnaissance planes and 11.19 heliooptcrt Into its aircraft 
inventory in 1958. 
7 Aircraft Control and Warning; Air Traffic and Air Communications Services. 
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policymakcrs. The recurring issues of aviation language training, trilateral air 
defence cooperation between the US, ROK and Japan, USAF's operational 
control over the ROKAF, and the challenge of the air defence of Seoul 
remain as vital concerns of the South Korean Air Force today. These issues 
had their genesis on the Korean peninsula immediately after the Second 
World War and continued alter the Korean War. 
The evolutionary process of the ROKAF was erratic, and 
accomplished by trial and error in battle. This extraordinary process derived 
from the failure of ROK-US military policy planners to coordinate a 
combined effort prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The failure of 
coordination is attributable to the political failure of ROK leadership to work 
with American policymakcrs during the two years between 1(OK 
independence and the Korean War. The ROK national leadership was 
successful in obtaining a security commitment from the United States after 
the Korean War (ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty), but American support 
for the continued existence of the South Korean Air Force was sporadic and 
extemporaneous, primarily because of the emphasis placed on the ROK 
Army in the Agreed Minute. 
Throughout the entire period covered by this study, it is obvious that 
the policy limitations of the American government on the South Korean Air 
Force derived partly from America's distrust in the South Korean 
government (Rhcc's March-North for-Untf cation). The imbalance of the 
South Korean military establishment permitted by American policy of 
manpower-oriented ROK forces resulted in the overgrowth of the 1(0K 
Army (20 divisions and 661,000 men - over three percent of the total Korean 
population and over ninety percent of the total Korean military forces), 
to the neglect of the ROK Air Force (one single fighter wing and 16,500 
airmen). The philosophy to use the huge local (Korean) infantry troops to 
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contain communist expansion in the For East could have been relatively less 
costly to the United States in regard to dollars and American casualties (New 
Look), and strategically it would also be easier for the United States 
government to maintain political and military leverage over the ROK as long 
as the US could continue to manipulate logistic support for the ROK Army 
and restrain the growth of the ROK Air Force. Consequently, America's 
preponderant emphasis on ROK ground troops, together with the ROK 
government's insufficient attention to the need for an indigenous air 
capability, promised a tenuous existence for the ROK Air Force for years 
during and after the war. This in turn led to a ROK defence posture that was 
overly dependent on US air support. 
In retrospect, it would have been worth the ROK's leaders (political 
and air) trying to double their efforts to appeal to their American 
counterparts to allow a further expansion of the South Korean Air Force by 
investing in ROKAFs non-offensive systems, [e. g., airlift, air search and 
rescue (SAR), command, control, communication and intelligence, aircraft 
control and warning (AC&W), and training and education institutions] 
without posing a threat to North Korea and Japan. These non-offensive 
systems would be indispcnsiblc to strengthen the ROKAFs infrastructure. 
To build self defence capability, the internal supporting structure would have 
been equally as important as tactical aircraft, especially in terms of the time 
required to establish such systems. 
Despite many challenges, the ROK Air Force continued its struggle 
not only to survive, but also to establish a firm foundation for the ultimate 
responsibility to defend its territorial air space on its own. The ROKAF 
learned to function as a joint military partner, on an international scale, with 
a superpower. The South Korean Air Force succeeded in living up to its 
name, as well as keeping its prestige, through the assiduous etrorts of its 
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leaders and airmen under the support of the United States Air Force, albeit 
'tethered' to the restraints, limitations and control exercised by the United 
States government. 8 Nevertheless, the American investment of their 
expertise, money and equipment in the development of South Korea's Air 
Force was well rewarded by the successful creation of an air arm of its client 
ally. This air arm would eventually become an important asset of not only 
South Korea's own defence, but also America's regional security in Northeast 
Asia. 
8 The word 'tethered' in the title of this study (TeAereji-Wit n) Implies tha4 like a tethered bird, 
the South Korean Air Force was confined to a Spacilic area of air operations within the f amewoa k 
of American policy, and never allowed to soar to its till potential. (The bird 'Falcon' refers to the 
ROKAF, which is currently operating F-16 fighter aircraft, whose nicknune is ýFYxhrrºrý/'ýlýt, re ) 
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APPENDICES" 
* Note: The first digit of the Appendix number identifies the most relevant chapter. 
Appendix 3-1: Letter, from Major General Kim Chung-Yul to 
Lt. General F. F. Everest, 1S September 1952.11* 
I listory of 5th Air Force. I July 1952 - 31 Docanbcr 1952. ' ms.. Val. 3, 
Appendix 99. K730,01 Jul-Dec 1952, v. 3. AFI IFA. 
HEADQUARTERS 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE 
Tacgu, Korca 
18 Scptcmbcr 1952 
SUBJECT: Strength of the ROK Air Force for the ROK Fiscal Year 1952 
TO: Commanding Gcncral 
Fifth Air Forcc 
APO 970 
The following information is given to justify the increase in personnel 
authorized by the ROK Government. 
1. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, the ROK Government has 
been doing its best in strengthening its defensive power, ten (10) divisions of 
ground forces are now being maintained, and the naval strength also has 
considerably been increased. 
2. Regarding airmen's role in the present war as of great importance, 
and tying to make up for the Air Force's disparity in strength as against the Army 
and Navy, it has been attempting to expand the Air Force by fostering the 
necessary number of airmen whose training requires such long time from two to 
four years. 
3. On 1 April 1951 (the beginning year of the ROK FY 1951) we had 
only 3,238 personnel and twenty-five (25) planes (11 F-S I's, 6 T-6's, 7 L-types, I 
C-47). In the light of successful and normal growth, however, the Government 
authorized 5,800 personnel as the full strength for the ROK FY 1951 (1 April 1951 
to 31 March 1952). With this authorization we could enhance our combat 
capability and train the required number of specialists. At the end of FY 1931, we 
had 5,552 personnel and fitly-two (52) planes: 13 F-S 1's, 11 T-b's, 27 L. typcs, I C- 
47. 
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4. As for the ROK FY 1952 (1 April 1952 to 31 March 1953) the 
Government's view was that we should make the first budget estimates, to begin 
with on the basis of the preceding ycaes strength and that supplementary budgets 
should be presented for additional estimates with the increase of strength. In 
accordance with this policy we obtained the National Assembly's approval of 
37,644,956,800 Won (approximately $6,000,000) for 5.800 personnel as the first 
budget. 
5. The ROK Air Force, through USAFs sincere guidance and support, 
and by its own efforts, has now come to be fully qualified as a promising one with 
its increased combat capability and the intensified specialists training in various 
fields. It is believed that USAF has come to admit a convincing possibility of 
ROKAFs progress. General Twining , Acting Chief of Statt. USAF has 
encouraged us in his letter that he is thinking of support for ROKAFs expansion. 
We know the recent increase of our fighter strength from twenty (20) to forty (40) 
is one of the living testimonies recognizing our hopeful future. 
6. In consideration of the above capability for expansion and to 
increase the effectiveness of our Air Force, we have mapped out a plan to have a 
complete fighter wing, and one training wing together %vith the necessary 
command and supporting elements. 
7. Thus it is necessary to increase our strength to meet the requirement 
for the above plan and to provide necessary personnel to such direct supporting 
units for the Fifth Air Force as the Special Activity Unit. It was also deemed 
advisable to training more specialist in view of the fact that their training requires 
comparatively long time. 
8. As a result of careful study considering various phases of our ability 
we have established a concrete program that wie should have the strength of 11,500 
at the end of FY 1952. This program was approved in the 30th State Council of 
out Government of 12 May 1952.17,200,000,000 Won (approximately 
$2,900,000) the expenditure for the additional 5,750 personnel, has already been 
sanctioned in the Ministry of National Defense, and by the end of October 1952, 
the whole budget is to be approved in the National Assembly. 
9. Under the Government's approval we have increased the number of 
ROKAFs personnel from 5,800 to 7,346 since May up to 31 August 1952, and the 
distribution of personnel is as it shown in the enclosure No. 1. By the end of FY 
1952,4,200 more personnel will be augmented for the reasons described in the 
enclosure No. 2. 
10. Not all of these additional personnel will have finished their regular 
training and been assigned by the end of FY 1952, but a number of them will 
continue to be in training. it may appear unnecessary to train so many at the 
present time, but we cannot be too early in training Air Force specialists %hose 
education takes so much time. 
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11. The above explanation is on the strength of 11,550 %hich we hope 
to reach by the end of FY 1952. This number is of paramount importance for the 
Korean Air Force to make a sound development toward the end of discharging its 
assigned duties effectively in defending the Korean sky in cooperation with the UN 
Air Forces. 
12. We would like you to have a full understanding of our plan and to 
uphold the hand of the ROKAF. The Government's budget of 17,200,000,000 Won 
(Enclosure No. 3) will pay most expenditures needed yet %hat with the difficulty 
of procurement at home and with the shortage of foreign exchange. some common 
items such as indicated in the Enclosure No. 4 arc expected through the USAF aid 
channels. 
13. It would be greatly appreciated if you will kindly recommend the 
above plan of augmentation to your higher headquarters for their favorable 
consideration. 
KIM C} SUNG YUL 
Major Gcncral, ROKAF 
Chicf of Staff 
4 Encl.: ' 
1. Distribution of Strength as of 31 August 1952 
2. Augmentation Plan for FY 1952 
3. Specification of Additional Budget for FY 1952 
4. Additional Requirement of Common items 
' Neither four enclosures nor General Kim's letter of 10 Match 1952 to the Commanding General 
of 5th Air Force (General Everest) on'T e Three Year Ilan' was available in'SAF IfiItory. I July - 
31 December 1952. ' m. r., vol. 3. pp. 4146. K"730.01, Jul-Doc 1932, v. 3. AFI IRA. 
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Appendix 3-2: Letter from l. t. General F. F. Everest to Major 
General Kim Chung. Yul, 21 May 1952* 
'1 [istory of 5th Air Force, Ih uiary 1952 - 30 June 1952, ' ms., Vol, 2, 
Appendix 102. K730.01 Jan-Jun 1952, v, 2. AFIIRA. 
HEADQUARTERS 
FIFTH AIR FORCE 
APO 970 
Major General Kim Chung Yul 21 May 1952 
Chief of Staff 
Republic of Korea Air Force 
Taegu, Korea 
Dear General Kim: 
I have read with great interest your Three Year Plan= for the Republic of 
Korea Air Force and am gratified to see your attention to the details of the 
necessary support units and non-tactical units which round out a well developed 
fighting force. 
Your ultimate goal, as far as the tactical units are concerned, is highly 
desirable. To build such an organization is not an easy task particularly 'hen you 
arc so dependent upon resources of other nations. As you know. I have 
recommended to Headquarters, USAF the initial establishment or n ROK Air Force 
organization of one fighter wing. one training %king, a transport squadron and the 
necessary command and support elements. This does not mean, however, that the 
larger organization proposed by you is not desirable. The question is solely one of 
cost. 
Before making further comment on the plan that you have developed, permit 
me to express my opinions on the mission of the ROK Air Force. While the threat 
of Soviet conspired aggression persists throughout the world, your primary 
objective will be to maintain a strategic defense of the Republic of Korea. In order 
to execute this mission, you must retain a capability of conducting an active 
defense against hostile air attack, while at the same time providing support to 
friendly ground forces when they are engaged. 
2 Kim's letter of the Three Year Plan is not available. USAF hiuoriW records indicaod the 
reference only: 'Reference to 'The Three Year Plan, ' prepared by Major General Kim Chung Yul, 
GS, ROK Air Force. 10 Mar 1952, printed by the AO, l 1q. ROKAF. ' 'SAF l lis ory. I )uwary 1952 
- 30 June 1952; ms., vol. Z pp. 367-368. K-730.01, ! an-Jun 1932, v. 2. All IRAI IRA. 
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In order to properly execute such a mission. emphasis must be placed on the 
attainment of a strong diversified fighter force together with an adequate aircraft 
control and warning system. To this end your program is well conceived. I am, 
however, concerned over the omission of photo reconnaissance, although I note 
that you include such a capability in your air tactical control group. The type of 
aircraft shown under the air tactical control group would preclude the utilization of 
such aircraft as photo reconnaissance aircraft for short range operations behind 
enemy front lines or deep penetration into enemy concentrations of air power. The 
matter of utilizing T-6 aircraft would be completely unsatisfactory for any combat 
function under average conditions. In the event that, in the later stages of 
development, a tactical air control group is deemed essential. a more suitable type 
of aircraft must be provided. Ym of course, realize that we are able to use the T- 
6's in their role of airborne controller purely because we enjoys supremacy of the 
air. 
In my opinion, there is no immediate requirement for a Tactical Command 
headquarters or for the Air or Ground Tactical Control Group shown in the plan. 
The function of reconnaissance would be more appropriately included in a photo 
reconnaissance squadron and the function of airborne controller for close support 
can similarly be included in that squadron, when required. The function of 
aircraft control and warning can be administered by a similar aircraft control and 
warning group, but the operation of that system, together with your righter force, 
could be conducted directly from within the Air Force Headquarters. It may be 
necessary in this connection to establish within the Operations Division a Control 
Center. Similarly, I believe that your navigational aids for tactical or non-tactical 
aircraft should be provided by your Communications Wing, while maintaining the 
operational control of that system and the control of air traffic directly through 
your control Center. 
My only other comment at this time is that the strength of the proposed ROK 
Air Force is too large in manpower for the number of tactical units which are 
planned and the organizational structure appears somewhat too heavy. 
One of the primary objectives of an Air Advisory Group in Korea would be 
to study these problems of organization and equipment and make 
recommendations based on the abundant experience of the USAF in such matters. 
My stall is available to you for further discussion of these problems and I should 
be very happy to discuss them personally at the first opportunity. 
F. F. Evcrcst 
Licutcnant General, USAF 
Commanding 
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Appendix 5-1: Appendix B: Republic of Korea Force Levels for 
Fiscal Year 1955 and United States Support Thereof. Agrccd 
Minute of Understanding Between the Governments of the United States and 
the Republic of Korea Based on the Conferences Iicid Between President 
Eisenhower and President Rhcc and Their Advisers in Washington. July 27- 
30,1954, and Subsequent Discussions Between Representatives of the Two 
Governments, 
1. The United States will assist in supporting the following maximum 




Air Force 16,500 
Adjustments in numbers will be acceptable to the United States as long as the 
720,000 total is not exceeded. 
2. Increase in pay rate from average of 6,900 hA-jn per man to an average annual 
rate not to exceed 20,000 hwan per man. 4 Food allowance increase from the 
current average annual rate of 24,000 to 38,000 hwan per man is authorized. This 
allowance will be supplemented during FY 55 by United States direct ration 
assistance. 
3. ROK will undertake formation of reserve divisions. As training load diminishes 
and trained reserve strengths arc attained, total number of active military personnel 
will be adjusted accordingly. Training will be accelerated to 20,000 men per 
month. 
4. The United States will supply reserve divisions with necessary equipment. 
5. The United States will assist in training the organized reserves. 
6. Functions which are common to more than one service will be operated under a 
combined type of organization which will have the responsibility of servicing all of 
the military forces. 
3 For the full text and Appendix A ('Measures for an E ectivc Economic Program') of the Agreed 
Minute, see Department of Siare Ilullerln 31: 805 (November 19,1954), pp. 810411. For the Ralf 
text and appendices, see 'SAF I listory, I July 1954 - 31 December 1954; apt,, vol. 3, Appendix 60, 
K-730.01, Jul-Doc 1954, v. 3. AF11RA; Kim, Kinn Chang }k1 Jllenoxr, pp. 447.455. For the final 
text with Appendices A. D, and C of Draft Minute. context of vºhich was discussed between ROK 
and US officials on 14 September 1954, see /-AUS I952-54, V. IS. pt 2, pp. 1876.1882. 
4 Ilwan was the currency unit prior to «hre. The value of 100 hwan became I won. 
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7. The Korean navy will continue to build toward a goal of 79 vessels. The ships 
will be supplied by loan from United States sources for a period not to exceed five 
years. 
8. The United States will make available jet fighters and training aircraft to the 
Korean Air Force in such quantities and at such times as the Korean pilots have 
demonstrated a capability to utilize this equipment properly, Determination of this 
capability will be made by the CINCUNC. The United States will plan to make 
available ten T-33 jet type trainers, and subsequently as need is demonstrated, 30 
F-86F and 16 C-46 aircraft during 1955, and remainder of one Jet Fighter Wing (45 
additional F-86Fs for attrition) by the end of Fiscal Year 1956. 
9. All new military construction projects not under construction will be deferred 
to Fiscal Year 1956 for further review. Minimum facilities for an arsenal and the 
reworking of ammunition and those construction projects specifically approved by 
CINCUNC will be funded for construction in Fiscal Year 1955. 
10. The Republic of Korea military budget will be jointly reviewed and analyzed 
by the Republic of Korea and CINCUNC in order to assure that the military 
program will produce the most effective forces at minimum cost. The Republic of 
Korea will undertake to revise the present budget of the Ministry of National 
Defense for Fiscal Year 1955 in order to effect adjustments in the budget 
conforming to the principles set forth above, to eliminate from the budget such 
items as arc found to have been budgeted in excess or in conflict with austerity 
standards, and to eliminate from the budget such items as will be replaced by the 
items the United States will supply the Republic of Korea Armed Forces under 
programs of military assistance. The implementation of the aid program planned 
by the United States contemplates that approximately 35 billion hwan will be 
made available by the Republic of Korea for the military program in Fiscal Year 
1955. 
11. The Republic of Korea will cooperate with CINCUNC by implementing 
recommendations designed to increase the c(T'cctiveness of the Republic of Korea 
Armed Forces and effect economies therein. 
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Appendix 6-1: The Roster of ROKAF Jet Pilot Trainees' 
" in dw lhutoJ Stowe 00 in K v« 
Ist Class: 9 September 1954 - 23 March 1955 " 
Colonel Kim Sung-Yong 
Lt. Colonel Oh Choon-Mok 
Lt. Colonel Lee Kang-t lwa 
Lt. Colonel Ok Man-I lo 
Lt. Colonel Yoon Eung-YuI 
Lt. Colonel Kim Too-Man 
Lt. Colonel Chon Bong-l fee 
Major Sohn Jac-Kwon 
2nd Class: 27 Scptcmber 1954 -6 April 1955" 
Lt. Coloncl Park Chac-No 
Captain Lim Sang-Sup 
Captain Kim Young-Min 
Captain Choi Young-Chang 
Captain Chang Kyong-Soon 
Major Lee Yang-Myong 
Captain Ma Jong-In 
Captain tcc Kac-Chul 
Captain Paik Man-Kil 
Captain Kim Young-Ii-an 
3rd Class: 23 October 1954 - 23 April 1955" 
Lt. Colonel Lee Kee-11yup 
Captain Lee HIo-Young 
Captain Lim Chong-Doo 
Captain Min Wook-Tong 
Captain Lee flcc-Kcun 
Major Park Wan-Kyoo 
Captain Choi Soon-Sun 
Captain Song Jac-Bong 
Captain Lcc Chan-Kwon 
Captain Lcc Kyo-Ahn 
Class 55-1: 9 Dcccmbcr 1954.15 Fcbruary 1995"" 
Lt. Colonels Kim Kcum"Sung. Chang Sung-Tae 
Majors Kwon Joong-llwa, Park Yong-Man, Koo Sun4in, Pac Sang-1 lo. 
Yoo Chi-Kon, Lim Soon-I lyok, Sohn I Icung-loon. Park Jung. 
Ilyun 
Class 55-2: 15 January- 1 April 1955"" 
Captains Ilyun Chang-Kwon, Park Hi-Kon, Wang Hyun-Shik, Hwang 
Jung-Duk, Choi Sung-Dal, Chun i ºyung-11. Choi Kyu-Soon, 
Kwon Chang-Shik, Kim Pit-Jung. Lee Jac-Kook. 
s ROKAF, Gcwtg-Goan Sa Jae 2 Jip (The History f i)w Rq v Mic Of Korea A1r 1"'cWrv 1 iaL2), 27 
July 1953 - 311)ecembrr 1957 (Seoul, K ea: ROKAF. 1964), pp. 91.93, 
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Appendix 7-1: Letter from President Syngman Rhee to General 




General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 
GIIQ, FEC, Tokyo 
Dcar Gcncral MacArthur, 
In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of 
the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land. sea and air, of the United 
Nations, fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational 
command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United 
Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea 
and air Forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of 
the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you 
personally or by such military commander or commanders to Nhom you may 
delegate the exercise of this authroity within Korea or in adjacent seas. 
The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the 
Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the 
overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and 
distinguished a soldier who also in his person possesses the delegated military 
authority of all the United Nations who have joined together to resist this infamous 
communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land. 
With continued highest and warmest feelings of personal regard. 
Sincerely yours. 
/s/ SYNGMAN RI ICE 
6 Ltr Rhee to MacArthur. Transfer of Operational Control of the Republic of Korea Armed Form 
to the United Nations Command, ' dtd 14 July 1930. Serial No. J-741.226.741.14 Jo-624-Goon. 
ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic records. ROK Ministry of Foreign Afairs. (k-A u 
Moon-So Cho1 AfoI-Rok (A /hr o/Uiplunwulc Utxwmen: s) (Seoul. Korea: ROK GPO, 1991). p. 99; 
Seoul Daily, Ju-11rn MI-Goon 30-Ayon. 1945.1978 (JO )Itears of US Fines in Kira. 1945.1978) 
(Seoul, Korea: hang-Rim Sa. 1979), pp. 168-170. Sec also James P. Finley. Z)s' 14; AAhaay 
t rlxrlenre In Kvrca: 1871-19.92: In the I'angu vJ of ROA41S Retwia s (Seoul, Korea: Command 
I listorians Offlcell leadquarters US Forces in Korea, 1983). p. 39, 
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Appendix 7-2: A Staff Study by the Far East Command to Transfer 
Control of ROK Armed Forces to the ROK 
Government* 
* 7listory of Sth Air force, I January 1935.30 July 19SS; res.. 
Appendix 185. K730.01 Jan-Jun 1933. AF)IRA. 
I Icadquartcrs 
Far East Command 
APO 500 
AOJ 091.711 CJ"P 19 April 1955 
SUBJECT: Transfer of Control of ROK Aimed Forces to the ROK 
Govcmmcnt (C) 
TO: Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East 
and Eighth United States Army, APO 343 
Commander Naval Forces, Far East, c /d FF'O San Francisco, 
California 
Commander, Far East Air Forces, APO 92S 
1. The inclosed study was prepared by the staff of this I lcadquarters as an 
initial step in the development or a United Nations Command position on the 
above subject. It is requested that you review this report and submit your 
comments on the study in general and on the specific aspects ofthe problem which 
are directly related to the ROK military service with which you arc primarily 
concerned. Your views on the following points are particularly desired: 
a. Iran arrangement is concluded for the cxcrcise of UNC operational 
control through the respective ROK Chiefs of Stdf, what is the minimum degree 
of control which CINCUNC must retain? 
b. If in the future US/UN forccs in Korea continue to be reduced, at 
what point will the exercise of operational control of ROK forces under the present 
arrangement become no longer practicable? 
2. To minimize speculation and risk of exposure to ROK personnel, it is 
directed that all copies of this letter and the inclosed study which may be 
distributed to commands in Korea be handled on a "need to know" basis. 
3. It is requested that your comments be forwarded prior to 20 June 195$. 
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4. This letter may be dowmgradcd to CONFIDENTIAL upon separation 
from enclosures of a higher classification. 
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR: 
isigncd' 
EUGENE L. ANDERSON 
I st Lt 




JMAG-K (PROV) APO 301 
J-2, J-4, Compt 
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HEADQUARTERS 
FAR EAST COMMAND 
J3 Division 
APO 500 
17 April 1955 
SUBJECT: Return of Control of ROK Armed Forces to the ROK Government 
(C) 
1. PROBLEM. To review the problem of returning operational control of ROK 
Armed Forces to the ROK Government and to determine the point in time and/or 
in the course of events when the transfer of control would be desirable. 
2. ASSUMPTION. 
a. UNC control of ROK forccs cannot continuo indcfinitcly. 
b. ROK operational control of US of UN forces is unacccp(able. 
c. Basic US/UN policies and objectives with respect to Korea will remain 
unchanged in principle for the next two calendar years. 
d. The Armistice Agreement will remain in cfcct, although it may be 
amended in part. 
c. MDAP will assume funding responsibility for the ROK Military Assistance 
Program as of 1 July 1955, and a conventional MSP arrangement will eventually 
be established in Korea. 
f. A US Military Advisory Group will be retained in Korea throughout the 
foreseeable future. 
3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. 
a. In July 1950, ROK President Rhec assigned command authority over all 
land, sea and Air Forces of the ROK to the Supreme Commander. United Nations 
Forces, "during the period of the continuation of the present sate of hostilities. " 
(AMEMI Pusan msg DTO 1405452, July 1950). 
b. In the Dullcs-Rhcc agreement of 8 August 1953, President Rhec renewed 
his commitment for UNC control of ROK forces "until the Mutual Defense Treaty 
can be expected to come into force and effect. " This commitment expired in 
March 1954, when ratification of the treaty was completed, although the 
instruments of ratification were not exchanged until 18 November 1954. 
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c. President Rhee last renewed his commitment for UNC control of ROK 
forces, on a condition basis, in the US-ROK Minute of 17 November 1954. 
d. The JCS have stated that in the absence of satisfactory US-ROK command 
arrangements, US forces should be withdrawn from Korea (JCS 2147/103). 
e. Since the US-ROK Minute was signed, several ROK officials have 
evidenced a desire for a change in the present arrangement for UNC control of 
ROK forces. 
f. As of I July 1955. US/UN forces in Korea will have been reduced to a 
residual corps of two US divisions and a small UN contingent with an Army 
(Forward) }lcadquartcrs, and one US fighter bomber %sing. CINCFC has 
recommended a further reduction to one US RCT with necessary supporting 
troops. (C-71121) UN Governments concerned have indicated that further 
reductions in their forces will be made in the near future. 
g. Current US policy contemplates that a US Military Advisory Group will 
remain in Korea throughout the foreseeable future (JCS 2147/103). 
h. The Korean Armistice Agreement is binding upon all armed forces in Korea 
which were under the control of the respective commanders at the time they signed 
the truce. During negotiation of the Armistice, CINCUNC, on authority from 
Washington, assured the Communists that ROK forces were a part of the UNC, 
that they would comply with the Armistice for the duration of its effectiveness, and 
that there is no time limit upon the Armistice except as contained in paragraph 62 
thereof (IINU 7-1,19 July 1953, and related messages). 
i. The ROK agreement to accept an armistice, upon which CINCUNCs 
assurances were based, did not refer to UNC control of ROK forces and committed 
the ROK to compliance with the armistice only until the political conference had 
been in session for 90 days. (Letter - Rhee to Robertson, 9 July 1953; Robertson 
Aide Memoir, 3 July 1953). 
4. DISCUSSION. 
a. In the light of the above assumptions and statements of fact, the problem can 
be considered more readily if factored into the following questions: 
(1) In the balance, would the implementation of US policies and the pursuit 
of US objectives with respect to Korea be favorably or adversely affected by 
voluntary return of control of ROK forces to the ROK Government? 
(2) Is voluntary relinquishment of UNC control conclusively prohibited by 
any agreement or commitment? 
(3) If control is voluntarily returned to the ROK Government, should the 
transfer be effected by a single action or by progressive stages; or should a 
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different command arrangement be substituted for unilateral control by either the 
ROK or the UNC. 
(4) At what point in time or in connection with hat event mould return of 
control to the ROK Government be most advantageous to the UNC? 
The answer to these questions can best be determined by consideration of the 
effect of the transfer r control on existing and projected policies, objectives. 
commitments and programs. 
b. Background: In July 1950, shortly after the entry of the UNC into the 
Korean conflict, President Rhee assigned command authority over ROK forces to 
CINCUNC "during the period of the continuation of the present state of 
hostilities. " The obvious latitude for differing interpretations of this time limit his 
been of concern to the US and the UNC forces has therefore become an clement of 
US policy (NSC 5514) and was included in the US"ROK Agreed Minute, which 
was signed by both governments on 17 November 1954, as follows: 
"lt is the intention and policy of the Republic of Korea to.. . 
Retain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control 
of the United Nations Command chile that Command has 
responsibilities for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless 
after consultation it is agreed that our mutual and individual 
interest would best be served by a change; " 
Since the Minute was signed, several ROK officials have indicated 
a desire to initiate consultations regarding a "change" and in some cases have 
publicly claimed that such consultations were in progress. To date ROK 
suggestions have included outright and complete transfer of control; assignment of 
a ROK officer as Deputy CINCUNC; the establishment of the First ROK Army and 
the US Eighth Army as co-equal forces under CINCUNC; and an arrangement 
whereby CINCUNC would exercise his command control through the ROK Chiefs 
of Staff. During a conference in Korea on 23 November 1954, CINCUNC and CO 
AFFE/EIGIfFI! ARMY advised ROK officials that direct UNC command control 
of ROK forces would be required in combat and that the present command 
arrangement should not be changed while CINCUNC has responsibilities for the 
defense of Korea. In connection with a recommendation for further reductions in 
US forces in Korea, however, Generals I full and Taylor have subsequently advised 
DA (but not the ROK) that a definite date should be set for the return of control of 
ROK forces to the ROK should be set and have estimated that the effectiveness of 
the ROK forces should still continue to increase since it is conditioned to a large 
degree by the advisory group (sec C"71121, Part If. paragraph 6). It is probable 
that the question of a change in the existing arrangement for control of ROK forces 
cannot be avoided indefinitely without risk of the issue developing into another 
major source of US-ROK friction. 
c. The Armistice Agreements. The Armistice Agreement is binding upon all 
forces in Korea which were under the control of CINCUNC at the time the 
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Agreement was signed. During negotiation of the Agreement, CINCUNC assured 
the Communists that ROK forces were under his control and would abide by the 
terms of the Armistice. Legally, therefore. transfer of control of ROK forces to the 
ROK Government could be interpreted to be a violation of the Armistice 
Agreement so long as the present agreement remains in effect. Unless the ROK 
Government violated the Agreement by some concrete action after assuming 
control of their forces, the transfer of control probably could be established as a 
technical violation only. For this reason, ifcontrol of ROIL forces is to be 
transferred, it is desirable that NNSC problem be resolved before the transfer is 
effected. Some additional considerations with respect to this problem merit 
attention: 
(1) The ROK agreement upon which CINCUNCs assurances regarding 
UNC control of ROK forces were based committed the ROK to comply with the 
Armistice only until the Political Confercnce provided for in the Armistice 
Agreement had been in session for 90 days. This "political conference" was 
conducted as a part of the Geneva Conference which convened on 26 April 1954. 
The Korean phase terminated without result on 15 June 1954. Therefore, the ROK 
commitment expired not later than 24 July 1954 (26 April plus 90 days). Tenuous 
though the argument is, it could be contended that CINCUNCs assurances to the 
Communists expired with the termination of the Korean phase of the Geneva 
Conference. 
(2) Coincident with assumption of control of its forces, the ROK 
Government could agree formally to comply with the Armistice Agreement insofar 
as it relates to their forces. Such an agreement would not relieve the UNC of its 
responsibilities, however, unless it took the form of an amendment of the 
Armistice Agreement to include the ROK as a party, or the form or a separate 
Armistice Agreement between the ROK and the Communists. The probability is 
neglibilble that the ROK Government would enter into any such agreement. ROK 
assurances embodied in the Minute and in the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty arc 
considered the maximum obtainable and an attempt to make the transfer of control 
of ROK forces contingent upon a more firm agreement probably would not 
prosper. An effort in this direction could be made, however, to emphasize the 
moral responsibilities which accompany control of ROK forces. 
(3) If complete control of ROK forces is transfcrrcd to the ROK 
Government, the Military Armistice Commission should be notified of the action. 
d. Unilateral ROK Resumption of hostilities. Transfer ofcontrol of ROK 
forces to the ROK Government would increase to some degree the capability of 
that Government to plan and unilaterally to initiate a resumption of ROK forces is 
high, due to the presence of MAG personnel present with KOREAN units. The 
likelihood of unilateral action to resume hostilities is slight at the present time, but 
the possibility of a ROK engineered incident on a small scale to provoke the 
Communists into a resumption of hostilities is a definite possibility that will 
increase as the ROK forces increase in efts iciency and logistic support capability. 
In the final analysis, the real deterrent to initiation of unilateral action by the ROK 
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is not UNC control of ROK forces, but the announced US intention to discontinue 
military assistance and to deny air, naval, and ground support if the ROK 
undertakes such an adventure. It is not likely that a ROK offensive could be 
sustained, even for the period for which combat reserves of supplies are available 
in Korea, without US assistance in logistics operations. Further, there is evidence 
that Rhcc and his military leaders realize that no ROK offensive could succeed 
without US combat support. Possibility exists that the ROK can initiate a 
resumption of hostilities in coordination with events ekes'here in the Far Cast or 
under other conditions which could require reconsideration of US intentions 
regarding participation and or support, but this is another problem. The fact 
remains that Rhce can order his forces to resume hostilities s hcther or not they are 
under UNC control at the time. If Rhee issues such a directive with sufficient 
firmness, the probability of his military leaders executing the order will be the 
same in either case. 
There have been no indications to date that the ROK desire for a 
change in the UNC-ROK command arrangement is related to plans for unilateral 
action. 
DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ROK ARMED FORCES 
c. ROK Army. If supported logistically by the US, the ROKA could at present 
resist attack by any nation other than a major power (JSC 2099/459, page 3529). 
It is estimated that the ROKA combat forces are combat ready and, except in the 
field of planning and logistics support operations, arc operationally self sufficient. 
Several units of the ROKA combat forces are staellitcd upon US units or are 
integrated with US units for training, however, and these arrangements must be 
continued until the ROKA units concerned have been trained and equipped. 
Recently organized ROKA service and support forces are not presently capable of 
supporting the combat forces in either peacetime or wartime, but improvement of 
their capabilities is being accomplished and it is estimated that they will be 
capable of supporting the ROKA combat forces under peacetime conditions by the 
end of calendar year 1955. They arc not expected to be fully trained and self- 
sui icicnt, however, before the end of FY 1956. ROKA combat forces and service 
units are both deficient in motor equipment and technical maintenance capability. 
The ROK Army school system is firmly established, and 17V. of all ROK 
personnel trained in US Service schools arc being used as instructors in ROK 
Army Service schools. Limited education among enlisted men and lack of 
experience in the Officer Corps arc the principal problems faced by the training 
command. The Chief, KMAO, estimates that the present effectiveness of the 
ROKA is due in large part to the fact that the US exercises command control and 
training supervision over the forces, and that without US command guidance at 
this critical stage in its development the ROKA would gradually lose its present 
effectiveness. (J4 D/F dated 8 April 1955; KMAG edition of Country Statement - 
Korea, dated 31 December 1954. ) 
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f. ROK Navy. Within the limits of operational capability established by 
equipment levels, availability of trained technical personnel, and outside logistic 
support, the ROKN is presently capable of peacetime operation independent of 
direct US command control. For some time past US command control ofthe 
ROKN has been exercised primarily through the ROKN Chicf of Naval Operations 
and results to date have been satisfactory. Additional ships required (and currently 
programmed) and necessary improvements in the operating characteristic of 
existing ships must be obtained from the US. Other problems of outside logistic 
support relate principally to the lack of responsive supply sources -a situation that 
has developed since the US Army has commenced transferring basic stocks to the 
ROK Army for administration. 
S. ROES Marine Corps. The ROKMC, less the Division, is capable of and is 
now functioning independent of US command control below the level of Corps 
Commandant. The Division will require extensive guidance from US advisors 
until it is fully organized and equipped, but is capable of operating in peacetime 
independent of US command control except as exercised through the 
Commandant. While on the MI3P, the Division probably % ll continue under the 
operational control of the Army organization responsible for defense of the MI3P. 
The ROKMC is critically deficient in motor transport, which severely limits its 
offensive capability, and faces the same problems with respect to logistic support 
from ROK Army sources as described for the ROKN. In view of the unique 
situation presented by the West Coast Islands now garrisoned by the ROKMC, it is 
probable that the ROKMC Island Defense Force must remain directly under UNC 
control until those islands are incorporated into the overall ROK defense system. 
h. ROK Air Force. The degree to which the ROKAF is satallitcd upon the US 
Fifth Air Force for training during the conversion to jet aircraft and the 
organization of AC&W and similar specialized units would appear to preclude 
early transfer of operational control of the ROKAF as a thole. Transfer of control 
of the various units of the ROKAF in accordance with a phased program, with the 
US continuing to exercise general control through the ROKAF Chief orstaff and 
with an effective USAF advisory group in place, probably could be considered 
after the first jet squadron becomes operational. Aside from the major conversion 
program which is in progress, the operational capability of the ROKAF, and hence 
its ability to operate independent of direct US command control, is influenced 
primarily by the same factors which affect the other services, i. e., lack of adequate 
equipment and of trained technical personnel. 
i. General. 
(1) The preceding estimates consider that most material requirements of the 
ROK Armed Forces must be supplied from US sources. 
(2) The principal deficiencies of the ROK forces arc: 
(a) Lack of an industrial mobilization bast. 
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(b) Lack of equipment and supplies (particularly motor transport) and an 
effective material maintenance capability; 
training. 
(c) Lack of trained enlisted men and experienced officers; and 
(d) Lack of personnel with sufficient education to absorb technical 
(3) To date more than 2300 ROM officers and a proportionate number of 
ROKN and ROKAF officers, in addition to large numbers ofenlisted instructors 
and technicians, have been trained in schools in the US. Seventeen percent of 
these ROKA personnel are on duty as instructors in ROKA Service schools and the 
remainder are being used to rill key command, administrative, and staff positions. 
In addition to their superior performance of duty, these individuals have provided 
important on-the-job training for subordinates. Most senior ROKA officers have 
received high level strategic and tactical training in US schools. Leadership ability 
of junior officers is considered to be below US standards, but field grade and 
senior officers are, in general, combat experienced and are considered to be 
qualified for a greater degree of independence of command than that which ROK 
military leaders now exercise. 
(4) Indications are that ROKA combat forces, the ROK combat forces, the 
ROK Navy, and the ROK Marine Corps arc presently capable ofoperating 
independent of direct US command control under peacetime conditions. ROKA 
service and support forces are not expected to possess this capability until I 
January 1956 at the earliest. Transfer of control of the ROKAF probably could 
begin when the first jet squadron achieves operational status, but could not be 
completed until the jet wing is entirely operational, and alter that AC&W units and 
other specialized units must remain closely associated with US Air Force units 
until their training is completed. 
(5) MDA Programs are normally operated in support of armed forces which 
are under the control of their national governments and it cannot logically be 
expected that transfer of control of ROK Armed Forces to the ROK Government 
would adversely affect the operation of an MDA Program in Korean when 
established. 
(6) Current planning contemplates that by 1957 US funds for support of ROK 
forces will be reduced to a degree which will require a phase-down of active ROK 
forces. Some advantage would accrue to the US if control of ROK forces had been 
transferred prior to that time and if the ROK Government were responsible for 
deciding upon, planning, and accomplishing the phase-down. Risk exists that the 
ROK Government would make unwise decisions, such as attempting maintain their 
forces at present levels by distributing US aid more thinly, but the ROK 
Government is capable of making and enforcing such decisions even if their forces 
remain under UNC operational control. 
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(7) US commanders have considered ROK troops under their command and, 
within permitted limits, have supported them accordingly. With the separation of 
units which would follow transfer of operational control, it would be difficult for 
this to continue. 
j. Summary. Assuming that US material, advisory and training support 
continues, whether or not the effectiveness of ROK forces would decrease and 
their rate of development decline if operational control were transferred to the 
ROK Government would appear to depend upon subjective rather than objective 
considerations. If the character and national pride ofresponsible ROK military 
leaders is adequate to the task, if the US has been successful in indoctrinating them 
in the art of military science as practiced by US Armed Forces, and if ROK respect 
for US military advisors remains as high as it is now considered to be. the sense of 
pride and responsibility which will derive from their independence should result in 
an increase in the basic capability of the ROK forces. The expected initial 
decrease in their effectiveness possibly could be controlled within acceptable 
limits through the efforts of the MAGs, and it would be more than offset if their 
capability to operate with less dependence upon US command guidance increased 
concurrently. Conversely, if the ROK military leaders do not possess the requisite 
character and have not been effectively indoctrinated, and if the ROK Government 
does not continue to respect the professional character of its military organization, 
risk exists that the of ectivcnss and itcgrity of the ROK Armed Forces would 
steadily deteriorate after transfer of operational control from the UNC. This risk, 
however, ust eventually be faced unless the US is to retain control of and 
responsibility for ROK forces indefinitely. The above remarks refer to peacetime 
opcraions. In the event of a resumption of hostilities requiring extensive air and 
naval operations and large-scale logistical support, unified control under US 
command of all forces engaged would be required. 
US/UNC OPERATIONS IN KOREA 
k. CINCUNC's responsibilities for the dcfcnsc of Korea constitute the principal 
consideration in this problem, and it does not appear that CINCUNC could 
completely relinquish control of ROK forces so long as he is charged with such 
responsibilities. It is possible, however, that existing command arrangements 
could be modified to make the ROK forces less dependent upon direct US control 
at the operating level. Modifications acceptable to the ROK could be expected to 
reduce or eliminate existing lines of command between UNC field commanders on 
the one hand and ROK commanders on the other, which in turn, could be expected 
to require new arrangements regarding responsibility for the MI3P and would 
require numerous agreements between the UNC and ROK commanders regarding 
KATUSA; US control of ROK units while attached to UNC forces for training; 
joint use of training areas and facilities; combined planning; employment of US. 
supported ROK forces for purposes not sanctioned by the US (e. g., enforcement of 
the Rhec line); tactical air control; defense of the West Coast islands; etc. 
Negotiation of these agreements probably would stimulate ROK demands for an 
administrative-type agreement to define the rights of UNC forces regarding access 
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to and utilization of facilities, entry and egress, etc. This could raise such 
objectionable questions as criminal jurisdiction, measures of security of UNC 
forces and property, and others. Transfer of control of the ROK forces would, 
however, relieve the UNC commander in Korea of a major burden of command 
responsibility and would increase the amount of time and attention %%hich he could 
devote exclusively to UNC forces. 
1. Transfer of control of the ROK forces would increase the need for a joint US 
military advisory group similar to the joint MAO presently planned. Although the 
present authority of US advisory groups to require ROK acceptance of advice and 
guidance is limited, transfer of control of ROK forces would remove this authority 
entirely. A part of this deficiency could be supplied through US control of MDA 
support. As much as possible of the remainder would have to be supplied by a 
well-considered US-ROK MDA Agreement. The MAG would continue to be able 
to observe and monitor the actions of the ROK forces and to deter them (probably 
as much as at present) from such objectionable practices as waste and misuse of 
aid furnished, etc. 
m. Discussion to this point has considered the continued existence of UNC 
forces in Korea approximately as presently constituted. If UNC forces were 
reduced to the level of one RCT with necessary supporting troops as has been 
recommended, or if the UNC were disestablished, it is doubtful that direct 
command control such as is presently exercised over ROK forces could be 
continued. 
POLITICAL AND RELATED CONSIDERATIONS 
n. Transfer of operational control of ROK Armed Forces to the ROK 
Government would increase, at least temporarily. the prestige of President Rhee 
and his administration at home and abroad and possibly would improve US-ROK 
relations. Conversely, however, it would also increase the potentiality of 
unrestricted use of ROK military forces for political purposes such as enforcement 
of the Rhce line; suppression of political opposition; and facilitation of political 
crisis by use of military forces for police purposes, possibly under martial law. 
o. The action would tend to diminish the concept of United Nations solidarity 
in the Far East with attendant retrogression of UN political influence in Far Cast 
countries. Further, the separation of the ROK forces would not divorce the UN 
nations concerned from responsibility for events in the ROIL. and they probably 
could not absolve themselves politically from responsibility for ROK actions so 
long as their forces remain in Korea. Those nations have already indicated the 
intention to reduce their forces now assigned to the UNC. The transfer of ROK 
forces from UNC command probable would be interpreted as a US estimate of 
reduced tension in Korea and would hasten the process of reducing the UNC to the 
status of a cadre. It is considered important that the continue reduction of the 
operating forces in the UNC not be permitted to Icad to the dissolution of the 
Command. The UNC was established and mandated to the US by the UN at a time 
when the UN Security Council was being boycotted by the USSR. It is not likely 
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that another such instrument of UN policy could be created in the face or a Soviet 
veto capability. 
5. CONCLUSIONS. 
a. CINCUNC's responsibilities for the defense of Korea and for 
implementation of the Armistice Agreement prohibit complete relinquishment of 
UNC control of ROK forces so long as these responsibilities are included in 
CINCUNC's mission. Transfer to the ROK Government of the maximum degree 
of control of ROK forces consistent with CINCUNCs requirements, however, 
would not adversely affect the implementation of US policies or the pursuit of US 
objectives with respect to Korea if initiated at an appropriate time (see paragraph 
Sc below). 
b. Legally, transfer of control of ROK forces to the ROK Government could be 
construed, with justification, as a violation of the Armistice Agreement as 
presently written. 
c. If a change in command relations becomes necessary or desirable while 
UNC forces in Korea are of the strength of the currently planned residual corps or 
greater, the UNC should seek an arrangement whereby CINCUNC would exercise 
command through the respective ROK Chiefs or staff. either directly or through 
the FEC component service commanders or through a Deputy CINCUNC. An 
arrangement of this type, which will serve to change procedures for the exercise of 
UNC control, must not serve, however. to reduce the degree of control cxcrcised 
by CINCUNC beyond the minimum point required for the accomplishment of his 
assigned mission. 
d. If UNC forces in Korea should be reduced in strength to a point where the 
exercise of operational control at the desired level, as is presently the case with 
respect to control of the ROK Army, becomes no longer practicable, a new 
command arrangement would be required regardless of other considerations. Even 
if all UNC forces were withdrawn from Korea, however, UNC control of ROK 
forces could not prudently be completely relinquished without a change in 
CINCUNC's assigned mission. 
c. With respect to timing: 
(1) If otherwise possible, the present command arrangement should not be 
radically altered until ROKA service and support units are capable of supporting 
ROKA combat forces under peacetime conditions and until, in the opinion of 
COMFEA, a reduction of Fifth Air Force control of ROKAF operations can safely 
be initiated. At present, it appears that the existing arrangement should be 
continued without significant modification until 1 January 1956 or later. 
(2) If ROK pressure for a change threatens the effectiveness of the present 
arrangement before existing major problems of logistics and training have been 
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resolved, agreement for a phase translation to a mutually acceptable alternate 
arrangement should be sought. 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is rccommcndcd that: 
a. This study be distributed to the component service commanders for review 
and comment before it is refined and a firm position developed. 
b. TAB B, draft letter of transmittal to component service commanders, be 
approved. 
Date for automatic downgrading cannot be predetermined at this time. Review for 
purpose of reclassification will be made on 19 July 1955. 
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military history, Air University (1985-1991). 29 July 1994,17-18 
October 1994,27 February, 31 March, 11 July, and 3/14 November 
1995. 
Colonel Phillip S. Mcilingcr, USAF, Ph. D., Commandant, School of 
Advanced Airpower Studies, USAF Air University. 25 April 1993, 
20 March 1994,15 August 1994,25 March and 6 November1995. 
Lt. General PAE Yang-11, ROKAF, Commander, ROKAF Air Operations 
Command (1 June 1994- Present). I May 1995. 
Major General PARK Yong-Jik, ROKAF, Rd., Air Attachd in 
Washington, DC (1976-79), and Director of Personnel, Ministry 
of National Defense (1985-87). 10 January and 30 September 1995. 
Dr. RI ZEE Sang-Woo, Instructor of Political Science of ROKAF Academy 
(1961-64) and Professor of Sogeng University (1972 - Present). 27 
April 1994,2 May and 29 September 1995. 
William Russell, Archivist, USAF 1listorical Research Agency. 15 March 
1993,5 August 1994,9 March, and 21 November 1995. 
Colonel SUI 1 Sang-Ito, ROKAF, Chief of ROK Air Force 1listory (June 
1993-February 1995). 16 September 1994. 
Mr. James Tong, I Iistorian, Directorate of Air Force Programs for the 
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JUSMAG-K (May 1992-Prescnt). 25 April 1995. 
Colonel YOUM Scong-1lwnan, ROKA, Chief of the Modem War Archival 
Collection, Ofiicc of ROK Army I listory, I IQ ROK Army. 28 
April 1995. 
TAPES: ROKAF historians and archivists conducted a series of personal 
interviews from 1983 to 1991 with former ROKAF Chiefs of Staff as listed 
below and recorded their interviewed materials in unedited tapes, that arc in 
the possession of the ROKAF O(Yicc of 1listory. The permission of the chief 
of the office is required to obtain access. ' 
3 Lt. Generals (Ret. ) Kim Chung-Yul (1949-32.1934-56). Kim Chang"Kyu (195W). Kim Shin 
(1960-62); Chang Sung-Whsn (1962-64); Park Won-Suk (1964.66); Chang Chi"Rysng (1968.70); 
and General (Ret. ) Kim Sung-Ryong (1970-72). 
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